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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the two main works that related in assessing the implications of (i) fiscal 
expansion (or contraction) and (ii) implementing a carbon tax on carbon-based fuels as well as 
the feed-in tariffs (subsidies to clean energy production) on Indonesia’s economy, within the 
context of static computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis.  
In the first study, we investigate the impacts of increasing the public consumptions on 
Indonesia’s main macroeconomic indicators and to their consequences by examining how 
different institutions and sectors in the economy are affected. Three scenarios are carried out 
under different financing options to budgeting neutral the additional public spending. The 
results suggest that the increase of government expenditure on goods under the adjusted 
government saving generates the highest improvement on Indonesia’s GDP but results in a rise 
of budget deficit. In contrast, under the budget-neutral scheme of either reducing the subsidy 
rates across activities or increasing the output tax rates would result in less improvement to the 
Indonesia’s GDP. This is because a subsidy cut (or higher output tax) immediately escalates 
the production costs and, thus, increases the prices of final goods purchased by the households. 
These changes result in a fall of their real consumption that eventually leads to a drop in 
aggregate demand. However, compared to the scenario of subsidy cut, a higher output tax has 
the most adverse effects on national income. The industry’s production costs are more 
pressurized by a higher output tax. which in turn, creates deindustrialization, lower 
employment, and thus reduces the national income and output. 
In the second study, we investigate the two key frameworks to reduce Indonesia’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: (i) implementing a carbon tax on fossil fuels; and (ii) 
promoting clean (renewable) energy production through the feed-in tariff (subsidy) scheme. In 
the carbon tax implementation, we assume that the government levies a tax of Rp. 100,000/ton 
CO2e with three possible revenue-recycling scenarios. In a first scenario, we allow the carbon 
tax to be recycled through adjustment of the labour (income) tax rate.  In a second scenario, 
we allow the government to increase their spending on goods proportionally to compensate the 
revenue raised from a carbon tax. And finally, in the third scenario, we assume that the 
additional revenue from carbon tax is kept to run a budget surplus (government saving adjusts). 
Whilst, in the feed-in tariff (FIT) scenario, we assume that the government sets a 13.14% 
subsidy rate to renewable generations (hydro and geothermal generation) where the support 
payments are distributed equally among electricity consumers through a higher electricity tax 
rate. Overall, the results suggested that the carbon tax, in the short run, reduces the national 
emissions but raises costs to the economy, resulting a fall in GDP. In terms of income 
distribution, the carbon tax tends to be progressive in both (first and second) scenarios of 
xiii 
 
revenue-recycling. However, when there is no compensating (recycling) mechanism (third 
scenario), the carbon tax tends to be regressive - the poorer households carry a higher share of 
the carbon tax burden. On the other hand, in case of the FIT scheme (15% subsidy to renewable 
generation), the impacts are negligible on national income and emissions. This is because the 
initial renewable shares in the electricity mix are small (a 11% share from hydro generation 
and a 5% share from geothermal generation); and these technology outputs are only utilized in 
the electricity industry. Therefore, we argue that the current Indonesia’s FIT regulation – about 
13.14% subsidy rate for renewable generation technologies – is ineffective to reduce the 
national emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the impacts of (i) fiscal expansion (or contraction), and (ii) 
implementing the carbon tax and incentive (subsidy) on renewable energy production 
(often called feed-in tariffs) on Indonesia’s economy. In the first research, three simulations 
are conducted in order to analyze the expansion of exogenous public spending using a 
standard CGE model that is calibrated to the official Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Indonesia in year 2008. These simulations are related to the sources of financing to cover 
the additional public expenditure on goods and services, i.e. borrowing, subsidy cuts, or 
higher tax rates. In the second research, we carry out a number of scenarios which are 
principally related to the ways of fiscal schemes in recycling the carbon tax revenues or 
financing the renewables’ subsidy injections. Here, we employ a hybrid CGE model – by 
incorporating the energy-factors combinations and electricity technological explicitness to 
the standard CGE – that is calibrated to a hypothetical Energy-SAM for Indonesia in year 
2008.  
 
Motivation 
Increasing the revenue on taxes or reducing expenditures on subsidies has become the main 
agenda of the Indonesian government to compensate the increase in public expenditure 
(The World Bank, 2007). Over recent years, the government expenditures have been 
sharply increased due to an increase of transfer payments for district development as well 
as a sharp rise in energy subsidies following a spike in international oil prices. On the other 
hand, the government deficit also tended to increase over the last decade which influenced 
by a contraction (and expansion) in government revenue (spending) caused by global 
recession. To maintain the fiscal sustainability, the Indonesian government has decided to 
reduce their budget allocation for fuel subsidies by half and to reallocate the budget for 
improving the public infrastructure in rural areas. Aside from subsidy cuts, Indonesia’s 
government has also been targeting to improve the tax revenues which could be possibly 
obtained through either improvement in taxation administration or higher tax rates. 
Motivated by these challenges, we opt to investigate the implications of increasing 
the public expenditures on goods and services under three different financing schemes 
either by (i) borrowing; (ii) reducing the subsidy rates across industries; or (iii) increasing 
the output tax rates. The findings of this research can provide empirical justifications for 
policy makers in choosing the sources of financing to cover the additional public 
expenditures on goods and services as these choices would influence the equilibrium output 
and national income.  
Furthermore, in the second research, we also put our interest to examine the 
implications of introducing a carbon tax on fossil fuels, and (ii) a subsidy to clean 
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(renewable) energy resources on Indonesia’s economy. This study is important since the 
government of Indonesia has ratified the United Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) and adopted the Kyoto Protocol in order to seriously mitigate the climate 
change (Ministry of Finance, 2008). Under the Copenhagen Accord, the Indonesia’s 
government has voluntarily made a commitment to reduce their national greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by 26% in 2020 where the greenhouse gas emission shares from fossil 
fuels utilization are targeted to be reduced by about 1% (NCCC, 2009). In the year 2000, 
Indonesia was among the largest GHG emitters countries. It has been widely recognized 
that the GHG emissions from fossil fuels combustion in Indonesia tend to increase in line 
to their GDP growth which would bring severe problems on population such as a rising sea 
level, extreme weather, prolonged droughts, and heavy flooding (Resosudarmo and 
Abdurohman, 2011; Lackner et al., 2012; and Baumert et al., 2005). 
Motivated by these climate change issues, we also carry out several simulations 
which are principally related to the revenue-recycling mechanisms of carbon taxation and 
financing schemes to cover the extra expenditures on renewable subsidies such that the 
fiscal balance can be maintained. In the study case of carbon tax introduction, we allow 
two possible revenue-recycling schemes, i.e. a reduction in income (labour) tax rates and 
an increase in public expenditure on commodities. In addition, we also assess the impact of 
carbon tax on Indonesia’s economy if no compensating mechanism is allowed. In other 
words, the carbon tax revenues are kept as government saving to run a budget surplus. In 
the case of implementing the renewable subsidies (feed-in tariffs), we also allow two 
possible financing schemes, i.e. the subsidies are either paid by electricity customers 
through a higher electricity tax rate or carbon tax. The findings of this research can also 
provide empirical justifications for policy makers in choosing the possibilities of (i) 
compensating the carbon tax; and (ii) financing the feed-in tariffs as these choices would 
influence the equilibrium output, national income, and households’ welfare and income 
distribution.    
 
Methodology 
The first assessment is based on the standard general equilibrium framework –which only 
features a conventional top-down system of equations to model the economy’s transaction 
flows such as the behavior of economic agents that relate to their income and consumption 
budget, the industry’s production structure, transfers among institutions’, investment and 
saving, and trade aggregations (transformations). In developing countries, CGE models 
have been commonly employed to examine the short and long-term effects of certain 
policies on national income, equilibrium outputs, and household income distribution. CGE 
models are used as tools to address the lack of time series database in econometric models, 
which is identified as a major issue for a standard economic analysis in the countries. This 
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model is calibrated to the official SAM dataset for Indonesia in year 2008 and other 
supporting data matrices.  
The second assessment is based on a hybrid general equilibrium framework –which 
incorporates the technological explicitness of bottom-up energy system models for the 
electricity sector (in addition to the conventional top-down models). The hybrid CGE 
model is an extended version of the standard CGE model used in the first assessment. The 
construction of a hybrid CGE model is essential since the targeting sectors in this 
assessment are those of energy specific. More specifically, a hybrid CGE model can enable 
us to identify the magnitudes of the carbon taxes (renewable subsidies) on energy supply-
demand and to reconcile divergent results between the bottom-up engineering and 
macroeconomic top-down perspectives. The core modifications in the hybrid model from 
standard CGE model are as follows: 
1) We separate the nested production structure between energy and non-energy producing 
industries by which we allow the substitution possibilities between energy and 
production factors as well as inter-fuels.  
2) In the refinery sector, we permit a single-to-multiple relationship between refinery 
industry output (and price) and its relevant commodity supply (and price).  
3) In the electricity sector, we explicitly include the generation technologies – i.e. fossil 
fuels generation, hydro generation, and geothermal generation – to allow switching 
possibilities among these technologies.    
4) We incorporate carbon emissions accounting and its taxation features.   
5) We add the households’ welfare and inequality measure. 
The hybrid CGE model is calibrated to the hypothetical Energy-SAM dataset for 
Indonesia in year 2008 including emission factors and population data. This hypothetical 
SAM is an extended version of the official SAM for Indonesia in the year 2008. The 
extensions are as follows: 
1) We disaggregate the specific energy accounts (both industries and commodities) from 
their aggregated account. 
2) We characterize the activity-commodity relationship for each energy type, i.e. a refinery 
sector is permitted to produce multiple types of petroleum products, and multiple types 
of generation technologies produce a homogenous electricity commodity. 
3) We disaggregate the natural resources factor from the capital account to represent the 
‘fixed factor’ resources input such as water debits to generate hydro turbines, and hot 
dry rock to generate geothermal-based electricity.   
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Organization of the Study 
The first chapter ‘Overview of Indonesian Economy’ presents Indonesia’s macroeconomic 
outlook related to economy’s growth, inflation, poverty, and employments; targets and 
challenges of fiscal policy in general terms; fiscal policies towards sustainable 
environment; and Indonesia’s energy outlook. This chapter is the fundamental background 
of initiating our research studies.   
The second chapter ‘Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)’ presents the principles and 
schematic frameworks of the SAM. The chapter also discusses the preliminary 
modification of the official SAM for Indonesia in year 2008 such that it is fitted to calibrate 
the standard CGE model. This modification is aimed to simplify the Indonesian SAM 
structure since some of accounts are too specific and are not utilized in the standard CGE 
model.   
The third chapter ‘The Standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model’ 
discusses definitions as well as the construction of the standard CGE model. This chapter 
also includes the closure choices to equalize the total number of equations and endogenous 
variables such that the equilibrium condition is obtainable. 
The fourth chapter ‘Simulation and Discussion Results of Standard CGE Model for 
Indonesia’ presents the background and motivation of our first study in examining the 
impact of exogenous fiscal policies on the Indonesian main macroeconomic indicators and 
the implications on different institutions and sectors in the economy. This chapter also 
discusses the fiscal policy scenarios using the standard CGE model developed in Chapter 
3 that is calibrated to the SAM database outlined in Chapter 2. Each scenario quantifies the 
implications of expanding the public spending on goods and services on Indonesia’s 
economy at macro level, industry level, and households’ level. A sensitivity analysis of the 
results is performed.  
The fifth chapter ‘Constructing Indonesia’s Energy-SAM’ presents the background 
and the construction of the hypothetical Energy-SAM dataset. This chapter details the steps 
of developing the Energy-SAM from the official SAM for Indonesia outlined in Chapter 2. 
The issues and limitations to build this dataset are also discussed in this chapter. 
The sixth chapter ‘The Extended CGE Model for Specific Energy Analysis’ discusses 
the background and the development of the hybrid CGE model for specific energy analysis 
with emphasis on reducing (and promoting) the fossil fuels (and clean energy) production. 
The hybrid CGE model is the extended version of the standard CGE model developed in 
Chapter 3. This chapter presents in details the steps of constructing the energy flows across 
industries and the carbon emissions and its taxation features; including the required 
modifications to the other block of equations. This chapter also presents the closure choices 
to equalize the total number of equations and endogenous variables.  
The seventh chapter ‘Policy Experiments using the Hybrid CGE Model for Energy 
Analysis in Indonesia’ presents the background and motivation of our second study in 
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investigating the impact of implementing the carbon tax and feed-in tariff on the main 
macroeconomic indicators and the implications on different institutions and sectors in the 
Indonesian economy. This chapter also discusses the carbon tax and feed-in tariff policy 
scenarios using the hybrid CGE model developed in Chapter 6 that is calibrated to the 
database outlined in Chapter 5. Each scenario quantifies the implications of implementing 
the carbon tax (or feed-in tariff) on national emissions, Indonesia’s macroeconomic, 
sectoral output and commodities, and households’ welfare and inequality. A sensitivity 
analysis of the results is also performed.  
Finally, the eighth chapter ‘Conclusions’ summarizes the main results, underlines this 
research limitation and suggests future improvements of research. 
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Indonesian Economy 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to briefly discuss the four main areas of Indonesia’s economy that 
fundamentally become the background of our research studies. These areas are organized 
as follows. In Section 1.2, we present an outlook of the Indonesia’s macroeconomic – in 
terms of national income-expenditure, institutions’ consumption, and households’ welfare 
– over recent years. In Section 1.3, we highlight the fiscal postures in general including 
challenges and targets of fiscal policy. In Section 1.4, we discuss the specific fiscal policy 
related to environmental function budget towards sustainable development in order to 
support the Indonesia’s commitment – under the United Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) – to lower the emissions generated from energy consumption by 26%. 
Section 1.5 presents the outlook of Indonesia’s energy sector in order to provide references 
about the national energy pattern in terms of both current conditions and future projection. 
Finally, Section 1.6 presents the conclusions.  
 
1.2. Indonesia’s Macroeconomic Outlook 
Indonesia – the world’s largest archipelago and the fourth most populous nation – has 
charted a strong economic growth since the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997. Even after 
the global financial crisis in year 2008 – 2009, the Indonesian economy was still capable 
to grow about 4.5%, which ranked as the third-fastest growing country in the G-20 (Francis, 
2012; and Financial Note, 2011). However, according to BPS (2015a), since the last 5 
years, the Indonesia’s economy tends to grow slower. In 2011, the GDP growth was around 
6.17%; but it was growing flatter during the period of 2012 - 2015 which only about less 
than 6%. The downward trend of GDP growth is influenced mostly by the slow global 
economy’s recovery – which results in a decline in investment and exports as well as a 
higher inflation rate due to the increased price of subsidized gasoline in year 2013 and 
domestic currency depreciation. The economy’s growth in year 2015 (around 5.4 – 5.8%) 
are induced by government consumption and investment especially on public infrastructure 
development.  
On the sectoral side, in general, all sectors are expected to grow in year 2016 due to 
improvement in global economy which induces a higher demand for domestic products 
(Financial Note, 2016). The GDP at producer prices, in 2016, will be mostly dominated by 
processing, agricultural, trade, and construction industries which contribute about 57% to 
total GDP (Financial Note, 2016). These sectors are expected to grow sharply because of 
the following reasons. The processing industry – i.e. food and drink sectors, which 
contributes about 21% to total GDP, is expected to grow about 5.7% due to their typical 
labour-intensive sector that could favor the job creation absorption (Financial Note, 2016). 
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The agricultural industry, which contributes about 13.7% to total GDP, is expected to grow 
about 4.2% due to the government’s main objective to achieve national food sovereignty 
(Financial Note, 2016). The agricultural sector also plays an important role as a labour-
intensive sector. According to World Bank (2009), this sector could absorb employment to 
more than 40% of total Indonesian labour force and does provide income to two-thirds of 
total poor households. Furthermore, the trade sector, which contributes about 13%, is 
expected to grow by 4.8% due to world’s economy recovery since 2008’s crisis that would 
improve international trade (Financial Note, 2016). Whilst, the construction sector is 
expected to grow about 7.0% due to the ongoing government’s project of constructing 35 
Gigawatts electricity generation infrastructure and a million housing construction for low-
income households (Financial Note, 2016). In contrast, mining industry had the smallest 
contribution to GDP at producer prices where the growth sharply declined from 4.29% in 
year 2011 to only about 0.55% in year 2014. This large contraction is caused by the mining 
export restriction as well as their low (high) international demand (price) (BPS, 2015a). 
Table 1.1 presents the sectoral contribution on GDP at producer prices in the year 2014. 
 
Figure 1.1:The Sectoral Shares on GDP at Producer Prices, 2014 
 
 Source: BPS, 2015a 
 
In terms of GDP at market side components, the household consumption (including 
non-profit households) still indicates the largest growth in year 2014 by about 17.57%; 
followed by investment (4.12%), import (2.19%), government’s consumption (1.98%), and 
export (1.02%). The increasing trend of household consumption is mainly due to the 
existence of presidential election as well as expansion of demand for vehicles and 
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electricity. Meanwhile, the government’s consumption has reached the lowest growth in 
year 2014 because of the current regulation of public spending efficiency; this contraction 
was suggested to be one of the main factors of GDP growth weakening (BPS, 2015a). The 
growth of exports has declined over the last 5 years from 14.77% in year 2011 to only about 
1.02% in year 2014 which was mainly caused by the restricted mining export regulation. 
While, import growth has tended to expand due to (i) higher demand on imported gasoline, 
foreign capital, and raw materials; (ii) higher purchasing power of households; and (iii) 
domestic currency depreciation (BPS, 2015a).  
In Indonesia, inflation has always been occurred annually, although the patterns 
fluctuated due to a number of factors. Between the year of 2011 – 2012, the inflation rate 
was low (about 3.7%). This was influenced by the decline in global food prices and a 
regulation delay of elevating the electricity and subsidized gasoline prices (BPS, 2015a). 
However, between 2013 and 2015, the inflation rate was sharply higher within the range of 
5.0% – 8.4% that was subject to the increasing trend of food and energy commodities 
demand in both international and domestic markets (Financial Note, 2016). The world’s 
economic recovery is suspected to play an important role in boosting the demand in 
international markets (Financial Note, 2016). Whilst, from the supply side, the geopolitical 
tensions that occurred in Middle East, North Africa and South Africa would strongly affect 
the supply, especially fossil fuels, in the international market (Financial Note, 2016). 
Internally, climate change (and natural disaster) is the most potential factor to induce the 
future inflation rate for which climate change could distort the production (and the 
distribution) of foods (Financial Note, 2016). In attempts to ease the fiscal pressures on the 
budget deficit and the national economy, the government is committed to maintain the 
stabilization of the prices of food and energy products through improving the food supplies 
(facilities and distributions) from agricultural sectors (Financial Note, 2016).  
Furthermore, in year 2014, the poverty rate reached about 11.25% which was slightly 
lower than that of year 2013 (11.36%) (BPS, 2015a). However, the number of poor 
households actually increased from 28.07 million people in year 2013 to about 28.28 
million people in year 2014 and 28.59 million people in year 2015 (BPS, 2015a; BPS, 
2015b). Indonesia’s poverty line – defined as the minimum budget to meet the subsistence 
level of consumption – has increased from Rp. 271, 626 to Rp. 330,776 during the period 
2013 – 2015. The rate of poverty in rural areas reached almost two folds higher than in 
urban areas. In addition, in year 2015, the inequality among poor households, measured 
from the Poverty Severity Index1, increased significantly; inequality among poor 
households is greater in rural than in urban areas (BPS, 2015b). It is argued that this 
increasing trend of poverty was influenced by the output contraction in agricultural sector 
                                                          
1 Poverty Severity Index is one of the approaches to estimate the expenditure inequality among poor 
households (Bappenas, 2015).  
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which results in a reduction of employment demand (BPS, 2015a). The government has set 
a national target of poverty rate in year 2016 between 9.0% and 10% (Financial Note, 
2016). To reach this target, several key strategies will be implemented including (i) 
improvements in government transfer to the poor households regarding to social aid 
programs such as health insurance, food subsidy, aid distribution to the victims of natural 
disasters, and social protection; and (ii) agricultural reform. 
Employment can also be used as an indicator of people’s welfare (Financial Note, 
2016). Based on BPS (2015b), the Indonesian labour force during the period 2011 – 2014 
tend to increase from 116.09 million people to 121.87 million people; in other words, the 
annual growth of labour force was about 1.63%. This increase is influenced by the 
increasing growth of population by around 1.3% annually. During the period 2012-2013, 
the number of unemployed increased from 7.34 million people to 7.41 million people. In 
year 2014, the opened unemployment rate in urban areas (7.12%) is higher than that in rural 
areas (4.81%). This implied that job creation in urban areas is insufficient to absorb the 
large number of labour forces; also, there is a tendency of strong urbanization resulting in 
excessive labour supply in cities (BPS, 2015b). To address these issues, the government 
has taken some bold strategies including: (i) improving the quality of the labour force, 
especially the poor workers, through technical training provided by industry partnership 
programs; and (ii) intensifying the development of basic infrastructure, focused on labour-
intensive projects, in rural and urban areas to absorb the local workforce (Financial Note, 
2016). 
 
1.3. Targets and Challenges of Fiscal Policy  
Fiscal policy plays an important role in stabilizing the aggregate demand and fostering the 
national income (Romer, 2001; Vladimirov and Neicheva, 2008; Maipita et al., 2010). It 
can directly intervene in correcting market failure and income distribution (Griffiths and 
Wall, 1997; Damuri and Perdana, 2003). The effectiveness of government intervention to 
improve the economy’s performance is highly dependent on their fiscal sustainability. For 
instances, if the government increases its expenditure, then the financing schemes could be 
done through several channels, i.e. increasing the tax revenues, increasing the debt, 
reducing subsidies, or reducing transfer of payments to certain institutions. 
The Indonesian government recently faced uncertainty in their fiscal sustainability 
(Ikhsan et al., 2005). According to World Bank (2009) and BPS (2015a), during the period 
of 2006 – 2014, total government expenditures increased by about 12% annually in real 
terms, which related to (i) a sharp rise of government transfers to regions that accounted 
for one third of central government spending; and (ii) a sharp rise in fuel subsidies 
following a large increase in its international oil prices. The spending was financed mainly 
by large increases in non-oil and gas tax revenues which increased from 9.6% of GDP in 
year 2001 to 11.7% in 2008; meanwhile, the revenues from oil and gas taxes sharply fell 
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from around 6% of GDP in year 2001 to only about 2% of GDP in year 2009 due to a 
contraction in the international oil prices (World Bank, 2009). 
Word Bank (2009) stated that there are at least 5 sectors that should become a priority 
target in the government spending over recent years, including education, health, 
infrastructure, agriculture, and government administration. Government spending on 
education covered about 20% of public expenditures. Apart from its successful 
achievement in improving the levels of schooling, however, more progress is required to 
improve human resources, quality of teaching, maintaining school infrastructures, and 
transition rates to the secondary level (World Bank, 2009). Between 2001 and 2008, public 
spending on health more than doubled, from about Rp. 16 trillion to more than Rp. 36 
trillion in real terms (or about 0.9% of GDP in year 2008). However, the coverage of health 
insurance is still low; only about 26% of the population who benefited the health insurance. 
The rates of maternal mortality as well as child malnutrition remained high (World Bank, 
2009). Furthermore, total investment (public and private) on infrastructure – especially in 
the energy sector – remained very low which only about 4.1% of GDP in year 2007. For 
comparison, in some of Indonesia’s regional peers, such as China and Vietnam, total 
investment on infrastructure reached about 10% of GDP. The poor condition of Indonesia’s 
infrastructure can result in higher business costs, blackouts across the country due to 
inadequate electricity supply and major health risks due to a limited access to clean water 
and improved sanitation (World Bank, 2009). To address these issues, the government has 
included infrastructure, i.e. electricity sector, as a top priority since 2006. Together with 
private investment, the government has committed to develop 10,000 MW of coal-fired 
power plants (World Bank, 2009). Government spending on the agricultural sector has 
increased on average by 16% annually between the period of 2001 – 2008 where half of 
the budget was directed to agricultural subsidies, especially for fertilizer. However, 
agricultural productivity has not grown at the same pace as the allocated budget; while 
value-added per worker remained flat. Finally, in order to address both corruption and 
administration inefficiency, the government has also been rapidly improved its public 
services in recent years. Since 2006, spending on government administration has stably 
increased about 14% of total expenditure of which 83% of the shares were allocated to the 
sub-national governments (World Bank, 2009). 
On the other hand, the government debt has increased by around 1.3% on annual 
average, from US$ 132 billion to US$ 151 billion since the last ten years. However, the 
debt burden (as percentage to GDP) has dropped significantly due to the increase in national 
output and government revenue. For example, the debt to GDP ratio dropped from 90.9% 
in 2000 to only 33.1% at the end 2008 while the government revenues increased by 14% 
annually (World Bank, 2009).  
The revenues generated from oil and gas are strongly correlated to the government 
expenditure on energy subsidies (World Bank, 2009). For example, in 2005 and 2008, 
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government spending for energy subsidies made up more than two thirds of their revenues 
on oil and gas (World Bank, 2009). Most of subsidies, fuel, electricity, and agriculture 
goods, are found to be regressive. They mostly benefit rich households. Therefore, to 
address the fiscal burden of subsidies, in 2015, the Indonesian government has targeted to 
lower their spending on fuel subsidies by about half, from Rp. 415 trillion to only around 
Rp. 233 trillion (BPS, 2015a). The government would then switch their fiscal priority from 
fuel subsidies to investment in public infrastructure in rural areas, by increasing the budget 
more than two fold from Rp. 9 trillion to Rp. 21 trillion; other priorities include maritime, 
foods, and energy sectors – i.e. constructing a number of ports and achieving the electricity 
production target about 25,000 MW (BPS, 2015a). 
In 2015, the budget deficit reached the level of 2.5% of GDP (or about Rp. 292.1 
billion), which exceeded the target of 1.9% of GDP. This increase was influenced by a 
contraction in government revenue and in expansion in spending caused by the global 
recession (Bank of Indonesia, 2015). The increased deficit was financed through raising 
the bonds selling and loans which resulted in a higher level of borrowing ratio to GDP of 
about 26% (Bank of Indonesia, 2015).  
Aside from subsidy cuts, to address such burdens, Indonesia’s government has no 
other choice but to increase the tax revenues (Ikhsan et al., 2005). This increase can be 
achieved either through improvement in taxation administration – i.e. reducing tax 
avoidance or optimizing the collection from registered tax payers – or by increasing the tax 
values through higher rates (Ikhsan et al., 2005). Since the postcolonial-tax reform in 1985, 
the Indonesian tax system was based on income tax and a value added tax (Ikhsan et al., 
2005). The government receipts from taxes collection increased from 5% of GDP to 9.9% 
of GDP between the year of 1995 – 1996 and remained considerably stable by about 13.3% 
until 2008 (Amir et al., 2013). The revenues from income taxes (including personal and 
corporate) and value added taxes (including luxury sales taxes) strongly increased from Rp. 
0.9 billion and 0.4 billion between the year of 1980 – 1981 to Rp. 327 trillion and 209.6 
trillion in 2008, respectively; or equivalently about 23.3% and 32%, respectively, of total 
revenues (Amir et al., 2013). Both taxes contributed more than 81% of total tax revenues 
or 55% of total government’s receipts in year 2008. At the same time, however, the 
revenues from oil and gas has fallen from 72.9% to 32.1% (Amir et al., 2013). Although 
the Indonesian tax revenues have a tendency to improve, however, the tax revenue ratio 
rates (as a percentage of GDP) is still low compared to other countries (Ikhsan et al., 2005); 
which indicates an opportunity to increase the government receipts through tax 
administration improvement without having need to increase their rates. According to 
World Bank Statistics (2015), the Indonesian tax ratio to GDP was lower (11.4%) than that 
average of low and middle income countries (12.85%) in year 2012. 
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1.4.  Fiscal Policies towards Sustainable Environment  
As an archipelagic nation, Indonesia is vulnerable to threats of climate change– such as 
prolonged droughts, extreme weather events, and heavy flooding – which could harm the 
population (Resosudarmo and Abdurohman, 2011). Table 1.1 shows the unscaled amount 
of GHG emitting in some countries to present a large majority of global GHG emissions 
(70% of the global population) generated in absolute terms at a particular year. In general, 
it shows that countries with large economies and (or) population tend to produce the largest 
GHG emissions even though their emissions per capita may be small (Baumert et al., 2005).   
Indonesia was ranked 15th among the top 25 countries with the largest GHG emitters 
in year 2000 (Baumert et al., 2005)2. In fact, if CO2 emissions generated from land use and 
non-CO2 gases are included, Indonesia ranks 4
th in total emissions; Indonesia ranks 21th 
when only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are taken into account (Baumert et al., 2005).   
The main sources of CO2 emissions are generated from deforestation (48%), energy sector 
(21%), and peatland (12%); total Indonesia’s GHG emission in year 2000 was 1.72 Gigaton 
(Gt) CO2e and it is projected to reach 2.95 Gt CO2e under the business as usual scenarios 
(NCCC, 2009). Although the largest shares of emissions derived from deforestation and 
land use change, however, the emissions from the fossil fuel combustion will keep growing 
as GDP grows, which will cause severe problems in long-run (MEMR, 2011; and Ministry 
of Finance, 2012).   
At the 15th conference of the parties (COP15) in Copenhagen, the Indonesian 
government has committed to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26% (about 
767 million tCO2e) from the ‘business as usual (BAU)’ level in year 2020. The guidance 
to this mitigation policy is provided in the National Action Plan on Greenhouse Gases 
Emission Reduction (RAN-GRK), as defined in the Presidential Regulation Number 
61/2011. More specifically, the RAN-GRK is used as a reference for (i) implementing the 
emissions reduction by priority areas or sectors at the national and regional levels; (ii) 
investment to mitigate the emissions; and (iii) strategies and action plans to reduce the GHG 
emissions by regions (Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 In terms of emissions per capita, Australia, United States, and Canada generated the highest per capita 
emissions globally that ranked 4th, 6th, and 7th (Baumert et al., 2005). Their emissions per capita are more 
than doubled to the EU (37th globally), six times to China (99th globally), and thirteen times to India (140th 
globally). On the other hand, Indonesia was ranked 122th globally. To investigate in details the GHG 
emitting countries – such as emissions per capita, emissions per GDP, emissions per income, etc – see 
Baumert et al., 2005. 
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Table 1.1: Top GHG Emitting Countries in year 2000 
No. Country 
Million ton CO2 
equivalent 
% of World GHGs 
1 United States 6,928 20.6 
2 China 4,938 14.7 
3 EU-25 4,725 14 
4 Russia 1,915 5.7 
5 India 1,884 5.6 
6 Japan 1,317 3.9 
7 Germany 1,009 3 
8 Brazil 851 2.5 
9 Canada 680 2 
10 United Kingdom 654 1.9 
11 Italy 531 1.6 
12 South Korea 521 1.5 
13 France 513 1.5 
14 Mexico 512 1.5 
15 Indonesia 503 1.5 
16 Australia 491 1.5 
17 Ukraine 482 1.4 
18 Iran 480 1.4 
19 South Africa 417 1.2 
20 Spain 381 1.1 
21 Poland 381 1.1 
22 Turkey 355 1.1 
23 Saudi Arabia 341 1 
24 Argentina 289 0.9 
25 Pakistan 285 0.8 
Top 25 27,915 83 
Rest of World 5,751 17 
Developed 17,355 52 
Developing 16,310 48 
Note: Emissions from international bunker fuels and land use change and forestry are 
excluded. 
Source: Baumert et al., 2005 
 
According to the RAN-GRK, the 26% reduction target of GHG emissions is broken 
down into sectoral reduction targets, in which the emissions from (i) forestry and peatland 
are expected to decline the most by 672 million tCO2e; (ii) energy and transport by 38 
million tCO2e; and (iii) agriculture, industry, and water sectors cover the remaining target. 
These action plans will be associated with the government budget allocations. In year 2012, 
the central government budget for mitigation actions was about Rp. 7.7 trillion (less than 
1% of total expenditure) or about four times than the budget allocation in year 2009. The 
budget is mainly aimed to achieve sustainable forest and peatland. The local government 
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budget for mitigation financing was about Rp. 3 trillion. In addition, between the year 2008 
– 2012, the government spent about Rp. 5.5 trillion for conversion program from kerosene 
to LPG; and a further allocation of about Rp. 5.3 trillion tax subsidy in order to support the 
mitigation activities, especially for geothermal and biofuels production. In total, the budget 
for the RAN-GRK actions was about Rp. 15.9 trillion in year 2012. Figure 1.2 presents the 
trends of funding sources for climate change mitigation during the period 2008 – 2012 
(Ministry of Finance, 2012). However, it has been argued that if the budget allocation for 
climate change mitigation from 2012 is kept constant until 2020, thus, the budget would 
only be able to reduce the GHG emissions by about 15% (116 million tCO2). In other words, 
to achieve the emission reduction target of 26%, the government requires more budget 
allocation to fill the gap of 11% (Ministry of Finance, 2012).   
   
Figure 1.2: The Trend of Budget Allocations for Climate Change Mitigation 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2012 
 
1.4.1. Emissions from Deforestation and Peatland 
Deforestation contributes the largest share of national GHG emissions. Emissions from 
deforestation are mainly due to land clearing activities including conventional logging 
(62%) and intense fires (38%) (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2015). In 2012, 
forest degradation (about 1.1 million ha/year) contributes about 450 million tCO2e of GHG 
emissions or about 59% of the total net emissions from Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) including peatland (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Deforestation usually 
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occurred in production forests (44%), forested land (43%), as well as conservation and 
protection forests types (13%) (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2015).  
Meanwhile, the emissions from peatland are mainly caused from the biological 
oxidation that generates not only CO2 but also direct N2O, dissolved organic carbon (DOC) 
and methane (CH4) emissions. Figure 1.3 shows the GHG emissions from peatland in 
Indonesia during the period 2001 – 2012. In total, these emissions increased from about 
307 million tCO2e in year 2001 to about 335 million tCO2e in year 2012. Regionally, the 
provinces of Riau, Central Kalimantan and Papua contributed to more than 60% of total 
GHG emissions from peatland in Indonesia. In addition, peat fires may also contribute to 
total emissions from peatland in Indonesia, although they substantially fluctuated between 
the year 2001 – 2012. The largest incidence of peat fires occurred in 2002 and 2006 which 
contributed to about 180 – 183 million tCO2e (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 
2015).  
 
Figure 1.3: Indonesia’s GHG Emissions from Peatland 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2015 
According to Ministry of Finance (2012), in order to curb the GHG emissions from 
forestry, the local government of Indonesia has taken actions to limit deforestation, 
including restrictions on road construction in new forest areas, from 1.1 million ha/year 
(generating about 440 million tCO2e/year) to 450,000 ha/year. These actions will reduce 
about 260 million tCO2e lower than the BAU scenario in 2020 or equal to 34% GHG 
emissions reduction target. However, these restrictions will reduce profits (private sector) 
due to less timber exploitation and deforested land; and (relatively small) costs to the 
government due to license and royalty losses. On the other hand, to reduce emissions from 
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the peatland, the government has supported peatland restoration by rewetting the peatland 
through canal blocking, which could potentially reduce the GHG emissions from 18 to 9 
tCO2/ha/year. This restoration effort, however, was found to be ineffective because of its 
high uncertainty (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The simple canal blocking appeared to be 
less beneficial unless it is combined with other techniques that can ensure the sustainability 
results. Therefore, the peatland restoration approach is currently being reviewed to develop 
better models.   
 
 
1.4.2. Emissions from the Energy and Transportation Sectors 
Total GHG emissions from the energy sector are suspected to grow rapidly, from 598 
million tCO2e (28% of total national emissions) in 2014 to about 2,900 million tCO2e in 
2050 in the base scenario, or about 3,829 million tCO2e in the high scenario
3 (BPPT, 2016). 
The largest emissions contributor is the high rate of fossil fuels combustion in industrial 
activities that reached around 5.1% on growth rate average per year, with coal accounting 
for 56% of total fuel consumption. Ministry of Finance (2012) argued that by promoting 
clean energy production and reducing fossil fuels dependence at current roadmap, the 
emissions from electricity industry are most likely to be reduced by 26%. If this is achieved, 
the total national emissions can be cut by around 14% or about 104 million tCO2e in year 
2020. This target, however, requires additional funding at least one third of the total budget 
either through some joint financing schemes or fiscal compensations.  
In a Ministry of Finance (2009) green paper, the government proposed a longer-term 
strategic framework in order to mitigate the GHG emissions from the energy sector. Some 
key strategies that related to this sector are given as follows: 
1. Imposing a carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption and, at the same time, removing 
energy subsidies. The levies on fossil fuel combustion has not yet to be implemented. 
However, the contribution of carbon tax is important since the GHG emissions from 
energy activities are expected to be increased in line with the economy’s growth in 
future.  
2. Providing incentives for energy efficiency and zero (low) emissions technologies – such 
as promoting the renewable production. The subsidies on clean energy production has 
been introduced through the Feed-in Tariff schemes.  
                                                          
3 Based on BPPT (2016), the energy projections until 2050 are estimated on two different scenarios: base 
scenario and high scenario. In base (high) scenario, the Indonesian GDP between 2014 – 2050 is assumed 
to be increased at average growth rate 6% (7%) per year. GDP growth in year 2014 (5.02%) is projected to 
be increased by 7% (8%) in year 2025 and then slowly reduces until 5% (6%) in year 2050. These 
projection trends are in line to the projections given in the national development plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019. 
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3.  Supporting the carbon market mechanisms, such as sectoral carbon targets and 
crediting, through domestic and international funding. This strategy has been under 
discussion due to constraints over measurement, reporting, and verification. 
4. Strengthening the budget capacity for climate policy coordination. This strategy is 
important to improve the budget capacity for climate change mitigation and adaption 
through environmental conservation and renewable energy promotion.   
Furthermore, according to Ministry of Finance (2012), land transportation accounted 
for almost 50% of total fuel demand; and 90% of this consumption are given from the road 
transportation. Vehicle ownership such as car, bus and lorry, and motorcycle are growing 
annually by about 12%, 11%, and 17%, respectively; while the growth of urban roadways 
is less than 1% per year. These patterns generated air pollution which contributed between 
60% - 80% of national air pollution. The increased congestion in capital city has also led 
to an increase in fuel consumption by about 930 million litter per year. 
The government of Indonesia has been developing the long term plan to achieve a 
reliable, sustainable, competitive, affordable, and safe transportation in all sites of the 
country. This plan includes investment support to public transportation infrastructure, 
especially in urban areas, which is environmentally friendly and efficient. The government 
is also considering to support energy diversification in transportation sector from fuels to 
biofuels and gas.  
 
1.4.3. Energy Outlook 
Until date, Indonesia still faces great challenges to reach the target of an evenly distributed 
energy development. Indonesia’s energy supply has been strongly dominated by fossil fuels 
(96%), while only 4% energy supply from zero emission (renewable) sources – mostly from 
hydro and geothermal (National Energy Council, 2014; Ministry of Finance, 2012). On the 
other hand, fossil energy reserves declined over time which was not offset by new reserve 
discoveries. Poor development in energy infrastructure also limits the public accesses to 
energy. These conditions have made Indonesia very vulnerable to disturbances in global 
energy markets especially at her current position as net-oil importer (National Energy 
Council, 2014).  
Both energy intensity (energy consumption per GDP) and energy elasticity (the 
percentage of energy consumption growth per GDP growth) are often used to indicate the 
effectiveness of an economy’s activities in a country (MEMR, 2010; Burakov, 2016). 
Figure 1.4 compares Indonesia’s energy intensity to some developed and developing 
countries. It shows that the Indonesia’s energy intensity was more than 2 BOE/thousand 
USD in year 2015. This implies that Indonesia’s GDP (at producer prices) is influenced 
mostly by energy-intensive industries (MEMR, 2010). In contrast, the energy intensity in 
developed countries, i.e. Japan, United Kingdom, United States, reached only between 0 – 
1 BOE/ thousand USD in year 2015. Figure 1.5 presents Indonesia’s energy elasticity 
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compared to other countries. The energy elasticity of Indonesia in year 2009 was the highest 
reaching almost 1.44. While other countries were only less than 0.7. This implies that, in 
Indonesia, to increase economic growth by 1%, the percentage of the required energy 
consumption was higher than 1%. According to the National Energy Plan (2014), 
Indonesian energy elasticity target of less than 1% should be achieved in year 2025. 
 
Figure 1.4: Primary Energy Intensity in some Countries 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, World Economic Outlook, and IMF in MEMR (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 To our findings, the latest statistic of Indonesian energy elasticity compared to other countries was in year 
2009. In addition, the Indonesian energy elasticity between 1985 and 2000 was above 1 (1.04 – 1.35), 
which was higher than those of developed countries (0.55 – 0.65) at the same period (Koalisi Energi cited in 
Ardiansyah et al (2012).  
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Figure 1.5: The Energy Elasticity (2009) 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook, in MEMR, 2010 
 
1.4.3.1. Current Energy Consumption 
The Indonesian final energy consumption by sector increased during the period of 2000 – 
2014, excluding 2005/06, from about 556 million BOE in year 2000 to 961 million BOE in 
year 2014 or an average of 4% per year (MEMR, 2015). The largest final energy 
consumption occurred in industrial sector, followed by households and transportation. 
However, in terms of annual growth, energy consumption in the transportation sector 
increased the most by average 6.46% per year due to a sharp increase in vehicle ownership, 
from 19 million units in 2000 to 114 million units in 2014. Whilst, the average growth of 
households’ energy consumption is only about 1.59% annually due to the implementation 
of a government program to (i) substitute kerosene for Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) for 
cooking; and (ii) energy efficiency for equipment and technology such as energy-saving 
lamps and solar cells. Substituting kerosene to LPG leads to a lower energy consumption 
because the LPG has higher calories (53% efficiency) than the kerosene (40% efficiency) 
(BPPT, 2016). 
By types, between the year 2000 – 2014, the final energy consumption was largely 
dominated by fuels (gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, fuel oil, avtur, and avgas) by about 308 
million BOE – 315 million BOE. In year 2000, the shares of diesel oil to total energy 
consumption was the largest (38.7%) followed by gasoline (23.0%), fuel oil (9.6%), diesel 
oil (3%), and avtur (2.2%) (BPPT, 2016). In year 2014, the shares of gasoline and diesel 
oil increased sharply by 45.5% and 45.2%, respectively, while diesel oil and avtur slightly 
dropped about 1.5% each (BPPT, 2016). These trends are due to the high consumption by 
private cars and airplanes; in the transportation sector, fuel consumption held the largest 
shares by 79.7% of total Indonesia’s fuels consumption (BPPT, 2016). In industrial sector, 
Energy per capita (BOE/capita) 
OECD North America 
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the consumption of coal increased sharply from 361 million BOE in year 2000 to 220.6 
million BOE in year 2014, an increase by an average 13.8% annually (BPPT, 2016). 
Electricity consumption between 2000 – 2014 had an average growth by 6.8% annually due 
to higher demand for electrical devices (BPPT, 2016). Figure 1.6 shows the Indonesian 
final energy consumption by type in year 2014.  
 
Figure 1.6: Indonesia’s Final Energy Consumption (and Shares) by Type (2014) 
 
 Source: BPPT, 2016 
 
1.4.3.2. Current Energy Potential 
In 2014, the national reserves of crude oil, natural gas, and coal were about 3.6 billion 
barrels, 100.3 TCF, and 32.27 billion tons, respectively. Without new reserve discoveries, 
these resources are expected to deplete in the next 12 years, 37 years, and 70 years, 
respectively. On the other hand, the potential of clean (renewable) energy resources has not 
yet been utilized optimally. As shown in Table 1.2, Indonesia has remarkable geothermal 
sources by around 28,543 MW or about 40% of the world’s geothermal potential. However, 
their utilization is only about 7.54% of total potential. Total hydro resources reached about 
75, 670 MW but only 4.17% of their potential have been utilized. The utilization of biomass 
is only about 3.25% of its total potential. Whilst, solar and wind resources have not yet 
been developed significantly MEMR, 2011). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biomass 
Electricity 
LPG 
Gas 
Coal  
Biofuel 
Oil Fuels 
 
 
21 
 
Table 1.2:The Potential of Renewable Resources in year 2011 
Types Potential 
Current Electricity 
Production 
Utilization 
Percentage (%) 
Geothermal 28,543 MW 1,189 MW 7.54 
Hydro 75,670 MW 5,705.29 MW 4.17 
Mini/Micro 
Hydro 
769.69 MW 5,705.29 MW 28.31 
Biomass 49,810 MW 5,705.29 MW 3.25 
Solar 4.80 kWh/m2/day 5,705.29 MWp - 
Wind 3 – 6 m/s 1.87 MW - 
Source: MEMR, 2011 
 
1.4.3.3. Recent Energy Policies 
This section discusses a number of recent energy-related policies. In late 2014, the 
Indonesian government, through Presidential Regulation No. 191/2014, decided to reform 
the energy subsidies. The subsidy on gasoline was deleted, fuel oil subsidy was kept fixed 
at Rp. 1,000 per liter, and the electricity subsidy was reduced by eliminating the subsidies 
to the electricity customers by criteria: (i) households (≥ 1,300 VA); (ii) business ((≥ 6,600 
VA); (iii) industry ((≥ 200 kVA); government ((≥ 6,600 VA), low voltage street lightning, 
and special services. This reform is due to the fact that energy subsidies had been a heavy 
burden on Indonesia’s fiscal sustainability. These policies have reduced the government 
expenditure from Rp. 315 trillion in year 2014 to Rp. 119 trillion in year 2015, which is 
used to improve public infrastructure and services (BPPT, 2016). 
To speed up the diversification away from kerosene, in 2015, the government 
developed a gas distribution network for households, which is stipulated in the MEMR 
Regulation No. 20/2015. This is implemented in residence areas that are available for 
natural gas distribution. The program also aims to substitute the LPG which is mostly 
imported. As a result, it increases the foreign exchange saving and energy security as well 
as reduces the national GHG emissions. In 2015, the gas network reached 213,132 
households in Aceh, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Jakarta and its surroundings, West Java, 
Central Java, East Java, East Borneo, North Borneo, South Sulawesi, and West Papua 
(BPPT, 2016).  
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Figure 1.7: Trend of Indonesia’s Energy Subsidy 
  
Source: BPPT, 2016 
To improve the welfare of small-scale fishermen, the government set a particular 
regulation of LPG supply, distribution, and price for fishing boats of low-income 
fishermen. For one fishing boat size of less than 5 Gigatons, it is expected that this program 
could save about Rp. 37 million per year, assuming that the boat operates 10 hours per day 
(one-day fishing). From the year 2016 – 2021, the government plans to compensate the 
low-income fishermen by distributing freely 5,000 packages of LPG as well as fishing 
equipment (BPPT, 2016).   
Biofuel mandatory is also one of the energy policies to support its large production, 
especially biodiesel, such that the fossil fuels dependence can be reduced. Since 2008, the 
government has obliged the biofuels mixture in gasoline and diesel oil. In 2015, the 
government required raised where the portion of biodiesel in the gasoline mixture from 
10% to 15%, and again to 20% in 2016 and 30% in 2020. This biofuel mandatory changes 
are immediately followed by the enactment of oil palm funding for collection and 
utilization in order to encourage the palm oil plantation improvement as they are primarily 
used as raw materials of biofuel production. To support their domestic production, the 
export of palm oil, including its derivative products, will be taxed (BPPT, 2016).  
Furthermore, a policy of waste utilization for electricity generation has also been set 
in the MEMR Regulation No. 19/2013; however, the policy still has weakness in pricing 
and operational schemes. As a replacement, the government sets the MEMR Regulation 
No. 44/2015 on power purchasing by the state-owned electricity company from the waste 
generation producer at the fixed feed-in tariff schemes. This policy is aimed to support the 
target of clean energy production as defined in the National Medium Term Development 
Plant for Year 2015 – 2019 (BPPT, 2016). At the end of 2015, the government stipulated 
the Presidential Regulation No. 15/2015 on Supply, Distribution, and Pricing of Gas for 
Road Transportation. In this regulation, the government allocates a budget to develop 
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public fuel gas stations aiming to accelerate the substitution of gasoline with gas. Since the 
last 22 years, oil refinery has never been constructed, while fuel consumption continues to 
increase – i.e. the national fuel consumption has increased from 40 million kilo liters in 
1994 to approximately 59 million kilo liters in 2014. Poor refinery infrastructure results in 
a higher import demand for fuels, especially gasoline and diesel oil, to meet domestic 
demand (BPPT, 2016). In Presidential Regulation No. 146/2015, the government has 
encouraged the establishment of new oil refineries as well as improvement of facilities in 
the existing refineries, which can be funded from fiscal and non-fiscal incentives, i.e. the 
reduction of various costs (taxes) during the construction and operation. To this end, the 
government agreed that new refineries will be built in Tuban (East Java), and Bontang (East 
Borneo), while the program of facilities improvement will be given to existing refineries 
(BPPT, 2016).  
 
1.4.3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the trends of Indonesia’s economy over recent years. By exploring 
the available information, it is revealed that Indonesia has a strong economic growth during 
the last two decades where the average GDP growth is between 5% – 6% per year. Even at 
the global financial crisis in period 2008 – 2009, the GDP growth can be maintained at 
level 4.5%, which ranked as the third-fastest growing country in the G-20.  
However, Indonesia’s government has been facing some uncertainty challenges that 
could harm their fiscal sustainability. Over recent years, the government budget for real 
public expenditure has been increased sharply due to an increase of transfer payments for 
regional development as well as a sharp rise in energy subsidies following a spike in 
international oil prices. The budget is mainly covered from non-oil and gas tax receipts 
since the revenues from oil and gas levies tend to decline annually. The government debt 
also tends to increase over the last decade which was influenced by a contraction (and 
expansion) in government revenue (spending) caused by global recession.  
To maintain fiscal sustainability, the government plans to reduce the budget for fuel 
subsidies by a half, and to reallocate it for improving the public infrastructure in rural areas. 
Aside from subsidy cuts, Indonesia’s government has also been targeting to increase the 
tax revenues which could be possibly obtained through either improvement in taxation 
administration or higher tax rates. 
Furthermore, at the world’s climate change mitigation event (COP15), Indonesia 
committed to participate in reducing their national GHG emissions by 26% from the BAU 
level (or about 767 million tCO2e) in year 2020. To follow-up this commitment, the 
Indonesian government stipulated the guidance of mitigation policy in the National Action 
Plan on Greenhouse Gases Emission Reduction (RAN-GRK), as defined in the Presidential 
Regulation Number 61/2011. The RAN-GRK is used as a reference for (i) implementing 
the emissions reduction by priority areas or sectors at the national and regional levels; (ii) 
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investment to mitigate the GHG emissions; and (iii) strategies and action plans to reduce 
the GHG emissions by regions. To meet the emissions reduction target, the emissions 
generated from forestry and peatland as well as energy and transportation sectors will be 
expected to decline by 672 million tCO2e and 38 million tCO2e, respectively. More 
specifically, the government introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuels consumption as well as 
incentives to promote clean energy production through feed-in tariff schemes as one their 
key strategy framework to curb emissions from energy sectors.  
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Chapter 2 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is an essential data set to numerically calibrate the 
macro models in a convenient format. It is an extended version of the input-output table, 
for which it integrates detailed information on income distribution for institutions, 
production factors, and capital accumulation (BPS, 2008). Because a SAM represents the 
circular flow of economic transactions, it can then be used to investigate the effects of 
exogenous shocks or injections on endogenous account using a general equilibrium 
approach. For instance, an increase of demand in a specific sector in a SAM will affect the 
whole system through a multiplier process (Thorbecke, 2000). In CGE models, a SAM is 
used to calibrate the initial equilibrium condition and compare its shifting state induced by 
changing the exogenous variables (Yusuf, 2006). 
This chapter aims to present the principle of a SAM in general and its framework for 
Indonesia. It also discusses the preliminary modification of an existing SAM for Indonesia 
in the year 2008 such that it is fitted to calibrate the proposed CGE model given in the next 
chapter. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the standard SAM 
and the official Indonesian SAM for 2008 that cover its schematic structure and accounts 
classification. Section 2.4 discusses Indonesia’s macro-economy based on its existing SAM 
in year 2008. Section 2.5 discusses the preliminary modification of the official SAM by 
aggregating and eliminating some of its accounts. Section 2.6 provides conclusion and 
remarks. 
 
2.2. The SAM 
A SAM is a square matrix representation of economic accounts that records all transactions 
between agents in the socio-economic system. The transactions for each account are 
explicitly shown in the cells corresponding to the relevant rows and columns of the matrix. 
A SAM is usually understood to picture an economy’s equilibrium in which every agent’s 
total receipts should be balanced with its total expenditure account (established by the 
equality between the sums over each row and column). Table 1 shows the schematic 
structure of a standard SAM. 
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Table 2.1: Schematic Structure of SAM Framework 
 
Expenditure 
Endogenous Account 
Exogenous 
Account 
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re
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Activity 1  
Total cost of 
production 
   Gross output 
Commodity 2 
Intermediate 
inputs 
  
Institution 
consumption 
Export, and 
Investment   
Total 
demand for 
composite 
good 
Production 
Factor 
3 
Value Added 
distribution 
    
Factor 
income 
Institution 4   
Factor 
income to 
institutions’ 
 
Transfer 
from 
foreign, 
indirect tax 
and import 
tariff 
Institutions’ 
income 
Exogenous Account 5  
Imports, 
sales tax, 
and imports 
tariff 
Fixed capital 
consumption  
Institutions’ 
saving 
 
Exogenous 
income 
Total 6 
Production 
cost 
expenditure 
Total supply 
expenditure  
Factor 
expenditure 
Institutions’ 
expenditure 
Exogenous 
expenditure 
 
Source: Hartono and Resosudarmo (2007), a modification 
From Table 2.1, it can be seen that each row represents receipts and column represents 
expenditure, where the row sum for a given account must be equal to its corresponding 
column sum. The accounts are usually divided into two groups: endogenous and exogenous 
accounts. The endogenous accounts are commonly given in the leading rows and columns 
which usually consist of: production activities, commodities, factors, and institutions. The 
saving-investment, taxes, subsidies, and rest of world (import and export) are, on the other 
hand, usually allocated as exogenous accounts (Pyatt and Round, 1979). In addition, the 
table separates production activities and commodities accounts where their respective row 
sum (receipt) reflects the producer price and market price5. The price separation is 
important because it allows for: (i) multiple commodities production from each activity, 
and (ii) a given commodity production from multiple activities.  
The production factors’ accounts, which primarily comprise of labour and capital, are 
utilized as the inputs for processing the production activity. The income generated from 
these factors is then transferred to institutions’ accounts who supply them. In general, the 
labour account can be further disaggregated based on several categories, i.e. location, skill, 
                                                          
5 The producer price is the market price less import and taxes. 
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level of education, gender, and so on. However, the capital account usually remains as a 
single account. 
The institutions’ accounts record the transactions of households, firms, and the 
government. The labour factor is fully supplied by households whereas the capital factor 
can, in principle, be supplied by every institution. The government’s account records the 
indirect taxation and subsidies as well as direct taxes and transfers. However, taxes and 
subsidies appear in separate (exogenous) accounts and are presented outside the core 
government institution account to avoid ambiguous interpretation of payments.   
Finally, the standard SAM provides the exogenous accounts which record the details 
of inflows and outflows to and from the country – i.e. the account for the rest of the world 
showing the value of imports and exports and transfer to and from abroad for every 
institution as well as the net surplus or deficit of the balance of payments account – and the 
investment-saving balance – i.e. the surplus or deficit for each institution and their 
contribution to capital formation, etc. 
 
2.3. The Indonesian SAM 
The official Indonesian SAM is published by the Centre of Statistic Agency6 every five 
years. Its most recent SAM publication is for the year 2008. This SAM is represented in 
three different sizes of matrices: 13x13, 37x37, and 105x105. The 13x13 matrices are the 
aggregated version from the 37x37 matrices, and the 37x37 matrices are the aggregated 
version from the 105x105 matrices (BPS, 2008).      
The framework structure of the Indonesian SAM in year 2008 is similar to that of the 
standard SAM described above. However, the differences are mainly in the way it also 
separately records the specific imported commodities, and in providing two margin 
accounts – trade and transportation margins. Commission of the European Communities 
(1993) defines the trade margin as: “The difference between the actual or imputed price 
realized on a good purchased for resale and the price that would have to be paid by the 
distributor to replace the good at the time it is sold or otherwise disposed of”. Decaluwé et 
al. (2012) stated that the exclusion of these margins from industry’s production costs is 
intended to differentiate the actual price between final consumer and intermediate 
(retailers) buyers. The margins can be interpreted as the additional costs to final consumers 
in purchasing goods from the wholesalers or retailers. Table 2.2 illustrates how these 
margins are incorporated in the official SAM.  
                                                          
6 In Indonesia language:  Badan Pusat Statistik 
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Table 2.2: The Schematic Structure of Indonesian SAM 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Receipt 
Expenditures 
 Activities Commodities 
Margin of 
Trade and 
Transportation 
Factors 
Households Firm Government S-I 
Indirect 
Tax 
Import 
Tariff 
Subsidy ROW Total 
Labour Capital 
Activities - 
Total cost of 
production 
- - - - - - - - - 
Subsidy to 
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- 
Gross 
output 
Commodities 
Intermediate 
inputs 
- 
Commodity 
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Households 
consumption 
- 
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Export 
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- 
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distribution 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Domestic 
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Capital 
Capital input 
distribution 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Domestic 
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abroad 
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Capital 
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Households - - - 
Labour 
income 
Capital 
income 
Transfers  Transfers  Transfers  - - - - Transfers  
Total 
household 
income 
Firm - - - - 
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income 
Transfers  Transfers  Transfers  - - - - Transfers  
Total Firm 
income 
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Direct 
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receipt 
Transfers  Transfers  - 
Indirect 
Taxes 
receipt 
Tariffs 
receipt 
- Transfers  
Total 
Government 
income 
S-I - - - - - Saving Saving Saving - - - - - Total saving 
Indirect Tax - Sales taxes - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 
indirect 
taxes 
Import Tariff - Tariffs - - - - - - - - - - - Total tariffs 
Subsidy - - - - - - - 
Government 
expenditure 
for subsidy 
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Total 
subsidies 
ROW - Import - 
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domestic 
Transfers  Transfers  Transfers  
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Total ROW 
income 
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Production 
cost 
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Total supply 
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costs 
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expenditure 
Total 
investment 
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Total 
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expenditure 
TOTAL 
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The Indonesian SAM in year 2008 distinguishes 24 accounts for each activity, 
commodity, and imported commodity classification that is presented in Table 2.3. These 
sectors are aggregated from the 66 production sectors in the Indonesian Input-Output table in 
the year 2008.  
 
Table 2.3:The Classification for Each Activity, Commodity, and Import Commodity  
in Indonesian SAM 2008 
No Description 
1 Agriculture Food Crops 
2 Agriculture for Other Crops 
3 Cattle and the Outcomes 
4 Forestry and Hunting 
5 Fishery 
6 Coal, Metal Seeds, and Oil Mining 
7 Other Mining and Excavations 
8 Food, Drink, and Tobacco 
9 Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries 
10 Wood and Goods from Wood 
11 Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Goods from Metal and Industry 
12 Chemical, Fertilizer, Goods from Clay and Cement 
13 Electricity, Gas, and Drinkable Water 
14 Construction 
15 Trade 
16 Restaurant 
17 Hotel 
18 Land Transportation 
19 Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation 
20 Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse 
21 Bank and Assurance 
22 Real Estate, and Private Services 
23 Government and Defence, Education, Health, Film, and Other Social Services 
24 Individual Services, Households, and Other Services 
Source: BPS, 2008 
Furthermore, there are two main groups for the production factors namely: labour and 
non-labour (capital) account. The labour account is further classified into 16 groups based on 
worker skills, work status (casual/formal), and location (rural/urban), while the capital account 
remains in a single account. The classifications of these factors are given in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: The Classifications of Production Factors in Official SAM 2008 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Labour 
Agriculture 
Formal 
Rural 
Urban 
Informal 
Rural 
Urban 
Production, 
Transport 
Equipment 
Operators, 
Manual and 
Labour 
Formal 
Rural 
Urban 
Informal 
Rural 
 
Urban 
Administration, 
Sales, and 
Services 
Formal 
Rural 
Urban 
Informal 
Rural 
Urban 
Leader, 
Manager, 
Military, 
Professional, 
and Technician 
Formal 
Rural 
Urban 
Informal 
Rural 
Urban 
Non labour 
Source: BPS, 2008 
In the institution accounts, the official SAM distinguishes four main representatives: 
household, firm, government, and the rest of the world (ROW). Each group is further classified 
as follows: The household account is first disaggregated in two groups: (1) households who are 
working in an agricultural sector; and (2) households who are not working in agricultural area 
(non-agricultural sector). For (1) is further disaggregated in two groups: (1a) agricultural 
employee; and (1b) agricultural employer. Group (2) is disaggregated in two groups: (2a) non-
agricultural households who are located in rural area; and (2b) non-agricultural households 
who are located in urban area. Finally, each of (2a) and (2b) is subsequently disaggregated in 
three identical categories of occupational types: low income employee/employer, high income 
employee/employer, and non-labour forces/ unidentified occupation. Firm and government 
remain in a single account. The disaggregation of these accounts is shown in Table 2.5. 
Total income of households is obtained from a labour and capital endowment, and 
income transfers from institutions; while its expenditure is given to institution payment 
transfers and consumption on goods and services. The remainder is then considered as saving. 
Lastly, the Indonesian SAM also distinguishes four other accounts namely: (1) saving-
investment, (2) indirect tax, (3) subsidy, and (4) ROW account.    
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Table 2.5: The Classification of Institution Accounts in the Official SAM 2008 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
  
Household 
Agriculture 
Employee 
Employer 
Non 
Agriculture 
Rural 
Low level type of income for: independent employer, 
administration employee, salesman, independent employee 
in transportation sector, individual services, office 
employee  
Non-labour forces and unidentified types of occupation 
High level type of income for: independent employer, non- 
agricultural employer, manager, military, professionals, 
technician, teacher, administration officer, and salesman  
Urban 
Low level type of income for: independent employer, 
administration employee, salesman, independent employee 
in transportation sector, individual services, office 
employee 
Non-labour forces and unidentified types of occupation 
High level type of income for: independent employer, non- 
agricultural employer, manager, military, professionals, 
technician, teacher, administration officer, and salesman 
Firm  
Government 
Source: BPS, 2008 
Table 2.6 summarizes the structure of Indonesia’s economy based on the 13x13 matrices 
size of macro-SAM in the year 20087. The macro-SAM accounts consist of the aggregate of 24 
types of industry (and commodity), the aggregate of 16 types of labour, and the aggregate of 8 
types of representative households8. Each entry cell in the macro-SAM is valued at nominal 
2008 trillion Rupiah (Rp). It is commonly identified as a SAM (“row, column”) combination, 
i.e. the entry cell of SAM (“labour, activity”) refers to the wage earned by the labour factor. 
Activity and Commodity 
An activity produces output (goods and services) by utilizing the production factors and 
intermediate commodities input. The output is then supplied to the final consumers (Breisinger 
et al., 2010). Table 2.6 shows that there are 9 non-zero entries for these accounts. These entries 
are described as follows: (1) the total domestic supply: SAM (“activity, commodity”) is Rp. 
10,175.38 trillion; (2) the total subsidy allocation for activity: SAM (“activity, subsidy”) is Rp. 
199.70 trillion; (3) the total intermediate commodity input cost for activity: SAM (“commodity, 
activity”) is Rp. 5,218.15 trillion; (4) the total demand of commodity for trade and 
transportation margin: SAM (“commodity, trade and transportation margin”) is Rp. 1,170.98 
trillion; (5) the total household consumption for commodity: SAM (“commodity”, 
                                                          
7 Due to the large dimension of 105x105 matrix of Indonesian SAM in the year 2008, here we use the macro-
SAM to characterize the Indonesia’s economy. However, we use the modified of the prior SAM to calibrate the 
CGE model exercises. This modification is explained in details in section 2.5.  
8 For the sake of simplicity, we eliminate the intermediate import commodity accounts and allocate them into 
the corresponding commodity accounts. For the step details of these eliminations, see section 2. 
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“household”) is Rp. 3,318.10 trillion; (6) the total government consumption for commodity: 
SAM (“commodity”, “government”) is Rp. 294.57 trillion; (7) the total export of commodity: 
SAM (“commodity”, “ROW”) is Rp. 1,487.24 trillion; (8) the total gross capital formation 
(investment) of commodity: SAM (“commodity”, “S-I”) is Rp. 1,508.83 trillion; and (9) the 
total commodity required for the purpose of subsidy: SAM (“commodities, subsidy”) is Rp. 
41.19 trillion. 
Trade and Transportation Margin 
The Indonesian Macro-SAM in year 2008 records the trade and transportation margin account 
to differentiate the purchaser’s price between retailers (resale) and final consumers. This record 
is given in the entry cell of SAM (“trade and transportation margin, commodity”) which is Rp. 
1,170.98 trillion.  
Production Factors 
The production factors include the labour and capital account. The total costs of labour and 
capital from activity are given in the respective entries cell of SAM (“labour, activity”) and 
(“capital”, “activity”) which are Rp. 2,692.62 trillion and Rp. 2,464.32 trillion. These records 
imply that the aggregate activity (as a whole) in year 2008 was labour intensive (52.21%). The 
value added, estimated by the sums of production factors, is Rp. 5,156.94 trillion which is the 
GDP at factor cost (producer price). Further, the total labour wage and capital return which are 
endowed from ROW (used abroad) are recorded in the respective entries cell of SAM 
(“labour”, “ROW”) and SAM (“capital”, “ROW”), which are Rp. 1.71 trillion and Rp. 6.66 
trillion.   
Institutions 
Institutions’ account represents the transaction flows of household, firm, government, and 
ROW account. The households earn wages and capital return due to their factor endowments. 
These records are given in the respective entries cell of SAM (“households”, “labour”) and 
SAM (“households”, “capital”), which are Rp. 2,688.91 trillion and Rp. 788.55 trillion. In the 
other hand, the firm only earns income from capital return (Rp. 1,591.20 trillion), which is 
given in the entry cell of SAM (“firm”, “capital”). Government does not earn any factor returns 
but they earn receipts from collecting direct taxes (income tax), indirect taxes (output sales 
tax), and import tariffs.  These records are given in the respective entries cell of SAM 
(“government, households”), SAM (“government, indirect tax”), and SAM (“government, 
import tariff”), which are Rp. 85.07 trillion, Rp. 237.10 trillion, and Rp. 107.84 trillion. 
Furthermore, transactions between institutions are given by the entries cell of “institution, 
institution”. These transactions will become the additional income for institutions apart from 
factor endowments and taxes. The transactions from household to institutions are given 
respectively in the entries cell of SAM (“households”, “households”), SAM (“households”, 
“firm”), SAM (“households”, “government”), and SAM (“households”, “ROW”), which are 
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Rp. 43.36 trillion, Rp. 43.09 trillion, Rp. 199.03 trillion, and Rp. 63.51. The transactions from 
firm to institutions are identified in the respective entries cell of SAM (“firm”, “households”), 
SAM (“firm”, “firms”), SAM (“firm”, “government”), and SAM (“firm”, “ROW”), which are 
Rp. 35.16 trillion, Rp. 176.47 trillion, Rp. 89.69 trillion, and Rp. 24.18 trillion. The transfers 
from government to institutions are identified in the respective entries cell of SAM 
(“government”, “firms”), SAM (“government”, “government”), and SAM (“government”, 
“ROW”) Rp. 650.05 trillion, Rp. 181.68 trillion, and Rp. 2.29 trillion9. The transactions from 
ROW to institutions are recorded in the respective entries cell of SAM (“ROW”, households”), 
SAM (“ROW”, “firms”), and SAM (“ROW”, “government”), which are Rp. 19.29 trillion, Rp. 
56.50 trillion, and Rp. 28.70 trillion.  
Finally, total import supply: SAM (“ROW, commodity”) is Rp. 1,347.76 trillion and the 
abroad labour and capital used in domestic are given in the respective entries cell of SAM 
(“ROW”, “labour”), and SAM (“ROW”, “capital”), which are Rp. 5.42 trillion and Rp. 91.23 
trillion. 
Saving-Investment (S-I) 
The institution saving accounts, excluding the ROW, are recorded in the respective entry cells 
of SAM (“S-I”, “households”), SAM (“S-I”, “firm”), and SAM (“S-I, government”), which are 
Rp. 325.44 trillion, Rp. 990.60 trillion, and Rp. 229.47 trillion. Whilst, investment on 
commodities are recorded in entry cell of SAM (“commodity, S-I”). Total saving is equal to 
total of investment. 
Taxes and Subsidy 
The costs of sales tax and import tariff across commodities are given in the respective entry 
cells of SAM (“indirect tax”, “commodity”), and SAM (“import tariff”, “commodity”), which 
are Rp. 237.10 trillion and Rp. 107.84 trillion. Meanwhile, the government subsidy is recorded 
in the entry cell of (“subsidy”, “government”), which is Rp. 240.89 trillion. Total costs of taxes 
must be equal to the corresponding receipt to government; and total government expenditure 
on subsidy must be equal to the corresponding receipts to activity and commodity which are 
identified as SAM (“activity”, “subsidy”) and SAM (“commodity” and “subsidy”), 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The official Indonesia SAM 2008 allows the inter-transactions between government and government transfer. 
It means that the transactions are transferred between inter-ministries or inter-divisions within the government 
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Table 2.6: The Indonesian Macro-SAM 2008: 13x13 Matrices 
Source: BPS, 2008: A modification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Receipt 
Expenditures 
 Activities Commodities 
Margin of 
Trade and 
Transportation 
Factors 
Households Firm Government S-I 
Indirect 
Tax 
Import 
Tariff 
Subsidy ROW Total 
Labour Capital 
Activities 
                     
-         10,175.38                     -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
      
199.70  
                   
-    
     
10,375.08  
Commodities 
        
5,218.15                       -          1,170.98  
                   
-    
                   
-    
      
3,318.10  
                   
-    
       
   294.57  
      
1,508.83  
                
-    
                
-    
         
41.19  
      
1,487.24  
     
13,039.06  
Aggregated 
Margins of 
Trade 
(TRDM) and 
Transportation 
(TRNSM)              -            1,170.98                     -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
        
1,170.98  
F
a
c
to
r
s 
Labour 
        
2,692.62                       -                       -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
1.71  
        
2,694.32  
Capital         
2,464.32                       -                       -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
6.66  
        
2,470.97  
Households 
                     
-                         -                       -    
      
2,688.91  
         
788.55  
            
43.36  
            
43.09  
         
 199.03  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
            
63.51  
        
3,826.44  
Firm 
                     
-                         -                       -    
                   
-    
      
1,591.20  
            
35.16  
         
176.47  
          
   89.69  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
            
24.18  
        
1,916.70  
Government 
                     
-                         -                       -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
            
85.07  
         
650.05  
       
   181.68  
                   
-    
      
237.10  
      
107.84  
                
-    
              
2.29  
        
1,264.03  
S-I 
                     
-                         -                       -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
         
325.44  
         
990.60  
      
    229.47  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
        
1,545.51  
Indirect Tax 
                     
-    
        
    237.10                     -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
           
237.10  
Import Tariff 
                     
-    
      
      107.84                     -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-                       -    
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
           
107.84  
Subsidy 
                     
-                         -                       -    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
                   
-    
      
    240.89  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
           
240.89  
ROW 
                     
-    
       
  1,347.76                     -    
              
5.42  
            
91.23  
            
19.29  
            
56.50  
         
    28.70  
            
36.68  
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                   
-    
        
1,585.58  
Total 
   
10,375.08  
    
  13,039.06  
    
  1,170.98  
  
2,694.32  
      
2,470.97  
      
3,826.44  
      
1,916.70        1,264.03  
      
1,545.51  
      
237.10  
      
107.84  
      
240.89  
      
1,585.58  
     
40,474.52  
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2.4. An Overview of Indonesia’s Macro-Economy Indicators 
By referring to the Macro-SAM in the year 2008 in Table 2.6 above, numerous Indonesia’s 
macro-economy indicators such as GDP at market price, GDP at factor cost, GNP, domestic 
and foreign saving, and other external transactions can be estimated. There are two approaches 
for estimating these indicators which are either the expenditure (column) or income (row) side 
(Ethiopian Development Research Institute, 2009).  
On the expenditure side, GDP at market prices is measured from the total final demand 
of institutions. Whilst from income side, it is measured as the sum of value added, output tax 
(indirect tax), and import tariffs (Breisinger et al., 2009). The value added is GDP at factor cost 
(producer prices). Thus, in other words, GDP at factor cost is GDP at market price excluding 
indirect taxes and import tariffs.  
The GNP is the total GDP at market prices less net factor payments (income approach). 
Whilst from the expenditure side, it is measured from the sum of domestic consumption 
(household and government), investment and the net investment abroad (expenditure approach) 
(Li, 2002).  
Furthermore, total saving is the sum of both domestic and external saving. Following 
Walrasian’s law, these total saving should be equal to its expenditure side which is total 
investment. Finally, the external transactions, which cover total export (income) and import 
(expenditure) accounts, can also be estimated through its equality law. 
In terms of equations identity, the above indicators are measured as follows10:  
𝐴𝐷 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃 =  𝐶 +  𝐼 +  𝐺 +  𝑋 –  𝑀 =  𝑉𝐴 +  𝐼𝐷𝑇 +  𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵                            1) 
or 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹𝐶 +  𝐼𝐷𝑇 +  𝑇𝐴𝑅 − 𝑆𝑈𝐵                                                                                   2) 
𝐺𝑁𝑃 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃 − 𝐹𝑝 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝐼𝑛                                                                                          3) 
𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇𝑆𝐷 − 𝑇𝑆𝐹 = (𝑆ℎ + 𝑆𝑓 + 𝑆𝑔) − 𝑇𝑆𝐹 = 𝐼                                                                            4) 
𝑋 + 𝐷𝑓 = 𝑀                                                                                                                                              5)
           
Where: 
𝐴𝐷  = Aggregate demand 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃 = GDP at market price 
𝐶  = Household consumption 
𝐼  = Investment 
𝐺  = Government consumption 
𝑋  = Exports 
𝑀  = Imports 
VA  = Value added 
𝐼𝐷𝑇  = Output tax 
𝑇𝐴𝑅  = Import tariff 
𝑆𝑈𝐵  = Subsidy; 
                                                          
10 Note that there are numerous equations to estimate macro-economy indicators. This is because the SAM is 
insured to be consistent and balanced (Thorbecke, 2000).  
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𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹𝐶 = GDP at factor cost 
𝐺𝑁𝑃  = Gross National Product 
𝐹𝑝  = Net factor of payments 
𝐼𝑛  = Investment to abroad 
𝑇𝑆  = Total saving 
𝑇𝑆𝐷  = Total saving in domestic 
𝑇𝑆𝐹  = Total saving in foreign 
𝑆ℎ  = Household saving 
𝑆𝑓  = Firm saving 
𝑆𝑔  = Government saving 
𝐷𝑓  = current account deficit 
 
The implementation of these equations into the macro-SAM are given as follows: 
 
GDPMP =    SAM(C,HH) + SAM(C, GOV) + SAM(C, GOV) + SAM(C, S − I) +
SAM(C, ROW) − SAM(ROW,C)        6) 
or 
GDPM = SAM(L, A) + SAM(K, A) + SAM(IDT, C) + SAM(TAR, C) − SAM(SUB, GOV) 7) 
 
GDPFP = SAM(L, A) + SAM(K, A)        8) 
GNP = SAM(C, HH) + SAM(C, GOV) + SAM(C, S − I) + SAM(ROW, S − I)  9) 
or 
GNP = GDPMP − (SAM(ROW, FIRM) + SAM(ROW,HH) + SAM(ROW, GOV) +
SAM(ROW, L) + SAM(ROW,K) − SAM(GOV, ROW) − SAM(HH,ROW) −
SAM(FIRM,ROW) − SAM(L, ROW) − SAM(K, ROW))     10) 
TS = SAM(K,HH) + SAM(K, FIRM) + SAM(K, GOV) − SAM(ROW,K)   11) 
or 
TS = SAM(C, S − I)          12) 
SAM(C, ROW) − SAM(ROW,HH) − SAM(ROW, FIRM) − SAM(ROW, GOV) −
SAM(ROW, L) − SAM(ROW,K) − SAM(ROW, S − I) + SAM(HH,ROW) +
SAM(FIRM,ROW) + SAM(GOV, ROW) + SAM(L, ROW) + SAM(K, ROW)  =
SAM(ROW, C)           13) 
Where: 
𝐶 = Commodities 
𝐴 = Activities 
𝐾 = Capital 
𝐿 = Labour 
𝐻𝐻 = Households 
𝐺𝑜𝑣 = Government 
𝑆 − 𝐼 = Saving-Investment 
𝑇𝐴𝑅 = Import tariff 
𝐼𝐷𝑇 = Indirect tax 
𝑅𝑂𝑊 = Rest of world 
𝐼 = Investment 
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The estimation of national income accounts for Indonesia’s economy based on the macro-SAM 
in the year 2008 is presented in Table 2.7. The Indonesia’s GDP at market prices, GNP, total 
saving and investment, and ROW transactions are: 5,260.99 trillion Rupiah, 5,158.19 trillion 
Rupiah, 1,508.83 trillion Rupiah, and 1,347.77 trillion Rupiah, respectively. These estimations 
are obtained from either income (row) or expenditure (column) side approach.  
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Table 2.7: Indonesia’s Macro-Economy Indicators Based on The Macro-SAM 2008 
(Trillion Rupiah, 2008 nominal price) 
Macro-economy 
Indicator Approach 
 Income side Expenditure side 
GDPMP 
GDPFC or total 
value added  
5,156.94 
Household 
consumption 
3,318.10 
Output tax 237.1 Investment  294.57 
Import Tariff 107.84 
Government 
consumption 
1,508.83 
Subsidy -240.89 
Export 1,487.24 
Import 5,260.98 
Total  5,260.99 Total  5,260.99 
GNP 
GDPMP 5,260.99 
Household 
consumption 
3,318.10 
Households transfer 
to ROW 
63.51 Investment 294.57 
Firm transfer to 
ROW 
24.18 
Government 
consumption 
1,508.83 
Government transfer 
to ROW 
2.29 
Investment to 
abroad 
36.68 
Labour used in 
ROW 
1.71 
 
Capital used in 
ROW 
6.66 
ROW transfer to 
household 
-19.29 
ROW transfer to 
firm 
-56.50 
ROW transfer to 
government 
-28.70 
ROW labour -5.42 
ROW capital -91.23 
Total  5,158.19 Total  5,158.19 
Saving-Investment 
Households saving 325.44 Investment 1508.83 
Firm saving 990.6 
 Government saving 229.47 
ROW saving 36.68 
Total 1,508.83 total 1,508.83 
ROW transaction 
Export  Import 1,347.77 
Households transfer 
to ROW 
63.51 
 
Firm transfer to 
ROW 
24.18 
Government transfer 
to ROW 
2.29 
Labour used in 
ROW 
1.71 
Capital used in 
ROW 
6.66 
ROW transfer to 
household 
-19.29 
ROW transfer to 
firm 
-56.50 
ROW transfer to 
government 
-28.70 
ROW labour -5.42 
ROW capital -91.23 
Investment to ROW 36.68 
Total 1,347.77 Total 1,347.77 
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2.4.1. Shares of GDP Generated by Activity 
The GDP (at producer prices) shares are obtained from the calculation of value added shares 
of each activity. By estimating these shares, we can determine which activity contributed the 
most to factors’ income. Table 2.8 presents the shares of GDP generated by activity.  
 The chemical industries (consisting of fuel refineries, fertilizer, clays materials, and 
cement) contribute the largest share of GDP at producer prices, which is 10.50%. The second 
and third largest sectors are: trade sector (9.69%) and mining sector (9.42%). These shares 
show that Indonesia’s economy is heavily dependent on these sectors. Electricity, gas, and 
clean water sectors aggregate contributed only around 2.47%; while the hotel sector has the 
smallest contribution by 0.50% (BPS, 2008). It implies that hotel sector is less significant to 
generate GDP compared to mining and chemical industries. 
 
2.4.2. Shares of Factors’ Income (Value Added)    
In the SAM, employment bills are measured as worker equivalents (𝑊𝐸), where 1 𝑊𝐸 is equal 
to 1 worker who works 40 hours per week. Thus, a worker who works less than 40 hours per 
week, is accounted as less than 1 𝑊𝐸. The average wage per 𝑊𝐸 in the year 2008 was 
24,825.88 thousand Rupiah.    
As shown in Table 2.9, the most capital-intensive sectors are energy sectors indicated by 
their higher cost shares on capital than labour. For example, the cost shares of capital to total 
value added in the mining, utilities (electricity, clean water, and city gas), and petrochemical 
sector are approximately 87.64%, 87.17%, 69.23%, respectively. In contrast, the most labour-
intensive sectors are agricultural and trade sector where the cost shares of labour employments 
to total value added are about 94.42% and 88.31%, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: The Shares of GDP at Producer Prices 
Sector 
% share in GDP at 
market prices 
Sector 
% share in GDP at 
market prices 
Agriculture Food Crops 7.32 
Electricity, gas, and 
drinkable water 
2.47 
Agriculture for Other 
Crops 
2.50 Construction 8.29 
Cattle Products 2.52 Trade 9.69 
Forestry and Hunting 
Products 
0.78 Restaurant 2.25 
Fishery 2.60 Hotel 0.45 
Coal, Oil, and Iron Ore 
Mining 
9.42 Land Transportation 2.05 
Other Mining 1.22 
Air, Sea, and 
Communication 
Transportation 
3.59 
Food, Drink, and 
Tobacco 
5.56 
Services for 
Transportation 
0.51 
Textile 2.11 Bank and Assurance 3.39 
Timber Products 1.40 Real Estate 3.84 
Papers and Printing 8.36 
Government services and 
Defense 
6.41 
Chemical and Petroleum 10.50 
Individual and Other 
Services 
2.75 
 
Table 2.9: The Shares of Value Added 
Sector Labour Capital 
Agriculture Food Crops 94.42 5.58 
Agriculture for Other Crops 82.55 17.45 
Cattle Products 70.51 29.49 
Forestry and Hunting Products 38.12 61.88 
Fishery 36.89 63.11 
Coal, Oil, and Iron Ore Mining 12.36 87.64 
Other Mining 74.04 25.96 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 41.94 58.06 
Textile 42.16 57.84 
Timber Products 49.73 50.27 
Papers and Printing 41.58 58.42 
Chemical and Petroleum 30.77 69.23 
Electricity, gas, and drinkable water 12.83 87.17 
Construction 46.98 53.02 
Trade 88.31 11.69 
Restaurant 89.75 10.25 
Hotel 39.57 60.43 
Land Transportation 82.38 17.62 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
36.83 63.17 
Services for Transportation 77.16 22.84 
Bank and Assurance 30.38 69.62 
Real Estate 22.99 77.01 
Government services and Defense 86.56 13.44 
Individual and Other Services 60.65 39.35 
Total 94.42 5.58 
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2.4.3. Shares of Intermediate Input for Each Activity 
By estimating the shares of intermediate commodity input used in activity, we can determine 
which commodity contributes the most to produce the output. Table 2.10 shows the shares of 
intermediate input for each activity.  
Based on our findings, mining commodities are the most important intermediate input. 
In the petrochemical sector, for example, the shares of mining inputs to total output are 24.61%. 
This means that to produce 100 rupiahs-worth of petrochemical output requires 24.61 rupiahs-
worth of mining inputs. Mining inputs are also largely used for their own activity (13.68%) and 
electricity generation (10.63%). Moreover, electricity sector also depends on petrochemical 
input (17.46%). These results imply that in year of 2008, the electricity sector in Indonesia was 
heavily depended on fossil fuel inputs.  
 
2.4.4. Shares of Trade (Import and Export) 
The shares of each commodity trade are presented in table 2.11. In terms of types of energy 
commodities’, our finding shows that in year 2008, Indonesia was not depended on the import 
of energy mining and electricity. This is reflected from their shares of total import, which are 
0.52% and 0% respectively. Nevertheless, the import share of secondary energy types of 
commodities (refineries products) was relatively as high as its export shares: 24.36% and 
23.74% respectively. In other hand, the electricity production was not exported (zero shares). 
But the mining commodities were hugely exported whereas about 16.67% of total national 
export. 
 
2.4.5. Shares of Commodity as Final Demand 
Table 2.12 presents the shares of commodities that are used as intermediate input in total 
activities and final demand for institutions’. These shares are estimated from the given formula: 
(
𝑋𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖
), where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑗 represent commodity type-𝑖 and consumer type-𝑗 respectively. 
For the sake of simplicity, we aggregate the following accounts: (1) the margins (trade and 
transport) account to the corresponding activity account; (2) subsidies transaction to the 
government account; and (3) eight types of households in a single account. 
Based on our estimation, mining commodity is used mostly as intermediate input 
(7.11%), investment (4.79%), and export (16.67%). The household, however, does not 
consume this commodity (zero demand). On the other hand, petrochemical commodity is 
mostly distributed to activity and institutions’ – excluding investment, which is indicated 
through its respective shares in activity (16.15%), households (9.35%), government (16.50%), 
and export (23.40%). While, electricity contributes only in small shares, which is: activity 
(1.29%), households (1.18%), and government (0.85%).  
Moreover, the households budget is mainly spent on food (including drink and tobacco) 
(22.83%). While the government spends more than a half of their budget (52.97%) on their 
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own services – government services and defenses. The largest investment shares are given to 
construction (75.83%). 
These results imply that in year 2008, the mining commodities were used mostly as 
intermediate inputs and exports. The small shares of households’ expenditure on electricity 
might be related from subsidy on electricity, where the price was cheaper than market price.  
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Table 2.10: The Shares of Intermediate Commodity to Activity 
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AGRI_C 
                    
4.17  
                
0.17  
                
2.79  
                 
-    
               
0.37  
                   
-    
              
-    
             
27.61  
                     
-    
              
-    
               
0.03  
                
0.07  
                   
-    
                
-    
             
0.05  
                
8.28  
             
4.57  
                      
-    
             
0.02  
                 
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
             
6.15  
                   
-    
OAGRI_C 
                    
2.53  
                
6.43  
                
0.81  
             
3.97  
                   
0.36  
                   
-    
              
-    
             
10.84  
                  
4.53  
             
0.82  
                   
0.11  
                
3.88  
                   
-    
                
-    
             
0.00  
                
0.46  
             
0.04  
                   
0.00  
                
0.00  
                 
-    
               
0.00  
                   
-    
             
0.10  
                
0.28  
CATLE_C 
                    
3.48  
                
2.08  
              
19.94  
                   
-    
               
0.08  
                   
-    
              
-    
               
1.20  
                
3.61  
             
0.00  
                   
0.03  
                
0.03  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
           
23.07  
             
14.82  
                    
0.03  
                
0.05  
                 
-    
                  
-    
             
0.00  
                
2.42  
                   
-    
FORH_C 
                    
0.00  
                
0.04  
                
0.02  
             
2.16  
                   
0.08  
                
0.00  
             
0.16  
                   
0.05  
                
0.04  
           
13.94  
                    
0.20  
                
0.07  
                
0.00  
                
2.01  
                
0.00  
                
0.02  
             
0.03  
                   
0.00  
                   
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
             
0.01  
                
0.00  
                
0.11  
FISH_C 
                       
-    
             
0.01  
                   
-    
              
-    
             
12.72  
                     
-    
              
-    
               
5.60  
                
0.00  
                 
-    
               
0.07  
                
0.00  
                   
-    
                
-    
                
-    
             
3.97  
             
1.94  
                      
-    
             
0.02  
                 
-    
                  
-    
             
0.11  
                
0.66  
                   
-    
COMOIL_C 
                       
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
           
13.68  
                   
-    
               
0.07  
                
0.20  
             
0.06  
                   
4.90  
              
24.61  
                
10.63  
                  
0.00  
                   
-    
                
-    
          
0.04  
                   
0.03  
                   
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
OMINE_C 
                       
-    
             
0.00  
                
0.00  
                 
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
          
0.74  
                   
0.05  
                
0.00  
                 
-    
               
0.03  
                
1.11  
                   
-    
             
7.41  
                
0.00  
                
0.00  
                 
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
             
0.24  
                   
-    
FODT_C 
                       
-    
             
0.24  
              
25.29  
                   
-    
               
4.60  
                   
-    
              
-    
             
18.58  
                  
0.58  
             
0.53  
                   
0.08  
                
0.40  
                   
-    
                
-    
             
0.13  
              
20.94  
             
14.75  
                    
0.04  
                
1.04  
             
0.28  
                   
0.11  
                
0.32  
                
4.89  
                
0.19  
STGL_C 
                    
0.05  
                
0.11  
                
0.00  
             
0.23  
                   
0.01  
                
0.03  
             
0.04  
                   
0.03  
              
29.46  
               
0.42  
                   
0.25  
                
0.29  
                
0.01  
                
0.09  
                
0.98  
                
0.74  
             
0.33  
                   
0.19  
                
0.13  
             
0.36  
                   
0.02  
                
0.26  
                
0.27  
                
0.99  
WOOG_C 
                    
0.02  
                
0.04  
                
0.01  
                 
-    
               
0.09  
                   
-    
          
0.12  
                   
0.03  
                
0.06  
           
22.26  
                    
0.56  
                
0.03  
                   
-    
             
5.60  
                
0.49  
                
0.01  
             
0.01  
                   
0.01  
                
0.00  
             
0.08  
                   
0.00  
                
0.01  
                
0.06  
                
0.07  
PPTM_C 
                    
0.11  
                
1.12  
                
0.03  
             
6.26  
                   
1.18  
                
2.16  
             
1.90  
                   
1.07  
                
2.14  
             
2.56  
                 
40.02  
                  
1.13  
                
1.50  
              
25.94  
                  
3.48  
                
0.08  
             
0.54  
                   
2.64  
                
6.26  
             
2.26  
                   
2.45  
                
5.86  
                
5.05  
              
28.24  
CHFCC_C 
                    
7.95  
              
17.71  
                  
1.17  
             
3.33  
                   
5.66  
                
1.47  
             
8.45  
                   
1.68  
              
14.09  
               
8.51  
                 
11.38  
                
18.06  
                
17.46  
                
17.64  
                  
6.34  
                
0.61  
             
0.53  
                 
28.83  
                
13.79  
               
2.48  
                   
1.01  
                
1.80  
                
5.38  
              
11.40  
ELEGD_C 
                    
0.00  
                
0.02  
                
0.17  
             
0.09  
                   
0.12  
                
0.05  
             
0.07  
                   
0.18  
                
1.91  
             
0.85  
                   
1.16  
                
0.58  
                
6.22  
                
0.03  
                
2.51  
                
0.18  
             
0.31  
                   
0.43  
                
0.89  
             
2.73  
                   
0.54  
                
0.58  
                
0.35  
                
1.16  
CONS_C 
                    
0.22  
                
2.69  
                
0.05  
             
2.08  
                   
0.30  
                
0.61  
             
5.11  
                   
0.02  
                
0.24  
             
0.04  
                   
0.15  
                
0.09  
                
0.49  
                
0.10  
                
2.92  
                
0.02  
             
0.08  
                   
0.54  
                
1.27  
           
10.19  
                    
0.61  
                
5.47  
                
0.70  
                
0.31  
TRDE_C 
                       
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
                
-    
                
-    
RSTR_C 
                    
0.03  
                
0.06  
                
0.00  
             
0.14  
                   
0.17  
                
0.00  
             
0.79  
                   
0.13  
                
0.46  
             
0.46  
                   
0.31  
                
0.22  
                
0.03  
                
0.61  
                
1.99  
                
0.03  
             
0.35  
                   
0.32  
                
0.85  
             
0.41  
                   
0.35  
                
0.62  
                
0.27  
                
0.42  
HTEL_C 
                    
0.00  
                
0.01  
                
0.00  
             
0.01  
                   
0.00  
                
0.02  
             
0.03  
                   
0.03  
                
0.11  
             
0.00  
                   
0.06  
                
0.04  
                
0.01  
                
0.10  
                
0.27  
                
0.03  
             
0.04  
                   
0.03  
                
0.29  
             
0.06  
                   
0.19  
                
0.16  
                
0.04  
                
0.14  
LANT_C 
                    
0.20  
                
0.51  
                
0.12  
             
0.67  
                   
0.03  
                
0.26  
             
0.97  
                   
0.29  
                
0.79  
             
1.60  
                   
0.93  
                
0.32  
                
0.08  
                
0.30  
                
4.62  
                
0.02  
             
0.07  
                   
0.85  
                
0.15  
             
0.48  
                   
0.55  
                
0.53  
                
0.25  
                
0.18  
AISCOM_C 
                    
0.02  
                
0.10  
                
0.07  
             
1.06  
                   
0.18  
                
0.57  
             
0.27  
                   
0.40  
                
1.15  
             
1.93  
                   
1.13  
                
0.67  
                
0.10  
                
0.61  
                
4.75  
                
0.05  
             
0.52  
                   
2.04  
                
6.04  
             
7.98  
                   
2.06  
                
2.46  
                
0.81  
                
0.95  
SUPPS_C 
                    
0.01  
                
0.03  
                
0.01  
             
0.16  
                   
0.02  
                
0.02  
             
0.07  
                   
0.10  
                
0.29  
             
0.79  
                   
0.26  
                
0.11  
                
0.00  
                   
-    
             
0.25  
                
0.00  
             
0.08  
                   
0.94  
                
4.94  
             
6.63  
                   
0.06  
                
0.11  
                
0.04  
                
0.01  
BANKAS_C 
                    
0.23  
                
3.30  
                
0.27  
             
0.95  
                   
0.49  
                
0.38  
             
0.65  
                   
0.89  
                
1.78  
             
1.62  
                   
1.16  
                
0.74  
                
0.50  
                
1.02  
                
6.53  
                
0.28  
             
0.26  
                   
2.21  
                
2.66  
             
1.99  
                 
20.47  
                  
3.44  
                
0.59  
                
0.65  
ESTPRV_C 
                    
0.18  
                
0.30  
                
0.11  
             
0.67  
                   
0.03  
                
0.48  
             
1.39  
                   
0.34  
                
0.69  
             
0.71  
                   
1.67  
                
0.36  
                
0.96  
                
2.95  
              
10.07  
                  
0.33  
             
0.80  
                   
1.98  
                
3.07  
             
5.33  
                   
3.38  
                
2.65  
                
1.66  
                
2.75  
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GOVTD_C 
                       
-    
                
-    
                
-    
              
-    
                  
-    
                
-    
              
-    
               
0.42  
                
0.25  
             
0.37  
                   
0.24  
                
0.31  
                
0.01  
                   
-    
             
0.08  
                
0.07  
             
0.63  
                   
0.00  
                
0.61  
             
0.52  
                   
0.73  
                
1.16  
                
2.40  
                
0.64  
INDSHO_C 
                    
0.16  
                
1.36  
                
0.20  
             
1.48  
                   
0.05  
                
0.62  
             
2.29  
                   
0.28  
                
0.44  
             
0.85  
                   
0.72  
                
0.32  
                
0.08  
                
0.53  
                
2.76  
                
0.05  
             
0.04  
                 
19.12  
                  
1.32  
             
3.49  
                   
2.21  
                
5.31  
                
0.65  
                
0.67  
Labour 
Shares 
                  
76.13  
                
52.58  
                
34.51  
             
29.25  
                  
27.10  
                  
9.85  
           
56.97  
                  
12.62  
                
15.67  
             
20.71  
                  
14.37  
                
14.33  
                  
7.95  
              
16.47  
                
45.72  
                
36.57  
             
23.43  
                  
32.76  
                
20.84  
             
42.23  
                  
19.82  
                
15.90  
                
58.02  
                
30.83  
Capital 
Shares 
                    
4.50  
              
11.11  
                
14.43  
             
47.49  
                  
46.36  
                
69.81  
             
19.97  
                  
17.48  
                
21.51  
             
20.93  
                  
20.19  
                
32.23  
                
53.98  
                
18.59  
                  
6.05  
                
4.18  
           
35.79  
                    
7.01  
              
35.75  
             
12.50  
                  
45.42  
                
53.24  
                  
9.01  
              
20.01  
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: own calculation 
Note: AGRI_C: Agriculture Food Crops commodity; OAGRI_C: Agriculture for Other Crops commodity; CATLE_C: Cattle and the Outcomes commodity; FORH_C: Forestry  
and Hunting commodity; FISH_C: Fishery commodity; COMOIL_C: Coal, Metal Seeds, and Oil Mining commodity; OMINE_C: Other Mining and Excavations commodity; 
FODT_C: Food, Drink, and Tobacco commodity; STGL_C: Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries commodity; WOOG_C: Wood and Goods from Wood 
commodity; PPTM_C: Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Goods from Metal and Industry commodity; CHFCC_C: Chemical, Fertilizer, Goods from Clay and Cement 
commodity; ELECGD_C: Electricity, Gas, and Drinkable Water commodity; CONS_C: Construction commodity; TRDE_C: Trade commodity; RSTR_C: Restaurant 
commodity; HTEL_C: Hotel commodity; LANT_C: Land Transportation commodity; AISCOM_C: Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation commodity; SUPPS_C: 
Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse commodity; BANKAS_C: Bank and Assurance commodity; ESTPRV_C: Real Estate, and Private Services commodity; 
GOVTD_C: Government and Defense, Education, Health, Film, and Other Social Services commodity; INDSHO_C: Individual Services, Households, and Other Services 
commodity 
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Table 2.11: The Shares of International Trade 
Commodity Import Export 
Agriculture Food Crops 3.35 0.06 
Agriculture for Other Crops 2.23 1.55 
Cattle Products 0.37 0.04 
Forestry and Hunting Products 0.04 0.03 
Fishery 0.01 0.26 
Coal, Oil, and Iron Ore Mining 0.52 16.67 
Other Mining 0.78 0.08 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 7.72 13.82 
Textile 5.04 8.07 
Timber Products 0.25 3.14 
Papers and Printing 55.34 23.16 
Chemical and Petroleum 24.36 23.74 
Electricity, gas, and drinkable water                -                   -    
Construction              -                 -    
Trade              -                 -    
Restaurant                   -    0.88 
Hotel                   -    1.76 
Land Transportation              -    0.08 
Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation                    -    3.59 
Services for Transportation               -    0.36 
Bank and Assurance                    -    0.25 
Real Estate                  -    0.94 
Government services and Defense                   -    1.45 
Individual and Other Services 0 0.07 
Total 100 100 
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Table 2.12: The Shares of Commodities 
 Activities Households Government S-I ROW Total 
Agriculture Food Crops 5.45 8.48  -0.49 0.06 4.78 
Agriculture for Other 
Crops 3.08 0.47 0.01 0.05 1.55 1.81 
Cattle Products 2.82 5.62  -0.53 0.04 2.75 
Forestry and Hunting 
Products 0.85 0.20  0.20 0.03 0.50 
Fishery 1.46 4.66  -0.34 0.26 1.89 
Coal, Oil, and Iron Ore 
Mining 7.11   4.79 16.67 5.94 
Other Mining 1.66 0.04  0.00 0.08 0.83 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 5.60 22.83  -1.81 13.82 9.92 
Textile 1.77 3.43 0.45 0.90 8.07 2.78 
Timber Products 1.88 1.17 0.03 0.78 3.14 1.67 
Papers and Printing 16.67 11.50 5.41 22.48 23.16 16.48 
Chemical and Petroleum 16.15 9.35 16.50 -3.20 23.74 13.05 
Electricity, gas, and 
drinkable water 1.29 1.18 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.95 
Construction 1.29 0.00 5.10 75.83 0.00 9.54 
Trade 15.64    0.00 7.66 
Restaurant 0.74 6.91 4.08  0.88 2.32 
Hotel 0.13 0.63 0.96  1.76 0.45 
Land Transportation 3.04 2.24 1.62  0.08 2.11 
Air, Sea, and 
Communication 
Transportation 2.88 4.55 3.71  3.59 3.07 
Services for Transportation 0.80 0.15 0.46  0.36 0.48 
Bank and Assurance 3.36 1.67 1.96  0.25 2.15 
Real Estate 3.52 3.06 1.23 0.16 0.94 2.66 
Government services and 
Defense 0.54 8.29 52.97 0.13 1.45 3.92 
Individual and Other 
Services 2.27 3.59 4.65 1.04 0.07 2.27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: own calculation 
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2.5. Preliminary Modifications of SAM  
The official Indonesian SAM in the year 2008 (the version of 105x105 matrix) has a 
number of differences compared to the traditional SAM, of which it adds the accounts of 
intermediate import commodities, and trade and transportation margin. Since our main 
interest does not necessarily focus on price discrepancies between producers and market 
sellers, and international trade, we propose to modify this official SAM into its standard 
form by eliminating the intermediate import commodities and margin accounts (trade and 
transportation). This SAM can then be employed to calibrate the standard CGE model that 
is discussed in the next chapter.  
  
2.5.1. First Level of Modification: The Elimination of Imported Commodity 
Accounts (Rows and Columns) 
The official SAM extends its standard form, in which it records not only activity and 
commodity but also detailed transactions of imported commodities. In other words, it is 
more comprehensive than the traditional structure since it also adds detailed transactions 
related to: (1) the intermediate inputs of imported commodities used across activities: SAM 
(“import commodity”, “activity”); (2) the consumption of imported commodities across 
domestic institutions: SAM (“import commodity”, “institution”); (3) specific supply of 
import from ROW: SAM (“ROW”, “import commodity”); and (4) tariff of each imported 
commodity: SAM (“indirect tax”, “imported commodity”). These records imply that 
producers (and consumers) would utilize the specific import and domestic commodities as 
intermediate inputs (and final consumption). 
The additional transactions given above are obviously more than sufficient to 
calibrate the CGE model. However, when one starts to upgrade some accounts, i.e. 
disaggregating the activity or households’ account, the specific imported commodity 
accounts must therefore be disaggregated too. We argue that the supporting information to 
disaggregate the import commodities, especially in the case of energy specific, is limited. 
Also since the CGE model we used for analysis is not specifically focused on international 
trade, we propose to reduce the size of this SAM by eliminating the imported commodity 
accounts and allocating these values into commodity account. Therefore, the official SAM 
is then restored to its standard form, in which the SAM dataset distinguishes only specific 
activity and commodity; while the import transactions are simply recorded as an aggregated 
account: SAM (“ROW”, “Commodity”).  
The steps to eliminate the imported commodity accounts are as follows: (1) we take 
each entry cell in: SAM (“Import Commodity”, “Activity”) and add it to its corresponding 
SAM (“Commodity”, “Activity”) account; (2) we take each entries cell in: SAM (“Import 
Commodity”, “Institution”) and add it to its corresponding SAM (“Commodity”, 
“Institution”); (3) we take each entries cell in: SAM (“Import Balance”, “Saving-
Investment”) and add it to the corresponding SAM (“Commodity”, “Saving-Investment”) 
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account; (4) we take each entries cell in: SAM (“Import Commodity”, “Subsidy”) and add 
it to its corresponding SAM (“Commodity”, “Subsidy”) account; (6) we take each entries 
cell in: SAM (“ROW”, “Import Commodity”) and add it to its corresponding SAM 
(“ROW”, “Commodity”) account; (7) we take each entries cell in: SAM (“Trade Margin”, 
“Import “Commodity”) and add it to its corresponding SAM (“Trade Margin”, 
“Commodity”) account; and (8) we take each entries cell in: SAM (“Transportation 
Margin”, “Import Commodity”) and add it to its corresponding SAM (“Transportation 
Margin”, “Commodity”) account.   
Finally, because the imported commodity accounts (rows and columns) have been 
eliminated, thus the tariff records for each imported commodity, which are given in the 
SAM (“Indirect tax”, “imported commodity”), should be moved into a new row of the 
account: (“tariff”, “commodity”). 
 
2.5.2. Second Level of Modification: The Elimination of Trade and Transportation 
Margins (Row and Columns) 
The official SAM also records the trade and transportation margin. According to BPS 
(2008), these margins are aimed to identify the transaction discrepancies between prices of 
final consumers and traders (retailers or wholesales). The margins cover: (1) the traders 
receipt for commodity resale; and (2) the transportation costs for distributing the 
commodities from producers to final consumers. 
From the SAM framework, we notice that the value of trade margin account (TRDM) 
is obtained from the entries cell of trade commodity account (TRDE_C). This is reflected 
from commodity-activity transactions where all producers do not purchase input of 
intermediate trade commodity: SAM (“TRDE_C”, “activity”) is equal to zero. Also, final 
consumers (institutions) do not purchase trade commodity. TRDE_C is only absorbed for 
TRDM account. Thus, this transaction implies that total receipt of TRDE_C (row) is equal 
with the total expenditure (column) of TRDM. We find that the SAM allows a mechanism 
of purchasing transactions where retailer (or wholesale) traders will purchase the 
commodities from activity suppliers in the level of price excluding trade margin cost. These 
traders will then mark-up the price by adding this margin for resale distribution to final 
consumers.  
The transportation margin account (TRNSM) covers the additional costs of 
distributing the commodities from traders to consumers. TRNSM is obtained from the 
shares of each type of transportation account, namely land transportation (LANT), air, sea, 
and communication transportation (AISCOM), and supporting services (i.e. by 
warehouses) (SUPPS). This margin account aims to separate the price discrepancies 
between traders and final consumers in the market. The traders will purchase commodities 
from suppliers and then resale them to the consumers. The additional costs of distributing 
these commodities from traders to final consumers are then recorded in TRNSM. In other 
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words, the consumers will purchase the final commodities at retailer’s price plus the margin 
cost.  
Because the CGE model we used for analysis is focused only on transactions between 
suppliers (producer price) and final consumers (consumer price), thus we propose to 
eliminate these margins (row and column) to avoid ambiguity and complexity of 
interpretations. The steps of elimination are as follows: 
a) In the case of eliminating of trade margin, we take each of entries cell in “TRDM”, 
“Commodity” and add it to the corresponding cell of “TRDE_C”, “Activity”. Hence the 
total production costs will be increased at the level of adding this trade margin input. 
This implies that the relevant output supply should also be increased in order to maintain 
the receipt-expenditure balance. To do so, we also add this margin to its corresponding 
domestic supply: SAM (“Activity”, “Commodity”). For examples, the sum of: SAM 
(“TRDM”, “AGRI_C”) and SAM (“AGRI_A”, “AGRI_C”); SAM (“TRDM”, 
“OAGRI_C”) and SAM (“OAGRI_A”, “OAGRI_C”); and so on. As a result, the total 
receipts and expenditures of each activity and commodity account are squared. Thus, 
the trade margin account (row and column) can then be eliminated. 
b) In the case of eliminating the transportation margin, we first estimate how much the 
shares of each type of transportation account allocated for this margin by the following 
approach: 
𝑆𝑖 = 
𝑋𝑖
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑖
, 
Where: 
𝑆𝑖 = the shares of the 𝑖-th transportation account used for TRNSM; and 
𝑋𝑖 = the supply of the 𝑖-th transportation account used for TRNSM 
The supply of each type of transportation account for the margin is obtained from the 
following entry cell: (“LANT_C”, “TRNSM”), SAM (“AISCOM_C”, “TRNSM”), and 
SAM (“SUPPS”, “TRNSM”), which are: Rp. 109,626.51 billion, Rp. 44,695.33 billion, 
and Rp. 17,535.03 billion. Thus, the shares of these accounts allocated for TRNSM are 
0.64, 0.29, and 0.10 respectively.   
In the second step, we multiply each of the shares to the entries cell of SAM (“TRNSM”, 
“Commodity”) to obtain the initial values of each type of transportation account that 
allocated for TRNSM. Finally, each of this value is added to its corresponding entry cell 
of SAM (“LANT_C”, “Activity”), SAM (“AISCOM_C”, “Activity”), and SAM 
(“SUPPS_C”, “Activity”). 
Hence the total production expenditure for each activity will increase due to these 
additional costs. It implies that activity should balance its receipt by increasing its 
domestic supply as equal as these additional costs. Therefore, the balance is obtained by 
adding the initial values to the corresponding domestic supply: SAM (“Activity”, 
“Commodity”). For examples, the sum of: SAM (“TRNSM”, “AGRI_C”) and SAM 
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(“AGRI_A”, “AGRI_C”); SAM (“TRNSM”, “OAGRI_C”) and SAM (“OAGRI_A”, 
“OAGRI_C”); and so on. The transportation margin account (row and column) can then 
be eliminated. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The official Indonesia’s SAM in year 2008 provides comprehensive information about the 
Indonesia’s economy during that period of time. It is a square matrix representation of 
economic accounts that records all transactions between agents in the socio-economic 
system.  
There are numerous indicators which can be obtained from the Indonesian SAM 
dataset. For example, in sectoral outputs, it is found that chemical industries contribute the 
largest shares to GDP at producer prices; while hotel sector contributes the smallest 
contribution. The most capital-intensive sectors are given to energy sectors indicated 
through their higher cost shares on capital stock than labour employment; while the most 
labour-intensive sectors are given to agricultural and trade sector. More specifically, in 
electricity industry, both mining and petrochemical products tend to be the most important 
materials to produce electricity output. This implies that Indonesia’s electricity sector, in 
year 2008, heavily relied on fossil fuels. In terms of energy trade, electricity was not either 
exported or imported; but mining and petrochemical products were largely exported 
contributing the highest shares in total national export. Regarding to institutions’ 
consumption pattern, it can be seen that the household mostly spends their budget on food 
(including drink and tobacco); while the largest expenditure shares of government 
consumption are given to their own services which is government services and defense.         
Compared to the conventional SAM, the official Indonesian SAM in year 2008 also 
records specific account of intermediate import commodity as well as trade (and 
transportation) margins. Since our main interest does not necessarily focus on price 
discrepancies between producers and market sellers, and international trade, we opt to 
restore this official SAM into its standard form by which we eliminate the accounts of 
intermediate import commodity and margins. This standard form of SAM can then be used 
to calibrate the standard CGE model provided in Chapter 3. 
In the next works, we put our interest to investigate the impacts of implementing the 
carbon tax and feed-in tariff (subsidies on clean energy production) on Indonesia’s 
economy-wide, within the context of a hybrid CGE model (Chapter 6).  However, this 
model is constrained by limitations of the official Indonesian SAM especially in the case 
of disaggregated accounts of energy sectors: the existing SAM does not disaggregate the 
types of energy activity and commodity accounts. For example, the electricity sector is still 
aggregated with other utility sectors of clean water and city gas; all kinds of fossil mining 
are aggregated together with metal ores and other mining; and all types of petroleum 
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products – i.e. gasoline, diesel, biodiesel, bioethanol, kerosene, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), 
and so on – are also aggregated together with chemical, fertilizer, clays, and cement sectors.   
Thus, in order to accurately calibrate the hybrid CGE model for specific energy 
analysis, we continue to extend the Indonesian standard SAM into a hypothetical Energy-
SAM by disaggregating the energy sectors. To obtain this Energy-SAM, we use additional 
information such as the Indonesian Input-Output tables, electricity statistics, and an energy 
dataset compiled by the National Energy Council. This section will be further discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3 
The Standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The CGE model is considered as a transformed application model from the modern theory 
of general equilibrium that was first founded by Leon Walras. This theory formalizes the 
observed linkages between real markets, where the changes of supply and demand in one 
market are generally interdependent from price changes on another market (Bergman 
2005).  
The existence of general equilibrium theory was then developed by Arrow and 
Debreu (1954) by using numerous mathematical approaches to obtain the equilibrium 
snapshot and its stability. The analysis on this study, however, was limited only in the 
abstract forms without including the numerical analysis (Hosoe et al., 2010). The first 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model was by Johansen (1960 in Hosoe et al., 2010) 
in order to establish empirical analysis and evaluation purposes of economic policies based 
on the general equilibrium analysis. Since then, CGE models have become popular and 
been frequently developed among economists to analyse the wide impact of economic 
policy shocks (Hosoe et al., 2010). 
 In developing countries, CGE models have been commonly used for examining 
medium and long-term impacts of a certain policy such as development strategies on 
economy growth, resource allocation for exhaustible goods, income distribution and tariff 
reform (De Melo, 1988). CGE models are used as the answers to overcome the lack or 
insufficient time series data in econometric model, which is identified as a major problem 
for a standard economic analysis in developing countries. The model is able to describe the 
economy system within the equations structures along with the comprehensive database 
that is consistent with the equations model (Resosudarmo et al., 2009). CGE models 
typically assume a static general equilibrium that consists of demand input of industry 
factor production; commodity supply; household demand; export demands; government 
demands; basic value relationship between production costs and producer prices; market 
clearing condition for commodities and primary factors; and several macro economy 
variables and price index (Horridge, 2000). 
 The rest of this chapter are organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses in detail the 
construction of Indonesia standard CGE model including the choices of closure rules to 
obtain the solution. Section 3.3 presents the conclusions.   
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3.2. The Standard CGE Model 
In this section, we propose a standard CGE model based on a modified version of Decaluwé 
et al. (2012) and Hosoe et al. (2010), which can be appropriately applied to Indonesian 
SAM data set as the representation of Indonesia’s economy in year of 2008. This model, 
shortly, is a system of equations that features the economy’s transactions such as the 
behavior of the economic representatives that related to their receipt and consumption 
budget; the structure of industry’s output production;  transfers of income (and payment) 
among institutions; investment and saving; and trade aggregations (treatment of imported 
and exported goods). The framework structure of this model is summarized in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of Standard CGE Model 
 
Source: Hosoe et al. (2004), a modification 
 
3.2.1. Production of Gross Domestic Output 
Each industry (activity) produces gross domestic output by utilizing the inputs of 
production factors (types of labour and capital) and intermediate commodities. This 
industry is assumed to minimize the cost of inputs subject to its production technology, and 
is operated in a perfectly competitive market (price takers).  
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In the standard model, we assume that all activities typically follow the nested 
production structure shown in Figure 3.2. Let the set of activity is represented by indices 
𝑗 ∈ 𝐴. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Nested Production Structure 
 
Source: Own Modification 
 
At the top stage, gross domestic output j (𝑄𝐴𝑗) is produced from the combination between 
value added (𝑉𝐴𝑗) and intermediate commodities in a fixed coefficients (Leontief) function. 
Since the SAM dataset includes subsidy given to the 𝑗-th industry, we then assume that the 
level of subsidy rate 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑗  is added to the price of gross domestic output
11.   
Let 𝑄𝐴𝑗 be the gross domestic output of the 𝑗-th industry; 𝑖 be the element of all 
intermediate inputs (𝐶) used in the 𝑗-th industry; 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the intermediate input of the 𝑖-th 
commodity used by the 𝑗-th industry; 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 be the coefficient of minimum requirements of 
the 𝑖-th intermediate input for one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 be the coefficient of minimum 
requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝑗 for one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴 be the price of 𝑉𝐴𝑗; and 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 be the price 
of the 𝑖-th final (composite) goods. We assume that the 𝑗-th industry minimizes the cost 
inputs of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑉𝐴𝑗 following a Leontief production function: 
Top stage: 
min
𝑉𝐴𝑗,𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝐶𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑗 +∑𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖
  , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶   , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                        (1′) 
                                                          
11 For further explanation, see the section of government behaviour  
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Subject to: 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
,
𝑉𝐴𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗
)    , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶    , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                 (2′) 
Equation (2’) implies: 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗; and 𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗. We rearrange equation (1’) 
as follows: 
 𝐶𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 +∑𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑖
= (𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 +∑𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖
)𝑄𝐴𝑗   , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶   , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
If we define the price index 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 by including subsidy rate on 𝑗-th production (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗); 
such that 𝐶𝑗 = (1 + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗, the relationships are then given as follows:  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶           , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                             (1)    
𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗           , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                                             (2) 
(1 + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 +∑𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝐶
          , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                (3′) 
In equation (3’), we redefined 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 to allow a general average subsidy across 
activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) and the subsidy rate of activity specific (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗). The 
relationship is given as follows: 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
1
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝐴)
∑𝑠𝑢𝑏_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
       
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 = 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)       , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
This rewriting is important since sometimes government makes an exogenous change in 
their budget, which is paid for by increasing a specific tax or reducing a specific subsidy. 
In order to allow such experiment, we allow activity’s tax (subsidy) rate to adjust. Since 
there are 24 types of activity, and because these activities cannot be discriminated, the 
above rewriting of the tax rate allows to having only one endogenous variable to represent 
the overall tax rate for activity but keeping the structure of the tax rate across activities 
intact. Clearly, if the government wants to target a specific activity, then we can make 
endogenous only that activity’s subsidy rate, i.e. 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗  rather than 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒.  
Hence, eq. (3’) is rewritten as follows: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑖∈𝐶           , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴              (3)    
Equation (3) determines the unit cost of 𝑗-th industry to produce an output (𝑄𝐴𝑗) which is 
obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of value added and intermediate inputs.  
Moreover, because generally each commodity can be produced by a single or multi 
activities and each activity can produce a single or multi commodities,  the total output of 
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𝑖-th commodity from all activities should be aggregated to give 𝑄𝑖. This is modelled as 
follows: 
𝑄𝑖 =∑𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                                            (4) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 =∑𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝐶
     , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                           (5) 
Where:  
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 =
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝐴𝑗
, is the Input-Output coefficients; and  
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖: Output of the 𝑗-th activity for the 𝑖-th commodity. 
The existing SAM we used, however, is based on the principle that each activity 
produces one type of commodity, so 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 𝑗 and 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 ≠
𝑗. Hence the model will have a one-to-one relationship between activity output (and price) 
and commodity supply (and price). 
At the second stage, each industry minimizes the input cost combination of composite 
labour and capital by using a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce composite 
factor (value added). Let 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 be the respective price of composite labour and 
capital of 𝑗-th industry; 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the number of composite labour and capital input 
of 𝑗-th industry; 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 be the share parameter of labour composite by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 be the share parameter of capital by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 +
𝛿𝐾,𝑗 = 1; and 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗 be the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th 𝑉𝐴. The 𝑗-th industry problem to 
minimize cost of value added is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Second stage: 
min
𝐿𝑎𝑏,𝐾
(𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗)            , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴  
 
Subject to: 
𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝛿𝐾,𝑗 ,        𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 = 1   , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                       (6) 
 
The solution of the above problem yields the 𝑗-th industry demand for capital and 
composite labour:  
𝐾𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝑉𝐴𝑗              , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                                   (7′) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑉𝐴𝑗        , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                              (8′) 
Price index of value added 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴 is the unit cost of VA production and is obtained from a 
weighted sum combination of price of composite labour and capital:  
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𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                                  (9′) 
 Furthermore, we introduce the adjustment terms of factor prices to enable the 
variation of these prices across activities. Thus, we need to define the additional variables: 
𝑃𝐾 , 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵, 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾, 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 such that: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾  
Where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 is the adjustment factor for price of capital, and 𝑃𝐾 is the aggregate price 
of capital which together determine the activity level price of capital 𝑃𝑗
𝐾.  
Based on the SAM, the total supply of capital stock is obtained from sum of capital 
demand to activities and rest of world (ROW) (𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊) as follows:  
𝐾𝑆 =∑𝐾𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊 
We assume there is no unused or excess demand for capital: 𝐾𝑈 = 0.  Thus, the aggregate 
price of capital is estimated as: 𝑃𝐾 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑀
𝐾𝑆
. 
However, since there is no data available on real (physical) capital stock at activity level 
(𝐾𝑗) and at rest of world (ROW) (𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊) of the given year of SAM, we assume that: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗)
𝐾𝑗
⁄  and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐾 = 1   
Where 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗) = 𝐾𝑗. Thus, 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 is equal to 1. To test that we have correctly initialized 
these relationships, in the model we calculate the following gap, which should be zero: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐺𝐴𝑃(𝐾, 𝑗) = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗 − 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗) 
The price of labour composite across activities is defined as follows: 
 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the adjustment factor for price of labour composite, and 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the 
aggregate price of labour composite, which together determine the activity level price of 
labour composite 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵. Here we also assume that 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 = 1.  
 Therefore, based on above definitions, equations (7’ – 9’) are rewritten as follows: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾
𝑉𝐴𝑗              , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                      (7) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝑗        , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                            (8) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑗
          , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                      (9) 
  Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the 
equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, we eliminate one of the above 
conditions to maintain balance between numbers of equations and free endogenous 
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variables. This choice is considered arbitrary since it is aimed only to keep the income-
expenditure accounting identity in a closed system of supply and demand equilibrium 
(Decaluwe et al., 2012). We choose to exclude eq. 9 from the model specifications12. 
Finally, at the bottom stage, each industry minimizes the input cost of types of 
labour combination, indexed as 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, by a CES function. Let 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 be the 𝑜-th type of 
labour used in 𝑗-th industry; 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 be the wage of 𝑜-th labour; 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 be the share parameter of 
𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑗 be the efficiency parameter of 
composite labour used by the 𝑗-th industry; and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
(−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞, 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
 
Bottom stage: 
min
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
         , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
subject to: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
     , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                   (10′) 
By solving the above minimization problem, the labour demand solution is given as follows 
(Appendix A1): 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
        , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅      , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                              (11′) 
The price index of industry’s composite labour (𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵) is determined from the weighted 
sum of different types of 𝑜-th type of labour wage rates (𝑃𝑜
𝐿) (Appendix A2): 
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 =
∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
      , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                                             (12′) 
Denoting the elasticity of substitution by 𝜎𝑗
𝐿 (Appendix A3), we have: 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1. The 
parameter value of 𝛽𝑗 is obtained from Decaluwé et al (2012) since in this research we do 
not econometrically estimate this value. In the CGE model analysis, the modellers 
commonly choose the parameter values from literature. The way to choose these values is 
arbitrary. However, the robustness of the results generated from using these values will 
then be tested through a sensitivity analysis.   
In the bottom stage, we also introduce wage adjustment terms per type of labour to 
enable the variation of labours’ wages across activities. Thus, we need to define the 
additional variables: 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 , 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  such that: 
                                                          
12 For details, see Decaluwe, et al (2012) 
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𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑝𝑜
𝐿  
Where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  is the adjustment factor for wage of labour type, and 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 is the aggregate 
wage of labour type which together determine the activity level price of capital 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 .  
Based on the SAM, the total supply per labour type is generated from the sum of 
labour type demand to activities and abroad (𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜) as follows:  
∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,    𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
We assume there is unemployed labour: 𝐿𝑈𝑜.  Thus, the aggregate wage of labour type is 
estimated as: 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑀
𝐿𝑆𝑜
. 
We assume 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 = 1 and 𝑃𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐿 = 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 13, thus: 
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗)
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
⁄   
Where 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗) = 𝐿𝑜,𝑗; 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑅𝑂𝑊) = 𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜.  
To test the zero gaps, we estimate: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑜, 𝑗) = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑝𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗 − 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗) 
 Therefore, based on these definitions, equations (10’ – 12’) are rewritten as follows: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴, 𝛽 =
1
𝜎𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑙 > 1        (10)  
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                       (11) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                             (12) 
Due to Walras’ Law, one of the above equations is considered redundant. Thus, to obtain 
the income-expenditure accounting identity, we choose to exclude eq. 10 from the model 
specifications. 
  
3.2.2. Government Behavior 
The government has an important role in the CGE model as its revenue and expenditure 
influence the aggregate demand and supply in the market. The receipt (eq. (13)) is generally 
obtained from the collection of various types of taxes (including tariffs) net of subsidies 
and institutions’ transfers, and then is spent to finance public goods and services (Karadag 
& Westaway, 1999). The remainder between receipt and expenditures will therefore be 
deposited as saving. 
                                                          
13 The introduction of wage for each labour type is applied in next chapter 
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Government receives income from institutions’ transfers (𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛) and tax 
collections such as: (1) direct tax of the ℎ-th household income (𝐼𝐻ℎ) at the tax rate 
𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ; (2) ad valorem tax of the 𝑖-th gross domestic supply in terms of value (𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖) 
at rate of 𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖; (3) business tax of enterprise income (𝐼𝐵) at the tax rate 𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; 
and (4) import tariff of the 𝑖-th imported goods in terms of value (𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖) at rate of 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖. In the existing SAM, both direct (1) and business taxes (3) are represented as 
government transfer income from households’ and enterprise. Thus, to avoid a double 
counting transaction, we represent these taxes as transfer income to government; and let 
the respective 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ and 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 equal to 𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝐼𝐻ℎ and 𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐼𝐵, which are 
defined in the households’ and enterprise block of equations. 
The government total income from collecting taxes and transfer income is 
summarized as follows:  
𝐼𝐺 =∑𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+ ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
              (13′) 
 Where 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 = {𝐻1, … , 𝐻ℎ, 𝐺𝑜𝑣, 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑅𝑂𝑊} 
Similar to the above principle of rewriting subsidy in activity specific, we redefined 
𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 and 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 to obtain a general average ad valorem tax and tariffs across 
commodities (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒), and a specific ad valorem tax and tariffs per 
commodity specific (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 and 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖). The relationship is then given as follows: 
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
1
𝐶
∑𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑖
       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
1
𝐶
∑𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑖
       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶   
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶   
 
Therefore, eq. 13’ is rewritten as follows: 
𝐼𝐺 =∑(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+ ∑ (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                                                                                             (13) 
 Government expends their income by (1) purchasing public goods and services (𝐶𝐺𝑖); 
subsidizing: (i) some of 𝑖-th domestic supply (𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖) at the subsidy rate of 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖; and 
(ii) some of 𝑗-th industry gross output (𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗) at the subsidy rate of 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗; and (3) 
transfer payments to institutions’ (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣). Thus, equation for government expenditure 
is written as follows: 
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𝐸𝐺 =∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                            (14) 
Public spending of each goods and services (𝐶𝐺𝑖) is adjusted from initial expenditure 
of 𝑖-th final goods (𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖) (equation (15)); and (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣) of each institutions’ is 
determined from a fixed proportion of their total transfer payments (𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟) (equation 
(16a – 16b)). In addition, we assume that government transfer payment to households’ is 
measured in terms of real value, which is linked via 𝐶𝑃𝐼-indexed.  
𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                                                      (15) 
𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑃𝐼,             ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                 (16𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟,                𝑖𝑛 ≠ ℎ ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                           (16𝑏) 
The difference between government income and expenditure is therefore regarded as 
government saving (𝑆𝐺) as follows: 
𝑆𝐺 = 𝐼𝐺 − 𝐸𝐺                                                                                                                  (17) 
 
3.2.3. Households Behaviour 
Following Varian (1992), the households’ preferences on output bundles are described 
from their utility function that is maximized subject to their budget income constraint. 
Suppose that household income (equation (18)) is earned from its endowed factors (labour 
and capital) to 𝑗-th industry; and institutions’ transfers (𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛). Thus, income sources of 
the ℎ-th type of households are obtained as follows: 
𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ + ∑ 𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                       (18) 
Where: 
𝐼𝐻ℎ : Total income of the h-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ : Labour income of the h-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ : Capital income of the h-th type of households 
𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛 : Transfer income of the h-th type of households from the in-th institution’s 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ and 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ are determined from household income shares of each labour type and 
capital endowment to activity and ROW respectively: 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ = ∑ 𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻      (19) 
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𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊)    , ℎ ∈ 𝐻   , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁   (20) 
Where:  
𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜 : Share of the 𝑜-th type of labour income received by ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ : Share of capital income received by ℎ-th type of households 
𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜  : The 𝑜-th type of labour supply from ROW used in 𝑗-th industry 
𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊  : The abroad capital supply used in 𝑗-th industry 
The government collects income taxes on ℎ-th type of households which is 
represented as government transfer income from households’ (𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ). It yields the 
disposable income of households’ (𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ) as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                              (21) 
 Households’ transfer payments to institutions’ except the government (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ) are 
adjusted proportionally to their disposable income (equation (22a)); and household income 
tax which is regarded as households’ transfer payment to government is given in equation 
(22b).  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ = 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                    (22𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ = (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) 𝐼𝐻ℎ,       ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                        (22𝑏) 
Where 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ is the share of the ℎ-th type of households’ transfer payment to the 
𝑖𝑛-th institution. 
In eq. 22b, we also rewritten household tax rate 𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ as 
(𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) to distinguish a representation of overall and specific tax rate 
for households. 
 Furthermore, the subtractions of households’ transfer payments yield the actual 
disposable income (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ) of the ℎ-th type of households as follows:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                    (23) 
 The representative households are motivated to save some portions of their actual 
disposable income according to the constant average propensities for saving (equation 24), 
of which these portions are allowed to adjust endogenously (equation (25)).  
𝑆𝐻ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ,                  ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                 (24) 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ(1 + 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗),                   ℎ ∈ 𝐻                            (25) 
Where: 
𝑆𝐻ℎ : Saving of the ℎ-th type of households 
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𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ : Adjusted average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ :  Initial value of average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type of 
households  
𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ :  0, if 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ, i.e. no change in saving ratio 
𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ :  1, if 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ is allowed to adjust, in which case 𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗 is the 
endogenous adjustment of 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ 
Therefore, the available budget of household consumption on final goods (𝐸𝐻ℎ) is then 
obtained from their actual disposable income less saving (equation (26)). 
𝐸𝐻ℎ = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑆𝐻ℎ,              ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                           (26) 
Finally, by assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function (homogenous of degree one)14, the 
optimization problem of the ℎ-th type of households can be written as follows: 
Let (𝐶𝐻1,ℎ, 𝐶𝐻2,ℎ, … , 𝐶𝐻3,ℎ) and 𝑝 = (𝑝1
𝑍, 𝑝2
𝑍, . . . , 𝑝𝑖
𝑍)  be quantity and price vectors 
associated with 𝑖-th final goods. For each household type, ℎ ∈ 𝐻, the utility function and 
total expenditure are: 
max
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑈ℎ =∏𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
,         𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Subject to: 
∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
= 𝐸𝐻ℎ,              ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Where: 
𝑈ℎ : Utility of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝛼𝑖,ℎ : Share parameter in utility function of the ℎ-th type of households 
By solving the above conditions, we obtain the solution to which yield the corresponding 
demand function (Appendix A4): 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ,              𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                          (27) 
 
3.2.4. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
In this model, CPI is adjusted from total price index of 𝑖-th households (equation (28)), which 
is obtained from the homogeneity relationship of 𝑖-th final goods price (equation (29)) as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐼ℎ =∏(𝑃𝑖
𝑍)𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                        (28) 
                                                          
14 (𝑋) is a homogenous degree of 𝑏 if 𝑢(𝑡𝑋) = 𝑡𝑏𝑢(𝑋) for all 𝑋 >  0. Homogenous degree one where: 𝑏 =
1. The Cobb-Douglas utility function has a homogenous degree one because ∑ ∝𝑖𝑖 =  1. Therefore 
𝑢(𝑡𝑋1, 𝑡𝑋2, … , 𝑡𝑋𝑖) =  ∏ (𝑡𝑋)𝑖
𝛼𝑖
𝑖  = 𝑡𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑖) 
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𝐶𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝑤ℎ𝑃𝐼ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
                                                                                                                 (29) 
Where 𝑤ℎ is the weight of commodity purchased by ℎ-th of household.  
 
3.2.5. Enterprise Behavior 
The enterprise receipt (𝐼𝐵) is obtained from its capital endowment to 𝑗-th industry and 
institutions’ transfers (equation (30)). 𝐼𝐵𝐾 is determined from enterprise shares of capital 
supply (31).  
𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                                                                          (30) 
𝐼𝐵𝐾 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) ,   𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                    (31) 
Where: 
𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 : Share of capital income received by enterprise 
𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛 : Enterprise transfer income from 𝑖𝑛-th institutions’ 
Government collects income taxes from enterprise income, which is represented as 
business transfer payment to government. This yields enterprise disposable income as 
follows:  
𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 , 𝑔𝑜𝑣, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                 (32) 
Enterprise transfer payments to institutions’ excluding government are assumed to 
adjust proportionally to their disposable income (𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏) (equation (33a)) while 
enterprise transfer payments to government are regarded as enterprise income tax (equation 
(33b)).  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 = 𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏𝐷𝐼𝐵, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                          (33𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐼𝐵,    𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                     (33𝑏)    
These subtractions yield the actual disposable income of enterprise (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵) as 
follows:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐷𝐼𝐵 − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                                                           (34) 
 
Since enterprise does not purchase any goods, the enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) is thus 
simply equal with the actual disposable income (equation (35)). 
𝑆𝐵 = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                    (35) 
 
65 
 
 
 
3.2.6. Rest of World (ROW) 
In the existing SAM, total labour income (𝑇𝐿𝐼) generated within the country (payments to 
labour from activities and ROW) is defined as follows15: 
𝑇𝐿𝐼 =   ∑(𝑃𝑜
𝐿∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜
=∑(∑𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗)
𝑗
+ 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑅𝑂𝑊))
𝑜
 
𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 is the labour employed within the country by ROW and it is treated as exogenous.   
𝑇𝐿𝐼 is distributed across institutions’ (households’ and ROW (𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐿𝐼)) as: 
𝑇𝐿𝐼 = 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ + 𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐿𝐼 =  ∑∑𝑆𝐴𝑀(ℎ, 𝑜)
𝑜ℎ
 +  ∑𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑅𝑂𝑊, 𝑜)
𝑜
 
Thus, we need a distribution mechanism across ROW. We propose: 
𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐿𝐼 =∑𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜 (𝑃𝑜
𝐿∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇o,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜
 
Therefore, ROW total outflow is generated from total of import, institutions’ income 
transfers to ROW, and ROW endowments of factors supply to domestic (equation (36)).  
𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
 
+  𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                  (36) 
Where 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes ROW total outflow; 𝑀𝑖 denotes import of the 𝑖-th goods; 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛 
denotes transfer income from 𝑖𝑛-th institutions to ROW; 𝐶𝑀 denotes the exported and 
imported commodities; and respective 𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜 and 𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 denote the shares of the 
𝑜-th foreign labour and capital used domestically which are identified in SAM as: 
𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑅𝑂𝑊, 𝑜)
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗)𝑗 + 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑅𝑂𝑊)
,       𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅 
𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝐾)
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗)𝑗 + 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑅𝑂𝑊)
 
ROW total inflow is determined from total exports, ROW payment transfers to 
institutions’, payment to labour and capital employed by ROW (equation (37)).  
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝐸
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+ 𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 ,     𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆            (37) 
                                                          
15 The same principal applies to define total capital income. 
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Where 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes ROW total inflow; 𝐸𝑖 denotes export of the 𝑖-th goods; 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 
denotes transfer payment from RoW to institutions; and 𝐶𝐸 denotes the exported and 
imported commodities.  
ROW transfer payments to institutions are determined from a fixed proportion of 
ROW total transfer payments (𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟) (equation (38a – 38b)). Since there is no 
transaction record from ROW to ROW, we treat this as exogenous. Finally, ROW saving 
(balance of payments) is determined equivalently from the current account deficit or 
residual between ROW outflow and inflow (equation (39)).  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊(𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟,            𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆               (38𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0                                                                                                                          (38𝑏) 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊                                                                                                        (39) 
Where 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes current acount deficit; 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes the shares of 
ROW transfer payments to 𝑖𝑛-th institutions’ excluding ROW; and 𝐸𝑋𝑅 denotes Exchange 
rate (domestic currency/foreign currency). 
The price relationships in terms of local and ROW currency between export and 
import commodities are given in equation (40) and (41) as follows: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊            , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸                                                                                (40) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊          , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀                                                                                (41) 
 
Where: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊 : Imported price of the 𝑖-th goods in terms of foreign currency (exogenous) 
 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊 : Exported price of the 𝑖-th goods in terms of foreign currency (exogenous) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 : Imported price of the i-th goods in terms of domestic currency 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸  : Exported price of the i-th goods in terms of domestic currency 
 
3.2.7. Investment 
In the static version of a CGE model, the behaviour of investment does not involve with its 
dynamic factors. We allow the case if the investment is kept fixed or otherwise is treated 
as endogenous to allow investment to adjust (equation (42)). The total investment demand 
will be therefore equal to total saving of  all institutions (household, firm, government, and 
rest of world) of an economy. Walras law states that the values of excess demand for all 
market systems must equal to the values of excess supplies. This implies that if an excess 
demand occurs in a market, excess supply must also exist in the other market. In other 
words, excess demand across all industries must equal to zero. Thus, to check Walras law 
identity, we apply equation (43), in which 𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆 should be zero in the equilibrium 
state.  
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Thus, the final demand of the 𝑖-th investment commodity is given as follows: 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽),              𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                    (42) 
Where 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖: Initial investment demand of the 𝑖-th commodity, 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽: The 
investment adjustment index (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽=0 if investment is fixed; otherwise if it is allowed 
to adjust endogenously). 
The Walras identity is then determined from the saving-investment balance as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝑆𝐻ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
++𝑆𝐵 + 𝑆𝐺 + 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 −∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
                                   (43) 
Where: 
𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆 :  Walras residual 
 
3.2.8. The Armington Aggregations 
In open economy model, we adopt Armington’s assumption to differentiate between a 
country’s domestically produced and exported or imported commodities. We assume that 
the industry combines its inputs (imported and domestic-produced goods) by a CES 
production function to produce composite goods. The exported goods are produced from 
the transformation of gross domestic output sold for domestic and export sales by a CET 
(Constant Elasticity of Transformation) production function, where industry will maximize 
its profit subject to this function. The isoquants of a CET function are actually the mirror 
images of CES function (Hosoe, 2004). For the sake of simplification, we assume no 
simultaneous cross hauling: export and import for the same goods.   
 Therefore the industry maximization problem to produce the 𝑖-th composite good 
can be written as follows: let 𝜋𝑖
𝑧 be the profit of the industry to produce the 𝑖-th Armington’s 
composite goods; 𝐷𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖 be the 𝑖-th domestic and imported commodity respectively; 𝑝𝑖
𝑑 
and 𝑝𝑖
𝑚 be the domestic and import price of the 𝑖-th commodity (in terms of domestic 
currency) respectively; 𝑍𝑖 be the 𝑖-th Armington’s composite goods; 𝛿𝑚𝑖 and 𝛿𝑑𝑖 be the 
import and domestic share parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th composite commodity 
respectively; 𝛿𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖 = 1, (0 ≤ 𝛿𝑚𝑖 ≤ 1) and (0 ≤ 𝛿𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑧𝑖 be the shift parameter 
of the 𝑖-th composite goods; and Φ𝑖 be the substitution parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th 
composite commodity. 
max
Zi,𝑀𝑖,𝐷𝑖
𝜋𝑖
𝑧 = 𝑃𝑖
𝑧𝑍𝑖 – ((1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑝𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖)       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
Subject to: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖    , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷   , Φ =
1
𝜎𝑧
− 1    , 𝜎𝑧 > 1        (44)  
Thus, by solving the above maximization problems, the solution for import (equation (46)) 
and domestic demand function (equation (47)) of the 𝑖-th good can be written as follows 
(appendix A5): 
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𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
(1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 }
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                (46) 
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
𝑍}
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                                (47) 
The price index of the composite (final) commodity (𝑃𝑖
𝑍) is determined from the zero profit 
condition or a weighted sum of values of domestic sales and imported goods:  
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 = (1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖        , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                 (48) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-
1) markets. Due to Walras’ Law, one of the above equations is considered redundant. Thus, 
to obtain the income-expenditure accounting identity, we choose to exclude eq. 44 from the 
model specifications. In addition, the parameter value of Φ𝑖 is obtained from Decaluwé et 
al (2012) since in this research work we do not econometrically estimate this value. The 
robustness of the results generated from using these values will then be tested through a 
sensitivity analysis. 
For the case where industry does not utilize imported goods, however, the relationship will 
be simply written as follows: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖         , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &   𝐶𝑀                                                                                   (45) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝑀                                                                                     (49) 
Next, the industry profit maximization problem solved for the i-th transformation 
(export and domestic) commodity can be written as follows: let 𝜋𝑖 be the profit of the 
industry for the 𝑖-th transformed commodity; 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐸𝑖 be the 𝑖-th domestic and exported 
commodity respectively; 𝑝𝑖
𝑑 and 𝑝𝑖
𝑒 be the domestic and export price (in terms of domestic 
currency) of the 𝑖-th commodity respectively; 𝑄𝑖 be the 𝑖-th gross domestic output; 𝜔𝑒𝑖 and 
𝜔𝑑𝑖 be the share parameter of 𝑖-th transformation commodity (0 ≤ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 ≤ 1;  0 ≤ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 ≤
1; 𝜔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑𝑖  = 1) respectively; and 𝜍𝑖 be the substitution parameter for 𝑖-th 
transformation. 
max
𝑄𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝐷𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖
𝑑𝐷𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖)
− (1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑞𝑄𝑖       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
 
Subject to: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑠𝑞𝑖(𝜔𝑒,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐸𝑖)
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐷𝑖)
𝜇𝑖)
1
 𝜇𝑖  
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷,    𝜇 =
1
𝜎𝑞
+ 1,     𝜎𝑞 > 0                                                                         (50) 
Let 𝜉 be a Lagrangian and 𝜇 be a Lagrange multiplier. 
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𝜉 = (𝑝𝑖
𝑑𝐷𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖) − (1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑞𝑄𝑖
+  µ (𝑠𝑞𝑖(𝜔𝑒𝑖
1−𝜍𝑖(𝐸𝑖)
𝜍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑𝑖
1−𝜍𝑖(𝐷𝑖)
𝜍𝑖)
1
 𝜍𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖) 
By deriving the above profit maximization problems, demand solution of export (equation 
(50)) and domestic goods (equation (51)) can be written as follows: 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝜔𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐸
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
 
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                                                                                                 (51) 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝜔𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝜍𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
(1 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
}
1
𝜍𝑖−1
         , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                (52) 
The price index of domestically produced commodity (𝑃𝑖
𝑞) is determined from the zero 
profit condition or a weighted sum of values of domestic sales and export: 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖         
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                                                                                                 (53) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-
1) markets. Due to Walras’ Law condition, eq. 50 is excluded from the model 
specifications. 
For the case where the industry produces only domestic commodities (not exported), 
however, the relationship will be simply written as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖          , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝐸                                                                                           (54) 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷      
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &  𝐶𝐸                                                                                                                 (55) 
 
3.2.9. Market-clearing 
Finally, at the last stage, we define market-clearing conditions to measure the equilibrium 
between supply and demand in all markets as follows: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 =∑𝑃𝑖
𝑧𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ
+ 𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝑧∑𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
 
By eliminating 𝑃𝑖
𝑧, we obtain the equilibrium between demand (total consumption of 
households, government, investment, and intermediate input) and supply of the 𝑖-th goods 
in domestic market. 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +∑𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
             , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                            (56) 
Factor market-clearing conditions:  
∑𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐾𝑈 = 𝐾𝑆         , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                      (57) 
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∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜      , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,    𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                            (58) 
Where: 
𝐾𝑆 : Total capital supply 
𝐾𝑈 : Unused or excessive capital stock   
𝐿𝑈𝑜 : The 𝑜-th unemployed labour 
𝐿𝑆𝑜 : Total supply of 𝑜-th labour 
 
3.2.10. Closures 
In CGE modeling, the equilibrium condition is obtainable by equalizing the total number 
of equations and endogenous variables. It is commonly that in CGE model, total numbers 
of equations are less than endogenous variables. Thus to obtain the solution, model closures 
must be applied. These problems are usually solved by setting a number of closure rules, 
either by adding a new equation to the standard model or by choosing the exogenous 
variables among all variables in the model based on justification of assumptions in the 
values (Pezzey and Lambie, 2001). Yusuf (2008) noted that the specification of closures 
should consider three crucial aspects: accomodating towards the research focus and 
objectives of the modellers; minimizing the weakness of the model in its description of the 
real world economy; and adjusting the timescale period (short run vs long run) of research 
investigation.  
The model consists of 2,333 endogenous variables. There are 1,818 equations 
describing the behavioural rules and constraints. We therefore need 515 additional 
equations in order to close the model and obtain a solution. These equations are specified 
as our closure rules, which are divided into 2 main categories: micro-closures that relates 
mostly to market clearing processes for production factors; and macro-closures that relates 
mostly to saving-investment and government balance (Gilbert & Tower, 2013). We also 
assume Indonesia as a small open economy country where the country cannot influence the 
world price of imports and exports. Thus, these assumed as exogenous. 
  
3.2.10.1. Micro-closures 
For micro-closures, the CGE modellers can choose some alternative ways to equalize the 
supply and demand of factor markets: by fixing the quantity of each factor suppy (full 
employment) and allowing their prices (wages and rental) to assure the clearing of supply-
demand factors; or choosing reversely, where the factors may endogenously unemployed 
and their prices are held fixed (Lofgren et al., 2002). These choices, however, can also be 
done through a combination, i.e. assuming full employment for high skilled labour and 
allowing the mobility (unemployment) of low skilled labour (Kyalimpa, 2014). In the 
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model, we design three choices of closures for each production factor (capital, types of 
labour, and composite labour).  
For capital and labour closures, they either fully employed or there is excess demand 
or supply. They can also be either mobile or activity specific. The choices for capital 
closures are expressed as follows: 
i) The capital stock across activities 𝐾𝑗 is exogenous or kept constant, and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 adjusts 
across activities to ensure market clearing. The aggregate rent of capital 𝑃𝐾 is also 
exogenous, and thus 𝐾𝑈 adjusts to ensure overall market clearing. 
ii) 𝐾𝑗 adjusts between 𝑗-th activities to ensure market clearing in each industry, and 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 is kept constant. 𝑃𝐾 is also kept constant, and thus 𝐾𝑈 adjusts to ensure overall 
market clearing.   
iii) 𝐾𝑗 adjusts between 𝑗-th activities to ensure market clearing of each industry, and 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 is kept constant. However, 𝐾𝑈 is kept constant (𝐾𝑈 = 0) and 𝑃𝐾 adjusts to 
ensure overall market clearing. 
The choices for labour closures are expressed as follows: 
i) The number of employed labour types across activities 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 is exogenous; while 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗, 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵, 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵, and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  are endogenous such that constraint of: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = ∑ (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗)𝑜  holds for each activity. 𝑃𝑜
𝐿 is fixed, 𝐿𝑈𝑜 =
0 adjusts to ensure labour market clearing: ∑ 𝐿𝑜,𝑗𝑗∈𝐴 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜. 
ii) 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  is exogenous while 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 adjust and determine 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗; 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 are 
also endogenous such that the constraint of: 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =
∑ (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗)𝑜  holds for each activity. Fully employed is assumed where 𝐿𝑈𝑜 =
0 is kept constant; 𝑃𝑜
𝐿 adjusts to obtain labour market clearing. 
iii) 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  is exogenous while 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 adjusts and determine 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗; 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 are 
also endogenous such that the constraint of: 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =
∑ (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗)𝑜  holds for each activity. 𝑃𝑜
𝐿 is exogenous and 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 0 adjusts to 
ensure labour market clearing.          
In the model experiments, we opted to choose the third option (iii) for both capital 
and labour closures because it relaxes the typical neoclassical closure of labour market 
where all types of labour are mobile inter-industries having fixed wages so that the labour 
market equilibrium is achievable through the endogenous adjustment of the rate of 
unemployment. This choice is deemed due to the fact that Indonesia is currently a 
developing country with a high labour surplus (Yusuf et al., 2008). We assume that the 
Indonesian economy does not operate on the production possibility frontier. For short-run 
analysis, we assume that there is no excessive capital. The capital stock is mobile across 
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industries but its adjusted rent across activities remain as exogenously fixed so that the 
equilibrium solution is achievable through the flexible adjustment of its aggregated prices. 
  
3.2.10.2. Macro-closures 
For simplicity, we specify macro-closures by categorizing them into three areas that related 
with: saving-investment balance; balance of payments; and government expenditure.  
In the saving-investment block, the model has one equation that represents the 
saving-investment identity (eq. 42), with two groups of endogenous variables: institution 
saving and investment. One of these variables should be exogenously fixed to achieve the 
solution. There are two ways to obtain it: (1) investment-driven closure as part of 
Neoclassical Closure, where investment is fixed and institution saving is endogenously 
determined to equalize the equilibrium; or (2) saving-driven closure as part of Johansen 
Closure, where institution saving is exogenous and investment will adjust to equalize the 
equilibrium (Robinson, in Janvry and Kanbur (2006)).  
Investment-driven closure is usually used for a static CGE model to avoid distorted 
results from inter-temporal allocation of welfare impact (Warr cited in Yusuf, 2008). Thus, 
the fixed and independent investment on the change of income will lead to fully change of 
welfare (Hosoe et al., 2010). In contrast, a saving-driven assumes the changes of welfare 
generated by the changes of income will be partly cancelled out by the changes of 
investment goods (Hosoe et al., 2010).              
In the model, we propose three variations of saving-investment closures, which are 
summarized as follows: 
1) Investment-driven closure: 
i) The actual investment good (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) is fixed and equal with the initial investment 
good (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖). It also implies that there is no adjustment of investment (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 =
0). Enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) is also exogenous. Thus, the saving of ℎ-th type of 
households (𝑆𝐻ℎ) and government (𝑆𝐺) are endogenously determined to obtain the 
saving-investment balance, which imply (𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆) variable is zero. In addition, 
since 𝑆𝐻ℎ is endogenous, it means that the average propensity to save of the ℎ-th 
households (𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ) is allowed to adjust proportionally to the level of (𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗) 
and assuming dummy variable of 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1. 
ii)  The actual investment goods (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) and household saving are exogenous while 
enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) and government saving (𝑆𝐺) are endogenous to ensure the 
balance.  
2) Saving-driven closure: 
 All institutions saving are fixed. The actual investment goods is therefore endogenously 
determined to obtain saving-investment balance, in which (𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆) variable is zero. 
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This adjusment implies that: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 ≠ 0 to equalize between the actual and initial 
investment.  
For (ii) and (2), because 𝑆𝐻ℎ is exogenously fixed, 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ is then fixed and equal to its 
initial level of 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ, where there is no saving rate adjustment (𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 0) and 
𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 0. In the CGE exercises, we choose option (i).   
Furthermore, within the context of open-economy model, the saving-investment 
balance has two additional variables namely: foreign saving (𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊) and the exchange rate 
(𝐸𝑋𝑅) but within one additional equation: the current account deficit constraint (Hosoe et 
al., 2010). Thus, the model has one endogenous variable that requires to be changed as 
exogenous variable to clear the solution. There are two ways to resolve this problem: (i) 
exchange rate is pegged and allowing foreign saving to clear the inflow – outflow deficit 
(or surplus); or (ii) foreign saving is fixed and allowing the exchange rate to clear the inflow 
– outflow deficit (or surplus). In the model simulations, we choose option (ii) where 
exchange rate is flexible to ensure that the balance of payments equals to zero. This 
assumption is in accordance to the flexible exchange rate regime of Indonesia, which has 
been implemented since post global monetary crisis in year of 1997. 
For government balance, Lofgren et al. (2002) proposed three alternative ways to 
close the model: (i) the default closure by which all net tax rates (including subsidy rates)16 
are exogenous, while government saving is endogenously flexible to obtain the balance; 
(ii) in contrast with (i) where all net tax rates are endogenous and government saving is 
fixed; and (iii) that is similiar with (ii) where all tax rates are flexible, but some of the tax 
rates are multiplied by a scaled scalar. Government expenditure on goods and services are 
held exogenously fixed on all of these proposals. Nonetheless, there is no choice of closure 
where both government saving and tax rates are exogenous while government expenditure 
is flexibly endogenous. In the model exercises, we choose option (i) as this is suitable for 
simulating the shock of government spending (increasing) and subsidy for activities 
(decreasing). 
The model also allows transfer payments (income) between institutions to be 
endogenously determined. This is because we assume that any changes to income and 
budget spending of institutions will adjust to their level of transfers. It is implausible 
justified to assume fixed transfers when income rate decreases (increases).  
As a result, the total number of equations (1,818 equations) is equal to total 
endogenous variables (1,818 variables).  
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Athough Lofgren, et al (2002) stated the rates of tax, here we change it slighlty as net tax rates to include 
the subsidy rates. This is because the SAM dataset has specific account for subsidy transactions. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter aims to explain a detailed construction of the features of the CGE model for 
Indonesia’s economy. The constructions are based on the modified version of Decaluwé et 
al. (2012) and Hosoe et al. (2010), such that the model can be appropriately calibrated to 
the Indonesia’s SAM dataset in the year 2008. A number of optimization conditions of 
agent behaviours are explained. Since the total numbers of equations are less than the 
endogenous variables, we adopt a set of closure rules that are closely related to the real 
condition of Indonesia’s economy. These closures are divided into two main groups: macro 
and micro closure rules.   
The standard CGE model is applied for simulating the variations of fiscal policies 
given in the next chapter. Afterwards, this model will be further extended to examine the 
economy-wide impact of fiscal policies to promote clean electricity utilizations on 
Indonesia’s economy. 
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Appendix 3.A: Mathematical Derivations 
 
3.A1. Labour Demand 
The 𝑗-th industry problem to minimize the cost of 𝑜-th labour demand subject to a CES 
technology:  
min
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
Subject to: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =  𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                                       (1𝑎) 
Let £ be a Lagrangian and µ be a Lagrange multiplier. 
£ =  ∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+ µ(𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
− 𝑉𝐴𝑗  ) 
First order conditions: 
𝜕£
𝜕𝐿𝑜,𝑗
= 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 + µ(−
1
 𝛽𝑗  
)(𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
−1
) 
(−𝛽𝑗𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗−1) = 0                                                                                           (1𝑏) 
𝜕£
𝜕µ
= 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
− 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 0                                                  (1𝑐) 
Ratio of two foc (2b): 
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 =
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗−1
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑚,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗−1
= (
𝛾𝑚,𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑜,𝑗𝐿𝑜+1,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1
 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗−1 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑚,𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗−1 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑚,𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗 = {(
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑚,𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
}
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
                                                                    (1𝑑) 
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Substitute (1d) to (1c) to obtain: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =  𝑠𝑙𝑗
{
 
 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗 ((
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑝𝑚𝐿 ,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑚,𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
 
 
 
 
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =  𝑠𝑙𝑗
{
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗 ((
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑝𝑚𝐿 ,𝑗
)
−𝛽𝑗−1 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 )
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
−(𝛽𝑗+1)𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
}
 
 
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =  
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 (
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 )
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
 
𝐿𝑚,𝑗 =
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗𝛾𝑚,𝑗(𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 )
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑠𝑙𝑗 {∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗(𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 )
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅 }
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
                                                                    (1𝑒) 
 
By defining the 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑗 Price index:  
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 =
1
𝑠𝑙𝑗
{ ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗(𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 )
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
𝛽𝑗+1
𝛽𝑗
 
Equation (1e) can then be simplified as follows: 
𝐿𝑚,𝑗 = 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝑏𝑗
(
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿
𝑏𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
 = 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝑏𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝛽𝑗
)(
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
 
Or 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑏𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)(
𝑃𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
          , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
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3.A2. The Price Index of Labour Composite (𝑳𝑨𝑩) 
Here, we show that the price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the unit cost of labour composite. Define 𝐸𝑗 
as the total cost of 𝐿𝐴𝐵 production in 𝑗-th industry: 
𝐸𝑗 = 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑚,𝑗    
= 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
(
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
+ 𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
(
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
 
=
1
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
1
𝛽𝑗+1 (𝛾𝑜,𝑗𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1 + 𝛾𝑚,𝑗𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1) 
=
1
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
1
𝛽𝑗+1(𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑠𝑙𝑗)
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1 
𝐸𝑗 = 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
 
3.A3. Elasticity of Substitution 
Here we prove that 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1 as follows: 
Recall equation (1b) from above: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
=
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
(
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿 )
−1
(𝛽𝑗+1)
⁄
 
MRS =
𝑝𝑚,𝑗
𝐿
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 =
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
(
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
)
𝛽𝑗+1
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑅𝑆 =  𝑙𝑛 (
𝛾𝑚,𝑗
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
) +  𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
)
𝛽𝑗+1
     
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑅𝑆)
𝑑𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝐿𝑚,𝑗
)
=  𝛽𝑗 + 1 =   
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿⁄  
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 = 
1
𝛽𝑗 + 1
⇒ 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1 
 
3.A4. The Households Demand Functions 
max
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑈ℎ =∏𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Subject to: 
∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
= 𝐸𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
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The above optimization problem is solved by using the Lagrange multiplier. Let £ be a 
Lagrangian and 𝜇 be a Lagrange multiplier.  
£ =∏𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
+ 𝜇 (∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
− 𝐸𝐻ℎ)                                              (3𝑎) 
The first order condition:  
𝜕£
𝜕𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
=  
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
 ∏𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
+ 𝜇𝑃𝑖
𝑍  =  0                                     (3𝑏) 
𝜕£
𝜕𝜇
=  ∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
− 𝐸𝐻ℎ  =  0                                                                                 (3𝑐) 
Ratio of two foc (3b): 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝑍 =
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
 
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ
𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ
 
=
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = (
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ
)𝑃𝑗
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ                                                                        (3𝑑) 
Substitute (3d) to (3c) to obtain: 
∑(
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ
)𝑃𝑗
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ
𝑖
= 𝐸𝐻ℎ 
(
1
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ
)𝑃𝑗
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ∑𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖
= 𝐸𝐻ℎ 
Because ∑ 𝛼𝑖,ℎ𝑖 = 1, we obtain equation (3e): 
𝐶𝐻𝑗,ℎ =
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗,ℎ
𝑃𝑗
𝑍 𝐸𝐻ℎ , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                 (3𝑒) 
 
3.A5. Import and Domestic Demand Function  
max
Zi,𝑀𝑖,𝐷𝑖
𝜋𝑖
𝑧 = 𝑃𝑖
𝑧𝑍𝑖  – ((1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖)       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
Subject to: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
Let 𝜉 be a Lagrangian and 𝜇 be a Lagrange multiplier. 
𝜉 = 𝑃𝑖
𝑧𝑍𝑖 – ((1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖)
+ 𝜇 ({𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 } − 𝑍𝑖)                                    (4𝑎) 
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First order condition: 
𝜕𝜉
𝜕Zi
= 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 − 𝜇 = 0                                                                                                         (4𝑏) 
𝜕𝜉
𝜕𝑀𝑖
=– (1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑀
+ 𝜇 (−
1
 Φ𝑖 
) (−Φ𝑖)(𝛿𝑚𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖−1) (𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖
+ 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 
−1
)  =  0                                                       (4𝑐) 
𝜕𝜉
𝜕𝐷𝑖
=–𝑝𝑖
𝐷
+ 𝜇 (−
1
 Φ𝑖 
) (−Φ𝑖)(𝛿𝑑𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖−1) (𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖
+ 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 
−1
)  =  0                                                                                  (4𝑑) 
𝜕𝜉
𝜕𝜇𝑖
= (𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖 (
𝑀𝑖
𝛿𝑚𝑖
)
−Φ𝑖
+ 𝛿𝑑𝑖 (
𝐷𝑖
𝛿𝑑𝑖
)
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 
− 𝑍𝑖)                                     (4𝑒) 
Substituting 𝜇 with 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 (equation 4b) and rearranging 𝛿𝑚𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
=
(
𝑍𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
)
−Φ𝑖
 (equation (4e)), we modify the respective equation (4c) and (4d) as follows: 
−(1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖)𝑝𝑖
𝑀 + 𝑃𝑖
𝑧(𝛿𝑚𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖−1)𝑠𝑧𝑖 (
𝑍𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
)
1+Φ𝑖
= 0                           (4𝑐′) 
 −𝑝𝑖
𝐷 + 𝑃𝑖
𝑍(𝛿𝑑𝑖
Φ𝑖+1𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖−1)𝑠𝑧𝑖 (
𝑍𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
)
1+Φ𝑖
=  0                                                   (4𝑑′)  
Next, equation (4c’) and (4d’) are then reconstructed to obtain the following demand 
solution for import and domestic of the 𝑖-th goods as follows: 
𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
(1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑀
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 }
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷  
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
𝑍}
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
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Appendix 3.B: List of equations of the CGE model 
Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
Domestic Production Block  
A. Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief type of function: 
1. ` The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity used by 𝑗-th industry: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 ,      𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴  
24x24 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
2.  The 𝑗-th VA used: 
𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗            , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
3.  The Price of Gross Domestic Output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗))𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 +∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴 
4.  The Relationship Between Activity Output and Commodity Supply: 
𝑄𝑖 =∑𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
24 𝑄𝑖  
5.  The Relationship Between Activity Price and Commodity Price: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 =∑𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 
B. Second stage: Value Added (VA) from Primary Factors 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
6.  𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾
𝑗
𝛿𝐾,𝑗 ,        𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 = 1,    𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝑉𝐴𝑗  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
7.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th industry for capital factor used: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾,𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝐾𝑗  
8.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th industry for composite labour factor used: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
9.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑗 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 redundant 
C. Bottom stage: The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
10.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴    , 𝛽 =
1
𝜎𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑙 > 1 
24 redundant 
11.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
    , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅     , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
16X24 𝐿𝑜,𝑗  
12.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
     , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
24 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 
Total No. of Equations  1200   
Government Block  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
13.  Total government revenue:  
𝐼𝐺 =∑(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+ ∑ (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
1 𝐼𝐺 
14.  Total government expenditure:  
𝐸𝐺 =∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
1 𝐸𝐺 
15.  Public spending on 𝑖-th final goods: 
𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
24 𝐶𝐺𝑖  
16.  Government spending on public services:  
𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑇𝑅𝑏𝑎𝑟,             ℎ ∈ 𝐻,   𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟,                𝑖𝑛 ≠ ℎ ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 
17.  Government saving: 
𝑆𝐺 = 𝐼𝐺 − 𝐸𝐺 
1 𝑆𝐺 
Total No. of Equations 38  
 
Households Block  
18.  Total income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ + ∑ 𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐼𝐻ℎ  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
19.  Labour income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ = ∑ 𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ  
20.  Capital income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊)    , ℎ ∈ 𝐻    , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
8 𝐼𝐻𝐾𝐿ℎ  
21.  Disposable income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻     , 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
8 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ 
22.  The the ℎ-th household transfer payments to institution’s:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ = 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ      , 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ = (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) 𝐼𝐻ℎ      , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
11x8 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ  
23.  Actual disposable income of the ℎ-th household:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
      , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ  
24.  The ℎ-th household saving: 
𝑆𝐻ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 
 
𝑆𝐻ℎ  
25.  Adjusted average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th households: 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ(1 + 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗)     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
26.  Consumption budget of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐸𝐻ℎ = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑆𝐻ℎ      , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐸𝐻ℎ  
27.  Final demand of the ℎ-th household:  
We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶      , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
24x8 𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ 
Total No. of Equations 344  
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  
28.  Price index of ℎ-th households: 
𝑃𝐼ℎ =∏𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
     , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝑃𝐼ℎ  
29.  CPI: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝑤ℎ𝑃𝐼ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
 
1 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵  
Total No. Of equation 9  
Enterprise  
30.  Total enterprise income: 
𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
       , 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐼𝐵 
31.  Capital income of enterprise: 1 𝐼𝐵𝐾 
85 
 
 
 
Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
𝐼𝐵𝐾 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊)     , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
32.  Disposable income of enterprise: 
𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏     , 𝑔𝑜𝑣, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐷𝐼𝐵 
33.  Enterprise transfer payment to 𝑖𝑛-th institutions:   
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 = 𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏𝐷𝐼𝐵           , 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐼𝐵        , 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆   
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 
34.  Actual disposable income of enterprise:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐷𝐼𝐵 − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
1 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 
35.  Saving of enterprise: 
𝑆𝐵 = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 
1 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 
Total No. of Equations 16  
Export, Import and The Balance of Payments Constraint Block  
36.  RoW total outflow:  1 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐿𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+  𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊)             , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
37.  RoW total inflow:   
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝐸
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+ 𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 
38.  ROW transfer payment to institutions’:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊(𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟       , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0 is treated as exogenous 
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊   
39.  Current account deficit: 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 
1 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 
40.  The price of export for the 𝑖-th of commodities: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊        , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 
21 𝑃𝑖
𝐸  
41.  The price of import for the 𝑖-th of commodities: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 
21 𝑃𝑖
𝑀  
Total No. of Equations 56  
Investment Block  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
42.  Final demand of the 𝑖-th investment commodities: 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽)       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
24 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑗  
43.  Saving-Investment identity used for Walras law 
𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝑆𝐻ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝑆𝐵 + 𝑆𝐺 + 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 −∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
  
1 𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆 
Total No. of Equations 25  
Production of composite good  
44.  Armington’ s production function: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚,𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑,𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖    , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷  , Φ =
1
𝜎𝑧
− 1   , 𝜎𝑧 > 1 
21 redundant 
45.  The final goods production by only utilizes the input of domestic commodities (not imported): 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &   𝐶𝑀 
3 𝐷𝑖  
46.  The 𝑖-th import commodity used: 
𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
(1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 }
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝑀𝑖  
47.  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity used: 
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
𝑍}
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
        , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝐷𝑖  
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
48.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 = (1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 
49.  Zero profit condition in which the industry only utilizes the input of domestic commodities (not imported): 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝑀 
3 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 
Total No. of Equations 90  
Division of gross production to domestic and exports sales    
50.  Armington’s transformation equation:  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑠𝑞𝑖(𝜔𝑒,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐸𝑖)
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐷𝑖)
𝜇𝑖)
1
 𝜇𝑖     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷     , 𝜇 =
1
𝜎𝑞
+ 1        , 𝜎𝑞 > 0 
21 redundant 
51.  Gross Domestic Output in the case where the industry produces only domestic commodities (not exported): 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝐸 
3 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 
52.  The 𝑖-th export commodity: 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝜔𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐸
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄  
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
    , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝐸𝑖  
53.  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity supply: 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝜔𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝜍𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄  
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 
54.  Zero profit condition:  
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖       , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
21 𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of Eqs. End. Var.  
55.  Zero profit condition in the case where the industry produces only for domestic commodities (not exported): 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷      , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &  𝐶𝐸 
3 𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
Total No. of Equations 90  
Market Clearing Conditions Block  
56.  Total supply equals with the total demand: 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +∑𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
24 𝑍𝑖  
57.  Capital factor market-clearing conditions: 
∑𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐾𝑈 = 𝐾𝑆     , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝑃𝐾  
58.  Labour factor market-clearing conditions: 
∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,    𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
16 𝑃𝑜
𝐿  
Total No. of Equations 57  
Overall Equations 1,818  
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Appendix 3.C: Sets 
Set Element Description 
Commodities Set C 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶  
AGRI_C 
AISCOM_C 
BANKAS_C 
CATLE_C 
CHFCC_C 
 
COMOIL_C 
CONS_C 
ESTPRV_C 
ELEGD_C 
 
FISH_C 
FODT_C 
FORH_C 
GOVTD_C 
 
HTEL_C 
INDSHO_C 
 
LANT_C 
OAGRI_C 
OMINE_C 
PPTM_C 
 
RSTR_C 
STGL_C 
 
SUPPS_C 
 
 
TRDE_C 
WOOG_C 
Agriculture Food Crops 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Bank and Assurance 
Cattle and the Outcomes 
Chemical, Fertilizer, Goods from 
Clay and Cement 
Coal, Metal Seeds, and Oil Mining 
Construction 
Real Estate, and Private Services 
Electricity, Gas, and Drinkable Water 
Fishery 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 
Forestry and Hunting 
Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social 
Services 
Hotel 
Individual Services, Households, and 
Other Services 
Land Transportation 
Agriculture for Other Crops 
Other Mining and Excavations 
Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, 
and Goods from Metal and Industry 
Restaurant 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and 
Leather Industries 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and Warehouse 
Transportation 
Trade 
Wood and Goods from Wood 
  
𝐶𝑀 ⊂ 𝐶: Set of commodities for 
which some of the output is imported 
AGRI_C 
AISCOM_C 
BANKAS_C 
CATLE_C 
CHFCC_C 
COMOIL_C 
ESTPRV_C 
FODT_C 
FORH_C 
FISH_C 
GOVTD_C 
HTEL_C 
INDSHO_C 
LANT_C 
OAGRI_C 
OMINE_C 
PPTM_C 
RSTR_C 
STGL_C 
SUPPS_C 
WOOG_C 
𝐶𝐸 ⊂ 𝐶: Set of commodities for 
which some of the output is exported 
AGRI_C 
AISCOM_C 
BANKAS_C 
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CATLE_C 
CHFCC_C 
COMOIL_C 
ESTPRV_C 
FODT_C 
FORH_C 
FISH_C 
GOVTD_C 
HTEL_C 
INDSHO_C 
LANT_C 
OAGRI_C 
OMINE_C 
PPTM_C 
RSTR_C 
STGL_C 
SUPPS_C 
WOOG_C 
Commodities Set A 
𝑗 ∈ 𝐴: where   𝑖 = 𝑗 and 𝐴 = C  
AGRI_A 
AISCOM_ A 
BANKAS_ A 
CATLE_ A 
CHFCC_ A 
COMOIL_ A 
CONS_ A 
ESTPRV_ A 
ELEGD_ A 
FODT_ A 
FORH_ A 
FISH_ A 
GOVTD_ A 
HTEL_ A 
INDSHO_ A 
LANT_ A 
OAGRI_ A 
OMINE_ A 
PPTM_ A 
RSTR_ A 
STGL_ A 
SUPPS_ A 
TRDE_ A 
WOOG_ A 
Labour Set LAB 
𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐴𝐵  
FAGR_LAB_U 
FAGR_LAB_R 
 
IAGR_LAB_U 
IAGR_LAB_R 
 
FMAN_LAB_U 
FMAN_LAB_R 
 
IMAN_LAB_U 
IMAN_LAB_R 
 
FCLER_LAB_U 
FCLER_LAB_R 
 
ICLER_LAB_U 
ICLER_LAB_R 
 
Formal agricultural labour in urban 
Formal agricultural labour in rural 
 
Informal agricultural labour in urban 
Informal agricultural labour in rural 
 
Formal manual labour in urban 
Formal manual labour in rural 
 
Informal manual labour in urban 
Informal manual labour in rural 
 
Formal clerical labour in urban 
Formal clerical labour in rural 
 
Informal clerical labour in urban 
Informal clerical labour in rural 
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FPROF_LAB_U 
FPROF_LAB_R 
 
IPROF_LAB_U 
IPROF_LAB_R 
Formal professional labour in urban 
Formal professional labour in rural 
 
Informal professional labour in urban 
Informal professional labour in rural 
 
Primary Factors Set FAC 
𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝐴𝐶 
FAGR_LAB_U 
FAGR_LAB_R 
IAGR_LAB_U 
IAGR_LAB_R 
FMAN_LAB_U 
FMAN_LAB_R 
IMAN_LAB_U 
IMAN_LAB_R 
FCLER_LAB_U 
FCLER_LAB_R 
ICLER_LAB_U 
ICLER_LAB_R 
FPROF_LAB_U 
FPROF_LAB_R 
IPROF_LAB_U 
IPROF_LAB_R 
K 
Formal agricultural labour in urban 
Formal agricultural labour in rural 
Informal agricultural labour in urban 
Informal agricultural labour in rural 
Formal manual labour in urban 
Formal manual labour in rural 
Informal manual labour in urban 
Informal manual labour in rural 
Formal clerical labour in urban 
Formal clerical labour in rural 
Informal clerical labour in urban 
Informal clerical labour in rural 
Formal professional labour in urban 
Formal professional labour in rural 
Informal professional labour in urban 
Informal professional labour in rural 
Capital 
Household Set H 
ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
HH_AGR_L 
 
 
HH_AGR_NL 
 
 
HH_NAGR_LL 
 
 
HH_NAGR_NA 
 
 
 
HH_NAGR_HL  
 
 
HH_NAGU_LL 
 
 
HH_NAGU_NA 
 
 
 
HH_NAGU_HL 
Households who work as employee in 
agriculture 
 
Households who work as employer in 
agriculture 
 
Households who have low level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
 
Households in rural area with 
unidentified types of occupation: non 
agriculture 
 
Households who have high level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
 
Households who have low level of 
income in urban: non-agriculture 
 
Households in urban area with 
unidentified types of occupation: non 
agriculture 
 
Households who have high level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
Institution Set INS 
𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
HH_AGR_L 
 
 
HH_AGR_NL 
 
 
HH_NAGR_LL 
 
 
HH_NAGR_NA 
 
 
Households who work as employee in 
agriculture 
 
Households who work as employer in 
agriculture 
 
Households who have low level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
 
Households in rural area with 
unidentified types of occupation: non 
agriculture 
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HH_NAGR_HL  
 
 
HH_NAGU_LL 
 
 
HH_NAGU_NA 
 
 
 
HH_NAGU_HL 
 
 
FIRM 
GOV 
FOR_BAL 
 
Households who have high level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
 
Households who have low level of 
income in urban: non-agriculture 
 
Households in urban area with 
unidentified types of occupation: non 
agriculture 
 
Households who have high level of 
income in rural: non-agriculture 
 
Firms 
Government 
Foreign Balance 
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Appendix 3.D: List of all variables appearing in the CGE model  
(Alphabetical Orders) 
Notation used 
for the variable 
Number of Variables Definition of the Variable 
Endogenous Exogenous 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 1  Actual disposable income of enterprise 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ  8  
Actual disposable income of the h-th type of 
households 
𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 Income tax rate of enterprise  
𝐶𝐺𝑖 24  Government demand of the i-th composite goods 
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ 24*8  
The ℎ-th household final demand of the 𝑖-th 
composite goods  
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 24  Investment demand of the 𝑖-th composite goods 
𝐶𝑃𝐼  1 Consumer Price Index 
𝐷𝑖  24  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity 
𝐷𝐼𝐵 1  Disposable income of enterprise 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ 8  Disposable income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐸𝑖 21  The 𝑖-th exported commodity 
𝐸𝐺 1  Total government expenditure 
𝐸𝐻ℎ 8  Consumption budget of the ℎ-th household 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 1  RoW total inflow 
𝐸𝑋𝑅  1 
Exchange rate: units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency 
𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 Average tax rate of ℎ-th household income 
𝐼𝐵 1  Total enterprise income 
𝐼𝐵𝐾 1  Capital income of enterprise 
𝐼𝐺 1  Total government revenue 
𝐼𝐻ℎ  8  Total income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ  8  Capital income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ 8  Labour income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 1  
The investment adjustment index (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽=0 if 
investment is fixed; otherwise if it is allowed to 
adjust endogenously) 
𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 1  RoW total outflow 
𝐾𝑗 24  Capital used in 𝑗-th activity 
𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊  1 Capital used in abroad 
𝐾𝑆  1 Total of capital supply 
𝐾𝑈  1 Unemployed (unused) capital 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 16*24  The 𝑜-th labour used in 𝑗-th activity  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  24  The composite labour in 𝑗-th activity 
𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊  16 The 𝑜-th labour used abroad  
𝐿𝑆𝑜  16 Total supply of labour types  
𝐿𝑈𝑜  16 Total unemployment of labour types 
𝑀𝑖 21  The 𝑖-th import commodity 
𝑃𝑖
𝐷 24  Price of the 𝑖-th commodity 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾  24 The adjusted capital rent across activities  
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿   16*24 The adjusted labour type wages across activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 24  The adjusted labour composite wage across activities 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸  21  Price of the 𝑖-th exported commodity 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊  21 
The price of the 𝑖-th of exported commodities in 
terms of foreign currency  
𝑃𝐼ℎ 8  Price index of ℎ-th households 
𝑃𝐾  1  Price of aggregate capital  
𝑃𝑜
𝐿  16  Wages rate of the 𝑜-th labour  
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵  1  
Wages rate of the composite labour in aggregated 
activities 
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𝑃𝑖
𝑀 21  Price of the 𝑖-th imported commodity 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊  21 
The price of the 𝑖-th imported commodities in terms 
of foreign currency 
𝑃𝑖
𝑄
 24  Price of the 𝑖-th domestically produced goods 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 24  Price of gross domestic output of 𝑗-th activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴 24  Price of value added in 𝑗-th activity 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 24  Price of the 𝑖-th final (composite) goods 
𝑄𝑖  24  The 𝑖-th domestic goods 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 24  Gross domestic output of 𝑗-th activity 
𝑆𝐵  1 Enterprise saving 
𝑆𝐺 1  Government saving 
𝑆𝐻ℎ 8  Household saving 
𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗  1 The endogenous adjustment of 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ 8  
Adjusted average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th 
type of households 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 1 1 Current account deficit 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 Average subsidy rate of the 𝑗-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 
Average subsidy rate of the 𝑖-th gross domestic 
output 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 
Average import tariff rate of 𝑖-th imported 
commodity 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛 120 1 Transfers between 𝑖𝑛-th institution’s 
𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟  1 Total government transfer payments 
𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟  1 Total ROW transfer payments 
𝑉𝐴𝑗 24  The value added output in 𝑗-th activity 
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  1 
The average ad valorem tax rate of the 𝑖-th gross 
domestic output 
𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆 1  Saving-Investment identity used for Walras law 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 24*24  
The 𝑖-th intermediate commodity input for 𝑗-th 
activity  
𝑍𝑖 24  Final output of the 𝑖-th composite commodity 
TOTAL No: 1,818   
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Appendix 3.E: List of all parameters used in the CGE model 
Parameters Description and measurement 
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗  Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝑗 for one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗 
𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑖-th intermediate input for a unit 
of 𝑄𝐴𝑗 
𝛿𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑚𝑖 = 1 Import and domestic share parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th composite 
commodity, 0 ≤ 𝛿𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 = 1 Share parameter of capital and labour by 𝑗-th industry, 0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾,𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛾𝑜,𝑗 Share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1) 
𝜔𝑒𝑖  Share parameter of 𝑖-th transformation commodity, 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 ≤ 1  
𝜔𝑑𝑖 + 𝜔𝑒𝑖 = 1 Export and domestic share parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th composite 
commodity, 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1 
  𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙 − 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1 
Elasticity (CES-composite labour) 
𝜇 =
1
𝜎𝑖
𝑞 + 1, 𝜎𝑖
𝑞 > 0 
Elasticity (CET-Armington’s) 
Φi =
1
𝜎𝑖
𝑧 − 1, 𝜎𝑖
𝑧 > 1 
Elasticity (CES-Armington’s) 
𝑠𝑙𝑗  Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th industry 
𝑠𝑞𝑖  Shift parameter of CET transformation of 𝑖-th commodity supply 
𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗  Efficiency parameter of 𝑉𝐴 used by the 𝑗-th industry 
𝑠𝑧𝑖  Shift parameter of Armington’s production of 𝑖-th final goods 
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Appendix 3.F: List of Shares, Rates, and Weights 
Parameters Description and measurement 
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Adjustment factor for government consumption  
𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖  Initial government consumption on the 𝑖-th types of composite goods 
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ 
Share parameter of Cobb-Douglas utility function of the ℎ-th type of households 
to consume the 𝑖-th composite goods 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖  Initial investment demand of the 𝑖-th commodity 
𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ Specific tax rate adjustment of ℎ-th household 
𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 Share of capital income received by enterprise 
𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ  Share of capital income received by ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜 Share of the 𝑜-th type of labour income received by ℎ-th type of households 
𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 Share of the foreign capital used domestically 
𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜  Share of the 𝑜-th type of foreign labour used domestically 
𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ Dummy parameter to allow 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ to adjust 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ  Initial value of average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗  Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑗-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑖-th gross domestic output 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  Import tariff rate adjustment across 𝑖-th imported commodity 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 Input-Output coefficients 
𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏 The share of enterprise transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 The share of government transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ  
The share of the ℎ-th type of households transfer payment to non-government 
institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊  The share of the 𝑅𝑂𝑊 transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th institution’s  
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 The ad valorem tax rate adjustment across 𝑖-th gross domestic output 
𝑤ℎ CPI weight as share of each households’ expenditure in total expenditure 
 
Appendix 3.G: Value of CES and CET Elasticity 
CES and CET 
Parameter 
Value Source 
𝛽𝑗 0.8 
Decaluwé et al (2012) 
𝜍𝑖 2 
𝜌𝑗 1.5 
Φ𝑖 2 
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Chapter 4 
Simulation and Results Discussion 
Of Standard CGE Model for Indonesia 
 
4.1. Introduction  
The effectiveness of government interventions to improve the economy’s performance is 
highly dependent on their fiscal sustainability. For instance, if the government increases its 
expenditure, then the financing schemes could be done through several channels, i.e. 
increasing the tax revenues, increasing the debt, reducing subsidies, or reducing transfer 
payments to certain institutions. These decisions should attain a primary objective of which 
it leads to the improvement of national income. In other word, the chosen fiscal policies 
should be well-designed to avoid adverse effects on the economy’s performance. 
According to Indonesia’s Public Expenditure Review published by The World Bank 
(2007), total public spending of Indonesia in real terms increased annually by 11% in 
average between the year 2001 and 2005. However, since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
the Indonesian government debt for domestic and foreign, rose from 25% of GDP at pre-
crisis to about 100% of GDP in the year 2000 (Francis, 2012). At the receipt side, 
Indonesia’s tax ratio is relatively low compared to other Southeast Asian countries 
(ASEAN). The percentage ratio of government tax revenues to Indonesia’s GDP was 
11.9% in the year 2003 and 12.6% in the year 2011. Whilst, the tax ratio of developed 
ASEAN and OECD countries reached more than 15% and 33.8% of their respective GDP 
in the year 2009 (Francis, 2012; Ikhsan et al., 2005). In order to overcome such burden, the 
Indonesian government has been starting to implement one of the main agendas, i.e. 
improving its revenue by either raising the ad valorem tax rates or reducing subsidies to 
gradually achieve fiscal sustainability (Amir et al., 2013; Oktaviani et al., 2004; Ikhsan et 
al., 2005).    
It is usually argued that the Indonesian economy has been adversely affected by the 
subsidies policies. In particular, subsidies applied to energy-related products are considered 
to be harmful (Dartanto, 2013; Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008). In general, the budget 
allocation for total subsidies is gradually growing about Rp. 72.8 trillion nominally or 
within the average growth rate of 4.8% annually. In year 2014, the government spent about 
30% of its total budget for subsidies, which regarded as the largest shares to total 
government expenditures (Financial Note and Indonesian Budget, 2014). These burdens 
are further deteriorating due to factors such as: the upward trend of world oil price; the 
increasing rate of population; the rise in per capita domestic consumption on fuels and 
electricity; and the low utilization of renewable energy sources and instead heavily reliance 
on fossil fuels input to generate electricity.  
Fiscal policy plays an important role in stabilizing the aggregate demand and 
fostering the national income (Romer, 2001; Vladimirov and Neicheva, 2008; Maipita et 
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al., 2010). The instruments of fiscal policy are generally categorised into three components: 
net taxes (total taxes less subsidies), government expenditure, and transfer payments – 
including social security payments and debt interest payments (Case et al., 2012). The 
government levies taxes (net of transfer benefits) and spends them to purchase goods and 
services. A budget deficit will occur when government expenditure exceeds its receipt in a 
given period. Thus, in order to finance this deficit, the government must borrow from 
institutions mainly by selling the bonds (Begg et al., 2003).  
Higher public spending increases the equilibrium output. With fixed tax revenues, 
the extra expenditures imply larger budget deficit. Begg et al. (2003) argues that a huge 
budget deficit can lead to a vicious circle of additional borrowing, additional interest 
payments, and yet more borrowing from public and foreign to finance the deficit. To reduce 
the deficit, the government should therefore undertake either fiscal contraction such as 
reducing their spending on subsidy or fiscal expansion such as increasing taxes (Maipta et 
al., 2010; Mabugu et al., 2013).    
This chapter aims to investigate, within the context of computable general 
equilibrium analysis, the impact of exogenous fiscal expansions/contractions on 
Indonesia’s main macroeconomic indicators and to their consequences by examining how 
different institutions and sectors in the economy are affected as a result. The main questions 
to be asked in this chapter: What is the macroeconomic impact of government fiscal policy? 
Could the economy’s income be improved by higher government expenditure? Whether 
the increased indirect tax rates (or reduced subsidy rates) constitute a progressive economy 
performance? More specifically, following the approach advocated in the literature by 
studies such as Damuri and Perdana (2003); Amir et al. (2013); Mabugu et al. (2013); 
Maipita et al. (2010); and Solaymani et al. (2014), we use a policy shock of a 10% increase 
in government spending. Three different scenarios are considered to finance the extra 
expenditure: (1) the government is allowed to borrow by government saving adjustment 
without any changes in all tax and subsidy rates; (2) the subsidy rates across activities adjust 
without any changes in government saving as well as the rests of tax and subsidy rates; and 
(3) the output tax rates adjust without any changes in government saving as well as the rests 
of tax and subsidy rates.  
Damuri and Perdana (2003) argue that in the short run an increase in public spending 
financed by loan only (scenario 1) raises the level of GDP by more than that case of both 
simultaneous loan and tax rates adjustment to finance the additional government’s 
expenditure. They argue that the increase in tax rates impedes the market mechanism and 
restrict consumer choice and thus could lead to a contraction in economy’s performance 
(Griffiths and Wall 1997). However, Begg et al. (2003) obtain a different result: the 
financing scheme through both loans and taxes leads to higher GDP because of the balanced 
budget multiplier effect. This multiplier leads to changes in autonomous demand, which in 
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turn results in changes in equilibrium national income and output17. This chapter, therefore, 
aims to investigate these contradictions by adopting two channels of financing the extra 
government expenditure, i.e., allowing the borrowing adjustment or a simultaneous 
injection of both borrowing adjustment and increasing the exogenous output tax rates. 
Alternatively, to ease the fiscal pressures on higher public expenditures, the 
government also can reduce its subsidy payments. Subsidy is a form of government 
expenditure which is aimed to help poor households in reducing the price of a specific 
domestic good relatively to its market price (Maipita et al., 2010; Solaymani et al., 2014). 
However, the effectiveness of subsidy is highly dependent on the fluctuation of these price 
margins. For example, suppose the government grants a subsidy in order to lower the 
burden stemming from a high fuel price, the producers of fuel could, at the same time, 
increase their market price; hence the effects of subsidy are offset by an increase in price 
level, which renders the subsidy ineffective. In other words, subsidies could create adverse 
consequences such as inefficient distribution, misallocation of recipients, market failures 
and could diminish welfare (Solaymani et al., 2014; World Trade Reports, 2006; Karami 
et al., 2012; Morgan, 2007; OECD, 2005). Therefore, motivated by these implications, we 
also assess the impact of a 10% subsidy rates cut of all activities to increase the net 
government revenue. Lofgren (1995) found that, within a fixed government spending on 
commodities, a subsidy cut leads to contraction in GDP and income distribution. In the 
short run, a reduction of specific fuel subsidies increases the domestic price which in turn 
reduces the household consumption particularly the lower-income households’ (Clements 
et al., 2007). However, in long run, it improves the poor households because subsidy 
removal increases government expenditure, i.e. infrastructure development, human capital 
investments, and social protection (Dartanto, 2013).    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 discusses an overview of 
the specific literatures that assess the distribution impact of fiscal policy using a CGE model 
framework. The scenarios provided in these literatures are used to motivate the simulations 
proposed in our model. Section 4.3 discusses the theoretical model and identification of 
scenarios motivated in Section 4.2 in the context of the specific model. It refers to the 
benchmark CGE model of the previous chapter and uses the relevant equations to 
demonstrate our scenarios and closure rules. Section 4.4 discusses simulation results and 
sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 4.5 presents the conclusions.    
 
4.2. Literature and motivation 
A number of studies have been conducted to analyse the distributional impact of fiscal 
policies in Indonesia (Damuri and Perdana, 2003; Amir et al., 2013 and Maipita et al., 
2010, among others) and other countries (see, for example, Solaymani et al., 2013 and 
                                                          
17 For details see: Begg et al (2003).  
101 
 
 
 
Mabugu et al., 2013). These studies look at the impact of fiscal policy 
expansions/contractions in various scenarios by using a SAM based CGE model, which 
closely relates to the objectives of this research. Moreover, the simulations proposed in our 
current study are motivated by these literatures. In what follows, we provide a brief 
overview of these studies. 
 Damuri and Perdana (2003) analysed the effect of a fiscal expansion on income 
distribution and poverty in Indonesia. The model was based on a comparative static CGE 
model that is specifically designed by Warr et al. (1998) and Wittwer (1999) for Indonesia’s 
economy18. The study examined the impact of a 20% increase in government expenditure 
with 4 different scenarios to cover the extra spending budget: (i) government deficit and 
balance of payments are allowed to adjust in response to the increasing level of public 
spending but government revenues from net tax collection remained exogenous; (ii) income 
tax rate adjusts while other taxes, budget deficit, and balance of payments are fixed; (iii) 
ad valorem tax adjusts but other taxes, budget deficit and balance of payments are fixed; 
and (iv) as in (i) but keeping balance of payments fixed to prohibit foreign borrowing. 
Damuri and Perdana (2003) concluded that the impact of fiscal expansion on the Indonesian 
economy depends on the source of financing. They found that scenario (i) had the strongest 
impact on the national income. This was explained by the fact that the excess of public 
spending was covered by loans in current year which would be paid in future. The fixed 
balance of payment in scenario (iv), however, led to a lower GDP level compared to 
scenario (i). In scenario (ii), the income tax rate would adjust to a higher level which 
reduced households’ disposable income, thus reducing demand on final goods. This led to 
a drop in Indonesia’s GDP. Nevertheless, the scenario of tax income rate adjustment 
resulted in a higher level of GDP compared to scenario (iii) because the increased level of 
ad valorem tax rates directly increases commodities’ prices. Furthermore, in terms of 
poverty incidence, scenarios (i) and (iv) were found to have a positive impact on poverty 
reduction while scenarios (ii) and (iii) generated the opposite result.    
Amir et al. (2013) investigated the impact of income tax reform on Indonesia’s 
economy. The study used a SAM based CGE model approach that combined the framework 
of ORANI-G developed by Horridge (2003) and AGEFIS developed by Yusuf et al. (2008). 
Calibration was based on the Indonesian SAM in year 2005. The policy scenarios were 
considered under two conditions: (i) fixed budget deficit (interpreted as balanced budget); 
and (ii) flexible budget deficit condition (interpreted as borrowing financed budget). For 
each condition, the authors simulated three different scenarios: (a) a reduction in household 
income tax rate; (b) a reduction in business income tax rate; and (c) simultaneous reduction 
in both tax rates. The magnitude of each shock was estimated according to tax returns data 
                                                          
18 The model is called WAYANG model, which is designed closely to the family of the ORANI model, a 
single region model for Australia’s economy. For details see Warr (1998) and Witwerr (1999). 
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published by the Indonesian Financial Ministry. For the business income tax rate, the 
authors determined a shock of -0.57%, while household income tax rate varied for each 
category of 200 types of households. They concluded that the reduction of income tax rate 
within a fixed budget deficit immediately reduces government expenditure. The specific 
supply from public activity (government administration, defence, education, health, and 
social service sector)19 is dropped, which in turn reduces government demand for labour. 
Meanwhile, households’ disposable income is increasing, and hence it improves their 
consumption on goods by 0.418%. The increased demand of goods from households’ 
offsets the reduction of public sector production. Overall, this simulation still indicates a 
strong income effect that leads to higher demand for final goods, real investment, and net 
exports; which results in real GDP improvement. In the second scenario, which business 
income tax rate is reduced under the fixed budget deficit, Amir et al. (2013) found that 
again government spending reduces. Supply production from public activity drops, which 
in turn also reduces its demand for labour. In comparison with the simulation of income tax 
rate reduction, this scenario does not directly affect households’ disposable income. 
Therefore, the improvement of private consumption on goods is smaller by only 0.018%. 
A reduction of the business income tax rate provides lower stimuli to real GDP growth. 
Furthermore, under the endogenous budget deficit condition, government expenditure does 
not decline although its revenue is decreasing. The government is allowed to increase their 
level of borrowing in order to cover the inadequate receipts, which will be paid in the future. 
The reduction of both income and business tax rates improve the national income. It induces 
higher demand for final goods, leading to the increased level of output volumes and prices. 
The author’s concluded that under both conditions: exogenous and endogenous budget 
deficits, the reduction of income and business tax rates have a positive impact on 
Indonesia’s economy. The aggregate supply and demand are increasing. 
Mabugu et al. (2013) constructed a dynamic CGE model to simulate the expansion 
of government spending on South Africa’s economy. The model is based on the PEP 
standard CGE model developed by Decaluwé et al. (2010). It is calibrated from the South 
African SAM in the year 2005. The study simulates about 6% increase of government 
expenditure and assumes that this magnitude of shock will be levelled off to initial level in 
the future. Three scenarios are proposed to finance the increased level of public 
expenditure: (i) income tax rate adjusts to compensate the additional expenditure but other 
tax rates and budget deficit are exogenous; (ii) output tax rate adjusts to compensate the 
additional expenditure but other tax rates and budget deficit are exogenous; and (iii) All 
taxes are fixed but the budget deficit adjusts to finance the additional expenditures.  The 
author’s concluded that in scenario (i), income tax rate increases by 2.65% in short run. 
                                                          
19 The author’s defines the aggregated activity account of government administration, defence, education, 
health, and social services in the Indonesia’s SAM in the year 2005 as public sector. 
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However, this increase would decline accordingly to the inter-temporal magnitude of 
government expenditures. If the government decides scenario (ii) to compensate the 
additional spending, the output tax rate would increase by 1% for all commodities. Of all 
scenarios, the increased expenditure slightly improved the GDP in short run. However, in 
the long run, because of the effects on investment are higher, it thus induces GDP to 
increase more sharply. The impact on investment is stronger under the scenario (i) and (iii). 
This is because the endogenous income tax rate and budget deficit would give greater effect 
to increase the household and government saving.    
Maipita et al. (2010) investigated the impact of fiscal policies on Indonesia’s 
economy and its poverty rate. The study is based on a CGE model developed by Lofgren 
et al. (2002) from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). By using the 
cross-entropy method, the author’s first updated the Input-Output table for Indonesia in the 
year 2003 to 2005 to calibrate the model. Three simulations are covered in this study: (i) a 
contraction of fiscal policy by increasing the ad valorem tax rate by 10%; (ii) an expansion 
of fiscal policy by increasing subsidy rates in all activities by 10%; and (iii) an increase of 
government transfer payments to rural households by Rp. 100,000. In addition, of all 
scenarios, the government deficit is endogenous and all net taxes rates are fixed. The study 
concluded that the increased output tax rate in scenario (i) has a negative impact on GDP. 
This is due to the decline of its components such as private consumption, government 
consumption, and net exports. Across sectors, all activities indicate an improvement in 
output volumes, excluding manufacturing and trade, hotel, and restaurant activities. All 
prices of activity output increase. Labour demand in manufacturing and trade, hotel, and 
restaurant activities decline. Furthermore, higher prices of output lead to the reduction of 
households’ real income excluding rural agricultural labour and rural agricultural 
entrepreneur types20, due to the decline of their purchasing power. Thus, it leads to an 
increasing incidence of poverty. In contrast, the increased subsidy rate across activities in 
scenario (ii) has a positive impact on GDP. It favours producers to lower the output price, 
which in turn increases private and government consumption. Households’ real income 
increases. Hence, poverty declines particularly among households’ in the rural area. 
Finally, in scenario (iii), for which the government increases its transfer of payments to 
rural households’, real GDP slightly decreases by 0.002%. Across sectors, this scenario has 
a positive impact mostly on sectors that produce basic needs such as agriculture, public 
utilities (electricity, gas, and water), transportation, and telecommunication. It improves the 
labour demand to these sectors. Other sectors contract. Scenario (iii) immediately increases 
the real income among rural households’. Thus, it only reduces poverty incidence among 
                                                          
20 Maipita et al. (2010) distinguished the households into 8 groups: rural agricultural labour; rural 
agricultural entrepreneur; rural low-income non-agricultural labour; rural non-labour force and undefined 
group; rural high-income non-agricultural labour; urban low-income non-agricultural labour; urban non-
labour force and undefined group; and urban high-income non-agricultural labour.  
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these groups. Since fiscal policy aims to improve the country’s economy performance as a 
whole, the authors’ argued that this scenario cannot appropriately be implemented.  
In summary, the above literatures show that the changes of fiscal policy can affect 
equilibrium national income and output. The effectiveness of government intervention to 
improve economy’s performance is highly dependent on their fiscal sustainability. For 
instance, if the government increases its expenditure, then the financing could be done by 
initiating the following: increasing the tax revenues; increasing the debt; reducing 
subsidies, or reducing transfer of payments to certain institutions’. These decisions should 
attain a primary goal: to boost the national income. In other words, the implementation of 
fiscal policies should be well-designed to avoid adverse effects on the economy’s 
performance. 
 
4.3. Fiscal Policy Scenarios for Indonesia and Their Impacts 
In this section we use the CGE model developed in Chapter 3 to examine the impact 
of implementing specific fiscal policies in Indonesia. This model is a large-scale model that 
is based on the circular flow of income distribution. The household and enterprise gain 
income from the endowment of production factors. The industries produce goods and 
services by utilizing the production factors and raw materials in a perfectly competitive 
market: no entry or exit barriers of the market. In other words, the firm cannot influence 
the market price (price takers), hence, the firms can only generate normal profits. We 
assume the perfect market competition because there are numerous types of the aggregated 
industries (24) in the SAM data set which are too difficult to determine their market 
competition in reality. We assume no externalities – no external cost or benefit transactions 
caused by the third parties or non-marketable transactions. For example, the effect of 
carbon tax on CO2 emissions generated from fossil fuels combustion is not incorporated.       
The CGE model used for this analysis, however, has several limitations that could 
affect the likely results. First, the model is calibrated to the one year of a SAM benchmark 
which means that the model does not take into account the stochastic anomalies which 
occur in that one year of data set. Iqbal and Siddiqui (2001) argue that this generalization 
will detract the validity of the results drawn from the model. Second, some of parameters 
used in the model are obtained from the literature. In other words, these parameters are not 
econometrically estimated. This approach will detract the ability of the model to correctly 
represent the Indonesian economy (McKitrick, 1998). Third, the production structure 
across industries is derived from the first order functional forms of the constant elasticity 
of substitutional (CES). McKitrick (1998) argued that the chosen functional structure 
strongly influences the results from a policy simulation. Fourth, the model is static (a single 
period model) which means that the model does not incorporate the dynamic behavior. In 
other words, expectations are assumed to be perfect foresight. Fifth, the model does not 
explicitly incorporate the monetary effects since there is no money market transaction 
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provided in the SAM data set. Thus, the changes in money supply are assumed not to affect 
the real side of the economy. The absence of money variables implicitly imply that the 
financial sector passively adjusts to facilitate the observed changes in real economy 
(Thurlow and Seventer, 2002). For instance, the adjusments of interest rate due to changes 
in saving and investment are assumed without the explicit model of loanable funds market. 
Thurlow and Seventer (2002) argue that although this ‘black box’ approach limits the 
model to assess the implication of policy changes, it might not severely distort the 
conclusions obtained for the real economy. To extend the model by including the financial 
sector requires additional data in the form of a financial accounting matrix that must be 
consistent with the SAM data set. To obtain this data involve with sophisticated processes 
(Thurlow and Seventer, 2002).      
We are interested in fiscal policy assessment because it can directly intervene in 
correcting market failure and income distribution (Griffiths and Wall, 1997; Damuri and 
Perdana, 2003). Indeed, analysing public expenditures should be conducted in a routine 
process (The World Bank, 2007). Fiscal policy is also useful in targeting specific agents in 
the economy, which experience a severe condition in a given period (Damuri and Perdana, 
2003). This study seeks to provide empirical justifications for policy makers to implement 
these policies in Indonesia’s economy. It emphasizes the sources of financing to cover the 
additional public expenditure on goods and services and how these choices influence the 
equilibrium output, national income, and individuals’ income distribution. 
Increasing the revenue on taxes or reducing expenditures on subsidies has become 
the main agenda of Indonesian government to compensate the increase in public 
expenditure (The World Bank, 2007). Based on the World Bank (2007) information, the 
total public spending of Indonesia in real terms has increased annually by 11% between the 
year 2001 and 2005. Thus, by following this justification, we choose to undertake three 
different scenarios to finance the 10% increase in the exogenous government expenditure. 
The justification to choose the financing scenarios are explained as follows: 
i) Simulation 1: the government is allowed to borrow by government saving adjustment. 
This simulation adopts the first scenario given in Damuri and Perdana (2003) study, 
where government deficit and the balance of payments are allowed to adjust in 
response to the increasing level of public spending but government revenues from net 
taxes collection remained exogenous. This scenario ensures that the government can 
only borrow to finance the extra expenditure without having any change in tax 
revenues. We expect that in the short run, this expansion has the strongest impact on 
Indonesia’s economy since there are no adverse effects through the increased tax rates.   
ii) Simulation 2: the subsidy rates across activities adjusts to keep the budget balance. In 
this simulation, we modify the second scenario proposed in Amir et al. (2013) study, 
in which we allow the subsidy rate to activities increases under the fixed budget deficit 
condition. By reducing the subsidy expenditures, the net tax revenues can be escalated 
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without having any increase in tax rates. This scenario contributes as the first study 
within the context of CGE modelling analysis. Most studies to investigate the 
distributional impact of reducing subsidy were focused in specific sector. For 
examples, Dartanto (2013), Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2008), Octaviani et al. (2007), 
Azis (2006), Yusuf (2008), and Clements et al. (2003) focused in examining the 
economic impact of reducing fuel subsidies in Indonesia. Lofgren and El-Said (2001) 
examined the short-run effects of eliminating food subsidies in Egypt. Liu and Li 
(2011) investigated the impact of reforming fossil energy subsidies on China’s 
economy. Steenblik and Coroyannakis (1995) assessed the economic impact of 
eliminating coal subsidies in western European countries. The results generally proved 
that subsidy reduction without any compensation could increase the poverty incidence. 
Therefore, in this scenario, we propose to reduce the subsidy rates to all activities 
uniformly in order to compensate the increased government expenditure. We expect 
that this strategy could generate a positive impact on Indonesia’s economy. 
iii) Simulation 3: the output tax rates adjusts to keep the budget balance. In this simulation, 
we follow Damuri and Perdana (2003) and Maipita et al. (2010) in which the additional 
public expenditures are financed by increasing the output tax rates. We suspect that 
this scenario would lead to the most adverse effects on the Indonesia’s economy. This 
is because the reduction of output tax rates would lead to a contraction in national 
income (Begg et al., 2003).       
We now briefly discuss the theoretical model and identification of scenarios 
motivated in previous section in the context of the specific model. Based on the standard 
CGE model given in the previous chapter, the government behaviors are expressed in 
equations (3.13) – (3.17).  
The government levies revenues from the economy’s circular flow through taxes less 
subsidies (net taxes) and income transfers less transfer of payments. The taxes cover income 
taxes on households (𝐼𝐻ℎ) at the rate of 𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ; ad valorem taxes on gross production 
sales (𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖) at the rate of 𝑣𝑎𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖; income tax of enterprise (𝐼𝐵) at the rate of 
𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒; and tariff on import sales (𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖) at the rate of 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖. The subsidies are 
allocated to some domestic commodities (𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖) at the rate of 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖; and some of 𝑗-
th industry gross output (𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗) at the rate of 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗. All of these tax (subsidy) 
rates are redefined in order to distinguish the average and specific rates such that the 
government is allowed to choose an exogenous change in their tax revenues. For example, 
the income tax rate for households’ 𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ is rewritten as 
(𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ). Furthermore, the government also receives transfer income 
from their internal government transactions (𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑅𝑂𝑊) and foreign (𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑅𝑂𝑊) less 
transfers payments to institutions’ (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣).  The government spends these revenues to 
purchase goods and services, which are expressed as ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑖∈𝐶 . The residuals between 
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the government expenditure and revenue are regarded as government saving: 𝑆𝐺 = 𝐼𝐺 −
𝐸𝐺. A budget deficit (surplus) occurs when government spending is higher (lower) than its 
receipt.   
The solution software is the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) with the 
Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) solver that has advantage in flexibility and speed 
to solve complex economic models (Flakowski, 2003). To implement the proposed 
scenarios given in the previous section, we execute the model as follows. The adjusted 
government expenditure (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽), where its initial value is assumed 1, is shocked by a 10% 
increase with three different financing scenarios: 
i) In scenario 1, all tax and subsidy rates are fixed, which are income tax rates 
(𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); ad valorem tax rates (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); business income tax rates 
(𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); tariff rate (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); subsidy rates to domestic commodities 
(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); and subsidy rates to activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒). Hence, the government 
saving (𝑆𝐺) adjusts to clear the changes of public spending.     
ii) In scenario 2, the subsidy rates to activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) adjust to clear the budget 
balance. Whilst the rests of tax and subsidy rates including government saving are 
fixed, which are: income tax rates (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); ad valorem tax rates (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); 
business income tax rates (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); tariff rates (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); subsidy rates to 
domestic commodities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); and the government saving (𝑆𝐺)  
iii) In scenario 3, the output tax rates adjust to clear the budget balance. Whilst the rests of 
tax and subsidy rates are fixed, which are: income tax rates (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); business 
income tax rates (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); tariff’s rate (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); subsidy rates to domestic 
commodities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); subsidy rates to activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒); and the 
government saving (𝑆𝐺). 
Moreover, the closure rules of all experiments are determined as follows:  
1. Flexible exchange rate regime, where balance of payment (𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊) is fixed and 
exchange rate adjusts to ensure 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0. This closure setting is selected to reflect the 
real condition of Indonesia’s economy regime, where Indonesia has been following a 
floating exchange rate regime since the year of 1977 (Bank of Indonesia, 2014). In the 
model, the endogenous exchange rate ensures the model to avoid capital flow and 
foreign borrowing. Hence, this model restricts the government to only financing its 
budget deficit by selling their treasury bonds to domestic institutions. Lofgren et al. 
(2002) stated that by fixing the trade balance, within the context of ceteris paribus, a 
depreciation of exchange rate (domestic per foreign currency units) would occur to cover 
a drop of foreign saving below the exogenous level. Damuri and Perdana, (2003) argued 
that this closure ensures the private investment unaffected by the endogenous trade 
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balances. Fiscal expansion would therefore push the interest rate to soar21. The increased 
interest rate would reduce investment, which in turn lowers the positive effect on 
aggregate demand (Damuri and Perdana, 2003).  
2. Investment-driven, where the actual investment (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) and enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) are 
exogenous. Whilst household saving (𝑆𝐻ℎ) and government saving (𝑆𝐺) adjust to obtain 
the saving-investment balance. More specifically, in scenario 1 and 3, we allow only the 
richest type of household (non-agricultural-urban households with high wages 
(HH_NAGU_HL))22 to adjust their saving ratio (𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1) but the saving of other 
household types is assumed fixed. Here, we expect that this scenario would increase the 
level of real income of household such that only the richest households could afford to 
increase their saving for the sake of investment on goods. In scenario 2, we allow two 
groups of households, non-agricultural-urban households with low (HH_NAGU_LL) 
and high wages (HH_NAGU_HL), adjust their saving ratio; and let other types of 
household saving exogenous. This assumption is opted to examine the income 
distribution effects when two endogenous saving of these household groups are set in 
the model.          
3. Capital factor closure, where the distorted price of capital across activities (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐾𝑗) 
and unemployed capital are exogenous. The stock of capital (𝐾𝑗  ) adjusts to ensure 
clearing of each 𝑗-th activity. Rent of capital (𝑃𝐾) also adjusts to ensure overall market 
clearing. In other words, the capital stock is assumed to be mobile across activities. 
Capital rent of activity specific is fixed and hence the equilibrium can be achieved 
through the flexible adjustment of aggregated capital rent. Here we assume no excessive 
capital (fully employed capital).  
4. Labour factor closure, where the employed labour types used in ROW (𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊); labour 
types supply (𝐿𝑆𝑜); adjusted wage of labour types across activities (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝑜,𝑗); and 
average wage of labour types (𝑃𝑜
𝐿) are all exogenous. Whilst the employed labour used 
across activities (𝐿𝑜,𝑗); labour composite (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗); adjusted wage of labour composite 
across activities (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗); and average wage of labour composite (𝑃
𝐿𝐴𝐵) are 
endogenous such that the constraint of below is obtained:  
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗)(𝑃
𝐿𝐴𝐵)(𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) =∑(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝑜,𝑗)
𝑜
(𝑃𝑜
𝐿)(𝐿𝑜,𝑗) 
This closure relaxes the typical neoclassical closure where workers are mobile between 
industries with fixed wages. Hence, the labour market is cleared through the adjusted 
                                                          
21 In their simulations, Damuri and Perdana (2003) set the closure combinations of either fixed balance of 
payment (BOP) with the adjusted interest rate or flexible BOP while having interest rate fixed.  
22 We define the richest households’ based on the highest income ratio to total income of households given 
in the SAM classifications. 
109 
 
 
 
unemployment rates. This setting follows the fact that Indonesia currently faces a 
massive labour surplus (Yusuf et al., 2008).    
 
4.4. Simulation Results 
This section presents the simulation results of all scenarios. It aims to assess the 
implications of various fiscal policies shocks on Indonesia’s macroeconomy as well as 
distributional of income and output. 
 
 
4.4.1. Scenario 1: A 10 percent increase in government expenditure (𝑪𝑮𝑨𝑫𝑱) with 
Government Saving Adjustment 
In scenario 1, we examine the impact of a 10% increase in government expenditure on 
Indonesia’s economy. The government saving are endogenous to clear the government 
budget balance. All tax and subsidy rates are exogenous. Therefore, this simulation only 
allows the government to finance its excess expenditures by borrowing.  
 
4.4.1.1. Impact on Macroeconomic Account 
Table 4.1 presents the macroeconomic impact of scenario 1. It shows that the shock directly 
increases the aggregate demand side, forcing the level of GDP positively adjusts. The 
results are consistent to Keynes postulation, which stated that the government has a pivotal 
role in rapidly increasing the aggregate demand towards achieving full employment level 
(Maipita et al., 2010). Therefore, the increased level of factor returns influences the 
improvement of private consumption as well as net exports.  
In the model, we distinguish three types of GDP: GDP at factor cost which is obtained 
from total of wage bill and capital bill; GDP at market price from income side which is 
obtained from total of private consumption, government consumption, investment and net 
export; and GDP at market price from expenditure side which is the sum of GDP at factor 
costs and net taxes. The increased level of GDP at factor cost does not considerably 
different than that of GDP at market price (income side and expenditure side). Nevertheless, 
the differences could be explained from the linkage on each of GDP components and also 
the choices of factors closure.     
Scenario 1 immediately increases the level of output production which leads to an 
increase of factors cost across all activities. This is reflected from the increase of GDP at 
factor costs by 2.42% due to the increase of its total wage bill component by 4.63% while 
total capital bill only slightly increases by 0.01%. The slight change of capital bill is due to 
the choice of capital closures. The model assumes that the rent of capital is fixed, capital is 
fully employed, and the stock of capital is mobile inter-industries. This assumption would 
generate a negligible change on total capital bill because the changes of capital stock in 
some activities would be offset by the changes of stock in others. In the other hand, at 
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labour factor closures, there are two main distinctions: closure on labour types and labour 
composite. The labour type closure is similar to that of capital closure of which wage of 
each labour is exogenous, and employment is mobile between industries. However, for 
composite labour closure, both of its activity specific wage and average wage to all 
industries are endogenously determined. Thus, scenario 1 only induces the GDP at factor 
costs component of total wage bill to increase strongly.    
GDP at market price improves higher than GDP at factor costs because of the effect 
on factors return to households’ which in turn increases their demand on final goods. Table 
4.1 summarizes that GDP at market price from income side increases by 2.67% and GDP 
at market price from expenditure side increases by 2.56%. The components of GDPMP1 
such as household and government consumption, investment, and net export are increased 
largely excluding investment by 3.02%, 8.54%, 0.26%, and 3.92%. This is because in the 
model, investment of goods (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) is fixed, thus the slight increase of total real investment 
(0.26%) is determined from the rise of final goods price index (𝑃𝑖
𝑍). Total investment on 
goods is obtained from the following relationship: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 =  ∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
The increased demand in public goods also leads to a sharp increase of net indirect 
tax (9.32%). This is because a higher level of final demand causes aggregate supply to 
increase in order to clear the market, which in turn increases the net tax receipts to 
government. However, the expansion of government expenditure leads to an increase of its 
budget deficit by 5.59%. Due to static nature of the CGE model we used, the effects of this 
budget deficit cannot be captured in the analysis.  
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Table 4.1: Impact of Scenario 1 on National Income Account 
 Variables 
 
BASE SHOCKED 
% CHANGE 
(Billions Rupiah) 
GDP at factor costs  5156935.19 5281935.23 2.42 
GDP gap  0.04 0.04 2.71 
GDP at market prices from income side  5472873.35 5618877.83 2.67 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side  5260983.61 5395679.76 2.56 
Total private consumption  3318104.75 3418313.57 3.02 
Total investment 1508830.58 1512708.37 0.26 
Total real government consumption 294566.35 319708.98 8.54 
Total export 1487237.85 1497408.46 0.68 
Total import 1347755.91 1352459.63 0.35 
Net export 139481.93 144948.84 3.92 
Net indirect tax  104048.42 113744.52 9.32 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  2692617.74 2817376.29 4.63 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  2464317.45 2464558.94 0.01 
Government Saving (SG) 229473.00 216656.00 -5.59 
 
4.4.1.2. Impact on Gross Output and Value Added 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the effects of scenario 1 on gross domestic output and value 
added across industries. As discussed above, the increase in public consumption leads to 
higher aggregate demand of commodities. This implies that producers will optimize their 
revenue constrained by input reallocations such as production factors and intermediate 
inputs. The result found that those industries that increased their gross output are mostly 
due to lower costs of value added input – although a higher price of intermediate input 
could also negatively affect the output production across industries. 
Table 4.2 shows that an improvement in public expenditures does not necessarily 
increase the output production in each industry. There are 4 sectors that indicate a 
contraction in output production, namely fisheries (FISH_A); forestry products 
(FORH_A); other agricultural (OAGRI_A); restaurant (RSTR_A); and woods products 
(WOOG_A) by -18.47%, -0.39%, -6.57%, -3.21%, and -1.67%, respectively. Their output 
prices – excluding woods sector – also substantially increased, which are 58.65%, 0.48%, 
32.83%, 11.22%, and 0.10%, respectively. Their decline in output volumes (excluding 
woods sector) are strongly related to a higher cost per unit of value added presented in table 
4.3. The percentage changes of value added cost per unit of these industries are 2.24%, 
18.21%, 12.98%, 12.57%, and -3.27%, respectively.  
In contrast, the sector of supporting service for transportation (SUPPS_A) and hotel 
(HTEL_A) indicate the highest improvement on their output volumes by 61.90% and 
29.53%. Other sectors such as textiles (STGL_A), agricultural (AGRI_A), petrochemical 
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products (CHFCC_A), fossils mining (COMOIL_A), and electricity-city gas-clean water 
(ELEGD_A) are also improved by 14.13%, 3.55%, 2.85%, 5.41%, and 6.34% respectively. 
This improvement is due to a reduction in their value added cost which are -16.35%, -
8.44%, -8.81%, -5.08%, and -7.25%. 
 
Table 4.2: Impact of Scenario 1 on Activity Gross Domestic Output 
Activity 
Volume of Gross Domestic Output (𝑸𝑨𝒋) Price of Gross Domestic Output (𝑷𝑸𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % Change BASE SHOCKED % Change 
AGRI_A 577097 597590 3.55 1 0.96 -3.68 
AISCOM_A 325709 329841 1.27 1 0.99 -0.92 
BANKAS_A 268190 268918 0.27 1 1.05 5.07 
CATLE_A 351964 353240 0.36 1 1.03 3.16 
CHFCC_A 1274343 1310694 2.85 1 0.96 -3.65 
COMOIL_A 616125 649438 5.41 1 0.95 -4.89 
CONS_A 1243976 1250607 0.53 0.98 1.00 2.10 
ESTPRV_A 286491 305818 6.75 1 0.92 -7.63 
ELEGD_A 124491 132382 6.34 0.98 0.92 -6.32 
FISH_A 244882 199653 -18.47 1 1.38 37.98 
FODT_A 1173301 1181895 0.73 1 0.99 -0.64 
FORH_A 62143 61902 -0.39 1 1.02 1.98 
GOVTD_A 493287 521596 5.74 1 0.99 -1.06 
HTEL_A 39603 51298 29.53 1 0.94 -6.21 
INDSHO_A 279477 293948 5.18 1 0.95 -4.56 
LANT_A 265679 269945 1.61 1 1.02 2.32 
OAGRI_A 220411 205935 -6.57 1 1.21 20.51 
OMINE_A 99298 102702 3.43 1 0.83 -17.30 
PPTM_A 1579245 1618727 2.50 1 0.96 -3.84 
RSTR_A 285032 275883 -3.21 1 1.06 6.39 
STGL_A 336199 383689 14.13 1 0.94 -5.85 
SUPPS_A 48418 78387 61.90 1 0.65 -35.25 
TRDE_A 999123 1010054 1.09 0.97 1.07 10.49 
WOOG_A 211879 208343 -1.67 1 1.00 0.10 
TOTAL 11406362 11662484 2.25 1.00 0.99 -0.49 
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Table 4.3: Impact of Scenario 1 on Value Added 
ACTIVITY 
Value Added Price (𝑷𝑽𝑨𝒋) Volume of Value Added (𝑽𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % Change BASE SHOCKED % Change 
AGRI_A 1 0.92 -8.44 377515 390921 3.55 
AISCOM_A 1 1.04 3.53 184908 187254 1.27 
BANKAS_A 1 1.07 7.14 174958 175434 0.27 
CATLE_A 1 1.01 1.45 129760 130230 0.36 
CHFCC_A 1 0.91 -8.81 541374 556817 2.85 
COMOIL_A 1 0.95 -5.08 485997 512274 5.41 
CONS_A 1 1.15 15.07 427655 429935 0.53 
ESTPRV_A 1 0.90 -10.24 198081 211443 6.75 
ELEGD_A 1 0.93 -7.25 127591 135679 6.34 
FISH_A 1 1.59 58.65 134055 109295 -18.47 
FODT_A 1 0.80 -20.35 286708 288808 0.73 
FORH_A 1 1.01 0.48 40074 39918 -0.39 
GOVTD_A 1 0.99 -0.73 330641 349616 5.74 
HTEL_A 1 0.88 -11.86 23451 30376 29.53 
INDSHO_A 1 0.95 -5.07 141973 149324 5.18 
LANT_A 1 1.12 12.39 105917 107618 1.61 
OAGRI_A 1 1.33 32.83 128807 120347 -6.57 
OMINE_A 1 0.72 -27.78 63134 65299 3.43 
PPTM_A 1 0.87 -12.83 430990 441765 2.50 
RSTR_A 1 1.11 11.22 116147 112419 -3.21 
STGL_A 1 0.84 -16.35 108712 124069 14.13 
SUPPS_A 1 0.41 -58.61 26498 42900 61.90 
TRDE_A 1 1.22 22.36 499883 505352 1.09 
WOOG_A 1 0.97 -3.27 72105 70902 -1.67 
Average 1 0.99 -1.31   5.12 
 
4.4.1.3. Impact on Employed Factors 
Table 4.4 summarizes the impacts of scenario 1 on employed factors (labour composite and 
capital). The changes of value added cost across activities are strongly linked to its 
corresponding level of employed factors. Since the model assumes exogenous wages of 
labour types and capital rent, hence, the shock induces only the changes in capital stock, 
the number of labour composite; and wage labour composite.   
Scenario 1 improves the overall aggregate labour composite by 7.51% but capital 
stock negligibly increases by 0.00%. However, in activity specific, the results vary. For 
examples, the demand for capital stock increases for the respective of air communication 
(AISCOM_A); public services (GOVTD_A); hotel (HTEL_A); other agricultural 
(OAGRI_A); trade (TRDE_A); and fisheries (FISH_A) sector by 4.83%, 4.96%, 14.16%, 
24.09%, 23.69%, and 29.34%. In contrast, the decline of capital stock demand occurs in 
the sectors, namely: agricultural (AGRI_A); petrochemical products (CHFCC_A); real 
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estates (ESTPRV_A); electricity-city gas-clean water (ELEGD_A); food and tobaccos 
(FODT_A); other mining (OMINE_A), paper and metal goods (PPTM_A); textiles 
(STGL_A); supporting services for transportation (SUPPS_A); and woods (WOOG_A) 
sector by -5.20%, -6.22%, -4.19%, -1.39%, -19.77%, -25.31%, -10.66%, -4.54%, -32.99%, 
and -4.89% respectively.  
There are 9 sectors which indicate a reduction of labour demand. These are air 
communication (AISCOM_A); bank and insurances (BANKAS_A); cattle products 
(CATLE_A); construction (CONS_A); fisheries (FISH_A); forestry (FORH_A); land 
transportation (LANT_A); other agricultural (OAGRI_A); restaurant (RSTR_A); and trade 
(TRDE_A) sector by -4.57%, -14.37%, -0.24%, -14.19%, -62.97%, -1.14%, -12.01%, -
4.38%, and -1.57% respectively. Fisheries sector has the most severe effect of SIM-1. Other 
sectors generate the opposite results where they tend to increase the labour composite 
demand. In overall, table 4.4 indicates that hotel sector (HTEL_A), fossils mining 
(COMOIL_A), and government services (GOVTD_A) benefited the most from factors 
movement effects of both capital stock and labour composite. 
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Table 4.4: Impact of Scenario 1 on Employed Factors (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋 and 𝑲𝒋) 
Activity 
Labour Composite (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋) Capital (𝑲𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE  BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE  
AGRI_A 356465 371052 4.09 21051 19956 -5.20 
AISCOM_A 68100 64991 -4.57 116808 122454 4.83 
BANKAS_A 53146 45509 -14.37 121813 130852 7.42 
CATLE_A 91495 91280 -0.24 38265 38956 1.80 
CHFCC_A 166589 210890 26.59 374785 351485 -6.22 
COMOIL_A 60075 91687 52.62 425923 426114 0.05 
CONS_A 200904 172401 -14.19 226751 262287 15.67 
ESTPRV_A 45543 69830 53.33 152538 146141 -4.19 
ELEGD_A 16371 29056 77.49 111220 109680 -1.39 
FISH_A 49457 18313 -62.97 84598 109415 29.34 
FODT_A 120241 165990 38.05 166467 133550 -19.77 
FORH_A 15275 15100 -1.14 24799 24818 0.08 
GOVTD_A 286212 302984 5.86 44429 46633 4.96 
HTEL_A 9279 14577 57.10 14172 16178 14.16 
INDSHO_A 86104 93680 8.80 55869 55775 -0.17 
LANT_A 87258 86474 -0.90 18660 21306 14.18 
OAGRI_A 106334 93567 -12.01 22473 27887 24.09 
OMINE_A 46746 54194 15.93 16388 12240 -25.31 
PPTM_A 179195 222801 24.33 251795 224950 -10.66 
RSTR_A 104242 99680 -4.38 11905 12814 7.64 
STGL_A 45829 66825 45.81 62884 60030 -4.54 
SUPPS_A 20445 42978 110.22 6053 4056 -32.99 
TRDE_A 441454 434528 -1.57 58429 72268 23.69 
WOOG_A 35860 36470 1.70 36245 34472 -4.89 
Total 2692618 2894856 7.51 2464317 2464317 0.00 
 
4.4.1.4. Impact on Commodity Prices and Volumes 
Table 4.5 presents the effects of scenario 1 on commodity prices and volumes. The changes 
of commodity volumes are strongly linked to the changes of institutions’ final 
consumption: aggregated household consumption, government consumption, investment 
on goods, and net export.  
In the model, the price indexes of export (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) commodities are 
determined from the following relationships: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊,           𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 
where: 𝐸𝑋𝑅 is the exchange rate 
We assume that Indonesia’s economy constitutes a small and open economy country, 
for which the country cannot influence the world price of trade. Thus, based on the above 
descriptions, the world price indexes of exported and imported commodities (𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊and 
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𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊) are exogenous. It simply implies that the changes of both 𝑃𝑖
𝐸  and 𝑃𝑖
𝑀 are determined 
only by the adjusted exchange rate (depreciation/appreciation). The assumption of small-
open economy in the CGE model analysis is commonly adopted for the sake of 
simplification. This is because the transaction flows of industries and commodities 
recorded in the SAM data set are usually in terms of an aggregate level.  
At a certain commodity, this assumption might not reflect its reality of international 
trade between Indonesian and the rest of world. For instance, Indonesia in 2014 accounted 
for about 60% of world’s palm oil production. In this context, the assumption where 
Indonesia cannot influence the world price of palm oil may not be realistic. However, to 
implement the endogenous world price (export and import) of palm oil commodity into the 
model, one will require a specific transaction of palm oil (industry and commodity) 
recorded in the SAM data set to calibrate the model. In the Indonesian SAM for 2008, the 
palm oil commodity is aggregated together with other agricultural (food crops) type of 
commodities in one transaction account. This limitation is the reason behind the assumption 
of exogenous world’s price of all exported and imported commodities.  
Table 4.5 shows that the price indexes of all exported and imported commodities are 
shifting equally with the appreciated exchange rate (domestic per foreign currency unit), 
which is -5.15%. Overall, scenario 1 generates the increasing level of the relative price 
ratios of aggregated domestic-import (𝑃𝑖
𝐷/𝑃𝑖
𝑀) by 4.52% which creates a substitution effect 
from domestically produced commodity to imports. This is due to the fact that fiscal 
expansion will increase the aggregate demand which in turn increases the prices of 
domestic goods. Hence, the imported commodity would be relatively cheaper to purchase 
than its corresponding domestic commodity. It triggers a substitution effect by which the 
aggregate sectors would preferably increase the shares of imported input relatively to 
domestic input in order to produce the final output (𝑍𝑖). Table 4.5 shows that the aggregate 
sectors tend to increase the utilization of imported volumes (2.37%) higher than the 
domestic intermediate inputs (1.91%). Taken together, these changes lead to a rise of 
aggregated composite commodities by 2.38%. 
Across specific commodity, the impact of scenario 1 varies substantially. This is due 
to the trade assumptions of the model: imperfect substitutability of domestic-imported 
commodity and domestic-export transformation function. Thus, the solution of optimizing 
these problems determines the output reallocation inter-industries.  
 There are only two types of imported commodities that decline strongly in volume: 
other agricultural (OAGRI_C) and textiles (STGL_C) import by -22.12% and -50.87% 
respectively. Conversely, other commodity types are experiencing a volume expansion in 
which the import of fisheries (FISH_C) and other agricultural (OAGRI_C) indicate the 
most improvement by 74.90% and 62.23% respectively.  
 In terms of export, there are 10 types of commodities that indicate a contraction in 
volumes in which fisheries (FISH_C) and other agricultural (OAGRI_C) experience the 
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highest drop by -59.38% and -38.97% respectively. Other types of exports indicate a less 
decline. These are air-sea communication (AISCOM_C); bank and insurances 
(BANKAS_C); cattle products (CATLE_C); food and tobaccos (FODT_C); forestry 
(FORH_C); land transportation (LANT_C); restaurant (RSTR_C); and woods (WOOG_C) 
by -2.16%, -13.85%, -10.55%, -3.23%, and -9.15%, -7.95%, -18.88%, and -6.92% 
respectively. In contrast, other commodities have tendencies on export expansions where 
the most improved sectors are of those export in supporting services for transportation 
(SUPPS_C); other mining (OMINE_C); and hotel (HTEL_C) by 266.22%, 43.46%, and 
39.68% respectively. 
 In the domestic market, there are two types of domestic (𝐷𝑖) and composite 
commodities (𝑍𝑖) that indicate a drop in volumes: fisheries (-17.85% and -17.91%) and 
restaurant (-3.21% and -1.72%). These are due to the price effect, of which their 
commodities are costlier to purchase in market. Table 4.5 shows that these commodities 
price indexes increase by (38.45% and 38.40%) and (6.80% and 6.41%) respectively. By 
contrast, those commodities which are cheap to purchase tend to increase their quantities 
sold in the domestic market. 
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Table 4.5: Impact of Scenario 1 on Prices and Quantities of Commodities (% Change) 
Commodity 𝑷𝑸 𝑷𝒁 𝑷𝑫 𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑴 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑴 𝑸 𝒁 𝑫 𝑬 𝑴 
AGRI_C -3.68 -3.78 -3.68 -5.15 -5.15 1.53 1.53 3.55 3.77 3.55 5.86 6.79 
AISCOM_C -0.92 -1.37 -0.45 -5.15 -5.15 4.90 4.90 1.27 4.13 2.23 -2.16 12.60 
BANKAS_C 5.07 4.78 5.18 -5.15 -5.15 10.91 10.91 0.27 1.26 0.48 -13.85 23.56 
CATLE_C 3.16 3.04 3.17 -5.15 -5.15 8.80 8.80 0.36 0.62 0.38 -10.55 18.76 
CHFCC_C -3.65 -4.18 -3.72 -5.15 -5.15 1.53 1.53 2.85 3.68 2.70 5.08 5.82 
COMOIL_C -4.89 -5.65 -5.82 -5.15 -5.15 -0.69 -0.69 5.41 2.98 3.36 10.53 1.89 
CONS_C 2.10 2.10 2.10 -5.15 -5.15 7.64 7.64 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.29 
ESTPRV_C -7.63 -7.45 -7.85 -5.15 -5.15 -2.79 -2.79 6.75 5.33 6.25 18.67 74.90 
ELEGD_C -6.32 -6.32 -6.32 -5.15 -5.15 -1.21 -1.21 6.34 6.34 6.34 0.00 0.00 
FISH_C 37.98 38.40 38.45 -5.15 -5.15 45.91 45.91 -18.47 -17.85 -17.91 -59.38 13.02 
FODT_C -0.64 -0.42 -0.09 -5.15 -5.15 5.32 5.32 0.73 2.53 1.85 -3.23 15.34 
FORH_C 1.98 1.95 2.02 -5.15 -5.15 7.54 7.54 -0.39 -0.16 -0.31 -9.15 15.55 
GOVTD_C -1.06 -1.08 -0.95 -5.15 -5.15 4.37 4.37 5.74 6.24 5.97 2.45 2.83 
HTEL_C -6.21 -8.17 -10.97 -5.15 -5.15 -6.17 -6.17 29.53 9.69 16.72 39.68 6.48 
INDSHO_C -4.56 -4.58 -4.56 -5.15 -5.15 0.58 0.58 5.18 5.22 5.17 9.52 18.35 
LANT_C 2.32 2.30 2.34 -5.15 -5.15 7.85 7.85 1.61 1.74 1.65 -7.95 62.23 
OAGRI_C 20.51 20.49 22.73 -5.15 -5.15 29.36 29.36 -6.57 0.54 -3.10 -38.97 -22.12 
OMINE_C -17.30 -16.78 -17.50 -5.15 -5.15 -13.02 -13.02 3.43 1.18 2.94 43.46 4.88 
PPTM_C -3.84 -4.32 -3.95 -5.15 -5.15 1.32 1.32 2.50 3.07 2.28 5.15 23.68 
RSTR_C 6.39 6.41 6.80 -5.15 -5.15 12.60 12.60 -3.21 -1.72 -2.45 -18.88 6.11 
STGL_C -5.85 -7.02 -7.20 -5.15 -5.15 -2.16 -2.16 14.13 10.42 10.86 22.12 -50.87 
SUPPS_C -35.25 -36.81 -41.83 -5.15 -5.15 -38.64 -38.64 61.90 10.71 30.64 266.22 13.74 
TRDE_C 10.49 10.49 10.49 -5.15 -5.15 16.50 16.50 1.09 1.09 1.09 0.00 0.00 
WOOG_C 0.10 0.89 1.05 -5.15 -5.15 6.59 6.59 -1.67 0.53 0.21 -6.92 5.80 
Total -0.49 -0.71 -0.86 -5.15 -5.15 4.52 4.52 2.25 2.38 1.91 6.15 2.37 
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𝐸⁄ )
 ∗ 100% 
Where 1 for shock value; and 0 for base value 
 
Key variables: 
𝑃𝑄: Output price; 𝑃𝑍: composite commodity price; 𝑃𝐷: domestic commodity price; 𝑃𝐸: imported commodity price; 𝑃𝑀: imported commodity 
price; 𝑄: output volume; 𝑍: composite commodity quantity; 𝐷: domestic commodity quantity; 𝐸: exported commodity quantity; 𝑀: imported 
commodity quantity. 
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4.4.1.5. Impact of Scenario 1 on Household income and Expenditure 
In this section we briefly discuss the impact of SIM-1 on household income and expenditure 
across all categories. This section does not investigate the impact on welfare and inequality. 
Damuri and Perdana (2003) address three mechanisms of a policy that could 
influence household income: (i) direct linkages of primary factor returns, in which the 
household will receive higher income if their wages increased and lower income in the 
opposite condition. The variation of household income distribution is dependent on the 
combination of their factors supply; (ii) the injection effects on income tax adjustment. 
However, this mechanism is not applicable in this scenario since the model assumes 
exogenous income tax rates; and (iii) the price effect that contributes to households’ 
purchasing power on final goods. The changes of household budget will affect their real 
income distribution.    
Table 4.6 summarizes the effects of scenario 1 on households’ distribution income, 
expenditure, and saving. The results are consistent to Damuri and Perdana (2003) 
arguments. The shock has a positive impact on all types of households’ actual disposable 
income23. The level of improvements is correlated with their types of occupation status 
either workers or unclear job24, which in turn affect their factor returns. The worker types 
of households’ have tendencies on higher disposable income relatively to those of unclear 
occupation types. The actual disposable income of the respective HH_AGR_L, 
HH_NAGR_LL, HH_NAGR_HL, HH_NAGU_NA, and HH_NAGU_HL are increased by 
3.52%, 4.27%, 3.17%, 3.13%, and 5.64%. Meanwhile the groups of HH_AGR_NL, 
HH_NAGR_NA, and HH_NAGU_LL are increased only by 1.94%, 1.08%, and 1.47%. 
These results indicate that the increasing level of household actual disposable income is 
highly due to the endowed factors of production (labour types and capital) to activities.  
Furthermore, the changes of all household budget and saving, excluding non-
agricultural-urban household with high wages categories (HH_NAGU_HL), are equal to 
their level of income distribution. This is because in the model specifications, the 
relationships of household expenditure, income, and saving are expressed as follows: 
𝑆𝐻ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                       (1) 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ(1 + 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗), ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                  (2) 
𝐸𝐻ℎ = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑆𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                            (3) 
We assume that only the richest household groups (HH_NAGU_HL) adjust their saving 
ratio (𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1) to clear the saving-investment balance, whilst other household types 
                                                          
23 We define actual disposable income as disposable income less transfer payments to institutions’. 
24 The worker types of household include: agricultural household with unskilled labour (HH_AGR_L); non-
agricultural-rural household with low wages (HH_NAGR_LL); non-agricultural-rural household with high 
wages (HH_NAGR_HL); non-agricultural labour-urban household with low wages (HH_NAGU_LL); and 
non-agricultural labour-urban household with high wages (HH_NAGU_HL). Whilst the unclear occupation 
types of household are including agricultural-household (HH_AGR_NL), non-agricultural-rural household 
(HH_NAGR_NA), and non-agricultural-urban household (HH_NAGU_NA).    
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are fixed. The income tax rates of all households’ types are assumed exogenous. Thus, 
based on above description, the exogenous saving ratio (𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ) of those households’ 
types will generate the identical shifts in their expenditure, income, and saving. As a result, 
the actual disposable income of HH_NAGU_HL increases by 5.64% but the rise of their 
budget expenditure is lower, which is 4.89%. This is because the saving ratio of this group 
increases by 4.6%. It implies that this household saving increases relatively higher (10.5%) 
than its budget percentage change (4.89%). The increase in saving is utilized to adjust the 
exogenous investment on goods.  
Table 4.7 summarises the impact of scenario 1 on household consumption. Total 
households’ demand on aggregate commodities is strongly improved. Across commodity, 
this shock greatly influences the increased demand of supporting services for transportation 
(62.90%); other mining (23.69%); hotel (12.09%); textiles (10.70%); and real estate 
(11.21%).  Nevertheless, there are three types of composite goods show a decline: fisheries 
(-25.62%), other agricultural products (-14.57%), and banking and insurances (-3.26%). 
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Table 4.6: Impact of Scenario 1 on Household income and Expenditure 
Households’ 
Types 
𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑯𝒉 𝑬𝑯𝒉 𝑺𝑯𝒉 𝒔𝒉_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒉 
BASE SHOCKED 
% 
CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
% 
CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
% 
CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
% 
CHANGE 
HH_AGR_L 171254.15 177284.49 3.52 162021.42 167726.65 3.52 9232.73 9557.84 3.52 0.05 0.05 0.00 
HH_AGR_NL 703950.96 717606.80 1.94 642327.17 654787.58 1.94 61623.79 62819.22 1.94 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGR_LL 476495.04 496859.51 4.27 450508.35 469762.20 4.27 25986.69 27097.31 4.27 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_NA 167662.89 169480.74 1.08 158015.28 159728.53 1.08 9647.61 9752.21 1.08 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_HL 441588.76 455603.42 3.17 385336.98 397566.38 3.17 56251.78 58037.04 3.17 0.13 0.13 0.00 
HH_NAGU_LL 671493.46 681352.20 1.47 633498.92 642799.84 1.47 37994.53 38552.36 1.47 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGU_NA 233824.57 241142.97 3.13 213768.06 220458.71 3.13 20056.51 20684.26 3.13 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGU_HL 777279.03 821122.50 5.64 672628.57 705483.68 4.89 104650.46 115638.83 10.50 0.14 0.14 4.60 
 
Key variables: 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ: Actual disposable income; 𝐸𝐻ℎ: household budget; 𝑆𝐻ℎ: household saving; 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ: adjusted average propensity of saving 
Households’ types:    
HH_AGR_L: agricultural households’ with unskilled labour; HH_AGR_NL: agricultural-households’ with unclear occupation; HH_NAGR_LL: 
non-agricultural-rural households’ with low wages, HH_NAGR_NA: non-agricultural-rural households’ with unclear occupation; 
HH_NAGR_HL: non-agricultural-rural households’ with high wages, HH_NAGU_LL: non-agricultural labour-urban households’ with low 
wages, HH_NAGU_NA: non-agricultural-urban households with unclear occupation,  and HH_NAGU_HL: non-agricultural labour-urban 
households’ with high wages.   
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Table 4.7: The Impact of Scenario 1 on Households Consumption of Commodities Variety 
Commodity 
HH_AGR_L HH_AGR_NL HH_NAGR_LL HH_NAGR_NA HH_NAGR_HL HH_NAGU_LL HH_NAGU_NA HH_NAGU_HL AVG 
% CHANGE  
AGRI_C 7.59 5.94 8.37 5.05 7.23 5.45 7.18 9.00 6.98 
AISCOM_C 4.96 3.35 5.72 2.49 4.61 2.88 4.56 6.34 4.36 
BANKAS_C -1.20 -2.71 -0.48 -3.52 -1.53 -3.16 -1.57 0.10 -1.76 
CATLE_C 0.46 -1.07 1.19 -1.90 0.13 -1.53 0.08 1.79 -0.11 
CHFCC_C 8.04 6.39 8.82 5.49 7.67 5.89 7.63 9.46 7.42 
ESTPRV_C 11.85 10.14 12.66 9.22 11.47 9.63 11.43 13.32 11.21 
ELEGD_C 10.51 8.82 11.31 7.91 10.14 8.32 10.09 11.96 9.88 
FISH_C -25.20 -26.34 -24.66 -26.96 -25.45 -26.68 -25.48 -24.21 -25.62 
FODT_C 3.95 2.37 4.71 1.51 3.60 1.89 3.56 5.32 3.36 
FORH_C 1.54 -0.01 2.28 -0.85 1.20 -0.47 1.16 2.88 0.97 
GOVTD_C 4.65 3.05 5.41 2.19 4.30 2.58 4.26 6.03 4.06 
HTEL_C 12.73 11.00 13.55 10.07 12.35 10.49 12.30 14.21 12.09 
INDSHO_C 8.49 6.84 9.28 5.94 8.13 6.34 8.08 9.92 7.88 
LANT_C 1.19 -0.35 1.93 -1.19 0.85 -0.82 0.81 2.52 0.62 
OAGRI_C -14.08 -15.39 -13.46 -16.10 -14.37 -15.78 -14.41 -12.95 -14.57 
OMINE_C 24.40 22.50 25.30 21.47 23.98 21.93 23.93 26.03 23.69 
PPTM_C 8.20 6.54 8.98 5.65 7.83 6.05 7.79 9.62 7.58 
RSTR_C -2.71 -4.20 -2.01 -5.00 -3.04 -4.64 -3.08 -1.43 -3.26 
STGL_C 11.33 9.63 12.14 8.71 10.96 9.13 10.91 12.80 10.70 
SUPPS_C 63.83 61.33 65.02 59.97 63.28 60.58 63.21 65.99 62.90 
WOOG_C 2.61 1.04 3.35 0.19 2.26 0.57 2.22 3.96  
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4.4.1.6. Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario 1 
Since the parameters used in the model are taken from other studies, it is necessary to 
investigate the robustness of simulation results with respect to parameters uncertainty (Yusuf, 
2008). This is done by implementing a sensitivity analysis of CES or CET parameters and 
examining the changes of endogenous variables. In this exercise, we choose to vary the import 
elasticity (CES trade parameters) by 25% decrease and increase (between 1.5 and 2.5) and then 
check the reliability of results. The model is confirmed to be consistent when the differential 
effect is small. 
Table 4.8 summarizes the sensitivity analysis results of SIM-1 on macroeconomic 
accounts. It shows that under high and low elasticity, scenario 1 generates a consistent direction 
(positive) across all endogenous variables excluding the negative sign of capital bill which is 
considered negligible. Nevertheless, for both high and low elasticity, the simulations generate 
a variation of values although the differences are small. Nganou (2005) stated that the 
robustness of simulation results in CGE model is confirmed in two conditions: the small impact 
differential results of post shock and its consistent signs. Therefore, based on sensitivity results 
given in Table 4.8, the model is considered robust and consistent. 
 
Table 4.8: Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario 1 on National Income Accounts 
Variables 
Import Elasticity 
= 2 
Original Case 
Import Elasticity = 
2.5 
Import Elasticity = 
1.5 
% Change 
GDP at factor costs  2.42 1.76 2.02 
GDPGAP  2.71 1.55 2.10 
GDP at market prices from income 
side   2.67 1.92 2.22 
GDP at market prices from 
expenditure side  2.56 1.86 2.13 
Total private consumption  3.02 1.92 2.37 
Total investment 0.26 0.07 0.19 
Total government consumption 8.54 10.19 9.40 
Total export 0.68 0.83 0.62 
Total import 0.35 0.69 0.48 
Net export 3.92 2.18 2.07 
Net indirect tax  9.32 6.39 7.74 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  4.63 3.39 3.89 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 
  
 
 
125 
 
 
 
4.4.2. Scenario 2: A 10 percent increase in government expenditure (𝑪𝑮𝑨𝑫𝑱) with 
Adjustment in Subsidy Rates to Activities 
In scenario 2, we investigate the impact of a 10% increase in government expenditure on 
Indonesia’s economy. The subsidy rates to activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) are endogenous to clear the 
government budget balance. The rests of tax and subsidy rates including government saving 
are exogenous at the initial level.  
 
4.4.2.1. Impact on Macroeconomic Account 
Table 4.9 summarizes the impact of scenario 2 on the macroeconomic accounts and its 
comparison to SIM-1 results. As expected, scenario 2 results in less improvement on 
Indonesia’s GDP compared to SIM-1. According to the existing SAM, the government grants 
subsidy transfers only to sectors namely, agriculture (AGRI_A); fisheries (FISH_A); chemical 
and petroleum products (CHFCC_A); electricity, city gas, and clean water (ELEGD_A); land 
transportation (LANT_A); air and sea transportation and communication (AISCOM_A); and 
public services for national defense, education, health, and others (GOVT_A). Hence, the 
reduction in subsidy rates to these activities would negatively affect the flow of national supply 
and demand: the production costs will increase which in turn lead to a drop in equilibrium 
output and the level of factors demand. It also increases the cost of intermediate inputs inter-
industries.  
Table 4.9 shows that scenario 2 increases GDP at factor cost only by 1.27%, which is 
dominated by the increase of its component, total wage bill, by 2.44% while capital bill declines 
negligibly by -0.02%. In other hand, GDP at market price from income side and expenditure 
side improve slightly higher by 2.18% and 1.75% respectively. The components of GDP at 
market price from income side such as household and government consumption, investment, 
and net exports increased by 1.02%, 10.62%, 1.66%, and 1.21%. The increasing level of total 
investment 1.66% is due to the increased level of composite goods price index (𝑃𝑖
𝑍). 
Overall, scenario 2 improves the Indonesia’s macroeconomy. However, from Table 4.9, 
it can be seen that scenario 2 leads to a less improvement of all GDPs compared to scenario 1. 
This is because the reduction of subsidy rates across activities would increase the production 
costs, which in turn, results in a slight increase of aggregate composite prices (𝑃𝑖
𝑍) by 1.97%. 
Thus, the improvement of private consumption in scenario 2 (1.02%) is less pronounced than 
that of SIM-1 (3.02%).  
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Table 4.9: The Impact of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 on National Income Account 
Variables 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
BASE  SHOCKED  % 
CHANGE 
SHOCKED %  
CHANGE  (Billion Rupiah) (Billion 
Rupiah) 
GDP at factor costs   5156935 5281935.23 2.42 5222245 1.27 
GDP gap  0.04 0.04 2.71 0.045 11.06 
GDP at market prices from income 
side   
5472873 5618878 2.67 5592310 2.18 
GDP at market prices from 
expenditure side  
5260984 5395680 2.56 5352868 1.75 
Total private consumption  3318105 3418314 3.02 3351949 1.02 
Total investment 1508831 1512708 0.26 1533905 1.66 
Total government consumption 294566 319709 8.54 325839 10.62 
Total export 1487238 1497408 0.68 1514023 1.80 
Total import 1347756 1352460 0.35 1372849 1.86 
Net export 139482 144949 3.92 141174 1.21 
Net indirect tax  104048 113745 9.32 130623 25.54 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
2692618 2817376 4.63 2758359 2.44 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
2464317 2464559 0.01 2463886 -0.02 
SG 229473 216656 -5.59 229473  
 
4.4.2.2. Impact on Gross Output and Value Added 
Table 4.10 and 4.11 summarize the impact of scenario 2 on gross output and value added 
respectively. Overall, scenario 2 improves the output production although the changes are less 
than under scenario 1. This is due to the effect of a reduction in subsidy rates across activities 
which eventually raises the aggregate price index of output (𝑃𝑄𝐴𝑗) by 2.36%; in contrast, the 
aggregate 𝑃𝑄𝐴𝑗 slightly declines by 0.49% in scenario 1. Hence, it leads to a less improvement 
of total gross output production (1.62%) compared to scenario 1 (2.25%). 
Specifically, nine sectors indicate a declinate in output production. These are air and sea 
communication (AISCOM_A); cattle products (CATLE_A); petrochemical products 
(CHFCC_A); fossils mining (COMOIL_A); fisheries (FISH_A); households’ and other 
services (INDSHO_A); other mining (OMINE_A); restaurant (RSTR_A); and supporting 
services for transportation (SUPPS_A) by -2.90%, -0.77%, -0.69%, -2.91%, -3.71%, -1.55%, 
-7.20%, -7.84%, and -2.89% respectively. These are strongly correlated with the higher price 
of their output production which 3.04%, 1.53%, 0.24%, 0.26%, 7.48%, 7.88%, 48.69%, 
10.68%, and 3.80% respectively. A higher price of output production could be related to either 
the changes cost of its value added or intermediate input. Table 4.11 shows that excluding the 
sector of petrochemical products (CHFCC_A), the increased price of output is due to higher 
cost of value added by 5.23%, 7.64%, -1.09%, 0.35%, 14.42%, 17.12%, 76.77%, 26.13%, 
6.03% respectively. 
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In contrast, the hotel sector (HTEL_A) improves the most by 17.80%, whilst other sectors 
such as bank and insurances (BANKAS_A); real estates (ESTPRV_A); electricity, city gas, 
and clean water (ELEGD_A); government services (GOVTD_A); and land transportation 
(LANT_A) are increased by 4.65%, 1.94%, 5.06%, 4.31%, and 3.81% respectively. These are 
due to a fall on their value added cost which are -4.91%, -8.69%, -2.00%, -17.24%, -0.10%, -
1.65%, and -17.85% percent respectively. Compared to scenario 1, these sectors – excluding 
banking and insurance (BANKAS_A) – are less improving. This is because the reduction of 
subsidy rates across activities induces a higher production costs. 
 
Table 4.10: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Activity Gross Domestic Output 
Activity 
Industry Gross Domestic Output (𝑸𝑨𝒋) Price of Gross Domestic Output (𝑷𝑸𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE 
AGRI_A 
577097 587254 1.76 1 1.01 0.93 
AISCOM_A 
325709 316254 -2.90 1 1.03 3.04 
BANKAS_A 
268190 280669 4.65 1 0.93 -6.99 
CATLE_A 
351964 349261 -0.77 1 1.02 1.53 
CHFCC_A 
1274343 1265531 -0.69 1 1.00 0.24 
COMOIL_A 
616125 598205 -2.91 1 1.00 0.26 
CONS_A 
1243976 1246586 0.21 0.98 1.01 2.88 
ESTPRV_A 
286491 292040 1.94 1 0.99 -1.20 
ELEGD_A 
124491 130788 5.06 0.98 0.91 -7.39 
FISH_A 
244882 235793 -3.71 1 1.08 7.48 
FODT_A 
1173301 1223174 4.25 1 0.97 -2.66 
FORH_A 
62143 62552 0.66 1 1.09 8.53 
GOVTD_A 
493287 514538 4.31 1 1.00 -0.10 
HTEL_A 
39603 46653 17.80 1 0.97 -2.96 
INDSHO_A 
279477 275153 -1.55 1 1.08 7.88 
LANT_A 
265679 275792 3.81 1 0.94 -5.83 
OAGRI_A 
220411 224867 2.02 1 1.01 1.24 
OMINE_A 
99298 92152 -7.20 1 1.49 48.69 
PPTM_A 
1579245 1643357 4.06 1 0.97 -2.59 
RSTR_A 
285032 262683 -7.84 1 1.11 10.68 
STGL_A 
336199 379025 12.74 1 0.96 -3.97 
SUPPS_A 
48418 47017 -2.89 1 1.04 3.80 
TRDE_A 
999123 1022462 2.34 0.97 0.93 -4.06 
WOOG_A 
211879 219730 3.71 1 0.97 -3.13 
Total 11406362 11591536 1.62 1.00 1.02 2.36 
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Table 4.11: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Value Added 
Activity 
Volume of Value Added (𝑽𝑨𝒋) Value Added Price (𝑷𝑽𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE 
AGRI_A 377515 384160 1.76 1 1.02 2.41 
AISCOM_A 184908 179541 -2.90 1 1.05 5.23 
BANKAS_A 174958 183100 4.65 1 0.91 -8.69 
CATLE_A 129760 128763 -0.77 1 1.08 7.64 
CHFCC_A 541374 537631 -0.69 1 0.99 -1.09 
COMOIL_A 485997 471862 -2.91 1 1.00 0.35 
CONS_A 427655 428553 0.21 1 1.01 0.90 
ESTPRV_A 198081 201917 1.94 1 0.98 -2.00 
ELEGD_A 127591 134045 5.06 1 0.83 -17.24 
FISH_A 134055 129079 -3.71 1 1.14 14.42 
FODT_A 286708 298895 4.25 1 0.92 -8.53 
FORH_A 40074 40337 0.66 1 1.14 13.97 
GOVTD_A 330641 344885 4.31 1 1.00 -0.10 
HTEL_A 23451 27626 17.80 1 0.95 -4.91 
INDSHO_A 141973 139777 -1.55 1 1.17 17.12 
LANT_A 105917 109949 3.81 1 0.82 -17.85 
OAGRI_A 128807 131411 2.02 1 1.03 2.65 
OMINE_A 63134 58591 -7.20 1 1.77 76.77 
PPTM_A 430990 448487 4.06 1 0.97 -3.27 
RSTR_A 116147 107040 -7.84 1 1.26 26.13 
STGL_A 108712 122560 12.74 1 0.94 -6.12 
SUPPS_A 26498 25731 -2.89 1 1.06 6.03 
TRDE_A 499883 511560 2.34 1 0.93 -6.76 
WOOG_A 72105 74777 3.71 1 0.92 -7.62 
 
4.4.2.3. Impact on Employed Factors 
The impact of scenario 2 on employed factors is presented in Table 4.12. The changes of 
production cost in activity specific are determined from its corresponding level of employed 
factors. In addition, in this simulation, we assume fixed wages of labour types and capital rent. 
Hence, the shock induces only the adjustment in capital stock; number of labour composite; 
and labour composite wage.  
Compared to scenario 1, this simulation indicates a less improvement in aggregate 
demand of labour composite (3.78%) but negligible changes on capital stock (0.00%). 
Nevertheless, the demand of capital stock varies across activities. There are 8 sectors which 
indicate a decline. These are bank and insurances (-4.42%); petrochemical products (-1.76%); 
fossils mining (-1.42%); electricity, city gas, and clean water (-13.04%); food and tobaccos (-
4.63%), trade (-4.57%); woods products (-4.18%); and land transportation (-14.70%) which is 
contracted the most. In contrast, other sectors experience a positive demand on capital stock 
especially in fisheries (10.19%); forestry (14.74%); hotel (12.04%); restaurant (16.26%); 
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households’ and other services (15.33%); and other mining (64.08%) which is improved the 
most.    
In labour composite demand, there are 10 sectors which indicate a decline. These are: air 
and sea communication (-11.06%); cattle products (-3.78%); fossils mining (-5.37%); 
construction (-0.82%); fisheries (-23.55%); forestry (-18.62%); households’ and other services 
(-11.15%); other mining (-24.00%); restaurant (-10.25%); and supporting services for 
transportation (-4.57%); Fisheries and other mining sectors constitute the most severed fall in 
labour composite employment. Conversely, other sectors experience a positive impact on 
labour composite demand where electricity, city gas, and clean water sector (ELEG_A) 
indicates the highest demand (279.60%). Overall, Table 4.12 shows that the hotel sector 
benefits the most for both of factors movement effects where the demand of capital and labour 
composite increased by 12.04% and 27.18% respectively. 
 
Table 4.12: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Employed Factors (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋 and 𝑲𝒋) 
Activity 
Labour Composite (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋) Capital (𝑲𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE 
AGRI_A 356465 362224 1.62 21051 21942 4.24 
AISCOM_A 68100 60569 -11.06 116808 119370 2.19 
BANKAS_A 53146 68474 28.84 121813 116425 -4.42 
CATLE_A 91495 88033 -3.78 38265 40879 6.83 
CHFCC_A 166589 169503 1.75 374785 368198 -1.76 
COMOIL_A 60075 56848 -5.37 425923 415035 -2.56 
CONS_A 200904 199257 -0.82 226751 229316 1.13 
ESTPRV_A 45543 49640 9.00 152538 152414 -0.08 
ELEGD_A 16371 62144 279.60 111220 96715 -13.04 
FISH_A 49457 37813 -23.55 84598 93216 10.19 
FODT_A 120241 141792 17.92 166467 158762 -4.63 
FORH_A 15275 12431 -18.62 24799 28454 14.74 
GOVTD_A 286212 298579 4.32 44429 46306 4.22 
HTEL_A 9279 11801 27.18 14172 15878 12.04 
INDSHO_A 86104 76501 -11.15 55869 64434 15.33 
LANT_A 87258 94464 8.26 18660 15916 -14.70 
OAGRI_A 106334 107882 1.46 22473 23539 4.74 
OMINE_A 46746 35526 -24.00 16388 26889 64.08 
PPTM_A 179195 195340 9.01 251795 253493 0.68 
RSTR_A 104242 93554 -10.25 11905 13840 16.26 
STGL_A 45829 56326 22.91 62884 66570 5.86 
SUPPS_A 20445 19511 -4.57 6053 6234 2.98 
TRDE_A 441454 455961 3.29 58429 55761 -4.57 
WOOG_A 35860 40284 12.34 36245 34729 -4.18 
Total 2692618 2794457 3.78 2464317 2464317 0.00 
 
130 
 
 
 
4.4.2.4. Impact on Price and Volume of Commodities 
Table 4.13 presents scenario 2 impact on price and volumes. In scenario 2, we assume that the 
world price index of export and import are also exogenous. Hence, the changes of the export 
(𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) price are completely determined by the changes in exchange rates. 
In this scenario, the level of exchange rate still indicates an appreciation (-1.46%) 
although it is lower than scenario 1 result. In overall, the shock shifts up the relative aggregate 
domestic-import (𝑃𝑖
𝐷/𝑃𝑖
𝑀) price ratios by 3.75% which signaled import and domestic goods 
substitution. It reflects that imported goods are cheaper to purchase, which in turn increases the 
share of import relatively to domestic input to produce final output (𝑍𝑖).  These effects are due 
to the subsidy cuts that influence a higher cost at domestic production which in turn increases 
its price at consumer side. A higher price of domestically produced commodity leads to a higher 
demand on import relatively to volumes of domestic goods. Table 4.13 shows that the 
aggregated volume of import (∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑖 ) increases by 3.37% while domestic input (∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑖 ) 
increases only by 1.45%. A higher demand for trade input of domestic-import goods improves 
the production of aggregate composite goods (∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑖 ) by 1.66%.   
Furthermore, across commodity, the effects are related to the complex linkages of the 
changes of final demand, market prices, and production constraints. Five types of imported 
goods show a drop in volumes: cattle products (-7.12%); hotel (-0.70%); land transportation (-
3.84%); paper and metal equipment (-0.18%); textiles (-0.37%); and woods (-2.30%). Other 
commodities indicate an increase in import volumes, i.e. air and sea communication (3.18%), 
petrochemical products (3.23%), fisheries (18.20%), restaurant (13.50%), and supporting 
services for transportation (11.22%). Other mining and forestry constitute the largest 
improvement in import by 72% and 31.81% respectively.  
In terms of export, there are 12 types of commodities which indicate a contraction in 
volumes, i.e. agricultural (-1.57%), air and sea communication (-3.32%), cattle products (-
5.14%), petrochemical products (-5.27%), fossils mining (-4.82%), fisheries (-23.73%), 
forestry (-23.73%), households and other services (-16.64%), other agricultural (-1.91%), 
restaurant (-25.87%), and supporting services for transportation (-11.20%); and other mining 
which has the largest reduction (-58.64%). Rests of exported commodities are increased 
substantially where real estate and hotel experience the largest improvement by 15.28% and 
68.24% respectively. 
In domestic market, there are 6 types of both domestic (𝐷𝑖) and composite goods (𝑍𝑖) 
that indicate a volume contraction. These are cattle products (-0.76% and -0.68%); fisheries (-
3.49% and -3.48%); households and other services (-1.50% and -0.84%); restaurant (-7.03% 
and -6.32%); fossils mining (-1.42% and -0.13%); and other mining (-6.68% and -0.24%). 
These tendencies are caused by the increasing level of its price index in domestic market. 
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Table 4.13: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Prices and Quantities of Commodities (% Change) 
Commodity 𝑷𝑸 𝑷𝒁 𝑷𝑫 𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑴 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑴 𝑸 𝒁 𝑫 𝑬 𝑴 
AGRI_C 0.93 0.77 0.94 -1.46 -1.46 2.40 2.40 1.76 2.10 1.77 -1.57 6.78 
AISCOM_C 3.04 2.74 3.76 -1.46 -1.46 5.34 5.34 -2.90 0.44 -1.53 -9.88 9.18 
BANKAS_C -6.99 -6.89 -7.08 -1.46 -1.46 -5.72 -5.72 4.65 4.03 4.45 19.20 -7.12 
CATLE_C 1.53 1.49 1.53 -1.46 -1.46 3.01 3.01 -0.77 -0.68 -0.76 -5.14 5.36 
CHFCC_C 0.24 0.01 0.71 -1.46 -1.46 2.19 2.19 -0.69 1.66 0.25 -2.60 4.71 
COMOIL_C 0.26 0.38 1.03 -1.46 -1.46 2.50 2.50 -2.91 -0.13 -1.42 -4.82 3.63 
CONS_C 2.88 2.88 2.88 -1.46 -1.46 4.43 4.43 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.00 0 
ESTPRV_C -1.20 -1.25 -1.21 -1.46 -1.46 0.27 0.27 1.94 1.99 1.91 2.90 2.44 
ELEGD_C -7.39 -7.39 -7.39 -1.46 -1.46 -6.03 -6.03 5.06 5.06 5.06 0.00 0 
FISH_C 7.48 7.60 7.61 -1.46 -1.46 9.20 9.20 -3.71 -3.48 -3.49 -17.87 15.09 
FODT_C -2.66 -2.91 -3.01 -1.46 -1.46 -1.56 -1.56 4.25 3.31 3.51 8.42 0.29 
FORH_C 8.53 8.49 8.60 -1.46 -1.46 10.21 10.21 0.66 0.99 0.79 -15.79 22.42 
GOVTD_C -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -1.46 -1.46 1.38 1.38 4.31 4.48 4.39 2.98 7.39 
HTEL_C -2.96 -3.95 -6.30 -1.46 -1.46 -4.91 -4.91 17.80 4.52 9.82 23.27 -0.70 
INDSHO_C 7.88 7.55 7.90 -1.46 -1.46 9.50 9.50 -1.55 -0.84 -1.50 -16.64 18.12 
LANT_C -5.83 -5.83 -5.85 -1.46 -1.46 -4.50 -4.50 3.81 3.71 3.76 15.35 -5.28 
OAGRI_C 1.24 1.30 1.49 -1.46 -1.46 3.01 3.01 2.02 2.92 2.53 -1.91 8.76 
OMINE_C 48.69 44.20 49.10 -1.46 -1.46 51.31 51.31 -7.20 -0.24 -6.68 -58.64 113.66 
PPTM_C -2.59 -2.56 -3.04 -1.46 -1.46 -1.56 -1.56 4.06 2.09 3.10 8.05 -0.18 
RSTR_C 10.68 10.75 11.17 -1.46 -1.46 12.85 12.85 -7.84 -6.32 -7.03 -25.87 18.34 
STGL_C -3.97 -5.31 -5.68 -1.46 -1.46 -4.30 -4.30 12.74 7.89 8.75 20.46 -0.37 
SUPPS_C 3.80 3.10 4.34 -1.46 -1.46 5.85 5.85 -2.89 0.51 -1.88 -11.20 10.02 
TRDE_C -4.06 -4.06 -4.06 -1.46 -1.46 -2.68 -2.68 2.34 2.34 2.34 0.00 0 
WOOG_C -3.13 -3.69 -3.74 -1.46 -1.46 -2.27 -2.27 3.71 2.27 2.39 8.89 -2.30 
Total 2.35 1.97 2.23 -1.46 -1.46 3.75 3.75 1.62 1.66 1.45 3.31 3.37 
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Where 1 for shock value; and 0 for base value 
Key variables: 
𝑃𝑄: Output price; 𝑃𝑍: composite commodity price; 𝑃𝐷: domestic commodity price; 𝑃𝐸: imported commodity price; 𝑃𝑀: imported commodity 
price; 𝑄: output volume; 𝑍: composite commodity quantity; 𝐷: domestic commodity quantity; 𝐸: exported commodity quantity; 𝑀: imported 
commodity quantity.  
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4.4.2.5. Impact on Household Income and Expenditure 
Table 4.14 presents scenario 2 effects on household income, expenditure, and saving. Here 
we allow two groups of households, non-agricultural-urban households with low 
(HH_NAGU_LL) and high wages (HH_NAGU_HL), to adjust their saving ratio; and let 
the other types of household saving exogenously fixed. We expect that fiscal expansion 
would increase the level of real income households’ such that only these representatives 
could afford to adjust their saving for the sake of investment on goods.  
The results indicate that household income is improved for all categories but lower 
than that under scenario 1. A reduction of subsidy rates to activities influences the reduction 
of output production. Thus, producers will reduce the costs of factor production which in 
turn lead to a decline in factors return to households. In addition, contrary to SIM-1 results, 
the changes of household income are not directly correlated to their status of occupation: 
clear or unclear occupation. Table 4.14 shows that the actual disposable income of 
agricultural households’ with unskilled labour (HH_AGR_L); agricultural households’ 
with unclear occupation (HH_AGR_NL); non-agricultural rural households with unclear 
occupation (HH_NAGR_NA); and non-agricultural-rural households with high wages 
(HH_NAGR_HL) have tendencies on a higher improvement by 2.63%, 2.83%, 2.67%, and 
2.29% respectively. For the rest of groups, i.e. non-agricultural rural households with low 
wages (HH_NAGR_LL); non-agricultural labour urban households with high wages 
(HH_NAGU_HL); non-agricultural urban households with low wages (HH_NAGU_LL); 
and non-agricultural urban households with unclear job (HH_NAGU_NA) are 
experiencing lower improvement of actual income which are 1.50%, 1.05%, 0.86%, and 
0.94% respectively. Clearly, the reduction of subsidies tends to depress the income of 
richest households (represented as those who have higher wages and live in urban areas) 
higher than poor households. In other words, these results imply that subsidies mostly 
benefit households who have a lower level of income.          
On the other hand, the changes of household budget and saving for all types, 
excluding non-agricultural-urban households with low (HH_NAGU_LL) and high wages 
(HH_NAGU_HL), are equal to their level of income distribution. This is due to the 
assumption given in scenario 2 where both of these groups are allowed to adjust their saving 
ratio (𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1) whilst the other groups are held fixed. Table 4.14 shows that the 
actual income of HH_NAGU_LL and HH_NAGU_HL increases by 0.86% and 1.05% 
respectively. However, their spending budget on goods and services decreases by -0.10% 
and -1.45%. The saving ratios increase by 15.87% reflecting a sharp increase in the saving 
by 16.88% and 17.10% which are utilized to adjust the exogenous investment on goods.  
Furthermore, table 4.15 presents the effects of scenario 2 on varieties of household 
consumption. Overall, total private consumption on aggregate commodities increases. 
Specifically, scenario 2 influences the largest improvement of households’ demand on 
electricity, city gas, and clean water (9.50%); bank and insurances (8.92%); and land 
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transportation (7.69%). However, there are 8 types of commodities which severe a demand 
contraction, i.e. other mining (-29.67%), restaurant (-8.43%), forestry (-6.53%), fisheries 
(-5.75%), households’ and other services (-5.70%), supporting services for transportation 
(-1.63%), air and sea communication (-1.29%), and cattle products (-0.08%). The changes 
of household consumption are due to linkages of household income and changes in each 
type of composite commodity price.  
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Table 4.14: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Household Income and Expenditure 
Households’ Types 
𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑯𝒉 𝑬𝑯𝒉 𝑺𝑯𝒉 𝒔𝒉_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒉 
BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE 
HH_AGR_L 171254 175765 2.63 162021 166289 2.63 9233 9476 2.63 0.05 0.05 0.00 
HH_AGR_NL 703951 723836 2.83 642327 660471 2.83 61624 63364 2.83 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGR_LL 476495 483663 1.50 450508 457286 1.50 25987 26378 1.50 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_NA 167663 172136 2.67 158015 162231 2.67 9648 9905 2.67 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_HL 441589 451698 2.29 385337 394158 2.29 56252 57539 2.29 0.13 0.13 0.00 
HH_NAGU_LL 671493 677254 0.86 633499 632846 -0.10 37995 44408 16.88 0.06 0.07 15.89 
HH_NAGU_NA 233825 236020 0.94 213768 215775 0.94 20057 20245 0.94 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGU_HL 777279 785442 1.05 672629 662894 -1.45 104650 122549 17.10 0.14 0.16 15.89 
 
Key variables: 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ: Actual disposable income; 𝐸𝐻ℎ: household budget; 𝑆𝐻ℎ: household saving; 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ: adjusted average propensity of saving 
Households’ types:    
HH_AGR_L: agricultural households’ with unskilled labour; HH_AGR_NL: agricultural-households’ with unclear occupation; HH_NAGR_LL: 
non-agricultural-rural households’ with low wages, HH_NAGR_NA: non-agricultural-rural households’ with unclear occupation; 
HH_NAGR_HL: non-agricultural-rural households’ with high wages, HH_NAGU_LL: non-agricultural labour-urban households’ with low 
wages, HH_NAGU_NA: non-agricultural-urban households,  and HH_NAGU_HL: non-agricultural labour-urban households’ with high wages.   
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Table 4.15: The Impact of Scenario 2 on Household Consumption of Commodities by Variety 
Commodity 
HH_AGR_L HH_AGR_NL HH_NAGR_LL HH_NAGR_NA HH_NAGR_HL HH_NAGU_LL HH_NAGU_NA HH_NAGU_HL AVG 
PCHANGE  
AGRI_C 1.85 2.04 0.73 1.88 1.51 -0.87 0.17 -2.20 0.64 
AISCOM_C -0.10 0.08 -1.20 -0.07 -0.44 -2.77 -1.75 -4.08 -1.29 
BANKAS_C 10.23 10.43 9.02 10.27 9.86 7.29 8.41 5.85 8.92 
CATLE_C 1.13 1.32 0.01 1.16 0.79 -1.57 -0.54 -2.89 -0.08 
CHFCC_C 2.63 2.82 1.50 2.66 2.28 -0.11 0.93 -1.46 1.41 
ESTPRV_C 3.93 4.13 2.79 3.97 3.58 1.16 2.22 -0.20 2.70 
ELEGD_C 10.82 11.03 9.60 10.86 10.45 7.87 8.99 6.42 9.50 
FISH_C -4.61 -4.44 -5.66 -4.58 -4.93 -7.16 -6.19 -8.41 -5.75 
FODT_C 5.72 5.91 4.55 5.75 5.36 2.90 3.97 1.51 4.46 
FORH_C -5.40 -5.22 -6.44 -5.37 -5.72 -7.92 -6.96 -9.16 -6.53 
GOVTD_C 2.74 2.93 1.61 2.77 2.39 0.00 1.04 -1.35 1.51 
HTEL_C 6.86 7.06 5.68 6.89 6.50 4.01 5.09 2.61 5.59 
INDSHO_C -4.57 -4.39 -5.62 -4.54 -4.89 -7.11 -6.14 -8.36 -5.70 
LANT_C 8.99 9.19 7.79 9.02 8.62 6.08 7.19 4.65 7.69 
OAGRI_C 1.32 1.51 0.21 1.35 0.98 -1.38 -0.35 -2.71 0.12 
OMINE_C -28.83 -28.69 -29.61 -28.80 -29.07 -30.72 -30.00 -31.66 -29.67 
PPTM_C 5.33 5.53 4.17 5.36 4.98 2.52 3.59 1.14 4.08 
RSTR_C -7.33 -7.16 -8.35 -7.30 -7.64 -9.80 -8.86 -11.02 -8.43 
STGL_C 8.39 8.59 7.20 8.42 8.02 5.50 6.60 4.08 7.10 
SUPPS_C -0.45 -0.26 -1.54 -0.42 -0.78 -3.10 -2.09 -4.41 -1.63 
WOOG_C 6.57 6.77 5.39 6.60 6.21 3.73 4.81 2.33 5.30 
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4.4.2.6. Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario 2 
Table 4.16 shows the sensitivity analysis results of scenario 2 on the macroeconomic 
accounts for robustness checking. Similar to scenario 1, we vary the trade elasticity by 25% 
decrease and increase (between 1.5 and 2.5) and then check the sign and size of each value.  
Under high and low elasticity, scenario 2 also generates a consistent sign (positive) 
across all endogenous variables excluding the negative direction of capital bill which is 
considered negligibly small. For both high and low elasticity, the simulations generate 
small impact differential results of post shock. Therefore, based on these results, the model 
is confirmed robust and consistent. 
 
Table 4.16: Sensitivity Analysis Results of Scenario 2 (% Change) 
Variables 
Import Elasticity 
= 2 
Original Case 
Import Elasticity = 
2.5 
Import Elasticity = 
1.5 
GDP at factor costs  1.27 1.48 0.50 
GDP gap  11.06 11.70 12.55 
GDP at market prices from income 
side   2.18 2.44 1.50 
GDP at market prices from 
expenditure side 1.75 1.98 1.01 
Total private consumption  1.02 2.16 0.79 
Total investment 1.66 0.37 0.43 
Total government consumption 10.62 8.94 6.69 
Total export 1.80 1.76 1.14 
Total import 1.86 1.91 1.20 
Net export 1.21 0.26 0.53 
Net indirect tax  25.54 26.54 26.20 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  2.44 2.88 0.97 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  -0.02 -0.05 -0.00 
 
4.4.3. Scenario 3: A 10 percent increase in government expenditure (𝑪𝑮𝑨𝑫𝑱) with 
Adjustment in Output Tax Rates  
In scenario 3, we examine the effects of a 10% increase in government expenditure on 
Indonesia’s economy. The output tax rates are endogenous to compensate for the additional 
expenditure in public goods and services. The rests of the tax and subsidy rates including 
government saving are exogenous at the initial level. 
In this scenario, we expect that higher taxes on output production create higher 
distortion in their relative prices. It influences producers to lower the production volumes 
and thus creating a lower income at the national level (Damuri and Perdana, 2003). It 
implies labour market adjustments that could lead to a negative effect on household income 
and expenditure (Damuri and Perdana, 2003).    
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4.4.3.1. Impact on Macroeconomic Account 
Table 4.17 summarizes the impact of scenario 3 on macroeconomic accounts and its 
comparison to scenario 1 and scenario 2 results. Scenario 3 leads to negative effect on 
Indonesia’s economy performance. GDP at factor cost falls by -1.97% whilst both GDP at 
market prices, from income and expenditure side drop by -0.46% and -1.21% respectively. 
The reason is clear: The output tax rate is embodied in the output price system. Hence, the 
increase in output tax rates directly increases the output prices, which in turn, leads to 
higher prices of goods in final market. As a result, the equilibrium output falls. However, 
this effect may be offset by the injection of government spending on goods and services 
that shifts up the aggregate demand.   
The decline in GDP at factor cost is strongly due to the fall of one of the components, 
total wage bill, by -3.81% while capital bill increases negligibly by 0.05%. It implies that 
SIM-3 depresses the industry demand for labour which would reduce the factors return to 
households. Hence, this effect indirectly leads to a reduction in total private purchasing 
power which is reflected from a drop of private consumption by -2.47%. The other 
components of GDP at market prices from income side such as investment and net export 
are also declined by -1.07%, and -0.67% respectively.  
 
Table 4.17: The Impact of All Simulations on National Income Account 
Variables 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
% CHANGE % CHANGE % CHANGE 
GDP at factor costs   2.42 1.27 -1.97  
GDP gap  2.71 11.06  19.61  
GDP at market prices from income side  2.67 2.18 -0.46  
GDP at market prices from expenditure side   2.56 1.75 -1.21  
Total private consumption  3.02 1.02 -2.47  
Total investment 0.26 1.66 -1.07  
Total government consumption 8.54 10.62  11.91  
Total export 0.68 1.80  0.01  
Total import 0.35 1.86  0.08  
Net export 3.92 1.21 -0.67  
Net indirect tax  9.32 25.54  36.10  
Total payment to all workers (WAGEBILL)  4.63 2.44 -3.81  
Total payment to capital (CAPBILL)  0.01 -0.02  0.05  
SG -5.59 - -  
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4.4.3.2. Impact on Gross Output and Value Added 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19 present the impact of scenario 3 on gross domestic output and value 
added across activities. The increase in output tax rate has a negative effect on aggregate 
sectors. It raises the cost of production that leads to a contraction in production volumes. 
Table 4.20 shows that the total output production declines by -0.98% while its aggregate 
price (𝑃𝑄𝐴𝑗) increases by 1.90%. 
Nevertheless, by looking at specific industries, there are six sectors which indicate an 
improvement on output production. Textiles (STGL_A), hotel (HTEL_A), households’ and 
other services (INDSHO_A), and real estate (ESTPRV_A) sector indicate the highest 
expansion by 28.22%, 28.39%, 12.54%, and 6.75%; meanwhile, public services 
(GOVTD_A) and construction (CONS_A) sector only improve slightly, by about 0.08%. Rests of 
sectors are contracted where sector of supporting services for transportation (SUPPS_A) 
suffers the most. For example, the decline in output production of agricultural (AGRI_A); 
air and sea communication (AISCOM_A); fossils mining (COMOIL_A); and fisheries 
(FISH_A) sectors also indicate a fall in their respective cost of value added by -7.34%, -
5.02%, -1.21%, -1.27%. In other words, the contraction of these outputs could be related to 
the variation of intermediate input between industries. However, Table 4.19 indicates that 
a drop in output production for some sectors may not be directly related to the increased 
cost per unit of their value added input. The distributional effects can also be influenced by 
the complex interaction of the changes in aggregate demand, and constraint shifts of 
intermediate input prices inter-industries.  
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Table 4.18: Impact of Scenario 3 on Activity Gross Domestic Output 
Activity 
Volume of Gross Domestic Output (𝑸𝑨𝒋) Price of Gross Domestic Output (𝑷𝑸𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % Change BASE SHOCKED % Change 
AGRI_A 577097 576604 -0.09 1  0.94  -6.47  
AISCOM_A 325709 325405 -0.09 1  0.99  -1.43  
BANKAS_A 268190 248283 -7.42 1  1.22   21.97  
CATLE_A 351964 351165 -0.23 1  0.98  -2.00  
CHFCC_A 1274343 1222499 -4.07 1  1.02   1.84  
COMOIL_A 616125 607801 -1.35 1  0.99  -1.11  
CONS_A 1243976 1244991 0.08 0.98  0.96  -1.72  
ESTPRV_A 286491 305823 6.75 1  0.89  -10.82  
ELEGD_A 124491 119990 -3.62 0.98  1.09   10.76  
FISH_A 244882 242011 -1.17 1  0.97  -3.06  
FODT_A 1173301 1102099 -6.07 1  1.02   1.89  
FORH_A 62143 59196 -4.74 1  1.22   22.24  
GOVTD_A 493287 493695 0.08 1  1.03   3.16  
HTEL_A 39603 50845 28.39 1  0.96  -4.48  
INDSHO_A 279477 314528 12.54 1  0.76  -23.92  
LANT_A 265679 254030 -4.38 1  1.11   10.47  
OAGRI_A 220411 210205 -4.63 1  1.05   5.09  
OMINE_A 99298 97169 -2.14 1  1.10   10.18  
PPTM_A 1579245 1544421 -2.21 1  1.01   1.24  
RSTR_A 285032 269775 -5.35 1  1.04   3.73  
STGL_A 336199 431089 28.22 1  0.93  -7.00  
SUPPS_A 48418 40968 -15.39 1  1.22   22.17  
TRDE_A 999123 980073 -1.91 0.97  0.86  -11.47  
WOOG_A 211879 201474 -4.91 1  1.04   3.92  
TOTAL 11406362 11294140 -0.98 1.00 1.02 1.90 
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Table 4.19: Impact of Scenario 3 on Value Added 
ACTIVITY 
Value Added Price (𝑷𝑽𝑨𝒋) Volume of Value Added (𝑽𝑨𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % Change BASE SHOCKED % Change 
AGRI_A 1 0.93 -7.34 377515.4 375281.6 -0.59 
AISCOM_A 1 0.95 -5.02 184907.8 187200.4 1.24 
BANKAS_A 1 1.28 27.89 174958.4 187899.4 7.40 
CATLE_A 1 1.00 -0.23 129760 129342.4 -0.32 
CHFCC_A 1 1.06 5.69 541374.3 545510.3 0.76 
COMOIL_A 1 0.99 -1.21 485997.4 488020.4 0.42 
CONS_A 1 0.89 -10.73 427655.1 428654 0.23 
ESTPRV_A 1 0.85 -14.89 198080.9 185233.1 -6.49 
ELEGD_A 1 1.16 15.75 127591.3 128584.9 0.78 
FISH_A 1 0.99 -1.27 134054.8 132463.8 -1.19 
FODT_A 1 1.17 16.47 286707.7 280670.9 -2.11 
FORH_A 1 1.36 35.56 40073.65 40055.48 -0.05 
GOVTD_A 1 1.05 4.90 330641 354605.9 7.25 
HTEL_A 1 0.93 -7.40 23450.72 23945.22 2.11 
INDSHO_A 1 0.52 -48.00 141973.2 143269.9 0.91 
LANT_A 1 1.34 34.40 105917.4 106076.3 0.15 
OAGRI_A 1 1.08 8.06 128807.1 127119.7 -1.31 
OMINE_A 1 1.17 16.84 63134.19 63358.95 0.36 
PPTM_A 1 1.08 7.73 430989.9 431267.7 0.06 
RSTR_A 1 1.10 10.10 116147.1 116836.5 0.59 
STGL_A 1 0.87 -13.39 108712.3 110092.8 1.27 
SUPPS_A 1 1.39 39.29 26497.85 36813.79 38.93 
TRDE_A 1 0.76 -23.64 499882.7 497837.7 -0.41 
WOOG_A 1 1.03 2.81 72105.2 71966.71 -0.19 
Average 1 1.04 3.86   2.08 
 
4.4.3.3. Impact on Employed Factors 
Table 4.20 presents the impact of scenario 3 on employed factors. A higher tax rate on 
outputs will induce an increase in their prices. These changes will then influence the 
producers to reallocate the production factors. Analogous to previous simulations, under 
this scenario we assume wages of labour specific and rent of capital as exogenous. Whilst, 
stock of capital, number of labour composite, and labour composite wage are endogenously 
determined to clear the factors market.  
Overall, compared to scenario 1 and scenario 2, this simulation indicates the smallest 
increase in labour composite demand by only 0.96% and the effect on the stock of capital 
remains negligible (0.00%). Nevertheless, the results vary across industries. There are 10 
sectors which indicate a contraction: agriculture (AGRI_A); air and sea communication 
(AISCOM_A); cattle products (CATLE_A); fossils mining (COMOIL_A); construction 
(CONS_A); real estates (ESTPRV_A); fisheries (FISH_A); households’ and other services 
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(INDSHO_A); trade (TRDE_A); and timber products (WOOG_A). Conversely, the rest of 
sectors expand. These changes would trigger factor substitution in favour of labour 
composite. This is reflected by the expansion in labour composite for the corresponding 
sectors, excluding cattle products (CATLE_A) and timber products (WOOG_A), which 
also indicate a drop by -0.11% and -7.49% respectively. Furthermore, Table 4.22 indicates 
that hotel (HTEL_A) and textiles (STGL_A) sectors benefit the most from both of factors 
movement effects where the demand of capital and labour composite are increased. 
 
Table 4.20: The Impact of SIM-3 on Employed Factors (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋 and 𝑲𝒋) 
Activity 
Labour Composite (𝑳𝑨𝑩𝒋) Capital (𝑲𝒋) 
BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE BASE SHOCKED % CHANGE 
AGRI_A 356465 357778 0.37 21051  19,480  -7.46  
AISCOM_A 68100 74387 9.23 116808  110,783  -5.16  
BANKAS_A 53146 28028 -47.26 121813  144,151   18.34  
CATLE_A 91495 91395 -0.11 38265  38,071  -0.51  
CHFCC_A 166589 141281 -15.19 374785  379,784   1.33  
COMOIL_A 60075 64822 7.90 425923  414,888  -2.59  
CONS_A 200904 228673 13.82 226751  202,488  -10.70  
ESTPRV_A 45543 83568 83.49 152538  138,514  -9.19  
ELEGD_A 16371 5862 -64.19 111220  124,021   11.51  
FISH_A 49457 50000 1.10 84598  82,503  -2.48  
FODT_A 120241 91515 -23.89 166467  182,027   9.35  
FORH_A 15275 8887 -41.82 24799  32,005   29.06  
GOVTD_A 286212 284353 -0.65 44429  46,619   4.93  
HTEL_A 9279 13407 44.49 14172  16,840   18.83  
INDSHO_A 86104 148159 72.07 55869  32,682  -41.50  
LANT_A 87258 78329 -10.23 18660  23,967   28.44  
OAGRI_A 106334 99774 -6.17 22473  23,147   3.00  
OMINE_A 46746 43322 -7.32 16388  18,728   14.28  
PPTM_A 179195 157957 -11.85 251795  265,132   5.30  
RSTR_A 104242 97591 -6.38 11905  12,399   4.15  
STGL_A 45829 71626 56.29 62884  69,801   11.00  
SUPPS_A 20445 15685 -23.28 6053  7,131   17.80  
TRDE_A 441454 448806 1.67 58429  43,742  -25.14  
WOOG_A 35860 33173 -7.49 36245  35,417  -2.29  
Total 2692618 2718379 0.96 2464317 2464317 0.00 
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4.4.3.4. Impact on Price and Volume of Commodities 
Table 4.21 presents scenario 3 impact on price and volumes. Similar to the previous 
simulations, here we also assume that the world price index of export and import are 
exogenous. Hence, the changes of domestically export (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) price are 
influenced by the changes in exchange rates (local currency per foreign currency).  
Intuitively, the presence of higher output tax rates has a direct effect on higher prices 
on goods due to the increasing cost of production. However, the higher prices are offset by 
the increase in government expenditure on composite goods which at the end raises the 
aggregate demand. Under scenario 3, the results indicate that the prices of domestically 
produced commodities considerably increase. Hence, producers will favour to increase the 
shares of imported commodities relatively with domestic goods in order to produce 
composite goods. This leads to a raise in import price which in turn depreciates the 
exchange rate. Table 4.21 shows that under this simulation, the overall composite prices 
(𝑃𝑖
𝑍) increase by 2.05% and the domestic prices increase by 2.11%. Meanwhile, the 
exchange rate depreciates by 0.41%.    
In terms of volume absorptions, the aggregate demand for all types of goods: 
composite goods (∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑖 ), domestic goods (∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑖 ), import (∑ 𝑀𝑖𝑖 ), and export (∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑖 ) 
indicate a reduction. The demand for aggregate domestic goods falls by -1.12% is higher 
than import (-0.33%). This is due to the price effect which is reflected from the relative 
aggregate domestic-import (𝑃𝑖
𝐷/𝑃𝑖
𝑀) price ratios by 1.70%. Therefore, it triggers 
substitution between imports and domestic goods. In other words, the fall of import is less 
than domestic goods. Taken together, these effects result in a drop in composite goods by 
-1.04%. Furthermore, a higher increase in domestic price (𝑃𝑖
𝐷) to export price (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) would 
also lead to a small drop in export volumes (-0.40%).  
However, across commodities specific, the results vary. There are 11 types of 
imported goods that show an improvement in volumes. These are bank and assurances 
38.27%); food and beverages (0.26%); forestry (43.50%); government services (6.47%); 
land transportation (17.23%); other agricultural (7.09%); other mining (19.28%); paper 
products (1.06%); restaurant (3.06%); supporting services for transportation (37.26%); and 
timber products (6.22%). These are due to an increase in the specific price ratio between 
domestic price and its corresponding import price (𝑃𝑖
𝐷/𝑃𝑖
𝑀). The rests commodities indicate 
a contraction in import volumes. In terms of export, there are 8 types of commodities which 
indicate an increase in volumes, i.e. agricultural (14.33%); air and sea communication 
(2.03%); cattle products (4.03%); real estates (33.06%); fisheries (5.35%); hotel (37.43%); 
households and other services (93.42%); and textiles (48.20%). As mentioned earlier, the 
export competitiveness of each type of commodity is influenced by the increase in its price 
ratio (𝑃𝑖
𝐷/𝑃𝑖
𝐸). Finally, in the domestic market, there are 6 types of both domestic (𝐷𝑖) and 
composite goods (𝑍𝑖) that indicate an improvement in volumes. These are construction 
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(0.08% and 0.08%); real estates (5.35% and 1.78%); government services (0.34% and 
0.52%); hotel (12.91% and 2.43%); households and other services (12.22% and 10.34%); 
and textiles (16.52% and 14.05%).  
145 
 
 
 
Table 4.21: The Impact of Scenario 3 on Prices and Quantities of Commodities (% Change) 
Commodity 𝑷𝑸 𝑷𝒁 𝑷𝑫 𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑴 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑬 𝑷𝑫/𝑷𝑴 𝑸 𝒁 𝑫 𝑬 𝑴 
AGRI_C -6.47 -5.91 -6.34 0.41 0.41 -6.68 -6.68 -0.09 -1.01 -0.11 14.33 -13.08 
AISCOM_C -1.43 -0.79 -1.06 0.41 0.41 -1.50 -1.50 -0.09 -1.07 -0.53 2.03 -3.42 
BANKAS_C 21.97 21.50 22.45 0.41 0.41 22.00 22.00 -7.42 -5.58 -7.03 -37.75 38.27 
CATLE_C -2.00 -1.84 -1.87 0.41 0.41 -2.30 -2.30 -0.23 -0.30 -0.23 4.03 -4.71 
CHFCC_C 1.84 1.96 2.71 0.41 0.41 2.28 2.28 -4.07 -1.37 -2.79 -7.47 1.71 
COMOIL_C -1.11 -0.51 -0.82 0.41 0.41 -1.20 -1.20 -1.35 -2.81 -2.20 -0.16 -4.58 
CONS_C -1.72 -1.34 -1.34 0.41 0.41 -1.70 -1.70 0.08 0.08 0.08 - - 
ESTPRV_C -10.82 -9.29 -10.84 0.41 0.41 -11.16 -11.16 6.75 1.78 5.35 33.06 -16.93 
ELEGD_C 10.76 11.18 11.18 0.41 0.41 10.75 10.75 -3.62 -3.62 -3.62 - - 
FISH_C -3.06 -3.00 -3.00 0.41 0.41 -3.40 -3.40 -1.17 -1.29 -1.28 5.35 -7.87 
FODT_C 1.89 3.07 3.25 0.41 0.41 2.78 2.78 -6.07 -4.84 -5.18 -10.68 0.26 
FORH_C 22.24 22.82 23.09 0.41 0.41 22.60 22.60 -4.74 -4.09 -4.51 -36.72 43.50 
GOVTD_C 3.16 3.34 3.43 0.41 0.41 2.98 2.98 0.08 0.52 0.34 -5.82 6.47 
HTEL_C -4.48 -4.64 -9.17 0.41 0.41 -9.57 -9.57 28.39 2.43 12.91 37.43 -7.62 
INDSHO_C -23.92 -23.03 -23.67 0.41 0.41 -24.01 -24.01 12.54 10.34 12.22 93.42 -35.16 
LANT_C 10.47 11.08 11.14 0.41 0.41 10.65 10.65 -4.38 -4.21 -4.31 -22.21 17.23 
OAGRI_C 5.09 5.49 5.85 0.41 0.41 5.37 5.37 -4.63 -2.97 -3.63 -13.63 7.09 
OMINE_C 10.18 10.00 10.75 0.41 0.41 10.25 10.25 -2.14 -0.61 -1.95 -19.72 19.28 
PPTM_C 1.24 1.34 1.75 0.41 0.41 1.39 1.39 -2.21 -0.79 -1.60 -4.57 1.06 
RSTR_C 3.73 4.46 4.59 0.41 0.41 4.17 4.17 -5.35 -4.78 -5.02 -12.81 3.06 
STGL_C -7.00 -10.19 -11.15 0.41 0.41 -11.46 -11.46 28.22 14.05 16.52 48.20 -8.76 
SUPPS_C 22.17 19.46 25.62 0.41 0.41 25.09 25.09 -15.39 -3.03 -12.31 -44.20 37.26 
TRDE_C -11.47 -10.87 -10.87 0.41 0.41 -11.26 -11.26 -1.91 -1.91 -1.91 - - 
WOOG_C 3.92 4.98 5.10 0.41 0.41 4.67 4.67 -4.91 -2.83 -3.04 -11.86 6.22 
Total 1.88 2.05 2.11 0.41 0.41 1.70 1.70 -0.98 -1.04 -1.12 -0.40 -0.33 
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Where 1 for shock value; and 0 for base value 
Key variables: 
𝑃𝑄: Output price; 𝑃𝑍: composite commodity price; 𝑃𝐷: domestic commodity price; 𝑃𝐸: imported commodity price; 𝑃𝑀: imported commodity 
price; 𝑄: output volume; 𝑍: composite commodity quantity; 𝐷: domestic commodity quantity; 𝐸: exported commodity quantity; 𝑀: imported 
commodity quantity. 
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4.4.3.5. Impact on Households Income and Expenditure 
Table 4.22 summarises the impact of scenario 3 on household income, expenditure, and 
saving. Under this scenario, we only allow the representative household of non-
agricultural-urban households with high wages (HH_NAGU_HL) to adjust their saving 
ratio; and let the rest types of household saving exogenously fixed.  
We expect that this scenario may lead to a negative effect on household income and 
expenditure because of two main reasons. First, a higher output tax rates indirectly 
increases the prices of final goods purchased by the households’ which result in a fall in 
their real consumption. Second, it induces the cost of production to increase. This triggers 
producers to lower the wage bills and thus reducing the private income.  
As expected, the results indicate that household income drops for all types. The actual 
disposable income of agricultural households with unskilled labour (HH_AGR_L); 
agricultural households’ with unclear occupation (HH_AGR_NL); non-agricultural rural 
households’ with low wages (HH_NAGR_LL); non-agricultural rural households’ with 
unclear occupation (HH_NAGR_NA); non-agricultural-rural households with high wages 
(HH_NAGR_HL); non-agricultural urban households’ with low wages (HH_NAGU_LL); 
non-agricultural urban households’ with unclear job (HH_NAGU_NA); and non-
agricultural labour urban households’ with high wages (HH_NAGU_HL) are reduced by -
1.67%, -2.25%, -3.75%, -0.83%, -2.34%, -1.31%, -2.94%, and -4.40%. The rural 
households with unclear occupation (HH_NAGR_NA) has the smallest fall in their income.             
Furthermore, similar with SIM-1, the magnitude changes of expenditure and saving 
for all types of household budget and saving, excluding non-agricultural-urban households 
with high wages (HH_NAGU_HL), are identical with the level of income distribution. For 
instance, the changes of total expenditure and saving for HH_AGR_L; HH_AGR_NL; 
HH_NAGR_LL; HH_NAGR_NA; HH_NAGR_HL; HH_NAGU_LL; and 
HH_NAGU_NA are -1.67%, -2.25%, -3.75%, -0.83%, -2.34%, -1.31%, -2.94% 
respectively. This is due to the assumption of which only HH_NAGU_HL is allowed to 
adjust their saving ratio (𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1) in order to clear the saving-investment balance.    
Table 24 shows that actual income of HH_NAGU_HL falls by -4.40%. However, their total 
consumption declines lower by -3.41%. The saving ratio strongly declines by -6.70% 
reflecting a sharp reduction in saving by -10.81%.  
Table 4.23 presents the impact of SIM-3 on private consumption across final 
commodities. In sum, total private consumption on aggregate commodities declines. 
However, there is indication of expansion for some types of goods and services. The largest 
improvement of households’ demand is given to households and other services by 26.91%. 
Whilst, the other types of commodities namely agricultural, real estates, fisheries, hotel, 
and textiles are improved by 3.83%, 7.69%, 0.71%, 2.45%, and 8.77% respectively. The 
variations of household consumption can be explained from the distribution effects of 
household income and prices of goods.  
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Table 4.22: The Impact of Simulation 3 on Household Distribution Income and Expenditure 
Household Types 
𝑨𝑫𝑰𝑯𝒉 𝑬𝑯𝒉 𝑺𝑯𝒉 𝒔𝒉_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒉 
BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE BASE SHOCKED PCHANGE 
HH_AGR_L 171254 168403 -1.67 162021 159324 -1.67 9233 9079 -1.67 0.05 0.05 0.00 
HH_AGR_NL 703951 688143 -2.25 642327 627903 -2.25 61624 60240 -2.25 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGR_LL 476495 458644 -3.75 450508 433631 -3.75 25987 25013 -3.75 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_NA 167663 166272 -0.83 158015 156704 -0.83 9648 9568 -0.83 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGR_HL 441589 431242 -2.34 385337 376308 -2.34 56252 54934 -2.34 0.13 0.13 0.00 
HH_NAGU_LL 671493 662686 -1.31 633499 625190 -1.31 37995 37496 -1.31 0.06 0.06 0.00 
HH_NAGU_NA 233825 226942 -2.94 213768 207476 -2.94 20057 19466 -2.94 0.09 0.09 0.00 
HH_NAGU_HL 777279 743047 -4.40 672629 649707 -3.41 104650 93341 -10.81 0.14 0.13 -6.70 
 
Key variables: 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ: Actual disposable income; 𝐸𝐻ℎ: household budget; 𝑆𝐻ℎ: household saving; 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ: adjusted average propensity of saving 
Household types:    
HH_AGR_L: agricultural households with unskilled labour; HH_AGR_NL: agricultural-households with unclear occupation; HH_NAGR_LL: 
non-agricultural-rural households with low wages, HH_NAGR_NA: non-agricultural-rural households with unclear occupation; HH_NAGR_HL: 
non-agricultural-rural households with high wages, HH_NAGU_LL: non-agricultural labour-urban households with low wages, HH_NAGU_NA: 
non-agricultural-urban households, and HH_NAGU_HL: non-agricultural labour-urban households with high wages.   
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Table 4.23: The Impact of Scenario 3 on Household Consumption of Commodities Variety (% Change) 
Commodity HH_AGR_L HH_AGR_NL HH_NAGR_LL HH_NAGR_NA HH_NAGR_HL HH_NAGU_LL HH_NAGU_NA HH_NAGU_HL AVG 
AGRI_C 4.52 3.90 2.30 5.40 3.80 4.89 3.16 2.66 3.83 
AISCOM_C -0.88 -1.47 -2.98 -0.04 -1.57 -0.53 -2.17 -2.64 -1.54 
BANKAS_C -19.07 -19.55 -20.78 -18.38 -19.63 -18.78 -20.12 -20.50 -19.60 
CATLE_C 0.18 -0.41 -1.94 1.03 -0.51 0.54 -1.12 -1.60 -0.48 
CHFCC_C -3.56 -4.13 -5.60 -2.74 -4.23 -3.21 -4.81 -5.27 -4.19 
ESTPRV_C 8.40 7.76 6.11 9.32 7.65 8.79 6.99 6.48 7.69 
ELEGD_C -11.55 -12.07 -13.42 -10.80 -12.16 -11.23 -12.70 -13.12 -12.13 
FISH_C 1.37 0.78 -0.77 2.24 0.68 1.74 0.06 -0.42 0.71 
FODT_C -4.59 -5.15 -6.61 -3.78 -5.25 -4.25 -5.83 -6.28 -5.22 
FORH_C -19.94 -20.41 -21.63 -19.26 -20.49 -19.65 -20.98 -21.36 -20.46 
GOVTD_C -4.84 -5.41 -6.86 -4.04 -5.50 -4.50 -6.08 -6.53 -5.47 
HTEL_C 3.12 2.52 0.94 4.00 2.41 3.50 1.78 1.30 2.45 
INDSHO_C 27.75 27.00 25.05 28.84 26.87 28.21 26.09 25.49 26.91 
LANT_C -11.47 -11.99 -13.34 -10.72 -12.08 -11.15 -12.62 -13.04 -12.05 
OAGRI_C -6.78 -7.33 -8.75 -5.99 -7.42 -6.44 -7.99 -8.43 -7.39 
OMINE_C -10.60 -11.13 -12.49 -9.84 -11.22 -10.28 -11.76 -12.19 -11.19 
PPTM_C -2.96 -3.53 -5.02 -2.14 -3.63 -2.61 -4.22 -4.68 -3.60 
RSTR_C -5.86 -6.42 -7.86 -5.06 -6.51 -5.53 -7.09 -7.53 -6.48 
STGL_C 9.49 8.85 7.18 10.42 8.74 9.89 8.07 7.55 8.77 
SUPPS_C -17.68 -18.17 -19.42 -16.98 -18.25 -17.39 -18.75 -19.14 -18.22 
WOOG_C -6.33 -6.88 -8.31 -5.53 -6.97 -5.99 -7.55 -7.99 -6.94 
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4.4.3.6. Sensitivity Analysis of Scenario 3 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis by varying the import elasticity in order to check the 
robustness of scenario 3 results. Table 4.24 presents the sensitivity analysis results of SIM-
3 on the macroeconomic accounts. We choose in experimenting a decrease and an increase 
of the import elasticity by 25% (between 1.5 and 2.5). We then examine the sign and size 
of results. If the trade elasticity reduces the sensitivity of trade to changes in the relative 
price would fall.  
Apparently, the effects of changes in import elasticity are quite large especially in the 
case of higher elasticity. All macroeconomic accounts, excluding real investment and 
capital bills, generate a contrast sign by which they are tend to be positively improved. In 
the case of lower elasticity, however, the results are less sensitive where only GDP at 
market price from expenditure side and real investment give a contradicted sign. McDaniel 
and Balistreri (2003) found that the wide-ranging sensitivity with respect to trade elasticity 
is highly dependent to the degree of firm heterogeneity: the more disaggregated the sectors, 
the greater substitutability there is between varieties. We also suspect that these results 
could be due to the colliding mechanisms in which the effects of expansionary public goods 
on Indonesia’s macroeconomic are offset by the contractions of higher ad valorem tax rates. 
In other words, the increase in aggregate demand leads to a drop in prices of goods which 
in turn improves the national income account. However, these outcomes are suppressed by 
the presence of an increase in ad valorem tax rates. Thus, it indicates that the changes of 
elasticity in scenario 3 could sensitively generate a different result. Since the elasticity used 
in this model is adopted from other studies, we suggest that this value should be precisely 
weighed for each type of traded commodity based on Indonesia’s economy.          
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Table 4 24: Sensitivity Analysis Results of Scenario 3 (% Change) 
Variables 
Import Elasticity 
= 2 
Original Case 
Import Elasticity = 
2.5 
Import Elasticity = 
1.5 
GDP at factor costs  -1.97  0.639 -1.43  
GDPGAP   19.61  16.686  19.98  
GDP at market prices from income 
side   
-0.46  2.042  0.15  
GDP at market prices from 
expenditure side  
-1.21  1.387 -0.62  
Total private consumption  -2.47  1.261 -3.20  
Total investment -1.07  -2.423  3.01  
Total government consumption  11.91  20.315  10.60  
Total export  0.01  3.156 -0.55  
Total import  0.08  2.898 -0.38  
Net export -0.67  5.644 -2.12  
Net indirect tax   36.10  38.476  39.44  
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
-3.81  1.125 -2.73  
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
 0.05  0.108  0.00  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we use the standard CGE model developed in Chapter 3 to examine the 
impacts of implementing specific fiscal policies on Indonesia’s main macroeconomic 
indicators and to their consequences by examining how different institutions and sectors in 
the economy are affected as a result. Three simulations were conducted in order to 
compensate a 10% expansion in exogenous public spending. The first simulation is the 
impact of a 10% increase in government expenditure with the adjusted government deficit 
and balance of payment. This scenario ensures that the government can only borrow to 
finance the extra expenditure without having any change in tax revenue. The second 
simulation is a simultaneous 10% increase in government expenditure and 10% reduction 
in the subsidy rate to activities. Under this scenario, the extra government expenditure is 
compensated by a reduction in exogenous subsidy payments to activities and its 
endogenous saving. The third simulation is a simultaneous 10% increase in government 
expenditure and 10% increase in ad valorem tax rate. Here, we compensate the additional 
public expenditures by increasing the ad valorem tax rate such that the burden of budget 
deficit could be relaxed.  
The results show that different scenarios of fiscal policies would affect the economy’s 
performance. The increase in public expenditure shifts up the equilibrium output. We 
present that scenario 1 generates the strongest impact due to the static nature of the model 
for which it does not consider the deficit payment in the future. The financing scheme of 
lowering subsidy rates to activities given in scenario 2 resulted in less improvement on 
Indonesia’s GDP compared to scenario 1. This is because a subsidy cut directly increases 
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the cost of production which at the end reduces national income. However, we also found 
that fiscal expansion with higher output tax revenue under scenario 3 resulted in the 
opposite results. The sectors were pressurized by higher taxes which creates 
deindustrialization, low employment, and thus reduces equilibrium national income and 
output.  
We perform a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of simulations results by 
varying the import elasticity. The results indicate that scenario 1 and scenario 2 reveal a 
small sensitivity and generate consistent sign for most of the endogenous variables, which 
implies that the model is robust. However, in scenario 3, the results are sensitive with 
respect to the variation of import elasticity. We argue that these are due to the large number 
of disaggregated sectors provided in the data set and the colliding effects of which the 
expansionary of public goods are offset by higher ad valorem tax rates. 
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Chapter 5 
Constructing Indonesia’s Energy-SAM 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Integrating energy technology details within CGE model for energy analysis has been 
considered as a mediation to reconcile divergent results between the ‘bottom-up’ 
engineering and macroeconomic – usually called ‘top-down’ – perspectives (Wing, 
2008)25. The impact analysis of energy policies within the context of conventional top-
down framework (mainly CGE models) usually overestimates the economy’s adjustments 
of an energy system (Proenca and Aubyn, 2009). This is because it ignores the 
technological shifts induced by price changes (Proenca and Aubyn, 2009). Contrary to top-
down models, the bottom-up energy models, which underestimate the economy’s 
adjustments induced by the energy policy shocks, are a partial equilibrium representation 
of the energy sector that focused on the cost minimization problems of detailed energy 
technologies to satisfy the final energy demand (Proenca and Aubyn, 2009; Wing, 2008; 
Bohringer and Rutherford, 2008). In bottom-up models, energy demand is determined only 
from a simple aggregate macroeconomic framework; but energy supply is usually derived 
from specific energy system models which represent the transformation linkages of energy 
input-output processes (Wing, 2008). By looking at above strengths and weaknesses, 
therefore, we attempt to develop a hybrid-CGE model by incorporating the electricity 
technological explicitness of bottom-up model with the conventional top-down model (or 
standard CGE model) given in Chapter 3.   
Hybrid-CGE models are commonly constrained by several limitations of the SAM 
data set to numerically calibrate the model. The first issue is related to the typical 
aggregated account of a set of energy types (industries and commodities). For instance, in 
the official Indonesian SAM for 2008, all types of energy fossils26 sectors (oil, coal, and 
natural gas mining), usually known as primary energy types, are pooled together with 
geothermal and metal ores in a single account namely the fossils and metal ores mining 
sector. Refineries products are aggregated together with chemical, fertilizer, clays, and 
cements products in a single account. Electricity is pooled together with other utilities such 
as drinkable water and city gas products. We argue that the set comprising three energy 
sectors in the existing SAM will not be sufficiently applicable to calibrate the hybrid-CGE 
model for specific energy analysis in Indonesia. Therefore, these sectors need to be further 
disaggregated into specific types of energy in order to have a robust analytical result. 
Second, the official Indonesian SAM is principally based on a one-to-one relationship 
between activity output (and price) and commodity supply (and price). In other words, it 
                                                          
25 For detailed explanations about “bottom-up” and “top-down” models see Wing (2008), Manne et al. 
(1995), Paltsev et al. (2005). 
26 These are usually known as primary energy types. 
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does not permit an activity to produce multiple types of commodity, or conversely, multiple 
activities to produce a homogenous type of commodity. These relationships are essential to 
have more accurate picture of energy-economy flows especially among energy industries 
and commodities (Choumert et al., 2006). For example, electricity is a homogenous 
commodity generated from various types of generation technology such as conventional 
(fossil fuels) and renewables plant (solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, and so on). In contrast, 
a refinery industry can produce multi types of petroleum commodities such as gasoline, 
diesel oil, liquid petroleum gas, kerosene, asphalt, and others. Third, the SAM does not 
specifically record the factor contribution of natural resources that are strongly related to 
the climate problem. These values are approximated as the shares of capital input to activity 
(Wing, 2001). Wing (2008) defined these resource factors as: 
“Land area with incident insolation or atmospheric boundary-layer flow in the cases of 
solar and wind, topographically-determined hydrostatic potential in the case of 
hydroelectricity, or geologically-determined hot dry rock in the case of geothermal energy” 
(p. 563).      
This chapter aims to extend the existing Indonesia’s SAM by disaggregating the 
specific types of energy industry and commodity as well as factor of natural resources. This 
data set will then be used to calibrate the hybrid-CGE model for specific energy policies 
that is explained in detail in Chapter 6. The energy types are grouped into three sets: (1) 
primary energy (energy fossils) which is extracted by mining activity; (2) petroleum 
products which are produced by the refinery industry; and (3) electricity which is produced 
from multiple power plants (conventional and renewables). The activity-commodity 
relationship of each classification is then determined as follows. Any activity of fossil 
mining produces a homogenous commodity (a one-to-one relationship). The refinery 
industry produces multiple types of petroleum products (a one-to-multi relationship). And 
each activity of generation technology produces a homogenous electricity commodity (a 
multi-to-one relationship). The dimension level of energy disaggregation of each set is 
highly dependent on the data availability. For the energy disaggregation method, we follow 
Wissema (2006) and Wing (2008) that are basically based on the shares approach. To our 
findings, we are the first to construct an energy-SAM for Indonesia by disaggregating the 
specific energy types and the factor of natural resources following the above terminologies.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly discusses the current energy 
accounts in the official Indonesian SAM 2008 and the proposed energy types which will 
be disaggregated. Section 5.3 describes in detail the construction of disaggregating specific 
energy for each set of energy types, from how these types are mapped, the data availability, 
the introduction of natural resources factor as shares of capital input to energy sectors, and 
the step-by-step construction. Finally, chapter 5.4 presents conclusions and briefly 
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discusses how to update the standard CGE model for policy analysis related to energy and 
carbon dioxide emissions.            
 
5.2. The Energy Sector in the Official Indonesian SAM 2008 
The existing Indonesian SAM 2008 has 24 activities (and commodities) accounts. Among 
these accounts, there are only three main accounts which comprise energy aggregate sectors 
(or commodities), namely: (1) mining account; (2) chemical account; and (3) utility 
account. Based on the available data, we determine the elements of energy specific which 
are grouped in above set accounts as follows. Primary energy types (coal, crude oil, natural 
gas) and geothermal energy, are pooled in mining account. We disaggregate these energy 
types for both activity and commodity and ensure the activity-commodity relationship 
where each industry produces a single type of commodity. Secondary energy commodities 
(particularly petroleum products: subsidized gasoline, subsidized kerosene, subsidized 
diesel, non-subsidized gasoline, subsidized and non subsidized liquid petroleum gas, and 
liquid natural gas, are grouped in the chemical account. However, we keep its production 
activity, which is refinery industry, in a single account to ensure a single-to-multiple 
relationship between refinery output (and price) and its corresponding commodity supply 
(and price).  Finally, the activities (and commodities) of electricity and city gas are pooled 
in the utility account. The latter follows a one-to-one relationship of activity output (and 
price) and commodity supply (and price), whilst, for electricity industry, we follow Wing’s 
(2008) approach by splitting this sector into three activity accounts, namely: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The generation account is then further disaggregated into 
several types of power plants which are conventional (aggregated fossil fuels), geothermal, 
and hydro power plant. While electricity commodity account remains in a single account. 
Therefore, in contrast to refinery products, in the electricity sector we permit a multiple-to-
single relationship between electricity activities and its corresponding commodity.  
 
5.3. The Energy Data 
To update the details of energy activity (and commodity) into the existing SAM, we employ 
the data source compiled by the National Energy Council. This data set is compiled by 
consolidating the information obtained from (a) the Input-Output Table of 2008 and 2005, 
(b) the Input-Output of Small and Middle Business Table 2003, (c) The Handbook of 
Energy and Economic Statistics of Indonesia 2008, (d) The State Expenditure Budget from 
the Ministry of Finance, (e) The National Statistics of Electricity, (f) The Statistics of City 
Gas given from the State-Owned Gas Company, (g) data of subsidized gasoline from the 
Ministry of Mineral and Energy Resources, (h) and other data sources which were obtained 
from the forum group discussion meetings or direct interview to the head of energy sector 
stakeholders.  
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The compiled data records almost all types of energy sectors and covers the details 
of their balance sheet of expenditure and receipt transaction. The structural framework of 
the compiled data is similar to that of SAM. It is a square matrix of which column total of 
expenditure equal to total row of the receipt account. However, there are four aspects which 
differ from the SAM, namely that (1) the compiled data does not distinguish activity and 
commodity from the production sector; (2) labour is only classified into eight groups; (3) 
the households are only represented in a single account; and (4) there is no record of import 
tariff for each imported demand. The schematic structure of this compiled data is shown in 
Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: The Schematic Structure of the Compiled Data from National Energy Council 
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158 
 
Furthermore, the compiled data records 44 types of production sectors which obtained by 
disaggregating the 24 activity accounts in the existing Indonesian SAM in year 2008. The 
sectors mapping between the existing SAM and the compiled data is presented in Table 5.2.  
Metal ores mining, coal mining, oil mining, natural gas mining and geothermal mining are 
subsets of a sector in the existing SAM, namely ‘Coal, Metal Ores, and Oil Mining’ 
(COMOIL_A). Chemical industry, bio-ethanol industry, and biodiesel industry, other oil 
industry, subsidized gasoline industry, subsidized bio-gasoline industry, kerosene industry, 
subsidized bio-diesel industry, non-subsidized industry, and LNG industry are subsets of a 
sector, namely ‘Chemical, Fertilizer, Goods from Clay and Cement’ (CHFCC_A). Subsidized 
electricity, non-subsidized electricity, hydro power plant, city gas, and clean water are subsets 
of a sector, namely ‘electricity, city gas and clean water’ (ELEGD_A). Finally, train services 
and land transportation are subsets of a sector, namely ‘land transportation’ (LANT_A).   
 
Table 5.2: The Mapping Sectors 
24 Activities in the Existing SAM 2008 44 Activities in the Compiled Data 
No Sector No Sector 
1 Agriculture Food Crops 1 Agriculture Food Crops 
2 Agriculture for Other Crops 2 Agriculture for Other Crops 
3 Cattle and the Outcomes 3 Cattle and the Outcomes 
4 Forestry and Hunting 4 Forestry and Hunting 
5 Fishery 5 Fishery 
6 
Coal, Metal Ores, and Oil Mining 
(COMOIL_A) 
6 Metal Ores Mining 
7 Coal Mining 
8 Oil Mining 
9 Natural Gas Mining 
10 Geothermal Mining 
7 Other Mining and Excavations 11 Other Mining and Excavations 
8 Food, Drink, and Tobacco 12 Food, Drink, and Tobacco 
9 Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather 
Industries 
13 Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather 
Industries 
10 Wood and Goods from Wood 14 Wood and Goods from Wood 
11 Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and 
Goods from Metal and Industry 
15 Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and 
Goods from Metal and Industry 
12 
Chemical, Fertilizer, Goods from Clay and 
Cement (CHFCC_A) 
16 Chemical Industry 
17 Bio-Ethanol Industry 
18 Bio-Diesel Industry 
19 Other Oil Industries 
20 Subsidized Gasoline Industry 
21 Subsidized Bio-Gasoline Industry 
22 Kerosene Industry 
23 Subsidized Diesel Industry 
24 Subsidized Bio-Diesel Industry 
25 Non Subsidized Gasoline Industry 
26 Subsidized LPG Industry 
27 Non Subsidized LPG Industry 
28 LNG Industry 
13 29 Conventional Power Plant  
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24 Activities in the Existing SAM 2008 44 Activities in the Compiled Data 
No Sector No Sector 
Electricity, Gas, and Drinkable Water 
(ELEGD_A) 
(Aggregated Fossil Fuels Generation) 
30 Geothermal Power Plant 
31 Hydro Power Plant 
32 City Gas 
33 Clean Water 
14 Construction 34 Construction 
15 Trade 35 Trade 
16 Restaurant 
36 Restaurant and Hotel 
17 Hotel 
18 Land Transportation (LANT_A) 
37 Train Transportation 
38 Land Transportation 
19 Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
39 Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
20 Supporting Services for Transportation and 
Warehouse 
40 Supporting Services for Transportation and 
Warehouse 
21 Bank and Assurance 41 Bank and Assurance 
22 Real Estate, and Private Services 42 Real Estate, and Private Services 
23 Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social Services 
43 Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social Services 
24 Individual Services, Households, and Other 
Services 
44 Individual Services, Households, and Other 
Services 
 
As mentioned previously, the compiled data has 2 limitations: (1) it does not record the 
import tariff for all production sectors; and (2) the imported demand for a given commodity 
differs a lot from the existing SAM. Table 5.3 compares the import demand and import tariff 
of COMOIL_C commodity recorded in the existing SAM and the compiled data27. From Table 
4, it can be seen that the total import for COMOIL_C commodity in the existing SAM is 
134,406.64 billion Rp. However, in the compiled data, it is 24,773.80 billion Rp. The 
discrepancy between these two values reached almost six folds. Furthermore, the total import 
tariff revenue of COMOIL_C in the existing SAM is 561.07 billion Rp. However, in the 
compiled data, there is no record of this tariff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Due to the limited space of table presentation, we only present an example of import and tariff discrepancy of 
COMOIL_C given in the existing SAM and compiled data. These discrepancies appear for all types of imported 
energy commodities. 
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Table 5.3: Comparing the Values of Import and Import Tariff  
Between the Existing SAM and the Compiled Data (Billion Rp) 
 Expenditure 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
ROW 
Activity in 
the existing 
SAM 
Types of COMOIL_C in the compiled data 
COMOIL_C 
Metal Ores 
Mining 
Coal 
Mining 
Oil 
Mining 
Natural 
Gas Mining 
Geothermal 
Mining 
Import 134,406.64  2,340.97  2,174.37  19,445.68   139.25   105.34  
Total import 134,406.64 24,773.80 
Import Tariff 
Revenue 
561.07 
NA NA NA NA NA 
Total import 
tariff 
561.07 
- - - - - 
*NA means not available 
 
5.4. Constructing the Energy-SAM 
In this section, we describe a step-by-step construction of the energy-SAM by carefully paying 
attention to the activity-commodity link for each set of energy types: primary energy, 
petroleum products, and electricity. We use the compiled data as our main resource because it 
has a square matrix format similar to the existing SAM.   
In a first step, we disaggregate the activity (and commodity) of energy types. 
Traditionally there is a one-to-one relationship between activity output (price) and commodity 
supply (price). As previously mentioned, because of the discrepancy in import demand and 
import tariff for energy sector account, as a result, their total expenditure (column side) is not 
equal to its relevant total receipt (row side). Therefore, in a second step, we eliminate the 
residuals by assuming a rough approximation for each energy tariff (and import) such that the 
energy-SAM balance is obtainable. For consistency check, we compare these results to the 
energy balance in year 2008. For example, we determine coal tariff so that its total supply (or 
demand) of coal goods in the energy-SAM is approximately equal to the given energy statistics. 
This approach is preferable over applying a SAM balancing method in order to avoid the effect 
of changes on other entry cells. In a third step, we add an account of resources factor which is 
derived from applying a proportion of capital input to the relevant energy activity. In a fourth 
step, we follow Wing (2008) approach to disaggregate the electricity activity into types of 
generation technologies, transmission, and distribution. Nevertheless, the electricity 
commodity remains as a single account. Finally, we adopt method by Choumert et al. (2006) 
to aggregate all refinery activities but keeping the disaggregated accounts of refinery 
commodities. That way, for petroleum products, we permit a single-to-multiple relationship 
between its activity output and the relevant commodity supply.  
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5.4.1. The First Step: Disaggregating the Energy Types  
This section discusses the first step of constructing the Energy-SAM by which we disaggregate 
the activity (and commodity) of energy types following the traditional one-to-one relationship 
between activity output (price) and commodity supply (price). In the compiled data, the total 
expenditure of mining commodity (intermediate input) used in its corresponding differs from 
the existing SAM. Table 5.4 presents an example of statistic discrepancies between existing 
SAM and compiled data for intermediate input cost of COMOIL_C (and its subsets) to each 
mining sector. 
 
Table 5.4: Statistic Discrepancies of Intermediate Input Cost of Mining Sector  
between Existing SAM and Compiled Data (Billion Rupiah) 
 Expenditure 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
Mining 
Commodity 
Mining 
Activity  
in the 
Existing SAM 
Mining Activity in the Compiled Data 
Metal Seeds 
Mining 
Coal 
Mining 
Oil Mining 
Natural 
Gas 
Mining 
Geothermal 
Mining 
Metal Seeds 
Mining 
 
21,007.03 - - - - 
Coal Mining 391.57 8,217.35 0.46 0.38 0.01 
Oil Mining - - 21,404.18 10,414.45 316.01 
Natural Gas 
Mining 
- - 161.62 2,161.72 30.40 
Geothermal 
Mining 
- - - - - 
Total 83,490.17 
21,398.60 8,217.35 21,566.26 12,576.55 346.42 
64,105.18 
 
The total intermediate input cost of the Coal, Metal Seeds, and Oil Mining account 
(COMOIL_C) for its corresponding activity (COMOIL_A) in the existing SAM is 83,490.17 
billion Rp. However, the sum of this cost in the compiled data gives a value 64,105.18 billion 
Rp. This difference might arise from (1) the weighting process of the compiled data used to 
obtain a balance system; and (2) the absence of import tariff in each production sector. Thus, 
by directly using the values of 64,105.18 billion Rp. into the existing SAM will disrupt the 
balance system. Taking this issue into consideration, we use a weighting approach to update 
the existing SAM in order to balance the total expenditure and its corresponding receipt.  
The method works as follows. First calculate the share of input cost for each subset of 
the energy sector account in the compiled data. Then multiply this share to the corresponding 
set in the existing SAM to obtain the new value for each subset in the existing SAM. For 
example, as presented in Table 5.4, the compiled data records the intermediate input cost of 
COMOIL_C to each mining activity are: Rp. 21,398.60 billion; Rp. 8,217.35 billion; Rp. 
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21,566.26 billion; Rp. 12,576.55 billion; and Rp. 346.42 billion, respectively. We then 
calculate their share by using the shares approach as follows: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑂𝐼𝐿_𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑖
∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖
⁄    
Where: 𝐶𝑖 is the COMOIL_C cost to the i-th mining sector. 
Thus, the shares of COMOIL_C cost in each mining activity are: 0.33, 0.13, 0.34, 0.20, and 
0.01, respectively. Finally, use these shares to calculate the COMOIL_C cost for each mining 
activity account in the existing SAM by multiplying each of them to the cell of SAM 
(“COMOIL_C”, “COMOIL_A”) which is Rp. 83,490.17 billion. As a result, the intermediate 
cost of COMOIL_C input to each type of mining activity is: Rp. 27,869.40 billion; Rp. 
10,702.22 billion; Rp. 28,087.76 billion; Rp. 16,379.62 billion; and Rp. 451.17 billion, 
respectively. The COMOIL_A in the existing SAM has now been disaggregated into the 
subsets of mining sector namely: (1) metal seeds, (2) coal, (3) oil, (4) natural gas, and (4) 
geothermal. These approaches are also implemented to disaggregate the other energy sectors 
in the existing SAM for both the row and the column side.  
 
5.4.2. Second Step: Balancing the Traditional Energy-SAM  
This section discusses the second step of constructing the Energy-SAM by which we eliminate 
the discrepancies of the values of import demand and import tariff for energy sector account 
such that the energy-SAM balance is obtainable.  
As previously mentioned, the compiled data does not record the import tariff account of 
each energy type. To balance the energy-SAM, we use the information of energy import given 
in the compiled data and roughly approximate the import tariff for each mining sector in the 
existing SAM. This is done by calculating the share of import for each subset of COMOIL_C 
in the compiled data, and then multiplying them with the total import tariff revenue of 
COMOIL_C in the existing SAM (Rp. 561.07 billion). We adopt this approach by the 
consideration that the share of import demand for each subset of COMOIL_C reflects its share 
in import tariff revenue. These approaches are also applied to all energy types. Table 5.5 
presents the estimated imports and import tariff revenues of energy mining commodities. 
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Table 5.5: Import Values and Tariff Revenue in the Existing SAM (Billion Rp) 
 Expenditure 
R
ec
ei
p
t ROW 
COMOIL_C 
Metal Ores 
Mining 
Coal 
Mining 
Oil Mining 
Natural Gas 
Mining 
Geothermal Mining 
Import  12,998.69  12,073.66  107,976.15   773.23   584.91  
Import Tariff  54.26   50.40   450.73   3.23   2.44  
 
By employing the values of import tariff revenue provided in Table 5.5 into the Energy-SAM, 
thus, it will generate residuals between total row and its relevant total column of an energy 
account. Table 5.6 shows the example of an unbalanced total expenditure and income of 
COMOIL_C in the Energy-SAM.  
 
Table 5.6: The Values of Import and Import Tariff Revenue in the Energy-SAM 
(Billion Rp) 
 Expenditure 
R
ec
ei
p
t 
 
COMOIL_C 
Metal Ores 
Mining 
Coal Mining Oil Mining 
Natural Gas 
Mining 
Geothermal 
Mining 
Metal Seeds 
Mining Activity 161,677.16     
Coal Mining 
Activity  105,619.51    
Oil Mining   260,965.34   
Natural Gas 
Mining    85,226.96  
Geothermal 
Mining     2,636.50 
Sales tax  5,387.42   3,591.61   10,916.97   3,237.17   109.73  
Import  12,998.69  12,073.66  107,976.15   773.23   584.91  
Import Tariff  54.26   50.40   450.73   3.23   2.44  
 Total 
expenditure 
180,117.53   121,335.19   380,309.19   89,240.58   3,333.58  
 Total receipt 183,181.27   116,749.58   343,592.39   128,050.22   2,762.61  
 Residuals  -3,063.74  4,585.61   36,716.80   -38,809.64  570.96  
 
In Table 5.6, the column total (expenditure) and its corresponding row (receipt) of each mining 
commodity account is unbalanced. Thus, in order to maintain a balance system in the updated 
SAM, we eliminate these residuals by taking them directly and reallocate them to a certain cell. 
Because the compiled data has a bias information with respect to trade accounts (import, 
export, and tariff), we opt to reallocate these residuals into the import (or export) entry cell. 
The explanation of these reallocations is given as follows: 
1) In the metal ores mining commodity account, we take the residual of Rp, -3,063.74 billion 
and add it to its export cell. Hence the export of metal seeds mining commodity is reduced 
164 
 
 
 
from Rp. 42,279.90 billion to Rp. 39,216.16 billion. We choose this option so that it does 
not distract the transaction value in other accounts. 
2) In the coal mining commodity account, we take the remainder of Rp. 4,585.61 billion and 
add it to its export cell. Hence the export of coal mining commodity is increased from Rp. 
69,682.76 billion to be Rp. 74,268.37 billion.  
3) In the oil mining commodity account, we take the residual of Rp. 36,716.80 billion and add 
it to its corresponding export cell. Hence the export of oil mining commodity is increased 
from Rp. 129,142.04 billion to be Rp. 165,858.84 billion.  
4) In the natural gas mining commodity account, we reduce the intermediate input cost of 
natural gas mining commodity from Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) activity account as equal as 
the residual of Rp. 36,716.80 billion. Hence the intermediate input cost of natural gas 
mining commodity for the LNG activity declines from Rp. 94,475.58 billion to Rp. 
55,665.94. Thus, the domestic production of LNG reduces from Rp. 211,032.75 billion to 
Rp. 172,223.12.  
5) In the geothermal mining commodity account, we simply reduce imports as equal as the 
remainder. This is because according to the Indonesia energy balance 2008, the import of 
geothermal mining is zero. Thus the import cost for this mining in the updated SAM is 
lowered from Rp. 584.91 billion to be Rp. 13.95 billion. 
6) Finally, we also apply the approach of (5) to achieve balance in the commodity accounts 
comprising of (a) chemical; (b) bioethanol; (c) biodiesel; (d) other oil; (e) subsidized 
gasoline; (f) subsidized bio-gasoline; (g) kerosene; (h) subsidized diesel; (i) subsidized bio-
diesel; (j) non-subsidized gasoline; (k) subsidized LPG; (l) non-subsidized LPG; (m) LNG; 
(n) subsidized electricity; (o) non-subsidized electricity; (p) hydro power plant; (q) city gas; 
and (r) clean water. 
As results, the traditional Energy-SAM for Indonesia in year 2008 is obtained. 
 
5.4.3. Final Step: Disaggregating the Technology Details of Electricity Sector 
Within a CGE modelling framework, the electricity sector has been targeted as the sector that 
most contributed to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions (Sue Wing, 2004). By switching 
(combining) power generation technology, i.e. from conventional coal to hydro power plant, 
which is emission-free, this sector has a substantial capability to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. The CGE model designed for green electricity promotion and environmental 
analysis is therefore ought to be calibrated on a fitted SAM for Indonesia that explicitly 
provides a technology for electricity production.   
However, the official Indonesia SAM 2008 does not record these accounts in details. The 
account of the electricity sector is simply organized in terms of a one-to-one relationship 
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between the electricity industry and its homogenous commodity supply. Sue Wing (2008) 
argued that this dataset could bias the results of CGE approach due to the overly simplistic 
representation of electricity production function by which the electricity is actually generated 
from multi-types of power plant. 
In this section, we disaggregate the technology details of the electricity sector in the SAM 
by employing a number of additional engineering statistics, so that the SAM enables to 
calibrate the distinct characteristics of the power production structure in the CGE model. 
Nevertheless, this is difficult because engineering and economic datasets are rarely consistent 
to each other. Thus, the integration of these databases requires plausible judicious assumptions 
and procedures (Sue Wing, 2008).  
In order to avoid such problematic issues, we follow Sue Wing’s (2008) approach, which 
addressess the problems via a mathematical scheme that integrates the engineering databases 
with the SAM dataset. This methodology is simple, transparent, and robust (Sue Wing, 2008). 
 
5.4.3.1. The Fundamental Framework of Electricity System 
To successfully overcome the challenge of disaggregating an activity account in the SAM, it 
is necessary to fully understand how this activity supplies its output to the final consumers. In 
the case of a power market, electricity is generated by utilizing various primary energy types, 
both renewable and non-renewables. Electricity is then transmitted to consumers through a 
high-voltage wire or grid network and distributed through a low-voltage grid to final 
consumers. The mechanism of this integrated industry is often called a generation-
transmission-distribution system, which is shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Electricity System Network 
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In contrast to other commodities, electricity cannot be stored effectively. Thus, the 
supply and demand for electricity must be kept in balance dynamically (Hu and Hu, 2013). An 
excess of demand (or shortage of a supply) will distort national economic development. 
Because of these characteristics, the supply and demand of electricity is known as one of the 
most complicated systems in world (Hu and Hu, 2013).   
In the existing SAM for Indonesia, however, the transaction behaviour of electricity 
market is treated identically to other activities’ accounts – i.e. agricultural, manufacture, 
mining, and so on, where commodity is only produced from the corresponding activity. The 
transaction flows of electricity activity-commodity given in the existing SAM for Indonesia 
are not in accordance to the framework illustrated in Figure 5.1. In other words, the activities 
of power generation, transmission, and distribution are aggregated into a single account. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the economy flow of electricity market in the existing SAM for Indonesia. 
 
Figure 5.2: Economy Flow of Electricity Market in SAM 
 
 
  In this section, we attempt to first reconciling the power system framework shown in 
Figure 5.1 with the SAM framework. To do so, we slightly modify Figure 5.1, in which each 
activity is an element of the electricity set: {Generation, Transmission, Distribution} ∊
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦; and each activity is assumed to produce electricity proportionally (Wing, 2008). 
This is because in the SAM framework, all activity accounts usually allocate their gross output 
production to the relevant commodity cell account. To our findings, there is no literature that 
employs the transaction flows of output production from activity-to-activity, although this 
framework is possible in the SAM.  
For the sake of simplification, since the activities of both transmission and distribution 
are responsible to dispatch the electricity output to consumers, we thus aggregate them into a 
single account namely: TD Activity. In a next step, we disaggregate the generation activity 
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into a number of discrete technologies: (i) conventional power plant which is the aggregated 
generation of coal-fired, coal-steam, oil-fired, and gas-fired power plants; (ii) hydro plant; and 
(iii) geothermal plant. Figure 5.3 illustrates the modified power system framework that will be 
employed in the SAM.  
 
Figure 5.3: The Structure of Power System in SAM 
 
 
Based on Figure 5.3, we further disaggregate the electricity activity account as discussed step-
by-step in the following section.  
 
5.4.3.2. Disaggregating the Electricity Activity Account 
It is helpful to first introduce the double-entry principle of the electricity account in Indonesia’s 
official SAM, in which the corresponding row (electricity demand or receipt) and column 
(electricity supply or expenditure) sums must balance. This principle can be written 
mathematically as follows: 
𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿 =∑𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐸𝐿
𝑓∈𝐹
+∑𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐿
𝑖∈𝐶
,              𝐸𝐿 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                            (1) 
𝑄𝐸𝐿 = 𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿 ,                      𝐸𝐿 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                                      (2) 
Where 𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿 denotes total electricity output; 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐸𝐿 is the 𝑓-th factors used in the electricity 
sector; and 𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐿 is the 𝑖-th intermediate input used in the electricity sector. Eq (2) represents a 
one-to-one relationship between electricity activity output (𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿) and its domestic commodity 
supply (𝑄𝐸𝐿) (single activity to produce a single type of commodity). 
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To distinguish the GEN (electricity generation) and TD (transmission and distribution) 
accounts from the electricity activity account, the above principles are extended such that 𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿 
is the sum of electricity produced from its component activities (𝐴𝐶𝑇 = {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷}) which 
can be rewritten as follows: 
𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿 = 𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 + 𝑄𝐴𝑇𝐷 =∑𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑇
𝐴𝐶𝑇
                                                                  (3) 
Following the zero profit condition, the production of each constituent output (𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑇) 
is equal to the sum of its inputs (factors production (𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐴𝐶𝑇) and intermediate goods (𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇)):   
𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑇 =∑𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐴𝐶𝑇
𝑓∈𝐹
+∑𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇,
𝑖∈𝐶
               𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                 (4) 
To maintain the SAM balance, two conditions must be satisfied: 
i) The sum of the factor inputs used in each constituent activity (𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐴𝐶𝑇) is equal to the 𝑓-th 
factor used in electricity sector in the official SAM: 
𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐸𝐿 = ∑ 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐴𝐶𝑇 ,
𝐴𝐶𝑇⊂𝑗∈𝐴
            𝑓 ∈ 𝐹,     𝐸𝐿 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                     (5) 
ii) The sum of the 𝑖-th type of intermediate used in each constituent activity (𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇) is equal 
to the 𝑖-th intermediate input used in the electricity sector:  
𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐿 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇 ,
𝐴𝐶𝑇⊂𝑗∈𝐴
                    𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,     𝐸𝐿 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                     (6) 
In addition, since TD activity functions only as a network connection to dispatch the 
electricity generated from GEN activity, we do not separate (𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇) into energy and non-
energy goods. In other words, we assume that the activity of TD does not require any specific 
quantity of each type of energy inputs.   
 
5.4.3.3. Disaggregating The Activity of Electricity Generation (GEN) Account  
In this section, we discuss the process of how to distinguish GEN activity into several power 
plant activities so that the SAM can actually characterize those electricity goods generated 
from multi-types power plant. Figure 5.4 presents the production structure of the electricity 
sector based on engineering (bottom-up) perspective. It shows that each type of generation 
plant utilizes the inputs of factors production (capital and labour) and intermediate 
commodities (energy and non-energy), to produce a homogenous electricity commodity. 
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Figure 5.4: Electricity Production Structure in Bottom-Up Perspective 
 
 
 
 
Note: Capital (K), Labour (L), Energy (E), Other inputs (M) 
Source: Sue Wing (2008): Author’s modification 
Based on Figure 5.4, we disaggregate the GEN activity account into a number of power 
plant types. Thus, 𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 is obtained from the sum of each generation technologies output 
(𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ) as follows: 
𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 = ∑ 𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
                                                                                        (7) 
Where 𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 is obtained from the shares of 𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿: 
𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 𝐺𝐸𝑁_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑄𝐴𝐸𝐿                                                                                      (8) 
Following the zero profit condition, the output produced from each 𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ is equal to 
the sum of its inputs requirement (factors production (𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ) and intermediate goods 
(𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ)):   
𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ =∑𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑓∈𝐹
+∑𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
,       𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                       (9) 
𝑄𝐸𝐿𝐶 = ∑ 𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝐸𝐿𝐶,
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
                𝐸𝐿𝐶 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                           (10) 
Where 𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ is the electricity production from 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th type of power plant; 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ and 𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐿 
are the respective 𝑓-th factors and 𝑖-th type of intermediate inputs used in the 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th type of 
power plant. Equation (10) represents a multi-to-one relationship between 𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ and its 
domestically commodity supply (𝑄𝐸𝐿) (multi-activities but produce a single type of 
commodity).   
𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ, 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ are obtained from the respective shares of 𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐺𝐸𝑁, and 
𝑋𝑖,𝐺𝐸𝑁 as follows: 
Total 
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𝑄𝐴𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝑄𝐴_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 ,       𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                                            (11) 
𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝐹𝐴_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐺𝐸𝑁 ,    𝑓 ∈ 𝐹,      𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ&𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴          (12) 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ = 𝑋_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑋𝑖,𝐺𝐸𝑁    ,    𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,      𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ&𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                  (13) 
Where 𝑄𝐴_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ is the share of output generated from each 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th type of power plant; 
𝐹𝐴_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ is the share of production factors used in each 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th type of power plant; 
and 𝑋_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ is the shares of intermediate goods used in each 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th type of power plant.    
To maintain the SAM balance, two conditions must be satisfied: 
i) The sum of 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ must be equal to 𝑓-th factors used in GEN activity (𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐺𝐸𝑁): 
𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = ∑ 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
            𝑓 ∈ 𝐹,      𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                          (14) 
ii) The sum of 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ must be equal to the 𝑖-th intermediate inputs used in the electricity sector 
(𝑋𝑖,𝐺𝐸𝑁):  
𝑋𝑖,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
                    , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,        𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴                       (15) 
Furthermore, the activity of each power plant is characterized distinctly based on its 
primary energy input (fossil fuels), i.e. a coal-fired power plant requires greater quantities of 
coal material input compared to a hydro power plant. Thus, we categorize 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ into two 
classifications: primary energy (𝑒) and non-primary energy (𝑛𝑒) material inputs. 
Eq. 15 can then be extended as follows:  
𝑋𝑒,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = ∑ 𝑋𝑒,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
,                    𝑒 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,        𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴            (16𝑎) 
𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = ∑ 𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑗∈𝐴
,               𝑛𝑒 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,        𝐺𝐸𝑁 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴          (16𝑏) 
 
5.4.3.4. Specifying The Natural Resources Input of Renewable Technologies 
The conversion of primary energy inputs to generate electricity is restricted to conventional 
generating technologies, i.e. coal-fired power plant, gas-fired power plant, and diesel-fired 
power plant. Renewable types of power plants such as hydro, wind, and solar power plant do 
not utilize fossil inputs, but convert the inputs of so-called “fixed-factor” natural resources 
(such as water debits, wind speed, the intensities of photovoltaic cells, and so on) to electricity.  
Although there is no reliable information to value these factors, their values should 
somehow be identified in the SAM. According to Wing (2008), these resources are defined as:  
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“Land area with incident insolation or atmospheric boundary-layer flow in the cases of solar 
and wind, topographically-determined hydrostatic potential in the case of hydroelectricity, or 
geologically-determined hot dry rock in the case of geothermal energy” (p. 563).  
Wing (2008) suggests that the value of natural resources inputs should be estimated as a 
share of capital input. This is because the aggregated capital account in the SAM represents 
the non-labour or assets categories, i.e. land, machineries, and other equipment. We adopt this 
suggestion by assuming resources input shares of 5% of total capital costs among all fossil 
fuels as well as renewable technologies. Based on this assumption, the production factors in 
SAM are classified into three broad types: capital, labour, and natural resources.    
    
5.4.3.5. The Availability and Limitations of Additional Databases 
A number of statistical databases are needed to identify the above equations (eq. 1 – 16), i.e. 
the statistics of electricity input-output – including electricity production from each generation 
technology, that must be accurately matched to transaction flows given in SAM dataset. 
Unfortunately, no such information is available for specific factors and intermediate inputs 
expenditures to separate TD and GEN activities. Baughman and Bottaro (1976) stated that 
assessing the costs in TD activities is complex because they are related to numerous 
components such as constructions, mounting, voltage levels, geographic constraints, and other 
technical operations. Therefore, it is difficult to precisely determine the average costs of each 
equipment category. It indeed becomes more problematic to match this equipment to the 
relevant intermediate commodity in the SAM, i.e. the costs of electricity poles which made 
from steel and concrete should be grouped into the steel and cement raw materials accounts. 
In this section, we discuss the available databases, their limitations, and the assumptions 
to solve the lack of data. The process to disaggregate the electricity account into TD and types 
of power plant activities is illustrated in Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.5: The Processes of Disaggregating Electricity Activity in SAM 
 
 
In a preliminary process, we use the compiled data constructed by the National Energy 
Council (2011)28 to separate the electricity account (for both activity and commodity) from the 
ELEC account. In the compiled data, the electricity sector already distinguishes into three 
classifications: (1) subsidized electricity; (2) non-subsidized electricity; and (3) hydro power 
plants. To obtain a single electricity account, these classifications are simply aggregated into a 
single account. We then estimate the cost shares of each input, i.e. production factors and 
intermediate inputs. These shares are then used to modify the transaction records of electricity 
account in the energy-SAM proportionally, by multiplying each of these shares to the 
electricity account of both activity and commodity in the Energy-SAM.    
The second stage is to distinguish TD and GEN activities from electricity activity by 
following the framework given in subsection 5.4.3.2. In this treatment, we employ the available 
electricity statistics published by the state-owned power company (PLN (2009)), given in 
Table 5.7. This table presents the operational costs (in Rp. trillion) of each power plant and TD 
activity, i.e. the costs to purchase the additional power (including rent of diesel engines), fuel 
inputs, maintenance, labour wages, depreciation, and others.   
                                                          
28 This database is not public but is available on a request. 
Initial SAM, where electricity, city gas, and clean 
water are grouped together in ELEC account 
(for both activity and commodity)
Separating the electricity account from ELEC  
account (for both activity and commodity) 
Separating the TD and GEN activity from 
Electricity Account 
(Electricity commodity account is remained) 
Separating the types of power plant activities from  
GEN activity 
(Electricity commodity account is remained) 
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Table 5.7 presents two difficulties. First, the costs categories are not compatible with the 
input costs classified in SAM. To solve this problem, we map the electricity production cost 
categories given in Table 5.7 to the input categories in SAM (Table 5.8). We then assume that 
the cost shares approximation of each specification is applied equally with the relevant types 
of inputs (production factors and intermediate inputs). Although this assumption is justified 
roughly, it is necessary to permit this condition; otherwise, the equations given in previous 
section cannot be identified (Wing, 2008). As a result, we estimate the share costs in TD and 
GEN activities in year 2008 as follows: 
1. The cost shares of intermediate commodity inputs (𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ     , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴): 
 Electricity: 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0; 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑦,𝑇𝐷 = 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝐸𝐿     , 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈
𝐶; {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷} ∈ 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴  
 Types of primary energy (e): 𝑋𝑒,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0.96𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿; 𝑋𝑒,𝑇𝐷 =  0.04𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿       , 𝑒 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈
𝐶; {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷} ∈ 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴   
 Other intermediate commodities: 
𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0.73𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿;    𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝑇𝐷 =  0.27𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿   , 𝑒 ⊂ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶; {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷} ∈ 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴    
2. The cost shares of production factors (𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ    , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴): 
  Capital: 𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0.75𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿; 𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝑇𝐷 = 0.25𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿  , 𝐾 ⊂ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷} ∈
𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
 𝑜-th types of labour: 𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0.15𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿; 𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝑇𝐷 = 0.85𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿  , 𝑜 ⊂ 𝑓 ∈
𝐹, {𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷} ∈ 𝐴𝐶𝑇 ⊂ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴  
 
Table 5.7: The Operational Costs of GEN (Types of Plants) and TD Activities  
(in trillion Rp.) 
Type of 
Activity 
Additional 
Power 
Purchasing 
Fuel 
input 
Maintenance Depreciation Others Employment Total 
1. Total GEN 
costs 
                                                          
-       103.31  
         
5.57  
                        
8.55  
                 
0.50  
                        
1.29  
              
119.22  
2. Total TD 
costs 
                                                      
20.74  4.47  
             
2.05  
                        
2.82  
                 
4.24  
                        
7.06  
                 
41.38  
Total 
Electricity 
Costs 
                                                      
20.74  107.78  
             
7.62  
                      
11.37  
                   
4.74  
                        
8.34  
              
160.60  
Shares of 
GEN costs 
 
0 
                      
0.96  
                        
0.73  
                        
0.75  
                 
0.10  
                        
0.15  
                   
0.74  
Shares of 
TD costs 
 
1 
                        
0.04  
                        
0.27  
                        
0.25  
                 
0.90  
                        
0.85  
                   
0.26  
Source: PLN Statistics, 2009; author modifications 
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Table 5.8: The Costs Specification Mapping 
No. 
Costs Specification of GEN and TD Activity 
Based on PLN Statistics (2009) 
Costs Specification of GEN and TD 
Activity in SAM 
1.  Additional electricity  Intermediate input: electricity  
2.  Fuels 
Intermediate input: types of primary 
energy  
3.  Maintenance Other intermediate inputs 
4.  Depreciation Production Factor: capital 
5.  Employment Production Factors: all types of labour 
 
The second problem, as shown in Table 5.9, arises because the electricity statistics record 
a surplus between electricity receipt and its expenditure in year of 2008 by about Rp. 3.61 
trillion. This deviation is obviously unmatched to the principal of SAM dataset where the total 
receipts should equal its corresponding expenditure. Table 5.10 illustrates the framework of 
separating GEN and TD activity accounts. It shows that there are discrepancies between total 
receiptd and expenditured in these activities (𝑄𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑇 ≠ ∑ 𝐹𝐴𝑓,𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑓∈𝐹 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖∈𝐶  , 𝐴𝐶𝑇 =
{𝐺𝐸𝑁, 𝑇𝐷}), which are expressed as follows:  
i) 𝑄𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁 = 0.96𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿 + 0.73𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿 + 0.75𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿 + 0.15𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿 = 𝑋𝑋 ≠ 𝑋𝑋′ 
ii) 𝑄𝐴𝑇𝐷  = 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,,𝐸𝐿 + 0.04𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿 + 0.27𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿 + 0.25𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿 + 0.85𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿 
= 𝑋𝑌 ≠ 𝑋𝑌′ 
Where: 𝑖 = {𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑒, 𝑛𝑒} ∈ 𝐶, and 𝑓 = {𝐾, 𝑜} ∈ 𝐹   
Some modellers have proposed the SAM balancing method to achieve the square matrix 
account of the SAM, i.e. Wing (2008) and Hosoe et al. (2010) suggested the approach of 
minimizing the deviations of an adjusted cell value from the original one. However, this 
method can lead to changes in values among other cells in SAM and the results may be dubious 
since the original SAM has already been constructed by the help of matrix balancing method 
(Hosoe et al., 2010). Therefore, we choose to maintain all other cell values original and assume 
that 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋′ + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 and 𝑋𝑌 = 𝑋𝑌′. In other words, the total input costs of GEN (or TD) 
activity equals the total receipts of domestically GEN (or TD) supply.   
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Table 5.9: The Value Discrepancies of Electricity Receipt and Expenditure 
Description Trillion Rp. 
Electricity Receipt 
Electricity Sales 84.25 
Connecting Cost 0.59 
Subsidy 78.58 
Others 0.79 
Total Receipt 164.21 
Electricity Expenditure 
Additional Power Purchasing 20.74 
Fuels 107.78 
Maintenance 7.62 
Employment 8.34 
Depreciation 11.37 
Others 4.74 
Total Expenditure 160.60 
Net Surplus 3.61 
Source: PLN Statistics, 2009 
 
Table 5.10: The Scheme Framework of Separating TD and GEN Activity 
 
Electricity Activity 
Other 
Activities 
Electricity 
Commodities 
Other 
Commodities 
Factors 
Other 
Accounts 
Total GEN 
Activity 
TD 
Activity 
GEN 
Activity 
- - - 𝑋𝑋′ - - (subsidy) 
𝑋𝑋′
+ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 
TD 
Activity 
- - - 𝑋𝑌′ - - - 𝑋𝑌′ 
Other 
Activities 
- - - - Not change - - 
Not 
change 
Electricity 
Commodities 
- 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,,𝐸𝐿 
Not 
change 
- - - 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Primary 
Energy 
commodities 
0.96𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿 0.04𝑋𝑒,𝐸𝐿 
Not 
change 
- - - 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Other 
Commodities 
0.73𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿 0.27𝑋𝑛𝑒,𝐸𝐿 
Not 
change 
- - - 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Capital 
Factors 
0.75𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿 0.25𝐹𝐴𝐾,𝐸𝐿 
Not 
change 
- - - 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Types of 
Labour 
Factors 
0.15𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿 0.85𝐹𝐴𝑜,𝐸𝐿   
Not 
change 
- - - 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Other 
Accounts 
- - - Not change Not change 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
Total 𝑋𝑋 𝑋𝑌 
Not 
change 
Not change Not change 
Not 
change 
Not 
change 
 
 Source: Own calculation 
Finally, we disaggregate the types of power generation from GEN activity by 
operationalizing the methodology proposed in subsection 1.3. We use the statistics of power 
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plants’ operational costs published by the state-owned power company (PLN) (2009) presented 
in Table 5.11.  
 
Table 5.11: Operational Costs of Power Plants (Trillion Rp) 
Power Plants   Maintenance  Depreciation   Others  Employment   Total  
Hydro Plant  
                               
0.23  
                  
0.83  
                 
0.05  
                 
 0.18  
                 
1.41  
Coal-fired Plant  
                                         
1.07  
                 
 2.73  
                 
0.12  
                
  0.28  
               
31.27  
Diesel-fired Plant  
                                         
1.65  
               
   0.66  
                 
0.09  
               
   0.48  
               
20.81  
Gas-fired Plant  
                                         
1.41  
              
    1.20  
                 
0.04  
                 
 0.11  
               
17.51  
Geothermal Plant  
                                         
0.05  
                 
 0.20  
                 
0.01  
                
  0.06  
                 
2.53  
Coal-Steam Plant  
                                         
1.16  
               
   2.93  
                 
0.19  
               
   0.18  
               
45.68  
Total Generation Costs  
                                         
5.57  
                
  8.55  
                 
0.50  
            
      1.29  
             
119.22  
Shares of Hydro Plant  
                                         
0.04  
             
     0.10  
                 
0.10  
            
      0.14  
                 
0.01  
Shares of Coal-fired Plant  
                                         
0.19  
             
     0.32  
                 
0.24  
           
       0.22  
                 
0.26  
Shares of Diesel-fired Plant  
                                     
0.30  
            
      0.08  
                 
0.17  
              
    0.37  
                 
0.17  
Shares of Gas-fired Plant  
                                         
0.25  
               
   0.14  
                 
0.08  
           
       0.09  
                 
0.15  
Shares of Geothermal Plant  
                                         
0.01  
             
     0.02  
                 
0.02  
              
    0.05  
                 
0.02  
Shares of Coal-Steam Plant  
                                         
0.21  
               
   0.34  
                 
0.38  
             
     0.14  
                 
0.38  
Total Shares  
                                         
1.00  
              
    1.00  
                 
1.00  
             
     1.00  
                 
1.00  
Source: PLN Statistics (2009); Author’s modifications 
 
The methods to disaggregate the generation technology are similar to that of the GEN 
and TD disaggregation. The types of operational costs for each generating technologies 
provided in statistics data are firstly mapped with the cost structure given in the SAM. 
However, since it is intuitively implausible to assume that the shares of fossil fuel inputs are 
equally applied to all type of generating technologies, we exclude these shares. Therefore, the 
cost shares of each input (except fossil fuel inputs) in the statistics are used to estimate the 
relevant input types used in each generation technology activity in the SAM.  
On the other hand, to obtain the shares of fossil fuel inputs for each conventional 
technology, we use the statistics of fuel consumption by type of power plant published by the 
PLN statistics (2009) presented in Table 5.12.  
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Table 5.12: Fuel Inputs by Types of Power Plant 
Fuel Input 
(unit) 
Hydro 
Plant 
Geothermal 
Plant 
Coal-fired 
Plant 
Gas-fired 
Plant 
Gas-steamed 
Plant 
Diesel-fired 
Plant 
Total 
Oil (kilolitres) 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                        
2.83  
                   
1.71  
                             
4.27  
                       
2.51  
                    
11.32  
Coal (tons) 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                     
21.00  
                             
-  
                             
-  
                      
-  
                    
21.00  
Natural Gas 
(mmscf) 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                        
0.01  
                   
0.02  
                             
0.15  
                             
-  
                      
0.18  
Oil Shares 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                        
0.25  
                   
0.15  
                             
0.38  
                       
0.22  
                      
1.00  
Coal Shares 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                        
1.00  
                          
-  
                             
-  
                      
-  
                      
1.00  
Natural Gas 
Shares 
                      
-  
                               
-  
                        
0.05  
                   
0.11  
                             
0.84  
                             
-  
                      
1.00  
Natural 
Resources 
Shares* 
               
0.20  
                             
0.20  
                              
-  
                       
-  
                             
-  
                      
-  
  
Source: PLN Statistics, 2009; Author Modifications 
*) Sue Wing (2008) justification 
 
Finally, we adopt Wing’s (2008) assumption that the share of natural resources input for each 
renewable technology is 5% of the capital cost.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we constructed a hypothetical energy-SAM for the year 2008 which will be 
used to initialize the hybrid-CGE model for specific energy policies that is explained in detail 
in Chapter 6. This construction is done by disaggregating the types of energy sectors and factor 
of natural resources given in the existing Indonesian SAM in year 2008. To do so, we employ 
compiled data developed by the National Energy Council. However, since there are statistic 
discrepancies between the compiled data and the existing SAM, we opt to roughly approximate 
a number of values of energy accounts such that the energy-SAM is balanced. As a consistency 
check, we compare these results to the statistics of Indonesia’s energy balance in the year 2008. 
In the energy-SAM for Indonesia in year 2008, we also introduce a bottom-up framework 
for the electricity sector by explicitly incorporating the generation technology such that the 
energy-SAM can characterize the electricity production from multi-types of power plant (fossil 
fuels based generation, hydro generation, and geothermal generation). However, due to the 
limited information, we employ the cost shares approach to estimate each input cost needed to 
produce an electricity output from each of generation technology. The information of these 
cost shares is obtained from Indonesia’s Electricity Statistics published by PLN (2009). 
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Chapter 6 
The Extended CGE Model for Specific Energy Analysis 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The promotion of clean energy production is currently recognized as one of the top economic 
priorities of Indonesia’s government to combat climate change. Under the Copenhagen Accord 
(2009), the government has reiterated its commitments to reduce Indonesia’s greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by 26% by 2020 and to boost the utilization of renewable energy by 25% of 
total energy production by 2025 (Ardiansyah et al., 2012). Generally, the expansion of clean 
energy production can be achieved based on two key strategies (or reforms). First, all types of 
renewable energy output – i.e. biofuel products and the electricity output produced from 
renewable power plants – are subsidised so that their production cost declines. And second, 
carbon taxes are levied on fossil fuels – i.e. gasoline, coal, gas, and electricity produced from 
conventional power plants – which contain pollutant emitter. These policy actions would, in 
turn, affect the economy’s equilibrium, thereby leading to supply and demand adjustments 
across commodities (Allan et al., 2008).  
It is widely acknowledged that to investigate these impacts CGE models are more 
appropriate than partial equilibrium models (Allan et al., 2008; Orlov, 2012). Indeed, CGE 
models have become the best-known approach for economy-wide analysis of energy and 
climate issues at national or regional levels (Devarajan and Robinson, 2002; Allan et al., 2008; 
Beausejour et al., 1995; Bergman, 1990; Bohringer and Loschel, 2006; Conrad and Schroder, 
1991; Goulder and Pizer, 2006; Lee and Roland-Holst, 1997; Conrad, 1999). CGE models have 
an advantage to investigate in detail the changes of representatives’ incomes and expenditure 
that result from the adjustments of various options such as carbon tax and energy pricing 
policies to reduce the level of carbon emissions in a particular region (Sue Wing, 2009). The 
can simultaneously characterize the equilibrium shifts of a particular economy in which market 
demand equals supply across all sectors. For example, by employing a CGE framework, the 
economy’s path of adjustment of increasing the level of renewable generations can be easily 
assessed (Allan et al., 2008). Therefore, we choose to employ a CGE framework to analyse the 
impacts of reducing CO2 emissions in Indonesia under two different schemes: (i) increasing 
the clean energy production by introducing a feed-in tariff (subsidy); and (ii) introducing a 
carbon tax in order to reduce the production of fossil energy which strongly emits pollutants.    
In this chapter, we discuss the construction of CGE model for specific energy analysis 
with emphasis on contracting the ‘dirty’ fuels and promoting zero-emission energy production. 
We specifically develop a hybrid CGE model that incorporates energy technologies – 
particularly power plants. This will enable us to identify the magnitude of the impact of 
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different level of carbon taxes on fossil fuel (or subsidy on renewable energy) on Indonesia’s 
economy. The hybrid CGE model is an extended version of the standard CGE model given in 
chapter 3. The modifications are briefly explained as follows: 
(i) We distinguish the nested structure between energy and non-energy producing sectors by 
which we allow substitution between energy and production factors as well as substitution 
among energy types. These modifications are justified according to Hudson and Jorgenson 
(1974), Berndt and Wood (1975), and Griffin and Gregory (1976) studies who 
econometrically estimated that energy is substitutable with labour and capital. 
Furthermore, we classify the relationship between activity output (and price) and 
commodity supply (and price) for each set of industry. For example, in the fossil energy 
and non-energy producing industries we only permit a one-to-one relationship between 
activity and its relevant commodity. However, for the refinery industry, we allow the 
activity to produce multiple commodities (a single-to-multiple relationship). Finally, for 
the electricity generation industry, we allow a multi-to-single relationship where any 
power technology activity will produce a single type of commodity (electricity).  
(ii) We incorporate carbon emission unit and its taxation features into the standard CGE model 
in order to assess the effects of carbon emission taxes on fossil fuel utilization by industries 
and representative agents29. However, following Deravajan et al. (2011), the terms of 
‘carbon emission’ only refer to emissions of fossil fuels and its refined fuels; we exclude 
the emissions generated from other activities, i.e. land use in agriculture and deforestation. 
Furthermore, the carbon emission is generated from consumption on final energy goods 
such as household types and government as well as industries (used as the intermediate 
inputs or factor inputs).   
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 6.2 presents in detail the extended 
CGE model for energy analysis including the closure choices. The standard structure of output 
production given in Chapter 3 is modified by incorporating substitution possibilities between 
energy and production factors and also among energy types. We also feature the expressions 
of carbon emission and its taxation into the model. Nevertheless, the expressions of other 
representative agents’ behaviours as well as trade aggregations and closures remain identical 
to the benchmark specifications. Finally, Section 6.3 presents the conclusions. 
 
                                                          
29 These approaches have been applied by numerous recent studies within the context of CGE modelling analysis 
for climate and energy policies. For instances, the Indonesia-E3 (Economy-Equity-Environment) model (Yusuf 
and Resosudarmo, 2007; Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008 and Yusuf and Ramayandi, 2008); GLOBE_EN (Energy) 
model (Mcdonald and Thierfeld, 2008); the modified STAGE model (Orlov et al., 2013) and a modified CGE 
model developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI, (Devarajan et al., 2009 and 
Deravajan et al., 2011).  
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6.2. The Hybrid CGE Model  
This section introduces the hybrid CGE model for specific energy analysis. It incorporates the 
specific energy flows across industries as well as carbon emissions and its taxation. This model 
is a modified version of the benchmark CGE model presented in Chapter 3; it is calibrated to 
the energy-SAM for 2008 given in Chapter 5. The economy’s flow in the energy-CGE 
framework is identical to the benchmark model since it covers the system equations of 
representative behaviour; transfers among institutions; output production and linkages inter-
industries; saving-investment balance; and treatments of traded goods and services. 
 
6.2.1. Production of Gross Domestic Output 
We employ nested functions to capture the structural characteristics of a specific industry to 
produce its output. According to Orlov et al. (2013), Paltsev et al. (2005), Burniaux et al. 
(1992), and Burniaux and Truong (2002), ‘top-down’ nested structures distinguish between 
energy (excluding electricity generation) and non-energy producing sectors. The differences 
are explained as follows.  
For non-energy sectors, we allow two possibilities of energy substitution: inter-fuel 
substitution and fuel-factor substitution (between the energy composite and production 
factors). However, for the energy producing sectors – such as fossil fuels and refineries – we 
follow Burniaux and Truong (2002), in which a complementary function (Leontief) is assumed 
to reflect the relationship of inter-fuel and fuel-factor30. The nesting choice between capital 
and energy composite is arguably preferable than between labour and energy composite 
(Schoutheete, 2012). This is because the aggregation of energy and capital can indicate the 
new technologies embodied in capital goods to affect the trends of energy substitution and 
energy saving. Hence, it is assumed that firms choose to optimize the energy-capital bundle.  
Furthermore, in the electricity sector, we apply a hybrid nested structure – combining the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives – following Wing’s (2006) approach where 
electricity activity is represented by an array of generation technologies (power plants). A 
hybrid model is aimed to take into account the aspects of technology substitution. Wing (2006) 
stated that incorporating the hybrid model into the CGE framework facilitates an accurate 
accounting for electricity production from conventional (fossil fuels) and renewables (hydro 
and geothermal) at the sub-sector level. The input requirements and output productions in each 
type of power technology can be separately identified (Wing, 2006).  
                                                          
30 The issue of energy-capital complementarity and substitutability has been a major controversy in some 
economic literatures of energy modelling (Allan et al., 2008; Vinals, 1984; Burniaux et al., 1992). However, we 
justify the non-substitution possibilities (complementarity) between inter-fuel and fuel-factor in non-energy 
producing sectors based on Burniaux and Truong (2002) and Orlov et al (2013) models. 
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The detailed modifications of nested structure for each set of producing sector are further 
explained below. 
 
6.2.1.1. Non-Energy Producing Structure 
The classifications of non-energy producing sectors are based on the Indonesia’s energy-SAM 
in year 2008. These sectors are: Agriculture Food Crops; Agriculture for Other Crops; Cattle 
and the Outcomes; Forestry and Hunting; Fishery; Other Mining and Excavations; Food, 
Drink, and Tobacco; Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries; Wood and Goods 
from Wood; Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Metal Products; Construction; Trade; 
Air, Sea, and Communication Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse; Bank 
and Assurance; Real Estate, and Private Services; Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social Services; Individual Services, Households, and Other Services; 
and electricity transmission (and distribution). We include the activity of electricity 
transmission (and distribution) as non-energy producing sector because this activity is only 
related to non-energy service (administration) management. 
We modify Orlov et al. (2013) and Paltsev et al. (2005) to determine the nested structure 
of these sectors31. Figure 6.1 presents the nested structure of the non-energy producing sector. 
Generally, each non-energy producing industry generates its output by using intermediate 
inputs and production factors. We assume that producers will minimize these costs subject to 
the constraints imposed by production technology in a perfectly competitive market (marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost). The production technologies are specified using a CES 
function. The degree of input combinations depends on the elasticities that reflect the trade-
offs between these inputs. Since this study does not econometrically estimate elasticities, we 
obtain them from the literature.  
The nested structure for non-energy producing sectors is similar to that implemented in 
the standard model. The only difference is that we allow substitution for inter-fuel and energy 
aggregate-capital. Let the set of non-energy producing sectors is denoted by indices 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂
𝐴,    𝑁𝐸 ∩ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = ∅. 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Orlov et al. (2013) assumes the substitution possibilities between intermediate inputs and value added-energy 
composite. However, based on our justification, we presume that raw material inputs are not substitutable with 
the aggregate factors; it is more plausible to assume a complementarity relationship between these types of 
inputs. According to Allan et al. (2008), the judgment of choosing the combination of the nested production 
structure is considerably acceptable since none of these models have been actually tested for the chosen 
assumptions. 
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Figure 6.1: The Nested Structure for Non-Energy Producing Sectors (𝒋 ∈ 𝑵𝑬 ⊂ 𝑨) 
 
At the top level, 𝑗-th non-energy domestic output is produced by a fixed coefficient (Leontief) 
function between intermediate commodities and the aggregate of value added-energy 
composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗). Because the Energy-SAM data set records subsidies given to the 𝑗-th 
industry, we add the level of subsidy rate 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑗  to the price of gross domestic output.  
Let 𝑄𝐴𝑗 be the gross domestic output of 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝑖 denotes the element 
of intermediate commodities, excluding energy inputs (𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝐶 ∩ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = ∅), 
used in 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 denotes the intermediate input of the 𝑖-th non-energy 
commodity used by the 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum 
requirements of the 𝑖-th non-energy intermediate input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 
denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 
𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price of 𝑖-th final (composite) non-
energy goods. We assume that the 𝑗-th industry produces 𝑄𝐴𝑗 by minimizing the cost inputs 
of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 following a Leontief production function: 
 
Top stage: 
min
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗,𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝐶𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍   𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                      (1′) 
Subject to: 
Gross Domestic Output 
(QAj)
Value 
Added 
(VAENj)
Composite 
Labour 
(Labj)
Labour 
type-1
Labour 
type-2
... Labour 
type-o
Energy Composite-Capital 
(KENj)
Capital (Kj)
Energy 
Composite 
(ENCOMi)
Energy
type-1
Energy
type-2
...
Energy
type-n
Intermediate 
Input type-1 
(X1,j)
Intermediate 
Input type 
type-2 (X2,j)
...
Intermediate 
Input type
type-i (Xi,j)
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𝑄𝐴𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
,
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗
) , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                     (2′) 
Equation (2’) implies that 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗; and 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗. We rearrange equation 
(1’) as follows: 
 𝐶𝑗 = (𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
)𝑄𝐴𝑗 ,     𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
The subsidy rate on 𝑗-th production (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗) is added to the price index 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 such that 
𝐶𝑗 = (1 + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗. Hence, the relationships are given as follows: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                           (1) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                          (2) 
(1 + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                     (3′) 
Furthermore, we redefine the variable of 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 into the average subsidy across 
activities (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) and the specific subsidy rate of activity (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗), which are 
obtained from the relationships below: 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
1
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝐴)
∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑏_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑁𝐸⊂𝐴
      
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 = 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗), 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Thus, eq. (3’) is rewritten as follows: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                                                       (3) 
Equation (3) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th non-energy industry to produce an output (𝑄𝐴𝑗) 
which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of value added-energy composite and 
intermediate commodities.   
We define the relationship between the activity output (and price) and its relevant 
commodity supply (and price) as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑁𝐸⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶                                                              (4) 
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𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,        𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                               (5) 
Where:  
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 =
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝐴𝑗
, is the Input-Output coefficients; and  
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖: Output of the 𝑗-th non-energy activity for the 𝑖-th non-energy commodity. 
Identically to the nesting structure in the standard model, for non-energy industries we allow a 
one-to-one relationship in which each activity produces a single type of commodity, thus 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑗,𝑖 = 1.  
At the second stage, the 𝑗-th non-energy industry minimizes the input cost combination 
of capital-energy composite and composite labour within a Cobb-Douglas function to produce 
the aggregate value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗). Let 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 be the respective 
price of composite labour and capital-energy composite of 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 be the number of composite labour and capital-energy input of 𝑗-th non-energy industry 
respectively; 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 be the share parameter of labour composite by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 ≤
1); 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 be the share parameter of capital-energy composite by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ≤
1); 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1; and 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗 be the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁.  
The 𝑗-th non-energy industry problem to minimize cost of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 is therefore defined as 
follows: 
 
Second stage: 
min
𝐿𝑎𝑏,𝐾𝐸𝑁
(𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴  
 
Subject to: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ,    𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1,     𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                      (6) 
The solution of the above problem yields the 𝑗-th industry demand for capital-energy 
composite and composite labour:  
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                       (7) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                        (8′) 
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The price index of value added 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 is the unit cost of VAEN production and is obtained 
from a weighted sum of the price of composite labour and composite capital-energy:  
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                             (9′) 
Next, we introduce the price adjustment terms of composite labour to enable its price 
variation across industries32. Thus, the price of composite labour across activities is defined as 
follows: 
 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the adjustment factor for price of labour composite, and 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the 
aggregate price of labour composite, which together determine the activity level price of labour 
composite, 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵. We assume 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 = 1.  
Based on the above definitions, equations (8’ – 9’) are rewritten as follows: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                        (8) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                           (9) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in 
(n-1) markets. Due to Walras’ Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 9 in order to maintain 
balance between total equations and endogenous variables. Hence, the income-expenditure 
accounting identity in the supply-demand equilibrium system can be obtained.  
At the third stage, we specify two kinds of aggregation. The labour composite is 
determined by a CES function over types of labour within a cost minimization problem. Let 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 be the 𝑜-th type of labour used in 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 be the wage of 𝑜-th labour; 
𝛾𝑜,𝑗 be the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑗 be the 
efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th industry; and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution 
parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞,   𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 We do not introduce the price adjustment of the capital-energy composite because the eenergy composite is 
classified as goods inputs that are combined together with capital factor. 
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Third stage (Left Side): 
min
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                  
 
subject to: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                  (10′) 
By solving the above minimization problem, the labour demand solution for 𝑁𝐸-th industry is 
given as follows: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                             (11′) 
The price index of industry’s composite labour (𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵) is obtained from the weighted sum of 
different types of 𝑜-th type of labour wage rates (𝑃𝑜
𝐿): 
𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 =
∑ 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                            (12′) 
Denoting the elasticity of substitution by 𝜎𝑗
𝐿 we have: 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1. The parameter value of 𝛽𝑗 
is obtained from Decaluwé et al (2012) since in this research we do not econometrically 
estimate this value. Tthe robustness of the results generated from using these values will be 
tested through a sensitivity analysis. 
Here, we introduce the terms of labour wage adjustment to enable the variation of wages 
across activities. Thus, we need to define the additional variables, 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 , such that: 
𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  is the adjustment factor for the wage of labour type, and 
𝑝𝑜
𝐿 is the aggregate wage of labour types which together determine the industry wage 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 .  
Based on the energy-SAM data set, total supply of labour’s type is obtained from total 
labour’s demand to activities and abroad (𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜) as follows:  
∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,    𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
We assume there is unemployed labour 𝐿𝑈𝑜.  Thus, the aggregate wage of labour type is 
estimated as: 𝑝𝑜
𝐿 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑀
𝐿𝑆𝑜
. 
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We assume 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 = 1 and 𝑃𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐿 = 𝑝𝑜
𝐿. Thus 𝑝𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗)
𝐿𝑜,𝑗
⁄  where 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗) = 𝐿𝑜,𝑁𝐸 
and 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑅𝑂𝑊) = 𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜.  
To test the zero gaps, we estimate: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑜, 𝑗) = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑝𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗 − 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝑜, 𝑗) 
 Therefore, based on these definitions, equations (10’ – 12’) are rewritten as follows: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
,        𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴,  
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1                                                                                                (10) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,       𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴             (11) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                 (12) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in 
(n-1) markets. Due to Walras’ Law, one of the above equations is redundant. We arbitrarily 
choose to eliminate eq. 10 from the model specifications. 
Furthermore, the aggregate of capital-energy composite is determined by a Cobb-
Douglas function over capital and energy composite within a cost minimization problem. Let 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 be the respective price of composite energy and capital of 𝑗-th non-energy 
industry; 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the inputs of composite energy and capital to 𝑗-th non-energy 
industry; 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 be the share parameter of energy composite by 𝑗-th non-energy industry 
(0 ≤ 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 be the share parameter of capital by 𝑗-th non-energy industry (0 ≤
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1; and 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗  be the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th capital-
energy composite. Hence, the 𝑗-th non-energy industry problem to minimize cost of aggregate 
capital-energy composite is estimated as follows: 
 
Third stage (Right Side): 
min
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝐾
(𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗) ,            𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴  
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Subject to: 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴       (13) 
 
The solution of the above optimization problem yields the 𝑗-th industry demand for energy 
composite and capital:  
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                         (14) 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                  (15′) 
The price index of the capital-energy composite 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 is the unit cost of capital-energy 
composite production, and is obtained from a weighted sum of the prices of energy composite 
and of capital:  
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                          (16′) 
 We introduce capital rent adjustment to obtain the specific capital rent across 𝑗-th non-
energy industries. Thus, we need to define the additional variables: 𝑃𝐾 and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 such that: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾 where 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 is the adjustment factor of capital rent, and 𝑃𝐾 is the 
aggregate capital rent which together determine the 𝑗-th industry’s level of capital rent, 𝑃𝑗
𝐾.  
Based on the energy-SAM data set, the total supply of capital stock is obtained from the 
sum of capital demand for activities and rest of world (ROW) (𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊) as follows:  
𝐾𝑆 = ∑ 𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝑁𝐸⊂𝐴
+ 𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊 
We assume there is no unemployed capital: 𝐾𝑈 = 0. Thus, the aggregate capital rent is 
obtained as: 𝑃𝐾 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑀
𝐾𝑆
. 
However, due to lack information on real (physical) capital stock at specific activity (𝐾𝑁𝐸) and 
rest of world (ROW) (𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊) in the given year of Energy-SAM, we then assume that: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾 =
𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗)
𝐾𝑗
⁄  and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝐾 = 1   
where 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗) = 𝐾𝑗. Thus, 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 is equal to 1. To test these relationships, in the model we 
estimate the cost gap, which should be zero: 
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𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝐺𝐴𝑃(𝐾, 𝑗) = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗 − 𝑆𝐴𝑀(𝐾, 𝑗) 
Therefore, based on above definitions, equations (15’ – 16’) are rewritten as follows: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                        (15) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                             (16) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Thus, due to Walras’ law condition, one of the above equations is redundant. We 
arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 16 from the model specifications. 
Finally, at bottom stage, the energy composite is determined by a CES function over 
types of energy (𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ∩ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 = ∅) within a cost minimization 
problem. Let 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the type of energy used in 𝑗-th non-energy industry; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 be the price of 
final energy goods; 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 be the share parameter of energy type used by 𝑗-th non-energy industry 
(0 ≤ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 be the efficiency parameter of energy composite used by the 𝑗-th non-
energy industry; and 𝜙𝑗 be the substitution parameter of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  (−1 ≤ 𝜙𝑗  ≤ ∞,𝜙𝑗 ≠ 0). In 
addition, in this stage we introduce the ad-valorem tax fuel33, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
Bottom Stage: 
min
𝑋𝑖,𝑗
∑ (1+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
subject to: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                    (17) 
By solving the above minimization problem, the energy demand solution for 𝑗-th industry is 
as follows: 
                                                          
33 For detailed explanations of introducing the tax fuel, see sub section 6.2.2.2. 
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𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                                                    (18) 
The price index of industry’s energy composite (𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) is obtained from the weighted sum 
of different type of energy price (𝑝𝑖
𝑍): 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴                           (19) 
Denoting the elasticity of substitution by 𝜎𝑗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
 we have: 𝜙𝑗 =
1
𝜎
𝑗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 − 1. The parameter 
value of 𝜙𝑗 is obtained from Paltsev, et al (2005); Orlov (2012); and Orlov, et al (2013)). The 
robustness of the results generated from using these values will then be tested through a 
sensitivity analysis. 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in 
(n-1) markets. Due to Walras’ Law, one of the above equations is redundant. We arbitrarily 
choose to eliminate eq. 19 from the model specifications. 
 
6.2.1.2. Energy Producing Structure 
We separate the types of energy producing industry into three subsets, namely: (i) primary 
energy (fossil fuel) including geothermal mining34 (𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩
𝑁𝐸 = ∅); (ii) secondary energy (refinery products) (𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩
𝑁𝐸 = ∅); and (iii) generation technology (power plants) (𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩ 𝑁𝐸 = ∅). Hence, the nested structures for energy producing sectors are 
distinguished according to above subsets. Following Burniaux and Truong (2002), we assume 
a complementarity (Leontief) relationship between inter-fuel and capital-energy composite for 
all types of energy producing sectors. 
 
6.2.1.2.1. Fossil Fuel Nested Structure 
The nested structure for fossil fuel production is similar to the non-energy producing sector. 
The difference, is that we assume no substitution possibilities (Leontief function) between 
                                                          
34Based on the compiled energy data set, geothermal activity is categorised as a mining activity where its 
production output is supplied to the geothermal power plant. Thus, because the production process of this 
mining activity is similar to that of fossil mining production structure – of which it requires the natural 
resources located beneath the land’s soil – we grouped this activity with the fossil fuel production subset.  
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capital and energy composite as well as inter-fuel. We modify Orlov et al (2013) to determine 
the nested structure of these sectors. We allow a fixed factor of natural resources of each type 
of fossil fuel, i.e. oil resources factor for oil sector, coal resources for coal mining, and natural 
gas resources for gas mining. These factors characterize the resource constraints due to the fact 
that fossil output production is highly dependent on the availability of these resource stocks 
(RTI, 2008).  
Figure 6.2 presents the nesting structure of fossil fuel sectors. The first two levels as well 
as the stage of labour composite in fossil fuel producing sectors are identical with those of non-
energy producing sectors. The difference is that we include the fixed factor of natural resource 
at the top stage. Let the subset of fossil fuel producing sectors is denoted by indices (𝑗 ∈
𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩ 𝑁𝐸 = ∅). 
Figure 6.2: The Nested Structure for Fossil Fuel Producing Industry  
(𝒋 ∈ 𝒇𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒍 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
 
 
Thus, at the top level, the domestic output of the 𝑗-th fossil industry is produced by a 
fixed coefficient (Leontief) function between intermediate non-energy commodities (𝑖 ∈
𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ∩ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 = ∅), the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗) and 
the fixed factor of resources (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗). By employing a similar approach for non-producing 
structures, the results are given as follows. Equations (20) – (22) determine the fixed proportion 
of non-energy intermediate inputs (𝑋𝑖,𝑗); value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗); and fixed 
resources to produce the domestic output of 𝑗-th fossil industry (𝑄𝐴𝑗).  
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The subsidy rate on 𝑗-th fossil mining production, (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗) is added 
to the price index 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 such that 𝐶𝑗 = (1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 𝑄𝐴𝑗. Equation 
(23) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th industry to produce 𝑄𝐴𝑗 which is obtained from the 
weighted sum of the prices of value added-energy composite, intermediate commodities, and 
the fixed factor. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                             (20) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                             (21) 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                 (22) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
= 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂𝐶
+ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑝𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 ,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                          (23) 
Where 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑖-th non-energy intermediate 
input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of 
the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements 
of the natural resources 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price of 𝑖-th final (composite) non-energy goods; 
𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 𝑝
𝑅𝐸𝑆 denotes the factor price of 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗.  
Furthermore, we define the relationship between the 𝑗-th output (and price) and its relevant 
commodity supply (and price) as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶             (24) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴             (25) 
Where:  
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 =
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝐴𝑗
, are the Input-Output coefficients; and  
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖: Output of the 𝑗-th activity for the 𝑖-th commodity. 
For fossil fuel industries we allow a one-to-one relationship in which each activity (𝑗 ∈
𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴) produces a single type of its relevant commodity (𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶), thus 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 = 1. 
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At the second stage, the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗) is defined 
by the two arguments of Cobb-Douglas function over capital-energy composite and composite 
labour; that is identical to that of non-energy producing structure. Hence, the results are given 
as follows. Equation (26) determines the constraint of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 production. Equation (27) – (28) 
represent the solution of the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry demand for capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) 
and composite labour respectively (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗). Equation (29) determines the price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 
that is obtained from a weighted sum combination of price of composite 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗:    
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗   , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                          (26) 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                          (27) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                           (28) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴              (29) 
Where 𝑃𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 denotes the respective price of composite labour and capital-energy 
composite of 𝑗-th industry; 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 denotes the share parameter of labour composite by 𝑗-th 
industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 be the share parameter of capital-energy composite by 
𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1; 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗 be the efficiency parameter of 
the 𝑗-th 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁; and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the adjustment factor for price of composite labour. Walras 
law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. 
Due to Walras’ Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. (29) such that the balance between 
total equations and endogenous variables can be obtained. 
At the third stage, the labour composite (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) is determined by a CES function over 
labour types within a cost minimization problem which is identical to that of non-energy 
producing structure. Thus, the results are given as follows. Equation (30) determines the 
constraint of 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 production. Equation (31) represents the solution of the 𝑗-th industry 
demand for labour types (𝐿𝑜,𝑗). Equation (32) determines the price index of labour composite 
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵) that is obtained from a weighted sum combination of wage of labour types 
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿).  
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𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 
𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1                                                                                                                (30) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,  
 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                          (31) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴       (32) 
Where 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 is the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th fossil industry (0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 
𝑠𝑙𝑗 is the efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th fossil industry; and 𝛽𝑗 be 
the substitution parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞,   𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). Walras law states that the 
equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Due to Walras’ 
Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. (32) to obtain the balance between total equations 
and endogenous variables. In addition, the parameter value of 𝛽𝑗 is obtained from Decaluwé et 
al (2012). The robustness of the results generated from using these values will then be tested 
through a sensitivity analysis. 
Furthermore, the aggregate of capital-energy composite is determined by a Leontief 
function over capital and energy composite within a cost minimization problem. Let 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 be 
the aggregate of capital-energy composite of 𝑗-th fossil industry; 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 be the 
respective price of composite energy and capital of 𝑗-th fossil industry; 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the 
respective inputs of composite energy and capital to 𝑗-th fossil industry;  𝑎𝑘𝑗 denotes the 
coefficient of minimum requirements of capital input to produce one unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 to produce one 
unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗. Hence, the 𝑗-th fossil industry problem to minimize cost of aggregate capital-
energy composite is estimated as follows: 
 
Third stage (Right Side): 
min
𝐾𝑗,𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝐶𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                    (33
′) 
Subject to: 
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𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝐾𝑗
𝑎𝑘𝑗
,
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗
) , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                      (34′) 
Equation (34’) implies that 𝐾𝑗  =   𝑎𝑘𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗. We rearrange 
equation (33’) as follows: 
 𝐶𝑗 = (𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝑎𝑘𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗)𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Hence, the relationships are given as follows: 
𝐾𝑗  =   𝑎𝑘𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                  (33) 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                 (34) 
𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑘𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                (35) 
Equation (35) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th fossil industry to produce the aggregate capital-
energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of capital and 
energy composite. 
Finally, at bottom stage, the energy composite is also determined by a Leontief function 
over types of energy commodity (𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶) within a cost minimization problem. Let 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the type of energy commodity used in 𝑗-th fossil industry; 𝑝𝑗
𝑍 be the price of final energy 
goods; 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of each type of energy 
commodity input to produce one unit of energy composite, 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗. In this stage we introduce 
the ad-valorem tax on fuel, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
Bottom Stage: 
min
𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝐶𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                         (36′) 
Subject to: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
) , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                         (37′) 
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By rearranging equation (36’) we obtain: 
𝐶𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Hence, the relationships are given as follows: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                      (36) 
𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴           (37) 
Equation (37) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th fossil mining industry to produce energy 
composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of energy types. 
 
6.2.1.2.2. Refinery Nested Structure 
The nested production structure for refinery industry (𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩ 𝑁𝐸 = ∅) is identical to that of fossil fuel industries. However, there are some 
differences.  
The refinery industry depends strongly on crude oil input – generated from oil mining 
industry – to produce petroleum products which cannot be replaced by other types of 
intermediate inputs. However, it is not dependent on the fixed factor of oil resources (RTI, 
2008). In the energy-SAM data set, there are 12 types of refinery products: bio-ethanol, bio-
diesel, subsidised gasoline, subsidised bio-gasoline, kerosene, subsidised diesel, subsidised 
bio-diesel, non-subsidised bio-diesel, non-subsidised gasoline, subsidised LPG, non-
subsidised LPG, LNG, and other oil products. Due to this principle, we modify the top stage 
of nested structure for fossil industries by excluding the fixed factor of natural resources input. 
But we are allowing the intermediate input of crude oil commodity – as the most essential input 
– in fixed proportion to produce petroleum products.  
Therefore, at the top stage, the domestic output of the 𝑗-th refinery industry is produced 
by a fixed coefficient (Leontief) function of intermediate commodities (excluding energy 
types) (𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶); the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗); and the 
intermediate input of crude oil commodity. Again, by employing an approach similar to fossil 
fuel producing structures, the results are given as follows. Equation (38) – (40) determine the 
fixed proportion of intermediate inputs (𝑋𝑖,𝑗); value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗); and the 
intermediate input of crude oil commodity to produce the domestic output of refinery industry 
(𝑄𝐴𝑗) respectively. Equation (41) represents the unit cost of refinery industry to produce 𝑄𝐴𝑗 
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which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of value added-energy composite, 
intermediate commodities (excluding energy goods), and crude oil input35. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                        (38) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                          (39) 
𝑋𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴            (40) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗  
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 
+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
+ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑍 𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦, 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                    (41) 
Where 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of non-energy 
intermediate input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum 
requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of 
minimum requirements of the crude oil input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price 
of 𝑖-th final (composite) non-energy goods; and 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗.  
Furthermore, because refinery industry produces several types of petroleum products, 
hence we characterise a one-to-multiple relationship between activity output (and price) and 
its commodity supply (and price). Figure 6.3 illustrates the relationship between refinery’s 
industry output and its petroleum products. 
 
Figure 6.3: Structure of Petroleum Products 
 
                                                          
35 We impose the ad-valorem tax fuel to the use of crude oil. 
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In the model, we define the above relationship as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                                                                                 (42) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴   (43) 
Where:  
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 =
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝐴𝑗
, is the Input-Output coefficients; and  
𝑄𝑄𝑗,𝑖: Output of the refinery activity for the 𝑖-th refinery commodity (petroleum product). 
For refinery industry we allow a one-to-multi relationship in which each activity produces 
multi types of petroleum products, thus: 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 ≠ 1,   𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. 
The above equations (eq. (42) – (43)) determine the relationship between refinery 
activity output (single) and its multi commodity supplies. It is simply fixed shares relationship 
where there is no substitution among commodities allowed here.  
Finally, of the last three stages (second – bottom stage), the specifications are similar to 
that of fossil fuel producing structures. The differences are by which we change the subset of 
‘𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙’ with ‘𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦’; and also taking the intermediate input of crude oil to be used at top 
stage of refinery producing structure. This rearrangement would plausibly portray the actual 
condition of which crude oil is used as raw material for refinery industry.  
At second stage, the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗) is defined by 
a two argument of Cobb-Douglas function over capital-energy composite and composite 
labour. Equation (44) determines the constraint of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 production. Equation (45) – (46) 
represent the demand of the 𝑗-th refinery industry for capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) and 
composite labour respectively (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗). Equation (47) determines the price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 that 
is obtained from a weighted sum combination of price of composite 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗. Walras 
law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. 
Due to Walras’ Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. (47) such that the balance between 
total equations and endogenous variables can be obtained.     
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                    (44) 
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𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                    (45) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                     (46) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴        (47) 
Where 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 is the respective price of composite labour and capital-energy composite 
of 𝑗-th refinery industry; 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 is the share parameter of labour composite by 𝑗-th refinery 
industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 is the share parameter of capital-energy composite by 𝑗-th 
industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1; 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗 is the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁; and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the adjustment factor for price of labour composite. 
At the third stage (left side), the labour composite (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) is determined by a CES 
function over labour types within a cost minimization problem. The results are given as 
follows. Equation (48) determines the constraint of 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 production. Equation (49) represents 
the demand of the 𝑗-th refinery industry for labour types (𝐿𝑜,𝑗). Equation (50) determines the 
price index of labour composite (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵) that is obtained from a weighted sum 
combination of wage of labour types (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿). Due to Walras’ Law condition, we 
arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. (50) to obtain the balance between total equations and 
endogenous variables.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 
𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1                                                                                                                (48) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 
 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                    (49) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗,
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴        (50) 
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Where 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 is the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th refinery industry (0 ≤
𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑗 is the efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th refinery industry; 
and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞, 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
Furthermore, at the third stage (right side), the aggregate of capital-energy composite is 
determined by a Leontief function over capital and energy composite within a cost 
minimization problem. Let 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 be the aggregate of capital-energy composite of 𝑗-th refinery 
industry; 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝐾 be the respective price of composite energy and capital of 𝑗-th 
refinery industry; 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the respective inputs of composite energy and capital to 
𝑗-th refinery industry;  𝑎𝑘𝑗 be the coefficient of minimum requirements of capital input to 
produce one unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 be the coefficient of minimum requirements of the 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 to produce one unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗. Hence, the results are given as follows.  
Equation (51) – (52) represent the capital (𝐾𝑗) and energy composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) used by 
𝑗-th refinery industry, respectively. Equation (53) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th refinery 
industry to produce the aggregate capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) which is obtained from the 
weighted sum of the prices of capital and energy composite.  
𝐾𝑗  =   𝑎𝑘𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                            (51) 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                           (52) 
𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑘𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴          (53) 
Finally, at the bottom stage, the energy composite is also determined by a Leontief 
function over types of energy within a cost minimization problem. Let 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the type of energy 
used (𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶) in 𝑗-th refinery industry; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 be the price of final energy goods; 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 
denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of each type of energy input to produce one 
unit of energy composite, 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗. In addition, in this stage we introduce the ad-valorem tax 
fuel, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
The results are given as follows. Equation (54) represents the energy used by 𝑗-th 
industry. Equation (55) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th industry to produce energy composite 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of energy types. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
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𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                    (54) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗,
𝑖≠𝑜𝑖𝑙∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                    (55) 
 
6.2.1.2.3. Electricity Generation Structure 
The expansion of clean energy technology has been expected as a crucial factor in mitigating 
the future climate change (Wing, 2006). Wing (2004) addressed that within the CGE 
framework analysis, the largest drop on carbon emissions will come from the electricity sector. 
This section attempts to introduce the nested structure of electricity generation in detail.   
In the traditional SAM data set, the account of electricity sector is obtained from the 
aggregation of three related activities: generation, transmission, and distribution (Wing, 2006). 
Generation activity comprises of types of electricity technology that use inputs of production 
factors and specific fuels (or renewable resources) to generate electricity output; whilst, 
transmission and distribution are related to non-energy service activities (Wing, 2006).     
Following Wing (2006) we employ a hybrid modeling approach – integrating top-down 
macroeconomic models and bottom-up engineering models – in which we disaggregate the 
electricity sector into activities of transmission (and distribution) and electricity technologies: 
conventional fossil, geothermal and hydro power plant. These technologies are chosen based 
on the available Indonesian Energy-SAM in year 2008. We do not include other generation 
technologies such as solar, nuclear, wind, and so on because these generations were not existed 
in the base year data set. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the production process of the 𝑗-th electricity industry (𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴) to generate the homogenous electricity supply. The electricity supply is 
determined from the fixed shares of transmission (and distribution) and generation composite 
output. Whilst, the generation composite output (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑗 ,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴) is 
defined by three arguments of Cobb-Douglas function over conventional, geothermal, and 
hydro power plants. 
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Figure 6.4: Structure of Electricity Sector 
 
 
We use the Leontief function to define the relationship between the activities of 
transmission (and distribution) and generation composite output (and price) and their relevant 
electricity supply (and price) as follows. Equation (56) represents the fixed shares of 
transmission (and distribution) output to electricity supply. Equation (57) represents the fixed 
shares of generation composite output to electricity supply. Equation (58) represents the price 
of electricity supply which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of transmission 
(and distribution) and generation composite:  
𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖  =   𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑄𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                                               (56) 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑄𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                                                    (57) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑝𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                        (58) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖 is the electricity supplied from the transmission (and distribution) activity output;  
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 be the electricity supplied from the generation composite activity output;  𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑖 be the 
fixed coefficient of 𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖; and 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 is the fixed coefficient of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖; 𝑝𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝐷 and 𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 be the 
respective price of 𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖 and 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖; 𝑄𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖
𝑄
 is the quantity and price of electricity supply, 
respectively.   
To determine the relationship between electricity activities output (multi-types) and its 
homogenous electricity supply (single type), we apply a fixed share by Leontief function (Eq. 
56 – 58) instead of using a standard input-output coefficient – i.e. by employing the 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖 – into above. In other words, the standard input-output approach may not be 
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available in the case of introducing the hybrid model in electricity generation since we have to 
define the aggregated power plant outputs (equation (57)).  
However, by implementing the usual Leontief function like above we can actually define 
the fixed shares of generation composite load: aggregated electricity outputs from 
conventional, geothermal, and hydro power plants. The fixed shares will then be determined 
by the relationship of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑄𝑖,   𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶.  
Furthermore, the generation activity minimizes the production cost of its power plants – 
conventional, geothermal, and hydro – within a simplified CES function, a Cobb-Douglas 
function, to produce the load composite output (𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖)
36. Equation (59) represents the 
constraint of generation composite load.  
min
𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
Subject to: 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝑠𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 ∏ 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
    , ∑ 𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
= 1, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                                                                                         (59) 
The solution of the above problem yields the optimum load of each type of generation 
technology: 
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖 = 𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,  
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                                                                                                         (60) 
The price index of the generation composite load 𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 is the unit cost of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 production and 
is obtained from a weighted sum combination of the prices of each generation technology:  
𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 =
1
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶      (61) 
Where 𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴
 and 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖 denote the price and quantity of each generation load supply, 
respectively; 𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 and 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 denote the price and quantity of generation composite load;  𝛿𝑗,𝑖 
is the share parameter of each generation load supply (0 ≤ 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 ≤ 1  , ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ∈𝐴 = 1); 
and 𝑠𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 is the efficiency parameter of generation composite load. Walras law states that the 
                                                          
36 Due to a lack of information, we assume that the CES parameter of substitutions among these technologies is 
limited to zero (𝜌 → 0) such that the elasticity of substitution is unity (𝜎 =
1
1+𝜌
= 1). This function is generally 
a Cobb-Douglas function.    
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equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Due to Walras’ 
Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. (59) to obtain the balance between total equations 
and endogenous variables. Thus, the optimum generation load of electricity supply from each 
technology – i.e. conventional, geothermal, and hydro plants – is estimated from equations (59 
– 61). 
 
A. Transmission and Distribution 
The detailed production structure of transmission (and distribution) is represented in Figure 
6.5. Since the activities of transmission and distribution are related only to non-energy services, 
we assume that the production structure is similar to that of non-energy producing sectors. 
Therefore, the specifications for all stages (top – bottom stage) of this activity are identical to 
the non-energy producing structures.   
 
Figure 6. 5: Structure of Transmission (and Distribution) Activity 
(𝒋 ∈ 𝑻𝑫 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
 
 
At the top stage, the domestic output of transmission (and distribution) industry (𝑄𝐴𝑗) is 
produced by a fixed coefficient (Leontief) function of non-energy intermediate inputs and the 
aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗). By employing similar approach of non-
energy producing structures, the results are given as follows. Equation (62) – (63) determine 
the fixed proportion of intermediate inputs (𝑋𝑖,𝑗) and value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗), 
respectively. Whilst, equation (64) represents the unit cost of transmission (and distribution) 
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industry to produce 𝑄𝐴𝑗 which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of value added-
energy composite and non-energy intermediate inputs. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                            (62) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                             (63) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                       (64) 
Where 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑖-th non-energy intermediate 
input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of 
the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price of 𝑖-th final (composite) non-
energy goods; and 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗. 
At the second stage, the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗) is defined 
by a two argument of Cobb-Douglas function over capital-energy composite and composite 
labour. Equation (65) determines the constraint of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 production. Equation (66) – (67) 
represent the demand of the 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry for capital-energy 
composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) and composite labour respectively (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗). Equation (68) determines the 
price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 that is obtained from a weighted sum combination of price of composite 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗. Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the 
equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law condition, we arbitrarily choose to 
eliminate eq. (68) for balancing the total equations and endogenous variables.     
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (65) 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                (66) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                 (67) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴    (68) 
Where 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵 is the respective price of composite labour and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 is the price of capital-energy 
composite of the 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry; 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 is the share parameter of 
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labour composite by the 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 
is the share parameter of capital-energy composite by the 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ≤ 1); 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1; 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑇𝐷 is the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁; and 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 is 
the adjustment factor for price of labour composite. 
At the third stage (left side), the labour composite (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) is determined by a CES 
function over labour types within a cost minimization problem. Equation (69) determines the 
constraint of 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 production. Equation (70) represents the demand of the 𝑗-th industry for 
labour types (𝐿𝑜,𝑗). Equation (71) determines the price index of labour composite 
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵) that is obtained from a weighted sum combination of wage of labour types 
(𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿). Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the 
equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, we choose to eliminate eq. (69) to 
obtain the balance between total equations and endogenous variables.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (69) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (70) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (71) 
Where 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 is the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑗 is the 
efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th industry; and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution 
parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞,   𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
At the third stage (right side), the aggregate of capital-energy composite is determined 
by a Cobb-Douglas function over capital and energy composite within a cost minimization 
problem. Let 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 be the respective price of composite energy and capital of 𝑗-th 
industry; 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the inputs of composite energy and capital to 𝑗-th transmission 
(and distribution) industry; 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 be the share parameter of energy composite by 𝑗-th 
industry (0 ≤ 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 be the share parameter of capital by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤
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𝜒𝐾,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1; and 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗  be the efficiency parameter of the 𝑗-th capital-
energy composite. Hence, the results are given as follows.  
Equation (72) represents the constraint of aggregated capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗). 
Equation (73) – (74) represent the demand solution of energy composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) and capital 
(𝐾𝑇𝐷) used by 𝑗-th industry, respectively. Equation (75) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th 
transmission (and distribution) industry to produce the aggregate capital-energy composite 
(𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of capital and energy composite. 
Equation (75) is eliminated due to Walras’ Law. 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (72) 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                      (73) 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                   (74) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴       (75) 
Finally, at the bottom stage, the energy composite is determined by a CES function over 
types of energy (𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶) within a cost minimization problem. Let 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the type of 
energy used in 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 be the price of final energy 
goods; 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 be the share parameter of energy type used by 𝑗-th industry (0 ≤ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 be 
the efficiency parameter of energy composite used by the 𝑗-th industry; and 𝜙𝑗 be the 
substitution parameter of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  (−1 ≤ 𝜙𝑗  ≤ ∞,𝜙𝑗 ≠ 0). In addition, in this stage we introduce 
the ad-valorem tax fuel, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
The results are given as follows. Equation (76) represents the constraint of energy 
composite used by 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry. Equation (77) represents the 
demand solution of energy types used by 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry. 
Equation (78) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry to 
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produce energy composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices 
of energy types. 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                         (76) 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                 (77) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
 , 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                                (78) 
Denoting the elasticity of substitution by 𝜎𝑗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
 we have: 𝜙𝑗 =
1
𝜎
𝑗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 − 1. The parameter 
value of 𝜙𝑗 is obtained from Paltsev, et al (2005); Orlov (2012); and Orlov, et al (2013). The 
robustness of the results generated from using these values will then be tested through a 
sensitivity analysis. 
One of the above equations is redundant. Walras law states that the equilibrium in n 
markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to Walras’ law, we 
arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 76 from the model specifications. 
 
B. Electricity Generation  
Following the energy-SAM data set in year 2008, we classify the generation activities into 
three types of technology: conventional fossil, geothermal, and hydro plant. Figures 6.6 and 
6.7 illustrate the production structure from top to bottom of conventional and renewable 
(geothermal and hydro) technology.  
Since renewable generation does not require fossil fuel input, we only combine the 
capital and electricity within a CES function to produce aggregate capital-electricity. In other 
words, we eliminate the combination of the energy composite.      
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Figure 6.6: Structure of Conventional Generation Activity  
(𝒋 ∈ 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒗 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
 
 
Figure 6.6, the model equations for conventional generation structure (this activity is denoted 
as 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴) are briefly described as follows.  
At the top stage, conventional generation output is produced by a fixed coefficient 
(Leontief) function between intermediate commodities and the aggregate of value added-
energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗):  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                 (79) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                (80) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,          
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (81) 
 Where 𝑄𝐴𝑗 is the conventional generation output; 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 denotes the intermediate input of 𝑖-th 
non-energy commodity used by conventional generation activity; 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient 
of minimum requirements of 𝑖-th non-energy intermediate input to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 to produce one unit of 
𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗; and 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price of 𝑖-th final (composite) 
non-energy goods.   
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 At the second stage, the conventional generation activity minimizes the input cost 
combination of capital-energy composite and composite labour within a Cobb-Douglas 
function to produce the aggregate of value added-energy composite (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗). Equation (82) 
determines the constraint of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 production. Equations (83) – (84) represent the demand of 
the conventional generation activity for capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) and composite 
labour (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗). Equation (85) determines the price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 that is obtained from a 
weighted sum combination of price of composite 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (82) 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                            (83) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴              (84) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴      (85) 
  Due to Walras’ Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 85 to ensure the income-
expenditure accounting identity in the supply-demand equilibrium system.  
At third stage (left side), labour composite is determined by a CES function over types 
of labour within a cost minimization problem. The results are given as follows. Equation (86) 
determines the constraint of 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 production. Equation (87) represents the demand of the 
conventional generation activity for labour types (𝐿𝑜,𝑗). Equation (88) determines the price 
index of labour composite (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵) that is obtained from a weighted sum combination 
of wage of labour types (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿). Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is 
obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, we choose to 
eliminate eq. (86) to obtain the balance between total equations and endogenous variables.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1                       (86) 
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𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (87) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  (88) 
Where 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 is the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by conventional generation activity (0 ≤
𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑇𝐷 is the efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the conventional 
generation activity; and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣  ≤ ∞,    𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
At the third stage (right side), the aggregate of capital-energy composite is determined 
by a Cobb-Douglas function over capital and energy composite within a cost minimization 
problem. Equation (89) represents the constraint of aggregated capital-energy composite 
(𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗). Equations (90) – (91) represent the demand solution of energy composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) 
and capital (𝐾𝑗) used by conventional generation activity. Equation (92) represents the unit cost 
of conventional activity to produce the aggregate capital-energy composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗) which is 
obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of capital and energy composite. One of the 
above equations is redundant. We eliminate equation (92) to obtain the balanced system. 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (89) 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                 (90) 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                (91) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴    (92) 
Where 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 and 𝑃𝑗
𝐾 are the price of composite energy and capital of conventional activity; 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 be the inputs of composite energy and capital to conventional activity; 
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 is the share parameter of energy composite by conventional activity (0 ≤ 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 ≤
1); 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 is the share parameter of capital by conventional activity (0 ≤ 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 +
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1; and 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗  is the efficiency parameter of capital-energy composite of the 
conventional activity. 
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Finally, at the bottom stage, the energy composite is determined by a CES function over 
types of energy (𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶) within a cost minimization problem. Let 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 be the type of 
energy used in conventional activity; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 be the price of final energy goods; 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 be the share 
parameter of energy type used by conventional activity (0 ≤ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 be the efficiency 
parameter of energy composite used by the conventional activity; and 𝜙𝑗 be the substitution 
parameter of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  (−1 ≤ 𝜙𝑗  ≤ ∞,   𝜙𝑗 ≠ 0). In addition, in this stage we introduce the ad-
valorem tax fuel, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
The results are given as follows. Equation (93) represents the constraint of energy 
composite used by conventional activity. Equation (94) represents the demand solution of 
energy types used by conventional activity. Equation (95) represents the unit cost of 
conventional activity to produce energy composite (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗) which is obtained from the 
weighted sum of the prices of energy types. 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦∈𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶                               (93) 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (94) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                             (95) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Due to Walras’ Law condition, one of the above equations is redundant. We arbitrarily 
choose to eliminate eq. 95 from the model specifications. In addition, the parameter value of 
𝜙𝑗 is obtained from Paltsev, et al (2005); Orlov (2012); and Orlov, et al (2013). The robustness 
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of the results generated from using these values will then be tested through a sensitivity 
analysis 
 
Figure 6. 7: Structure of Renewable (Geothermal or Hydro) Generation Activity  
( 𝒋 ∈ 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒘 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
 
 
The model equations for renewable generation (this activity is denoted as 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴) are similar to those of conventional electricity generation. The 
differences, however, are by which we allow the fixed factor of natural resources of each type 
of renewable generation, i.e. geological hot dry rock for geothermal generation, and 
topographically-determined hydrostatic potential for hydro generation (Sue Wing, 2006). 
Because the SAM data set does not record these factors explicitly, we follow Sue Wing (2006) 
approximation by which these are estimated as roughly 20% shares of capital input. In addition, 
we eliminate the specification for the energy composite at the bottom stage since this composite 
is not required to generate renewable energy. 
Therefore, at the top stage, the domestic output of renewable generation is produced by 
a fixed coefficient (Leontief) function between intermediate commodities, the aggregate of 
value added-electricity (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗) and the fixed factor of resources (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗). Equations (96) – (98) 
determine the fixed proportion of intermediate inputs (𝑋𝑖,𝑗) excluding the input of electricity 
(𝑖 ≠ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∈ 𝐶); value added- electricity (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗); and fixed resources to produce the 
domestic output of 𝑗-th renewable industry (𝑄𝐴𝑗). Equation (99) represents the unit cost of 𝑗-
th renewable industry to produce 𝑄𝐴𝑗 which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices 
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of value added-energy composite, intermediate commodities, and the fixed factor of natural 
resources: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∈ 𝐶  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴             (96) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                               (97) 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                 (98) 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + 
∑ (1+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖≠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦∈𝐶
+ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑝𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 ,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                          (99) 
Where 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗 denotes the coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑖-th intermediate input – 
excluding electricity input – to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 denotes the coefficient of 
minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗  to produce one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑗; 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 denotes the coefficient 
of minimum requirements of the 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗; 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the price of 𝑖-th final (composite) goods; 
𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿 denotes the price of 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗; 𝑝𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆 denotes the factor price of 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗; and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 =
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂
𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴. 
At the second stage, each 𝑗-th renewable activity minimizes the input cost combination 
of capital-electricity and composite labour within a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the 
aggregate of value added-electricity (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗). Equation (100) determines the constraint of 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗  production. Equations (100) – (101) represent the demand of the conventional 
generation activity for capital- electricity (𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗) and composite labour respectively (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗). 
Equation (102) determines the price index of 𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 that is obtained from a weighted sum 
combination of price of composite 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 and 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗:  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (100) 
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                         (101) 
215 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴        (102) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗
 ,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  (103) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, we arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 103 to ensure the 
income-expenditure accounting identity in the supply-demand equilibrium system. 
At the bottom stage (left side), the labour composite is determined by a CES function 
over types of labour within a cost minimization problem. The results are given as follows. 
Equation (104) determines the constraint of 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 production. Equation (105) represents the 
demand of the conventional generation activity for labour types (𝐿𝑜,𝑗). Equation (106) 
determines the price index of labour composite (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵) that is obtained from a 
weighted sum combination of wage of labour types (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿). Walras law states that the 
equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) markets. Thus, due to 
Walras’ Law, we choose to eliminate eq. (104) to obtain the balance between total equations 
and endogenous variables.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1                                                                                             (104) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (105) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (106) 
Where 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 is the share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by conventional generation activity (0 ≤
𝛾𝑜,𝑗 ≤ 1); 𝑠𝑙𝑇𝐷 is the efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th renewable 
generation activity; and 𝛽𝑗 be the substitution parameter of 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 (−1 ≤ 𝛽𝑗  ≤ ∞,    𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0). 
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At the bottom stage (right side), the aggregate of capital-energy composite is determined 
by a Cobb-Douglas function over capital and electricity within a cost minimization problem. 
The results are given as follows. Equation (107) represents the constraint of capital-electricity 
used by 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th generation activity. Equation (108) represents the demand solution of 
electricity used by 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th generation activity.  Equation (109) represents the demand 
solution of capital used by 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th generation activity. Equation (110) represents the unit 
cost of 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th activity to produce capital-electricity composite (𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗) which is obtained 
from the weighted sum of the prices of capital and electricity: 
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗
𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (107) 
𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 = 𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑧 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 ,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (108) 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                           (109) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿 =
𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑧 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴                                                                                       (110) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law condition, one of the above equations is redundant. We 
arbitrarily choose to eliminate eq. 110 from the model specifications. 
 
6.2.2. CO2 emissions accounting and its taxation modules 
To specificy the CO2 emission and its taxation, we assume that utilizations (absorptions) of 
fossil and its refinery (petroleum) products emit CO2 due to their combustion. Following Allan 
et al. (2008), we do not take into account the pollutants from non-CO2 emissions – i.e. methane, 
sulphuric acid, carbon monoxide emissions – due to the complexity of identifications that are 
strongly related to combustion conditions and technology. These absorptions cover: the fossil 
(and petroleum) input in the production process across industries and the final fossil (and 
petroleum) consumption by households and government. Because of limited information, 
however, we exclude the emissions generated by agriculture – i.e. land use change – and 
deforestation. 
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6.2.2.1. CO2 emissions accounting 
Following Mcdonald and Thierfelder (2008), we incorporate the CO2 emission accounting into 
the CGE model. Suppose the intermediate fuel inputs (fossils and refineries inputs), denoted 
as 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, used by the 𝑗-th industry in the production processes are 
specified as 𝑋𝑖,𝑗. Hence, the total CO2 emissions, expressed in tons, generated from fuels 
combustion in each industry (𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑗), is obtained by the multiplication of 𝑋𝑖,𝑗 and their 
emission factor 𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑖 as follows: 
𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑗 = ∑ 𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑖 . 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
The total CO2 emission generated from fuel consumption by households and government 
are obtained as follows: 
𝐶𝑂2𝐼𝑁𝑆 = ∑ 𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑖  . (∑ 𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝐺𝑖)
𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
Where 𝐶𝑂2𝐼𝑁𝑆 is the total CO2 emission on final consumption; 𝑖 is an element of the subset 
of fuel types (fossils and refineries) commodity; ∑ 𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎℎ∈𝐻  and 𝐶𝐺𝑖 are the respective fuel 
consumption by the households’ and government.   
In the absence of detailed emission factors by fuel type for Indonesia, we use the 
available data based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines for 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (2006). The emission factors depend on fuel types rather 
than combustion conditions and technology (Allan et al., 2008). To estimate the total CO2 
emissions emitted in Indonesia in the year 2008, the quantity (volume) of fuel domestic 
consumption is required. We use the available data of domestic oil fuels sales (unit of kilo liters 
(kl)), crude oil (unit of thousand barrels), coal, natural gas, and LPG consumption (unit of 
Thousand Barrel Oil Equivalent (BOE)) published in the Handbook of Energy and Economic 
Statistics of Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (2010). Table 6.1 shows the 
data of emission factors (
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑂2
𝑇𝐽⁄ ) and oil fuels volume sales (𝑇𝐽) for Indonesia in year of 
200837.   
 
 
 
                                                          
37 We convert the unit of oil fuels volume (kilo liters) to Tetra Joule (TJ) so that the total emissions can be 
calculated.  
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Table 6.1: CO2 Emission Factor and Volume Sales by Fuel Types 
No. Fuel Type 
CO2 emission Factor  
(
𝐓𝐨𝐧𝐂𝐎𝟐
𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐣𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐞𝐬⁄ ) 
Volume Sales 
(Terajoules) 
1.  Bio-ethanol 70.80 7,096.72 
2.  Bio-diesel 70.80  13,190.11  
3.  Coal 94.60  458,466.31  
4.  Crude Oil 73.30  2,187,141.07  
5.  Kerosene 71.90  280,375.41  
6.  Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) 64.20  1,394.87  
7.  Natural Gas 56.10  208,771.97  
8.  Non Subsidised Gasoline 
(‘Pertamax’) 
69.30  10,571.66  
9.  Non Subsidised Liquefied 
Petroleum Gases (LPG) 
63.10  96,160.52  
10.  Other Petroleum Products  
(Other Oils) 
73.30  176,335.08  
11.  Subsidised Bio-diesel 70.80  19,785.16  
12.  Subsidised Bio-gasoline 70.80  1,560.05  
13.  Subsidised Gasoline (‘Premium’) 69.30  682,208.69  
14.  Subsidised Diesel Oil 74.10  931,479.67  
15.  Subsidised Liquefied Petroleum 
Gases (LPG) 
63.10  313,148.78  
Source: IPCC (2006); Handbook of Energy and Economic Statistics of Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources (2008).  
Therefore, the overall CO2 emissions generated from the economy transactions are the sum of 
the emissions arising from the fuel combustion of industries, households and government: 
𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 =∑𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐶𝑂2𝐼𝑁𝑆 
 
6.2.2.2. CO2 Emission Taxation 
Because we only consider the emissions that result from fuel combustions, the CO2 emission 
tax be imposed as an ad-valorem fuel tax (Yusuf, 2008). The burden of this tax is then 
incorporated to the burning of fuel inputs by industries and the final fuel consumption by 
representative agents (households and government). 
The government revenue from a CO2 emission tax (𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑂2) is obtained by multiplying 
the tax rate (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2) and total CO2 emissions (𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿): 
𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑂2 = 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 
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= 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2 ∑ (∑𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+∑𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝑂2𝐺𝑖)
𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
Where 𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑂2 is the government revenue collected from CO2 emission tax; 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2 (in Rp / 
ton CO2) is the specific CO2 emission tax; 𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑗 is the CO2 emission generated from 
each type of fuel used by 𝑗-th industry; 𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ is the CO2 emission generated from each type 
of fuel used by ℎ-th households’; and 𝐶𝑂2𝐺𝑖 is the CO2 emission generated from each type of 
fuel used by government. This revenue is equivalent to the ad-valorem fuel tax imposed across 
users (industry, households, and government): 
𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑂2 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 (∑𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
+∑𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝐶𝐺𝑖) 
Where 𝑝𝑖
𝑍 denotes the market price index of each fuel and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 denotes the ad-
valorem tax fuel for users that are 𝑗-th industry, ℎ-th households, and government. The 
relationship between 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2 and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙,𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 is then expressed as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖,𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ =
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣 =
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝐺𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
The above expressions imply that 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙,𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 does not depend only on the carbon 
content of each fuel type, but also on economic variables such as fuel prices and volumes 
(Yusuf, 2008).   
Therefore, in the next step, we suppose that the government imposes an ad-valorem fuel 
tax on the utilization of energy input in the 𝑗-th industry production structure; and final fuel 
consumption by ℎ-th households and government.  
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For the 𝑗-th non-energy industry, we add 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 to the bottom stage of their 
production structure. The energy demand solution for 𝑗-th non-energy industry is then 
rearranged as follows: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
The price index of an industry’s energy composite (𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) is obtained from the weighted 
sum of different type of energy price (𝑝𝑖
𝑍): 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
For the 𝑗-th industry, we add 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 to the bottom stage of their 
production structure. The unit cost of 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry to produce energy composite 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙) is then rearranged as follows: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗,
𝑖≠𝑜𝑖𝑙∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴   
For the 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 industry, we add 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 that is identical to that of 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th 
industry: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗,
𝑖≠𝑜𝑖𝑙∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
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Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Finally, at bottom stage of conventional electricity generation activity, we add the 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 to the bottom stage of their production structure. The energy demand solution for 
the conventional generation industry is then rearranged as follows: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴    
The price index of this industry’s energy composite (𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) is obtained from the weighted 
sum of different types of energy prices (𝑝𝑖
𝑍): 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Furthermore, we introduce 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ to the representative households’ demand 
function as follows: 
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶;  𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶 
For the public spending on fuel commodities, we also add 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣. Thus, the equation 
for total government expenditure is rearranged as follows: 
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𝐸𝐺 =∑(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝐶;  𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝐶 
 
6.2.3. Government Behaviour 
The specifications to describe government behaviour are similar to those of the standard 
model38. The difference is that we add the collection of CO2 emission tax (𝐼𝐺𝐶𝑂2) as described 
above.  
Thus, in the modified model, the government earns income from total institutions’ 
transfers and taxes. This is expressed as follows: 
𝐼𝐺 =∑(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+ ∑ (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿                                                                           (111) 
Where 𝐼𝐺 denotes the government total income; (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) denotes ad valorem 
tax rate of the 𝑖-th gross domestic supply in terms of value (𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖); (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) 
denotes tariff’s rate of the 𝑖-th imported goods in terms of value (𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖); and 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛 denotes 
government transfer income from institutions’.  
Whilst government’s expenditure and saving are given as follows: 
𝐸𝐺 =∑(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                           (112) 
𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                                                              (113) 
𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑃𝐼, ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                              (114𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ ℎ ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                           (114𝑏) 
Government saving (𝑆𝐺) is therefore defined as follows: 
                                                          
38 For detailed explanations of government behaviour see section 3.2.2. 
223 
 
 
 
𝑆𝐺 = 𝐼𝐺 − 𝐸𝐺                                                                                                                             (115) 
Where 𝐸𝐺 denotes total public expenditure; 𝐶𝐺𝑖 denotes government spending on each goods 
and services; (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) denotes the subsidy rate of 𝑖-th domestic supply 
(𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖); (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗) denotes the subsidy rate of 𝑗-th industry gross output 
(𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗); 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 denotes government transfer payments to institutions’; 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖 denotes 
initial government expenditure of 𝑖-th final goods; 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 denotes the fixed 
proportion of government transfer payments to each institution; 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟 denotes total transfer 
payments; and 𝑆𝐺 denotes government saving.  
  
6.2.4. Households Behaviour 
The specifications to define household behaviour are similar to those of the standard model39. 
The differences are that we introduce: (i) the ad-valorem fuel tax, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ, to the 
representative households’ demand function as described in section 6.2.2.2; and (ii) the 
households’ fixed factor income of natural resources extracted by the fossil mining activities. 
Thus, in the modified model, the income sources obtained by the ℎ-th type of households 
are expressed as follows:  
𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ + ∑ 𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                           (116) 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ = ∑ 𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                 (117) 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) ,   ℎ ∈ 𝐻,   𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁                (118) 
𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝑅𝐸𝑆 ( ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
) , ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                           (119) 
Where 𝐼𝐻ℎ denotes total income of the h-th type of households; 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ denotes labour income 
of the h-th type of households’; 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ denotes capital income of the ℎ-th type of households; 
                                                          
39 For detailed explanations of households’ behaviour see section 3.2.3. 
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 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ denotes natural resources income of the ℎ-th type of households;  𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛 denotes 
transfer income of the h-th type of households from the 𝑖𝑛-th institutions’; 𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜 
denotes the share of the 𝑜-th type of labour income received by ℎ-th type of households; 
𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ denotes the share of capital income received by ℎ-th type of households; 
𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ denotes the share of natural resources income received by ℎ-th type of 
households; 𝐿_𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑜 denotes the 𝑜-th type of labour supply from ROW used in 𝑗-th industry; 
and 𝐾_𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes the abroad capital supply used in 𝑗-th industry.  
The government collects income tax and CO2 emission tax from households due to the 
final consumption of ‘dirty’ fuel commodities. According to the standard model, the income 
taxes are represented as transfer payment to the government (𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ). The disposable income 
households (𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ) is as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2 ∑ 𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻,   
𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                                                                                    (120) 
Where 𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙,ℎ is the CO2 emission generated from each type of fuel used by the ℎ-th 
household. 
Households’ transfer payments to institutions, other than the government, are specified 
in equation (121a):  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ = 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                               (121𝑎) 
Household income tax is regarded as household transfer payment to government: 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ = (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) 𝐼𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                 (121𝑏) 
Where 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ denotes the shares of the ℎ-th households’ transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-
th institutions’; and (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) denotes income tax rate of ℎ-th households’ 
respectively.  
Furthermore, the subtractions of households’ transfer payments yield the actual 
disposable income (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ) of the ℎ-th type of household as follows:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                               (122) 
The constant average propensities to save of households are given in equation (123):  
𝑆𝐻ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                     (123) 
The ratio of the constant average propensities to save is allowed to adjust endogenously: 
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𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ(1 + 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗), ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                 (124) 
Where 𝑆𝐻ℎ denotes saving of the ℎ-th type of households’; 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ denotes the adjusted 
average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type of households; 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ denotes the initial value 
of average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type of households;   𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ : 0, if 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ, i.e. no change in saving ratio; 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ: 1, if 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ is allowed to 
adjust, in which case 𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗 is the endogenous adjustment of 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ. 
Therefore, the budget of household consumption of final goods (𝐸𝐻ℎ) is then obtained 
from their actual disposable income less saving (𝑆𝐻ℎ) (equation (125)). 
𝐸𝐻ℎ = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑆𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                           (125) 
In this modified model, we introduce 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ to the representative households’ demand 
function. Hence, by solving the optimization problem with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
the solution to which yields the corresponding demand function: 
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                      (126) 
Where:  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶;  𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶. 
 
6.2.5. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
According to the standard model, CPI is adjusted from the total price index of 𝑖-th households 
(equation (127)), which is obtained from the homogeneity relationship of 𝑖-th final goods price 
(equation (128)). 
𝑃𝐼ℎ =∏(𝑃𝑖
𝑍)𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                   (127) 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝑤ℎ𝑃𝐼ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
                                                                                                                       (128) 
Where 𝑤ℎ is the weight of commodity purchased by the ℎ-th of households.  
 
6.2.6. Enterprise Behaviour 
In this modified model, all descriptions for enterprises are similar to that of standard model. 
The difference is that we assume that enterprises receive income from the extraction of natural 
resources beneath the land’s soil. The enterprise income (𝐼𝐵) is therefore obtained from total 
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of enterprise capital supply (𝐼𝐵𝐾), fixed resources (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆), and enterprise transfer income 
from the 𝑖𝑛-th institutions (𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛): 
𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾 + 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                                                                      (129) 
𝐼𝐵𝐾 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                            (130) 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆 = 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 ( ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
)                                                                                                 (131) 
Where 𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 and 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 denote the share of capital and resources income 
received by enterprise. 
Enterprise disposable income (𝐷𝐼𝐵) is expressed as follows:  
𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 , 𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                       (132) 
Enterprise transfer payments to institutions excluding government are assumed to adjust 
proportionally to their disposable income (𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏) (equation (133a)); whilst the 
enterprise transfer payments to government are enterprise income tax (equation (133b)). 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 = 𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏𝐷𝐼𝐵, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                       (133𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐼𝐵, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                             (133𝑏) 
These subtractions yield the actual disposable income of enterprise (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵) as follows:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐷𝐼𝐵 − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
                                                                                         (134) 
Finally, enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) is thus simply equal to the actual disposable income: 
𝑆𝐵 = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵                                                                                                                                  (135) 
 
6.2.7. Rest of World (ROW) 
In the modified model, all descriptions for ROW are similar to that of standard model. ROW 
total outflow is generated from total import, institutions’ income transfers to ROW, and ROW 
endowments of factors supply to domestic industries: 
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𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
 
+  𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                               (136) 
Where 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes ROW total outflow; 𝑀𝑖 denotes import of the 𝑖-th goods; 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛 
denotes transfer income from 𝑖𝑛-th institutions to ROW; 𝐶𝑀 denotes the exported and 
imported commodities; and respective 𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜 and 𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 denote the shares of the 𝑜-
th foreign labour and capital used domestically. 
ROW total inflow is determined from total of exports, ROW payment transfers to 
institutions’, payment to labour and capital employed by ROW (equation (137)).  
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝐸
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+ 𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊,  
𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                                                                                 (137) 
Where 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes ROW total inflow; 𝐸𝑖 denotes export of the 𝑖-th goods; 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 
denotes transfer payment from RoW to institutions; and 𝐶𝐸 denotes the exported and imported 
commodities. 
ROW transfer payments to institutions (𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊) are determined from a fixed 
proportion of ROW total transfer payments (𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟) as follows: 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊(𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆               (138𝑎) 
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0                                                                                                                        (138𝑏) 
Where 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 denotes the shares of ROW transfer payments to the 𝑖𝑛-th 
institutions excluding ROW; and 𝐸𝑋𝑅 denotes the exchange rate (domestic currency unit per 
foreign currency unit). 
The ROW saving (𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊) is determined from residual between ROW outflow and 
inflow: 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊                                                                                                      (139) 
Finally, the price relationships in terms of local and ROW currency between export and 
import commodities: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸                                                                                                 (140) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀                                                                                               (141) 
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Where 𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊 denotes imported price of the 𝑖-th goods in terms of foreign currency (exogenous); 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊 denotes exported price of the 𝑖-th goods in terms of foreign currency (exogenous); 𝑃𝑖
𝑀 
denotes imported price of the i-th goods in terms of domestic currency; 𝑃𝑖
𝐸  denotes exported 
price of the i-th goods in terms of domestic currency. 
 
6.2.8. Investment 
All descriptions for investment are similar to that of standard model. The final demand of 
the 𝑖-th investment commodity is given as follows: 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽), 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                                       (142) 
Where 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖 denotes the initial investment demand of the 𝑖-th commodity; 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 
denotes the investment adjustment index (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽=0 if investment is fixed; otherwise if it is 
allowed to adjust endogenously). 
The Walras identity is then determined from the saving-investment balance as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝑆𝐻ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
++𝑆𝐵 + 𝑆𝐺 + 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 −∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
                                (143) 
Where 𝑊𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆 denotes the Walras residual. 
 
6.2.9. The Armington Aggregations 
Finally, all descriptions to define Armington’s aggregations are similar to that of the standard 
model. In terms of trade aggregations (export and import), we assume that all energy goods do 
not generate CO2 emission since there are no processes of fuels burning. Hence, in this 
modified model, the equations of Armington’s aggregations are similar to the standard model 
of which we do not incorporate the CO2 emission tax. The respective of the 𝑖-th Armington’s 
composite goods (𝑍𝑖), demand function of import (𝑀𝑖) and domestic goods (𝐷𝑖) are specified 
as follows: 
 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 ,    
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷, Φ =
1
𝜎𝑧
− 1, 𝜎𝑧 > 1                                                                        (144) 
𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
(1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 }
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷           (145) 
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𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
𝑍}
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                            (146) 
The price index of the composite commodity (𝑃𝑖
𝑍) is obtained as:  
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 = (1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷              (147) 
Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, we exclude eq. 110 from the model specifications. 
For an industry that does not use imported goods, the relationship of domestically produced 
goods and composite goods is written as follows: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &   𝐶𝑀                                                                                                 (148) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝑀                                                                                                 (149) 
Furthermore, the respective of the 𝑖-th gross domestic output (𝑄𝑖); the i-th transformation 
of export (𝐸𝑖) and domestic commodity are specified as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑠𝑞𝑖(𝜔𝑒,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐸𝑖)
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐷𝑖)
𝜇𝑖)
1
 𝜇𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷, 
𝜇 =
1
𝜎𝑞
+ 1, 𝜎𝑞 > 0                                                                                                           (150) 
Nevertheless, for industry that produces only domestic commodities no exports 
transformation is needed and the relationship is simply written as follows: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝐸                                                                                                    (151) 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝜔𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐸
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄  
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                                                                                                (152) 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝜔𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝜍𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
(1 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
}
1
𝜍𝑖−1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                              (153) 
The price index of domestically produced commodity (𝑃𝑖
𝑞) is determined below: 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖 ,        
 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷                                                                                                                               (154) 
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Walras law states that the equilibrium in n markets is obtained by the the equilibrium in (n-1) 
markets. Thus, due to Walras’ Law, eq. 150 is arbitraly excluded from the model specifications. 
For an industry that produces only domestic commodities the price index of 𝑃𝑖
𝑞
 is simply 
written as follows: 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 ,  
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &  𝐶𝐸                                                                                                                           (155) 
 
 
 
6.2.10. Market-clearing 
The market-clearing conditions that correspond to the equilibrium between supply and demand 
in all goods markets are as follows: 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +∑𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶                                                        (156) 
The factor market-clearing conditions:  
∑𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐾𝑈 = 𝐾𝑆, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                                                    (157) 
∑ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈 = 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆                                                          (158) 
∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆                                  (159) 
Where 𝐾𝑆 denotes total capital supply; 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 denotes total resources supply; 𝐾𝑈 denotes 
unused or excessive capital stock; 𝐿𝑈𝑜 denotes the 𝑜-th unemployed labour; and 𝐿𝑆𝑜 denotes 
total supply of 𝑜-th labour. 
 
6.2.11. Closures 
The closure choices used in this CGE-energy model are similar to the standard CGE model 
specified in Chapter 3. For capital and labour closures we assume that capital and labour are 
mobile across industries with fixed (exogenous) rent and wages. The labour market equilibrium 
is obtained from the endogenous adjustment of unemployment rates, whilst the capital market 
equilibrium is achievable through the endogenous adjustment of aggregated capital rent. For 
saving-investment closure, we assume the exogenous institution saving. Thus the actual 
investment goods adjust to obtain the balance. For the open-economy model, we choose the 
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flexible exchange rate regime by which the Indonesian exchange rate is endogenous but having 
fixed the foreign saving such that the inflow-outflow deficit (or surplus) cleared. Finally, for 
the government balance, we assume that all net tax rates are exogenously determined but public 
saving is endogenous to clear the balance.  
Some closures, are added in this modified model since new equations and endogenous 
variables have been introduced into the system, including the fixed tax on fossil fuel used by 
activities and institutions (households and government).  We also assume that the adjusted 
resources rent across fossil and renewable (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆) activities and the total resources supply 
(𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆) are exogenously determined. The fixed resources used by the 𝑗-th fossil (including 
geothermal) and renewable industry (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗) adjust to ensure market clearing of each industry. 
However, we assume no unused resources (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈 = 0); the price of aggregated resources 
(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆) adjusts to ensure overall market clearing. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explain a detailed construction of the features of the CGE-energy model 
for Indonesia’s economy. The model extends the standard CGE model given in Chapter 3. The 
model is calibrated to the hypothetical energy-SAM dataset for the year 2008 explained in 
Chapter 5. The modifications mainly relate to expanding the energy production structures and 
the introduction of CO2 emission tax on dirty fuel consumption.    
Since the total number of equations is not equal to the total number of endogenous 
variables, we use a set of closure rules that are closely related to the actual condition of 
Indonesia’s economy. All closure rules used in the standard CGE model in Chapter 3 are 
implemented in this CGE-energy model, and some closures that relate to CO2 emission tax and 
natural resources factor are added.     
I will now apply the extended CGE-energy model to examine fiscal policies to promote 
clean energy utilization in Indonesia.  
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Appendix 6.A: List of equations of the Modified CGE model 
 
Eq. No Equations and their description No. of 
Eqs. 
End. Var. 
Domestic Production Block 
1. 𝒋-th Non-Energy Producing Structure (𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴,    𝑁𝐸 ∩ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = ∅) 
A. Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
B. We assume a Leontief function: 
1.  The intermediate input of 𝑖-th non-energy commodity (𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝐶 ∩ 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = ∅) used by 𝑗-th non-energy industry: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,      𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26x26 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
2.  The 𝑗-th value added-energy composite (VAEN) used: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
3.  The price of 𝑗-th non-energy domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
 
4.  The relationship between non-energy activity output and its commodity supply: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑁𝐸⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 
26 𝑄𝑖 
5.  The relationship between non-energy activity price and its commodity price: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,        𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴
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Eq. No Equations and their description No. of 
Eqs. 
End. Var. 
 Total no. of equations 780  
 
C. Second stage: Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵) Labour Composite and Capital-Energy Composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
6.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 ,    𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1,     𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
7.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th non-energy industry for capital-energy composite used: 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
8.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th non-energy industry for composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
9.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 Redundant 
 Total no. of equations 78  
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D. Third stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
10.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
,        𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴,  
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1 
0 redundant 
11.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,       𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
16X26 𝐿𝑜,𝑗  
12.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
 Total no. of equations 432  
 
E. Third stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
13.  𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
14.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th non-energy industry for energy composite used: 26 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
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𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
15.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th non-energy industry for capital used: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝐾𝑗  
16.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 Redundant 
 Total no. of equations 78  
 
F. Bottom stage: The choice of Energy Goods 
We assume a CES production function: 
17.  
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
18.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th non-energy industry for intermediate energy input used: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
17x26 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
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𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
19.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
26 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀
 
 Total no. of equations 468  
 
2. Energy Producing Structure 
2.1. 𝒋-th fossil mining industry (including geothermal mining) structure (𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ∩ 𝑁𝐸 = ∅) 
A. Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief function: 
20.  The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity – excluding energy goods – used by 
 𝑗-th fossil mining industry: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26x4 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
21.  The Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) used by the 𝑗-th fossil mining industry: 4 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
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𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
22.  The fixed resources (RES) used by the 𝑗-th fossil mining industry: 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗  
23.  The Price of 𝑗-th fossil mining domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂𝐶
+ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑝𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 ,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
 
24.  The relationship between activity output and commodity supply: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
4 𝑄𝑖 
25.  The relationship between activity price and commodity price: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 
 Total no. of equations 124  
 
B. Second stage: Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵) Labour Composite and Capital-Energy Composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
26.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗   , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
27.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th fossil mining industry for capital-energy composite used: 4 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
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𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
28.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th fossil mining industry for composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
29.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 Redundant 
 Total no. of equations 12  
 
C. Third stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
30.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 
𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1 
0 redundant 
31.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
16X4 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
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32.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
 
D. Third stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite 
We assume a Leontief function: 
33.  The capital used by 𝑗-th fossil mining industry: 
  𝐾𝑗  =   𝑎𝑘𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 ,    𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4   𝐾𝑗  
34.  The energy composite (ENCOM) used by 𝑗-th fossil mining industry: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
35.  The Price of 𝑗-th fossil mining capital-energy composite: 
𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑘𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
4 𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
 
 Total no. of equations 80  
 
E. Bottom stage: The choice of Energy Goods 
We assume a Leontief production function: 
36.  The energy used by 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17x4 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
37.  The Price of 𝑗-th fossil mining energy composite: 4 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀
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𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 Total no. of equations 72  
 
2.2. Refinery Industry Structure (𝒋 ∈ 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒚 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨, 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ∩ 𝑵𝑬 = ∅)  
A. Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief function: 
38.  The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity – excluding energy goods – used by 
 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26x1 𝑋𝑁𝐸𝐶,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 
39.  The Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) used by the 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
40.  The intermediate input of crude oil commodity used by 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
𝑋𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1x1 𝑋𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗 
41.  The price of 𝑗-th refinery domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗  
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 
1 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
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+ ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
+ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑗)𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑍 𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦, 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
42.  The relationship between activity output and commodity supply: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
12 𝑄𝑖  
43.  The relationship between activity price and commodity price: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑗,𝑖𝑃𝑖
𝑄
𝑖∈𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 
 Total no. of equations 42  
 
B. Second stage: Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵) Labour Composite and Capital-Energy Composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
44.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
45.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th refinery industry for capital-energy composite used: 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
46.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th refinery industry for composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
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47.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 Redundant 
 Total no. of equations 3  
 
C. Third stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
48.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙
− 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1 
0 redundant 
49.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
16X1 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
50.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
 Total no. of equations 17  
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D. Third stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite 
We assume a Leontief function: 
51.  The capital used by 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
  𝐾𝑗  =   𝑎𝑘𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 ,     𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐾𝑗  
52.  The energy composite (ENCOM) – excluding crude oil – used by 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
53.  The price of 𝑗-th refinery’s capital-energy composite: 
𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 = 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝑎𝑘𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑝𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
 
 Total no. of equations 3  
 
E. Bottom stage: The choice of Energy Goods 
We assume a Leontief production function: 
54.  The energy used – excluding crude oil – by 𝑗-th refinery industry: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑜𝑖𝑙 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
16x1 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
55.  The price of 𝑗-th refinery energy composite: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 = ∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗,
𝑖≠𝑜𝑖𝑙∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
1 𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀
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𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 Total no. of equations 17  
 
2.3. Electricity industry structure ( 𝒋 ∈ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨)  
The relationships of electricity activities output (and price) and their homogenous electricity supply 
56.  
The fixed shares of transmission (and distribution) output to electricity supply: 
𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖  =   𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑄𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
1 𝑄𝑖 
57.  
The fixed shares of generation composite output to electricity supply: 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑄𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
1 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖  
58.  
The price of electricity supply which is obtained from the weighted sum of the prices of transmission (and distribution) and 
generation composite: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑝𝑖
𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
1 𝑝𝑖
𝑄 
Introducing the hybrid model of electricity load 
59.  
The choice of generation composite load 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝑠𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑖 ∏ 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
    , ∑ 𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
= 1, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
0 redundant 
60.  The optimum load of each type of generation technology: 3 𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖 
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𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖 = 𝛿𝑗,𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
61.  
Price index of generation composite load: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁 =
1
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖
𝑗∈𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ⊂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦⊂𝐴
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
1 𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁
 
A. Transmission and Distribution ( 𝒋 ∈ 𝑻𝑫 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief function: 
62.  The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity – excluding energy goods – used by transmission (and distribution) activity: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26x1   𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
63.  The Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) used: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
64.  The Price of 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
 
 
Total no. of equations 
 
 
28 
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Second stage: Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵) Labour Composite and Capital-Energy Composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
65.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
66.  The demand solution of capital-energy composite used: 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
67.  The demand solution of composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
68.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
 Total no. of equations 3  
Third stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
69.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  
0 redundant 
70.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 16X1 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
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𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
71.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  
1 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
 Total no. of equations 17  
Third stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
72.  𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐾𝑗  
73.  The demand solution of energy composite used: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
74.  The demand solution of 𝑗-th transmission (and distribution) industry for capital used: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
 
75.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
 Total no. of equations 3  
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Bottom stage: The choice of Energy Goods 
We assume a CES production function: 
76.  
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
0 redundant 
77.  The demand solution of intermediate energy input used: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17x1 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
78.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
1 𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀
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𝑗 ∈ 𝑇𝐷 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 Total no. of equations 19  
B. Electricity Generation (Power Plant) 
B.1. Structure of Conventional Generation Activity ( 𝒋 ∈ 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒗 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief function: 
79.  The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity – excluding energy goods – used by conventional activity: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17x1 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
80.  The Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) used: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
81.  The price of conventional generation domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑁𝐸𝐶⊂𝐶
,          
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 
 Total no. of equations 19  
Second stage: Value Added-Energy Composite (VAEN) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵) Labour Composite and Capital-Energy Composite (𝐾𝐸𝑁) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
82.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  
1 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
83.  The demand solution of capital-energy composite used: 1 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
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𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  
84.  The demand solution of composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
85.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗
,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  
0 redundant 
Third stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
86.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1 
0 redundant 
87.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
16X1 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
88.  Zero profit condition: 1 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
251 
 
 
 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 Total no. of equations 17  
Third stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
89.  𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 
1 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
90.  The demand solution of energy composite used: 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
91.  The demand solution of conventional industry for capital used: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐾𝑗  
92.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 =
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
 Total no. of equations 3  
 
Bottom stage: The choice of Energy Goods 
We assume a CES production function: 
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93.  
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗 { ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
1+𝜙𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
−𝜙𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
}
−
1
 𝜙𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
1 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  
94.  The demand solution of intermediate energy input used: 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = (
𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑗
𝜙𝑗
𝜙𝑗+1
)𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗 (
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 )
−1
𝜙𝑗+1
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17x1 𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
95.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀 =
∑ (1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑖∈𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
 Total no. of equations 18  
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B.2. Structure of Renewable (Geothermal and Hydro) Generation Activity ( 𝒋 ∈ 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒘 ⊂ 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕 ⊂ 𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒚 ⊂ 𝑨) 
Top Stage: Activity Output (Gross Domestic Output) 
We assume a Leontief function: 
96.  
The intermediate input of 𝑖-th commodity – excluding electricity goods – used by renewable generation activity: 
  𝑋𝑖,𝑗  =   𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∈ 𝐶,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
43x2 
 
 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗  
97.  The Value Added- electricity (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗) used: 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑄𝐴𝑗  
98.  The fixed factor of natural resources used: 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑄𝐴𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗  
99.  The price of renewable generation domestic output: 
(1 + (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)) 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑗 + 
∑ (1+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗)𝑝𝑖
𝑍𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑖≠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦∈𝐶
+ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑝𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴;  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,     
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 
 Total 40  
254 
 
 
 
Second stage: Value Added-Electricity (𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗) from combination of (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) Labour Composite and Capital-Electricity (𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗) 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas function: 
100.  
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑗𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗 , 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗  
101.  The demand solution of capital-energy composite used: 
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝐿,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗  
102.  The demand solution of composite labour factor used: 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  
103.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿 =
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗
 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
 Total no. of equations 6  
Bottom stage (Left Side): The choice of labour factor 
We assume a CES production function: 
104.  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 = 𝑠𝑙𝑗 { ∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗
1+𝛽𝑗𝐿𝑜,𝑗
−𝛽𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
}
−
1
 𝛽𝑗 
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴, 
∑ 𝛾𝑜,𝑗 = 1
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝐿 − 1 
0 redundant 
255 
 
 
 
105.  The 𝑜-th labour used: 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 = (
𝛾𝑜,𝑗
𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝛽𝑗
𝛽𝑗+1
)𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 (
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵
)
−1
𝛽𝑗+1
, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
16X2 𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
106.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 =∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵
 
 Total no. of equations 34  
Bottom stage (Right Side): The choice of Capital and Energy Composite  
We assume a CES production function: 
107.  𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 = 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗
𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗𝐾𝑗
𝜒𝐾,𝑗 , 𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗  
108.  The demand solution of electricity input used: 
𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 = 𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑧 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗  
109.  The demand solution of capital used: 
𝐾𝑗 = 𝜒𝐾,𝑗
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝑗
𝐾 𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
2 𝐾𝑗  
110.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿 =
𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑧 𝑋𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑗 + 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤
, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
0 redundant 
256 
 
 
 
 Total no. of equations 6  
 
Government Block 
111.  Total government revenue:  
𝐼𝐺 =∑(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+ ∑ (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2. 𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 
1 𝐼𝐺 
112.  Total government expenditure:  
𝐸𝐺 =∑(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐺𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖)𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
+∑(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗)𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴𝑄𝐴𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝐶  ;  𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣 ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝐶 
1 𝐸𝐺 
113.  Public spending on 𝑖-th final goods: 
𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
43 𝐶𝐺𝑖  
114.  Government spending on public services:  
𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑔𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟, ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑏,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣  
257 
 
 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
115.  Government saving: 
𝑆𝐺 = 𝐼𝐺 − 𝐸𝐺 
1 𝑆𝐺 
 Total no. of equations 57  
 
Households Block 
116.  Total income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ + 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ + ∑ 𝑇𝑅ℎ,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐼𝐻ℎ  
117.  Labour income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ = ∑ 𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ  
118.  Capital income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
8 𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ  
119.  Household income due to the extraction of natural resources: 8 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ 
258 
 
 
 
𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ = 𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑃
𝑅𝐸𝑆 ( ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
) , ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
120.  Disposable income of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ  − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2 ∑ 𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈{𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠}⊂𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐⊂𝐶
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
8 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ  
121.  The the ℎ-th household transfer payments to institution’s:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ = 𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,ℎ = (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 )(𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ) 𝐼𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
11x8 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ 
122.  Actual disposable income of the ℎ-th household:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ = 𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,ℎ
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ  
123.  The ℎ-th household saving: 
𝑆𝐻ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 
 
𝑆𝐻ℎ  
124.  Adjusted average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th households: 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ = 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ(1 + 𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗), ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ  
125.  Consumption budget of the ℎ-th household: 
𝐸𝐻ℎ = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ − 𝑆𝐻ℎ, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝐸𝐻ℎ  
259 
 
 
 
126.  Final demand of the ℎ-th household:  
We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
(1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ)𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ = 𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝐸𝐻ℎ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶;  𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ ≠ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖: {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐶 
43x8 𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ 
 Total no. of equations 352  
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
127.  Price index of ℎ-th households: 
𝑃𝐼ℎ =∏𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ
𝑖∈𝐶
, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
8 𝑃𝐼ℎ  
128.  CPI: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝑤ℎ𝑃𝐼ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
 
1 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵  
 Total no. of equations 9  
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Enterprise 
129.  Total enterprise income: 
𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑏,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐼𝐵 
130.  Capital income of enterprise: 
𝐼𝐵𝐾 = 𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐼𝐵𝐾 
131.  Enterprise income due to the extraction of natural resources: 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆 = 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆 ( ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
) 
1 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆 
132.  Disposable income of enterprise: 
𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐼𝐵 − 𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 , 𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐷𝐼𝐵 
133.  Enterprise transfer payment to 𝑖𝑛-th institutions:   
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 = 𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏𝐷𝐼𝐵, 𝑖𝑛 ≠ 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = (𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐼𝐵,    𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆   
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏 
134.  Actual disposable income of enterprise:  
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝐷𝐼𝐵 − ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑏
 𝑖𝑛≠𝑔𝑜𝑣∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
 
1 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 
135.  Saving of enterprise: 1 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽 
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𝑆𝐵 = 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵 
 Total no. of equations 17  
 
Export, Import and The Balance of Payments Constraint Block 
136.  RoW total outflow:  
𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝑀
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑖𝑛
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑃𝑜
𝐿 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿
𝑗∈𝐴
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 + 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊)
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+  𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐾 (∑𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊) , 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 
137.  RoW total inflow:   
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶𝐸
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑖𝑛∈𝐼𝑁𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑜
𝐿𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑜∈𝐿𝐵𝑅
+ 𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
1 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 
138.  ROW transfer payment to institutions’:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊(𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊,𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 0 is treated as exogenous 
11x1 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊   
139.  Current account deficit: 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 = 𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊 − 𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊 
1 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 
140.  The price of export for the 𝑖-th of commodities: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 
28 𝑃𝑖
𝐸  
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141.  The price of import for the 𝑖-th of commodities: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 
37 𝑃𝑖
𝑀  
 Total no. of equations 88  
 
Investment Block 
142.  Final demand of the 𝑖-th investment commodities: 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 = 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽), 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
43 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑗  
143.  Saving-Investment identity used for Walras law 
𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝑆𝐻ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝑆𝐵 + 𝑆𝐺 + 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 −∑𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖∈𝐶
  
1 𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆 
 Total no. of equations 44  
 
Production of composite good  
144.  Armington’s production function: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑠𝑧𝑖 (𝛿𝑚,𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝑀𝑖
−Φ𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑,𝑖
1+Φ𝑖𝐷𝑖
−Φ𝑖
)
−
1
 Φ𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷  , Φ =
1
𝜎𝑧
− 1, 𝜎𝑧 > 1 
0 redundant 
145.  The final goods production by only utilizes the input of domestic commodities (not imported): 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &   𝐶𝑀 
6 𝐷𝑖  
146.  The 𝑖-th import commodity used: 37 𝑀𝑖  
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𝑀𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑚𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
(1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 }
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
147.  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity used: 
𝐷𝑖 = (
𝛿𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑧𝑖
Φ𝑖
1+Φ𝑖
)𝑍𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
𝑃𝑖
𝑍}
−
1
1+Φ𝑖
, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
37 𝐷𝑖  
148.  Zero profit condition: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 = (1 + (𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
37 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 
149.  Zero profit condition in which the industry only utilizes the input of domestic commodities (not imported): 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝑀 
6 𝑃𝑖
𝑍 
 Total no. of equations 127  
 
Division of gross production to domestic and exports sales   
150.  Armington’s transformation equation:  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑠𝑞𝑖(𝜔𝑒,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐸𝑖)
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜔𝑑,𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖(𝐷𝑖)
𝜇𝑖)
1
 𝜇𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷, 𝜇 =
1
𝜎𝑞
+ 1        , 𝜎𝑞 > 0 
0 redundant 
151.  Gross Domestic Output in the case where the industry produces only domestic commodities (not exported): 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷 &  𝐶𝐸 
15 𝑃𝑖
𝐷  
152.  The 𝑖-th export commodity: 28 𝐸𝑖  
264 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝜔𝑒𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝜇𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐸
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
153.  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity supply: 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝜔𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝜍𝑖
𝜍𝑖−1
⁄
𝑄𝑖 {
𝑃𝑖
𝐷
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 
}
1
𝜇𝑖−1
,  
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
28 𝑃𝑖
𝐷  
154.  Zero profit condition:  
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑖,
𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
28 𝑃𝑖
𝑄  
155.  Zero profit condition in the case where the industry produces only for domestic commodities (not exported): 
(1 + (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖) − (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖))𝑃𝑖
𝑄 = 𝑃𝑖
𝐷 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐷  &  𝐶𝐸 
15 𝑃𝑖
𝑄  
 Total no. of equations 168  
 
Market Clearing Conditions Block 
156.  Total supply equals with the total demand: 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ
ℎ∈𝐻
+ 𝐶𝐺𝑖 + 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 +∑𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
,   𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
43 𝑍𝑖  
157.  Capital factor market-clearing conditions: 1 𝑃𝐾  
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∑𝐾𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐾𝑈 = 𝐾𝑆, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
158.  Resource factor market-clearing conditions: 
∑ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙⊂𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗
𝑗∈𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤⊂𝐴
+ 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈 = 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 
1  
159.  Labour factor market-clearing conditions: 
∑𝐿𝑜,𝑗
𝑗∈𝐴
+ 𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝐿𝑈𝑜 = 𝐿𝑆𝑜 , 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
16 𝑃𝑜
𝐿  
 Total no. of equations 61  
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Appendix 6.B: List of all variables appearing in the CGE model (Alphabetical Orders) 
Notation used for the 
variable 
Set, Subset, and Element Notation Number of Variables Definition of the Variable 
 Endogenous Exogenous 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐵  1  Actual disposable income of enterprise 
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  
Actual disposable income of the h-th type of 
households 
𝐵𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 Income tax rate of enterprise  
𝐶𝑂2𝐻𝑖,ℎ 𝑖 ∈ {𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠} ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶  12*8 
CO2 emissions generated in ℎ-th households’ used of 
dirty fuel 
𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿  1  Total CO2 emissions generated 
𝐶𝐺𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 43  Government demand of the i-th composite goods 
𝐶𝐻𝑖,ℎ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 43*8  
The ℎ-th household final demand of the 𝑖-th composite 
goods  
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 43  Investment demand of the 𝑖-th composite goods 
𝐶𝑃𝐼   1 Consumer Price Index 
𝐷𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 43  The 𝑖-th domestic commodity 
𝐷𝐼𝐵  1  Disposable income of enterprise 
𝐷𝐼𝐻ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Disposable income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐸𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 28  The 𝑖-th exported commodity 
𝐸𝐺  1  Total government expenditure 
𝐸𝐻ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Consumption budget of the ℎ-th household 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Energy composite used in in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Energy composite used in in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Energy composite used in in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  Energy composite used in in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑊  1  RoW total inflow 
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𝐸𝑋𝑅   1 
Exchange rate: units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 1  Generation composite output to electricity supply 
𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 Average tax rate of ℎ-th household income 
𝐼𝐵  1  Total enterprise income 
𝐼𝐵𝐾  1  Capital income of enterprise 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆  1  Resources income of enterprise 
𝐼𝐺  1  Total government revenue 
𝐼𝐻ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Total income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐾ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Capital income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐿ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Labour income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽  1  
The investment adjustment index (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝐷𝐽=0 if 
investment is fixed; otherwise if it is allowed to adjust 
endogenously) 
𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Resources income of the ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝑅𝑂𝑊  1  RoW total outflow 
𝐾𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Capital used in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝐾𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Capital used in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including 
geothermal) 
𝐾𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Capital used in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝐾𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  Capital used in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝐾𝑅𝑂𝑊   1 Capital used in abroad 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Capital-energy composite used in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Capital-energy composite used in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Capital-energy composite used in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
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𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Capital-energy composite used in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
(excluding renewable generation) 
𝐾𝐸𝐿𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Capital-electricity composite used in 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th 
generation activity 
𝐾𝑆   1 Total of capital supply 
𝐾𝑈   1 Unemployed (unused) capital 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 16*26  The 𝑜-th labour used in 𝑁𝐸-th activity  
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 16*4  
The 𝑜-th labour used in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including 
geothermal) 
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 
𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
⊂ 𝐴 
16*1  
The 𝑜-th labour used in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity  
𝐿𝑜,𝑗 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅,   𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 16*4  The 𝑜-th labour used in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity  
𝐿𝑜,𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅  16 The 𝑜-th labour used abroad  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  The composite labour in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
The composite labour in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including 
geothermal) 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  The composite labour in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  The composite labour in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝐿𝑆𝑜 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅 16  Total supply of labour types  
𝐿𝑈𝑜 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅  16 Total unemployment of labour types 
𝑀𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 37  The 𝑖-th import commodity 
𝑃𝑖
𝐷 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 43  Price of the 𝑖-th domestically produced commodity 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴  26 The adjusted capital rent across 𝑁𝐸 activities  
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  4 
The adjusted capital rent across 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 activities 
(including geothermal) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  1 The adjusted capital rent across 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity 
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𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐾 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  4 The adjusted capital rent across 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activities  
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴  16*26 The adjusted labour type wages across 𝑁𝐸 activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  16*4 
The adjusted labour type wages across 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 
activities (including geothermal) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  16*1 
The adjusted labour type wages across 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 
activity 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑜,𝑗
𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  16*4 
The adjusted labour type wages across 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  
The adjusted labour composite wage across 𝑁𝐸 
activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
The adjusted labour composite wage across 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 
activities (including geothermal) 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  
The adjusted labour composite wage across 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 
activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝐿𝐴𝐵 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
The adjusted labour composite wage across 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  4 The adjusted resources rent across 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 activities 
𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗
𝑅𝐸𝑆  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴  2 The adjusted resources rent across 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 activities 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 28  Price of the 𝑖-th exported commodity 
𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Price of energy composite in 𝑁𝐸-th activity  
𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Price of energy composite in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal)   
𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Price of energy composite in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝑝𝑗
𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀  𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  Price of energy composite in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity  
𝑝𝑖
𝐺𝐸𝑁  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 1  Price of generation composite output 
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𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷  28 
The price of the 𝑖-th of exported commodities in terms 
of foreign currency  
𝑃𝐼ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Price index of ℎ-th households 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 37  Price of the 𝑖-th imported commodity 
𝑃𝐾   1  Price of aggregate capital  
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Price of capital-energy in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Price of capital-energy in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including 
geothermal) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Price of capital-energy in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝑁 𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Price of capital-energy in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity (excluding 
renewable generation) 
𝑃𝑗
𝐾𝐸𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Price of capital-electricity in 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th generation 
activity 
𝑃𝑜
𝐿  𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅 16  Wages rate of the 𝑜-th labour  
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐵   1  
Wages rate of the composite labour in aggregated 
activities 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷  37 
The price of the 𝑖-th imported commodities in terms of 
foreign currency 
𝑃𝑖
𝑄
 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 26  Price of the 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th domestically produced goods 
𝑃𝑖
𝑄 𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 4  
Price of the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐-th domestically produced goods 
(including geothermal) 
𝑃𝑖
𝑄 𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 12  
Price of the 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐-th domestically produced 
goods 
𝑃𝑖
𝑄 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 1  Price of the 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 domestically produced goods 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴
 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Price of gross domestic output of 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Price of gross domestic output of 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
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𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Price of gross domestic output of 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝑄𝐴 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  Price of gross domestic output of 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝑃𝑗,𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝐴
 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,   
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
3*1  
Price of gross domestic output of 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th power plant 
activity 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆  1  Price of aggregate resources 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Price of value added-energy in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Price of value added-energy in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Price of value added-energy in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁  𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Price of value added-energy in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
activity(excluding renewable generation) 
𝑃𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
Price of value added-energy in 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th generation 
activity  
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 17  Price of the 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th final (composite) goods 
𝑃𝑖
𝑍 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 26  Price of the 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th final (composite) goods 
𝑄𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 26  The 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th domestic goods 
𝑄𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 4  The 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐-th domestic goods (including geothermal) 
𝑄𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 12  The 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐-th domestic goods  
𝑄𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 1  The 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 domestic goods 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  Gross domestic output of 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
Gross domestic output of 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including 
geothermal) 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  Gross domestic output of 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝑄𝐴𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  Gross domestic output of 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦-th activity 
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𝑄𝑄𝐴𝑗,𝑖 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,   
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
3*1  
Gross domestic output of 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ-th power plant activity 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
The factor resources (RES) used by the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th 
industry (including geothermal) 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
The factor resources (RES) used by the 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th 
industry  
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆   1 Total of resources supply 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈   1 Unemployed (unused) resources 
𝑆𝐵   1 Enterprise saving 
𝑆𝐺  1  Government saving 
𝑆𝐻ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  Household saving 
𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑑𝑗  1  The endogenous adjustment of 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 8  
Adjusted average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th 
type of households 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 Average subsidy rate of the 𝑗-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 Average subsidy rate of the 𝑖-th gross domestic output 
𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊   1 Current account deficit 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2   1 Tax on CO2 emissions 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴  17*26 Tax of dirty fuel used in the 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 17*4 
Tax of dirty fuel used in the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 17*1 Tax of dirty fuel used in the 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
 17*4 Tax of dirty fuel used in the 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,𝑔𝑜𝑣  
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
 17*1 Tax of dirty fuel used in the government institution 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐹𝑈𝐸𝐿𝑖,ℎ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,    17*8 Tax of dirty fuel used in the government institution 
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ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 Average import tariff rate of 𝑖-th imported commodity 
𝑇𝐴𝐷𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 1  
Transmission (and distribution) output to electricity 
supply 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑛,𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 120 1 Transfers between 𝑖𝑛-th institution’s 
𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑏𝑎𝑟   1 Total government transfer payments 
𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑊_𝑏𝑎𝑟   1 Total ROW transfer payments 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26  The value added-energy output in 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 4  
The value added-energy output in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
(including geothermal) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 1  The value added-energy output in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑗 𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
The value added-energy output in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
(excluding renewable generation) 
𝑉𝐴𝐸𝐿𝑗 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 2  
The value added-electricity output in 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th 
generation activity 
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   1 
The average ad valorem tax rate of the 𝑖-th gross 
domestic output 
𝑊𝐴𝐿_𝑅𝐸𝑆  1  Saving-Investment identity used for Walras law 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 17*26  
The 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th intermediate commodity input for 𝑁𝐸-
th activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17*4  
The 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th intermediate commodity input for 
𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity (including geothermal) 
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17*1  
The 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th intermediate commodity input for 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
17*4  
The 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th intermediate commodity input for 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 26*26  
The 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate commodity input – 
excluding energy goods – for 𝑁𝐸-th activity  
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𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26*4  
The 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate commodity input – 
excluding energy goods – for 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26*1  
The 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate commodity input – 
excluding energy goods – for 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
26*2  
The 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate commodity input – 
excluding energy goods – for 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity  
𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∈ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
42*2  
The 𝑖-th intermediate commodity for 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th 
generation activity  
𝑍𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 43  Final output of the 𝑖-th composite commodity 
TOTAL No:  3505 1540  
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Appendix 6.C: List of all parameters used in the modified CGE model 
Parameters Set, Subset, and Element Notation Description and measurement 
𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝐾𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  for one 
unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  
𝑎𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  for one 
unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  for 
one unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  
𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
for one unit of 𝐾𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
The fixed shares of generation composite output to electricity 
supply 
𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
The fixed shares of transmission (and distribution) output to 
electricity supply 
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑁𝐸 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸 for one 
unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑁𝐸    
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  for 
one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙     
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  for 
one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦     
𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of the 𝑉𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  for 
one unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦    
𝑎𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐶,𝑁𝐸 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate 
input – excluding energy goods – for a unit of 𝑄𝐴𝑁𝐸    
𝑎𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐶,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate 
input – excluding energy goods – for a unit of 𝑄𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  
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𝑎𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐶,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate 
input – excluding energy goods – for a unit of 𝑄𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
𝑎𝑥𝑁𝐸𝐶,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑁𝐸𝐶-th intermediate 
input – excluding energy goods – for a unit of 𝑄𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th 
intermediate input for a unit of 𝑄𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Coefficient of minimum requirements of 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦-th 
intermediate input for a unit of 𝑄𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  
  𝛽𝑁𝐸 =
1
𝜎𝑁𝐸
𝑙 − 1, 𝜎𝑁𝐸
𝑙
> 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Elasticity (CES-composite labour) in 𝑁𝐸-th industry (non-
energy) 
  𝛽𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
=
1
𝜎𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
𝑙 − 1 , 𝜎𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
𝑙 > 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Elasticity (CES-composite labour) in 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry  
  𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦
=
1
𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑙
− 1      , 𝜎𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦
𝑙 > 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Elasticity (CES-composite labour) in 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 industry  
  𝛽𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑗
𝑙 − 1, 𝜎𝑗
𝑙 > 1 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
Elasticity (CES-composite labour) in 𝑗-th industry (non-
energy, and energy producing sectors) 
𝛿𝑑𝑖 + 𝛿𝑚𝑖 = 1 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
Import and domestic share parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th 
composite commodity, 0 ≤ 𝛿𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑁𝐸 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑁𝐸 = 1 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of capital and labour by 𝑁𝐸-th industry, 0 ≤
𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑁𝐸 ≤ 1 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙
= 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of capital and labour by 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry, 
0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ≤ 1 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 = 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of capital and labour by 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th 
industry, 
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0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ≤ 1 
𝛿𝐿𝐴𝐵,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1 𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of capital and labour by 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th industry, 
0 ≤ 𝛿𝐾𝐸𝑁,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ≤ 1 
𝜆𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,   
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
Share parameter of each generation technology to produce 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 commodity, 
∑ 𝜆𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐
𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ∈𝐴
= 1 
𝛾𝑜,𝑁𝐸 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑁𝐸-th industry  
(0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑁𝐸 ≤ 1) 
𝛾𝑜,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry  
(0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ≤ 1) 
𝛾𝑜,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th industry 
(0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ≤ 1) 
𝛾𝑜,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of 𝑜-th labour used by 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦-th 
industry  
(0 ≤ 𝛾𝑜,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ≤ 1) 
𝜅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑁𝐸  
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of energy types used by 𝑁𝐸-th industry  
(0 ≤ 𝜅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑁𝐸 ≤ 1) 
𝜅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶,   
𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of energy types used by 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th industry  
(0 ≤ 𝜅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ≤ 1) 
𝜔𝑒𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
Share parameter of 𝑖-th transformation commodity, 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑒𝑖 ≤
1  
𝜔𝑑𝑖 + 𝜔𝑒𝑖 = 1 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 
Export and domestic share parameter of Armington’s for 𝑖-th 
composite commodity, 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑑𝑖 ≤ 1 
𝜙𝑁𝐸 =
1
𝜎𝑁𝐸
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 − 1     
, 𝜎𝑁𝐸
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 > 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 Elasticity (CES-energy composite) in 𝑁𝐸-th industry  
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𝜙𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
1
𝜎𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 − 1     
, 𝜎𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 > 1 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Elasticity (CES-energy composite) in 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th industry  
𝜇𝑖 =
1
𝜎𝑖
𝑞 + 1, 𝜎𝑖
𝑞 > 0 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 Elasticity (CET-Armington’s) 
Φi =
1
𝜎𝑖
𝑧 − 1, 𝜎𝑖
𝑧 > 1 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∩ 𝐶𝐷 Elasticity (CES-Armington’s) 
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑁𝐸 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑁𝐸 = 1 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of energy composite and capital by 𝑁𝐸-th 
industry, 
0 ≤ 𝜒𝐾,𝑁𝐸 ≤ 1 
𝜒𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1 𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of energy composite and capital by 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
industry, 
0 ≤ 𝜒𝐾,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ≤ 1 
𝜒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡,𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝜒𝐾,𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 1 𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Share parameter of energy composite and capital by 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
industry, 
0 ≤ 𝜒𝐾,𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ≤ 1 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 The fixed resources (RES) used by the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ⊂ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 The fixed resources (RES) used by the 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤-th industry 
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑁𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of energy composite used by the 𝑁𝐸-th 
industry  
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of energy composite used by the 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-
th industry  
𝑠𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐  𝑖 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
Efficiency parameter of generation composite for 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐 
commodity  
𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑁𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of capital-energy composite used by the 
𝑁𝐸-th industry  
𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of capital-energy composite used by the 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th industry  
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𝑠𝑙𝑁𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑁𝐸-th 
industry (non-energy producing sectors) 
𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-
th industry  
𝑠𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 industry  
𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th 
industry  
𝑠𝑙𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of composite labour used by the 𝑗-th 
industry (non-energy, and energy producing sectors) 
𝑠𝑞𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
Shift parameter of CET transformation of 𝑖-th commodity 
supply 
𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑁𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 
Efficiency parameter of 𝑉𝐴EN used by the 𝑁𝐸-th industry 
(non-energy producing sectors) 
𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Efficiency parameter of 𝑉𝐴EN used by the 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th industry  
𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Efficiency parameter of 𝑉𝐴EN used by the 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 industry  
𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Efficiency parameter of 𝑉𝐴EN used by the 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th industry  
𝑠𝑧𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 Shift parameter of Armington’s production of 𝑖-th final goods 
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Appendix 6.D: List of Shares, Rates, and Weights 
Parameters Set, Subset, and Element Notation Description and measurement 
𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  Adjustment factor for government consumption  
𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
Initial government consumption on the 𝑖-th types of 
composite goods 
𝐶𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,ℎ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Share parameter of Cobb-Douglas utility function of the ℎ-th 
type of households to consume the 𝑖-th composite goods 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 Initial investment demand of the 𝑖-th commodity 
𝐻𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 Specific tax rate adjustment of ℎ-th household 
𝐼𝐵𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  Share of capital income received by enterprise 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  Share of resources income received by enterprise 
𝐼𝐻𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 Share of capital income received by ℎ-th type of households 
𝐼𝐻𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ,𝑜 ℎ ∈ 𝐻, 𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅 
Share of the 𝑜-th type of labour income received by ℎ-th type 
of households 
𝐼𝐻𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Share of resources income received by ℎ-th type of 
households 
𝑅𝐾_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  Share of the foreign capital used domestically 
𝑅𝐿_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜  𝑜 ∈ 𝐿𝐵𝑅 Share of the 𝑜-th type of foreign labour used domestically 
𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 Dummy parameter to allow 𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜ℎ to adjust 
𝑠ℎ_𝑟𝑖𝑛ℎ  ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
Initial value of average propensity for saving of the ℎ-th type 
of households 
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𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑁𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑁𝐸-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙  𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑗 ∈ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗  𝑗 ∈ 𝐴 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑗-th activity 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 Subsidy rate adjustment across 𝑖-th gross domestic output 
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖  𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 Import tariff rate adjustment across 𝑖-th imported commodity 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑁𝐸,𝑁𝐸𝐶  𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐸 ⊂ 𝐴, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝐶 ⊂ 𝐶 
Input-Output coefficients between non-energy output and 
their commodity supply 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙,𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,   
𝑖 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
Input-Output coefficients fossil output and their commodity 
supply 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦,𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐  
𝑗 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴,   
𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑐 ⊂ 𝐶 
Input-Output coefficients between refinery output and their 
commodity supply 
𝑇𝑅𝐵_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑏 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
The share of enterprise transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th 
institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝐺_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑔𝑜𝑣 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
The share of government transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th 
institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝐻_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,ℎ  𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, ℎ ∈ 𝐻 ⊂ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
The share of the ℎ-th type of households transfer payment to 
non-government institution’s  
𝑇𝑅𝑊_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛,𝑅𝑂𝑊  𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑅𝑂𝑊 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆 
The share of the 𝑅𝑂𝑊 transfer payment to the 𝑖𝑛-th 
institution’s  
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𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 
The ad valorem tax rate adjustment across 𝑖-th gross 
domestic output 
𝑤ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻 
CPI weight as share of each households’ expenditure in total 
expenditure 
 
Appendix 6.E: Value of CES and CET Elasticity 
CES and CET 
Parameter 
Value Source 
𝛽𝑗 0.8 
Decaluwé, et al (2012) 
𝜍𝑖 2 
𝜌𝑗 1.5 
Φ𝑖 2 
θ𝑁𝐸 0.3 – 0.5 Paltsev, et al (2005); Orlov (2012); and  
Orlov, et al (2013) 
θ𝑇𝐷 0.3 – 0.5 
θ𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 0.3 – 0.5 
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Chapter 7 
Policy Experiments Using the Hybrid CGE Model for Energy Analysis in Indonesia 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the threat of global warming – that is primarily caused by the 
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions – have become a central issue in the world’s political 
and scientific arena. The global average temperature has increased by 0.60C over the last 
century, whilst the CO2 concentration could rise between 75% - 350% above preindustrial level 
by the end of the twenty-first century (IPCC, 2010). If the CO2 emissions are not mitigated, 
the global temperature could rise by between 1.4 – 5.80C by 2100 (IEA, 2009; and Baumert, 
et al., 2005). As a consequence, the climate change can lead to severe problems for the world’s 
population, especially in developing countries, such as sea level rise, extreme weather, 
flooding, a drop in biodiversity, a lack of water resources, and diseases (Lackner, et al., 2012; 
and Baumert, et al., 2005).  
In addressing these issues, numerous international programs and approaches have been 
proposed to reduce the level of GHG released into the atmosphere that create global warming 
(Moore, 2012). Among other strategies, carbon abatement as well as the development of clean 
energy production are becoming one of the priority to mitigate the anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) effect. The common targeted types of GHGs to be reduced are (i) carbon dioxide 
(CO2) which is emitted mainly from the fossil fuels combustion; (ii) methane (CH4) which is 
emitted from the production of fossil fuels, livestock, and organic waste; (iii) nitrous oxide 
(N2O) which is emitted from agricultural and industrial activities as well as the burning of 
fossil fuels and waste; and (iv) the families of hydrofluorocarbons (HCFs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) which are emitted by industrial processes (Moore, 
2012). Nevertheless, compared to other GHGs, CO2 has a much higher concentration in the 
atmosphere and is increasing due to the combustion of fossil fuels which is identified as one 
of the major sources of greenhouse gas emissions (Lackner, et al., 2012). Baumert, et al (2005) 
stated that since post industrial revolution, the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have 
increased 35% which is mainly due to fossil fuels combustion and deforestation. Energy sector 
is considered as the major contributor of GHG emissions (Lackner, et al., 2012). It is generally 
recognized that in developing countries, the burning of fossil fuel tends to rapidly increase as 
a result of their economic growth (Lackner, et al., 2012). Therefore, it is important to achieve 
a low carbon development from, i.e., converting fossil-fuel utilization to renewable energies 
including energy efficiency (Lackner, et al., 2012).  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the 
United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations 
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Environment Program (UNEP), as key task to develop policies in addressing the climate 
change issues (Moore, 2012). The United Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was thereafter ratified by the United States and 153 other countries with a goal to 
voluntarily commit to reducing their GHG emissions within an acceptable level in future period 
(Moore, 2012). Annual meetings, referred as conferences of the parties (COP), have been held 
by all parties to discuss their target and action plan to reduce the GHGs; and the following 
progress updates on current issues and future planning (Moore, 2012). Of all COP meetings, 
the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in year 1997 and entered into force in year 2005, was considered 
as the most significant result to achieve the agreed commitment of GHG emission reduction 
targets for 37 developed countries and the European union (Moore, 2012). The agreed targets 
were an average reduction of 5% against 1990 emission levels from year 2008 to 2012 (Moore, 
2012). In year 2009, the Copenhagen Accord updated the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Moore, 2012). Approved by 186 countries, the Accord required: (i) countries to 
increase the mitigation actions in order to keep the increase of global temperatures below 20C; 
(ii) countries to submit their specific GHG emission reduction; and (iii) developed countries to 
provide financial support to the developing countries for forest conservation, adaptation, 
technology development and transfer as well as capacity building (Moore, 2012).   
The country members (parties) under the UNFCCC are classified into: (i) Annex 1 
industrialized-countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol to meet the reduction targets of their 
GHG emissions based on year 1990 emission levels; (ii) Annex 2 industrialized- countries that 
are essentially a subgroup of Annex 1 countries and members of OECD excluding those 
countries that were still in transition-economies in year 1992. These countries will be 
commissioned to finance mitigation and adaption expenses of developing countries; and (iii) 
Non-Annex 1 (developing) countries (Moore 2012; and Bumert et al., 2012. As a group 
member of non-Annex 1, Indonesia ratified the UNFCCC and adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 
order to seriously mitigate the climate change (Ministry of Finance, 2008). Under the 
Copenhagen Accord, the Indonesia’s government has voluntarily made a commitment to 
reduce their national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26% in year 2020 of which the GHG 
emissions shares from energy utilization are targeted to be reduced by about 1% (NCCC, 
2009). Despite the fact that Indonesia has a huge potential of renewable energy sources, their 
utilizations are still very low (NCCC, 2009). Therefore, Indonesia is expected to scaling up 
this clean energy production in order to lowering the national emissions (NCCC, 2009; 
Ardiansyah et al., 2012).  
According to Baumert et al. (2005) the emissions growth rate in Indonesia (97%) was 
fastest among other developing country emitters between the year 1990 – 2002. Indonesia 
ranked 21st in the total share of world’s CO2 emissions (counted only from fossil fuels 
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combustion). Indonesia’s emissions level is strongly influenced by the size of the population 
and economic growth. Indonesia is currently ranked as the 4th largest population in world with 
annual economic growth rates around 6-7% (Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2007; and Baumert et 
al (2005). The CO2 emissions are mainly generated by deforestation (48%), the energy sector 
(21%), and peatland (12%); total Indonesia’s GHG emission in year 2000 was 1.72 Gt CO2e 
and is projected to reach 2.95 Gt CO2e under business-as-usual scenarios (NCCC, 2009). 
Although the largest shares of emissions derived from deforestation and peat fires, emissions 
from the burning of ‘dirty’ energy will be growing in line with economic growth, which could 
cause severe problems in long-run (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2011; and 
Ministry of Finance, 2012).  
To meet the emission reduction targets, the Indonesian government has included the 
energy sector as a priority of its mitigation framework (Ministry Finance, 2012). Fossil fuels 
are still dominant in Indonesia’s energy supply: only about 4% of energy is from renewable 
sources – of which two thirds coming from hydro and one third from geothermal (Ministry of 
Finance, 2012). In the electricity generation, fossil fuels still dominate (about 86%) followed 
by renewable energy sources (3% from geothermal and 9% from hydro) (PLN, 2011a; Ministry 
of Finance, 2012). These statistics clearly show that the clean energy utilization remains very 
low compared to their huge potential (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Under Presidential Decree 
No. 5/2006, the electricity generation from renewable sources should reach 25% by the year 
2025.      
A feed-in tariff (FIT) plays an important role in addressing climate change. Feed-in tariff 
is a fixed price for purchases of renewable generation that is paid at a premium rate for each 
unit of electricity, kilowatt-hour (kWh), transmitted into the grid connection (Mendoca et al., 
2010). It is one of the policy schemes aimed to rapidly promote the production of non-emitting 
renewable energy sources (Rio and Bleda, 2013; and Mendoca et al., 2010). FIT schemes have 
proven to be the best support mechanism, stable, and has become the most essential policy to 
reduce the GHG emissions (Mendoca et al., 2010). In Germany, the FIT has successfully 
enabled to reduce emissions of 79 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in year 2008. 
FIT – substantial incentives given to renewable production – are independent from government 
spending because these schemes are generally financed through tax revenues (Mendoca et al., 
2010). FIT guarantees a fixed price for purchases of renewable generation from the producer 
in a long-term contract (Mendoca et al., 2010; and Bohringer et al., 2012). The price cap is 
usually set higher than either the average unit cost rate of electricity supplied into the grid 
connectors, or the average unit cost of the most expensive fuel generators, i.e. natural gas-fired 
generators (Mendoca et al., 2010; and Bohringer et al., 2012). A well designed FIT should 
enable to cover the costs of renewable energy development, to provide a reasonable rate of 
286 
 
 
 
return to investors, and to reduce the risk associated with financing the renewable electricity 
projects (Bohringer et al., 2012). The government will then regulate power companies to 
purchase renewable generation from producers at this price cap over the agreed long period of 
contract (Mendoca et al., 2010).  
The Indonesia’s FITs has been stipulated in the Government Regulation No. 79/2014 on 
National Energy Policy. It stated that “the selling price of renewable energy must be 
determined upon the FITs mechanism”. The price of each type of renewable sources is fixed 
by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 04/2012, and ranges from 
Rp. 656/kWh to Rp. 1,722.5/kWh. In the regulation, the price cap ranges are substantially 
determined on the types of renewables, level of generated voltage and geographic location. For 
example, if power company purchases wind or solar generation at medium voltages on any site 
location in Indonesia, the price will be Rp. 656/kWh. However, if the company purchases 
biomass or biogas generation at low voltages on east regions of Indonesia, i.e. Maluku or 
Papua, the price will be escalated up to about Rp. 1,722.5/kWh. Following Bohringer et al. 
(2012), we assume that the price is at the mid-point between these values (Rp. 1,189.25/kWh). 
Meanwhile, we assume that the average unit cost of electricity generation in year 2011 is Rp. 
1,051.14/kWh (PLN 2011b). The FITs therefore translate into a 13.14% subsidy rate to 
renewable generation technologies. The financing scheme to cover these additional subsidies, 
however, was not clearly explained in above Regulation.  
Imposing carbon taxes – carbon pricing instrument – can also be used as alternative 
schemes in mitigating the climate change (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Carbon pricing can be 
introduced in several ways, i.e. the implementation of Emission Trading System (ETS), carbon 
taxes, offset mechanisms, results-based finance (RBF), and internal carbon prices set by 
companies. Carbon tax is an explicit tax – in terms of the price per tCO2e – imposed on the 
carbon content of the polluter, i.e. the ‘dirty’ fuels (Hoeller and Wallin, 1991).  It is a Pigouvian 
tax aiming to internalise the externality of climate change (Bhattacharyya, 2011). Pittel et al. 
(2012) point out that a carbon tax increases the price of polluter commodities, such that there 
are incentives to reduce the utilization of such commodities. The carbon tax scheme is 
considered to have a number of significant advantages over the Kyoto mechanism: (i) it leads 
to the reduction of GHG emissions and supports energy efficiency, clean energy production as 
well as the technological progress; and (ii) it gains a “double dividend” to the government by 
inducing not only a cleaner environment but also less distorting taxes due to additional 
revenues raised from carbon taxes (Pittel et al., 2012; Orlov, 2012; and Ditya and 
Resosudarmo, 2016).   
However, a carbon tax has some disadvantages. It increases the energy costs which in 
turn reduces the domestic consumption (and production) (Orlov, 2012). It might also be 
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regressive towards income distribution40; as ‘dirty’ fuels are normal goods, thus, imposing 
carbon taxes to these polluters might disproportionately harm low-income households instead 
of rich households (Ditya and Resosudarmo, 2016; and Callan et al., 2009). Carbon pricing 
might also create a “rebound effect”, in that it triggers a higher level of GHG emissions instead 
of reducing it (Ditya and Resosudarmo, 2016). A rebound effect may occur from two channels. 
First, the increased price of CO2-related fuels leads to a higher energy efficiency which in turn 
increases the energy consumption that offsets the energy saving (Sorrel and Dimitropoulos 
2008; and Sorrel 2009). Second, the additional revenue gained from carbon tax could also 
increase the institutions’ demand for energy (Ditya and Resosudarmo, 2016).  
In some countries, a carbon tax has been adopted to mitigate climate change, where its 
implementation is usually revenue-neutral (other distorting taxes are reduced). Since the 1990s, 
Norway, Denmark, and Finland imposed fuels taxes based on the level of their carbon content 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). In 2015, Norway increased the carbon tax on natural gas and Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (from US$41/tCO2e to about US$50/tCO2e) to promote the production of 
biogas (World Bank, 2015). The UK, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy have also adopted 
carbon taxes to meet their commitments to reduce the GHG emissions (IPCC, 2001). In 2014, 
Chile implemented carbon tax to all power plants with thermal input based higher than 50 MW; 
the tax level is equivalent to about US$5/tCO2e (World Bank, 2015). France, in 2014, 
introduced a carbon tax of US$8/tCO2e on the fossil fuels that are not covered by the European 
Union’s Emission Trading System (ETS); the tax rate increased to US$16/tCO2e in 2015 and 
US$24/tCO2e in 2016, and will further rise to US$61/tCO2e in 2020 and US$110/tCO2e in 
2030 (World Bank, 2015). In Portugal, a carbon tax of approximately US$5/tCO2e in 2015, 
was imposed to all energy products used in non-EU ETS sectors; it covers almost a quarter of 
the country’s emissions (World Bank, 2015). Switzerland imposed a carbon tax on thermal 
fuels, excluding fossil motor fuels, which increased from US$62/tCO2e to US$87/tCO2e in 
2016. This adjustment was due to the past result in 2015 of which the emission level lied above 
the targeted level; the tax rate will be reviewed according to emissions level in 2018 (World 
Bank, 2015). Overall, in 2014, the total revenues in the world raised through carbon taxes 
implementation were US$10 billion. The United Kingdom accounted for about a fifth of total 
revenue, followed by Japan, Finland, Norway, and British Columbia (World Bank, 2015).  
In Indonesia, the carbon tax has yet to be implemented. A carbon tax was considered in 
the Ministry of Finance (2009) report as one of the government’s fiscal strategic framework to 
                                                          
40 Based on numerous literature studies, the regressive nature of carbon tax mostly occurrs in developed 
economies; in developing economies, carbon taxes are either less regressive or progressive (Ditya and 
Resosudarmo, 2016; Callan et al, 2009; Brannlund and Nordsrtom, 2004; Oladosu and Rose, 2007; Yusuf and 
Resosudarmo, 2015; and Corong, 2008).  
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finance the country’s action plan to reduce the GHG emissions – regulated in the Presidential 
Regulation no. 61/2011. The report identified the strategy including “working towards a carbon 
tax or levy on fossil fuel in parallel with removal over time of energy subsidies and with access 
to international carbon markets” (Ministry of Finance, 2012). The report argued that a carbon 
tax can lower the carbon emissions in electricity generation supply and industrial activities as 
well future investment decisions (Ministry of Finance, 2009).   
This study aims to investigate the two key frameworks to reduce Indonesia’s GHG 
emissions: (i) implementing carbon tax on fossil fuels; and (ii) promoting the production of 
renewable electricity through the FIT. We analyse the effects of these policy instruments, 
within the context of general equilibrium analysis, on Indonesia’s macroeconomy and examine 
how different institutions and sectors in the economy are affected. More specifically, the key 
questions to be asked in this analysis are: Would a carbon tax or FIT reduce Indonesia’s CO2 
emissions generated from the use of fossil fuels? What would be the impact of a carbon tax 
compared to the FIT on the Indonesia’s economy (on sectoral output, income equity, and 
demand of energy commodities)? Is a carbon tax progressive or regressive towards income 
distribution? To our knowledge, this work is the first to analyse the economy-wide impact of 
introducing the carbon tax and (or) FIT in Indonesia. 
Numerous experiments can be implemented using a carbon tax or FIT. For example, 
Yusuf (2008) investigated the effects of a carbon tax of US$32.6/tCO2e for Indonesia in three 
different experiments: (i) allowing only the government saving adjustment to obtain a budget 
surplus, aimed to assess the magnitude of distribution costs when there is no compensation to 
the increased tax revenues; (ii) testing a double-dividend hypothesis by allowing a revenue-
neutral mechanism in which the revenue raised from a carbon tax is compensated by the 
reduction of ad valorem tax rates across commodities; and (iii) allowing carbon tax 
compensation through the higher transfer payments to households. Ditya and Resosudarmo 
(2016) implemented a carbon tax of US$10/ton CO2e for ASEAN countries in three different 
simulations: (i) allowing the government to increase their expenditure on commodities by an 
amount equal to the additional revenue raised from the carbon tax; (ii) allowing the government 
to redistribute 50% of carbon tax revenues in the form of transfer payments to low-income 
households; and (iii) allowing a double-dividend hypothesis of which the government uses 
50% of the revenue raised to lower the indirect tax across industries. Proença and Aubyn (2013) 
implemented the FITs scheme – expressed as the endogenous ad-valorem output subsidy to 
renewable generation – to meet the 45% target share of Portugal’s electricity production from 
renewable generations. The subsidy is financed by a lump-sum transfer to households. In other 
words, the households lump-sum transfer is allowed to adjust in order to compensate the 
additional subsidies to renewable generations. Bohringer et al. (2012) introduced Ontario’s 
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FIT which is financed by the electricity consumers in the province through the endogenous tax 
of electricity sales. The FIT is set at €22.3/kWh or translated into 81.3% subsidy rate for 
renewable generations.   
By following the approaches advocated in the literature, such as above studies, we carry 
out a number of scenarios which are principally related to the ways of fiscal schemes in 
recycling (or neutralizing) the carbon tax or FIT injections. Firstly, we separate our simulations 
under two main policy instruments, the carbon tax and the FIT. Secondly, for each instrument, 
we consider some recycling schemes as follows.  
On carbon tax implementation, we assume that the Indonesia’s government levies a tax 
of Rp. 100,000/ton CO2e with three possible revenue-recycling schemes. In the first 
simulation, we allow the revenue neutralizing scheme by which the revenue raised from carbon 
tax is neutralize through a reduction in income (labour) tax rates. In other words, the income 
(labour) tax rate is allowed to adjust so that the government net receipts are in balance. In the 
second simulation, we allow the government to adjust their spending on goods proportionally 
in response to the revenue raised from carbon tax. A higher public expenditure is expected to 
increase the equilibrium output. The third simulation assumes endogenous government saving, 
without any revenue recycling, to allow a budget surplus. Following Yusuf (2008), this 
scenario aims to assess the impact of carbon tax on Indonesia’s economy when there is no 
compensating (revenue neutralizing) mechanisms. In the FIT implementation, we assume that 
the Indonesia’s government sets a 15% subsidy rate to renewable generations, in this case 
hydro and geothermal generation, with two possible financing schemes. Following Bohringer 
et al. (2012), in the fourth simulation, we assume that the FIT is distributed equally among the 
electricity consumers through the adjusted electricity tax rate. Finally, the fifth simulation 
assumes the FIT is financed by introducing the carbon tax. The FIT financing options are 
chosen such that there is no government financing intervention under this condition.   
Since the Kyoto Protocol, Indonesia has been strongly seeking for solutions to address 
its GHG emissions (Ministry of Finance, 2009). Allan et al. (2008) argued that climate policy 
actions to curb the GHG emissions would have effects on a country’s economy through, i.e. 
the price and output adjustments across sectors. The way in which the generated carbon tax 
revenues are recycled back into the economy is an important factor to meet the country’s 
economic and environmental objectives (Welsch, 1996; Corong, 2008; and Yusuf and 
Resosudarmo, 2015). The above proposed experiments, grounded in a general equilibrium 
model, provide some strategic frameworks for climate policy makers, i.e. the revenue-
neutralizing scheme through the carbon tax or FIT implementation. Each scenario is set out to 
empirically examine its impacts on Indonesia’s economy as well as the change in emissions 
which are generated from the fossil fuels utilization.   
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The restsof this chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 discusses a brief overview 
of the literature studies that assessed the economy-wide impact of implementing the carbon tax 
or FIT using a CGE model framework. The scenarios provided in these literatures are used to 
motivate the simulations proposed in our model. Section 7.3 discusses the theoretical model 
and identification of scenarios motivated in Section 7.2 in the context of the specific model. It 
refers to the extended CGE model (for energy analysis) explained in Chapter 6 and provides 
the relevant equations to demonstrate our scenarios and closure rules. Section 7.4 discusses 
simulation results and sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 7.5 presents the conclusions. 
 
7.2. Literature Reviews 
Various studies have assessed the effects of implementing a specific policy instrument in 
aiming to mitigate climate change. The instruments include the implementation of carbon 
taxes; emission trading systems (ETS); a cap-and-trade programs; quota obligation systems 
with tradable green certificates (TGC); feed-in tariffs (FIT); renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS); and so on. We focus on carbon taxes and the FITs. This section provides an overview 
of previous studies that specifically looked at the impact of carbon tax and the FIT. The 
simulations proposed in our study are motivated by these literatures.  
 
7.2.1. Carbon Tax Studies 
A carbon tax usually aims to improve the environment and to reduce tax distortion although 
the magnitude of its benefit highly depends on the economy’s structure and strategies in 
recycling the revenue (Goulder, 2002; Orlov, 2012). According to the literature, carbon taxes 
tend to be regressive in developed countries; and neutral or progressive in developing 
countries. These distributional implications are considered to be the most important issue on 
the carbon taxes political agenda (Baranzini et al., 2000). The studies that concerned developed 
countries are those by Pearson and Smith (1991), Hamilton and Cameron (1994), Cornwell 
and Creedy (1996), Barker and Kohler (1998), Tiezzi (2001), Bergin et al. (2004), Brȁnnlund 
and Nordstrom (2004), Wier (2005), Oladosu and Rose (2007), Wissema and Dellink (2007), 
Callan et al. (2009), Orlov and Grethe (2012), and Siriwardana et al. (2011). Whilst, on 
developing countries, among the few are those studies by Shah and Larsen (1992), Yusuf 
(2008), Brenner et al. (2007), Corong (2008), Mahmood and Marpaung (2014), and Ditya and 
Resosudarmo (2016).  
Among the earliest studies on developed economies, Pearson and Smith (1991) examined 
the distributional impacts of a carbon tax on fuel in several European countries (Spain, Italy, 
France, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, and the UK). By assessing a sample of the 1988 UK 
Family Expenditure Survey and the 1985 Eurostat data through the IFS simulation Program 
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for Indirect Taxes, the authors concluded that a carbon tax is strongly regressive in the UK and 
Ireland but less regressive in the other five countries. They argued that although household 
spending on energy goods in these countries is weakly related to income, the differences in the 
distributional incidence are principally related to the pattern of households’ energy spending 
and also affected, to some extent, by the consumption of particular fuels with high carbon 
content in each country. The increased price of energy due to the carbon tax reduces the volume 
of domestic energy consumption by about 6.5% within an uneven distribution among 
households. The percentage reduction in energy consumption amongst low-income households 
is greater than the high-income households. This is because the poor spends a higher proportion 
of their income on the taxed energy – for the poorest, the carbon tax accounted for more than 
2 percent of their total spending, while the richest less than 1%. By using a more 
comprehensive model – a sectoral, regionalised, econometric model of the European Union 
(the energy-environment-economy model, E3ME) – Barker and Kohler (1998) upgraded 
Pearson and Smith (1991) and found similar findings: the carbon taxation is not nearly so 
regressive towards the EU’s income distribution, where the most regressive impact is on West 
Germany, the UK and Ireland. If revenue raised from carbon tax is neutralized through lower 
taxes on labour income, all countries experienced an improvement in real disposable income. 
The UK, Belgium, Ireland, and West Germany benefited the most. The carbon tax can be 
progressive if the revenue is recycled through increasing government transfers to lower income 
households via social security payments.  
Hamilton and Cameron (1994) analysed the distributional impacts of a carbon tax for 
Canada by combining the CGE model developed by Beausejour et al. (1992), cost-push 
methods through the Input-Output model, a detailed energy disposition account, and micro-
simulation model of household expenditures. The simulation, taxing the carbon content of 
fossil fuels by $101.56/ton CO2e (or adding 6.5 cents to the cost of gasoline per liter), is 
designed to meet the Rio target in Canada: “stabilizing CO2 emissions at their 1990 level in 
year 2000”. The authors concluded that the simulated tax is moderately regressive, where the 
goods spending of the lowest quintile households is increasing between 1.1 – 1.2% higher than 
the highest quintile. Similar to Hamilton and Cameron (1994), Cornwell and Creedy (1996) 
examined the distributional impacts of implementing a carbon tax for Australia, using the 
combination of an input-output approach and a household demand system, to achieve the 
Toronto target: a reduction in CO2 emissions at 1998 levels by 2005. By implementing a carbon 
tax of A$ 113/ ton CO2e, the study found that the fuel, electricity, food and tobacco sectors 
faced the largest increases in price. This result suggested that carbon tax is regressive since the 
lower-income households spend a higher proportion of their budget on these commodities than 
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the higher-income households. The Gini inequality measure increases by 2.16%. Nevertheless, 
transfer payments can offset the regressive nature of the carbon tax.  
Tiezzi (2000) examined the welfare effects of the carbon tax introduced in Italy at the 
beginning year 1999. The effects are assessed using True Cost of Living index numbers where 
parameters are obtained from the demand system supplied by the Italian National Statistical 
Institute from 1985 – 1996. Surprisingly, the results showed that carbon taxation is progressive: 
the living cost of the poor households was not adversely affected. In other words, the negative 
impact is increasing towards a higher income groups. The author argued that this implication 
might be due to the fact that the carbon tax mainly increases the price of transport fuels instead 
of heating fuels. These changes, in turn, affect the car-owning household groups (or higher-
income groups) most. Callan et al. (2009) stated that the trend of household expenditure on 
transport fuels is in line towards their increasing income, as opposed to their spending on 
heating fuel which is relatively flat.  
Bergin et al. (2004) analysed the impact of a carbon tax on all fuels consumed in Ireland 
using a macroeconomic model approach, the ESRI’s Medium-Term Model (HERMES) 
embedded with an energy sub-model41. The model showed that a carbon tax of €20/ton CO2e 
significantly contributed to the reduction of emissions in year 2010 – about 28% above the 
1990 level. The demand elasticities for energy dropped over time, where the largest reduction 
in emissions derived from the electricity sector and industrial sector, and the smallest drop 
from the transport sector. Overall the economic cost (contraction in GDP) of implementing the 
carbon tax is small. The authors proposed four revenue-recycling with the implications as 
follows. Firstly, if the revenue is used to reduce labour taxes (social-insurance contributions), 
it improves the welfare – real disposable income increases which in turn improves consumption 
– and level of GNP. Secondly, reducing the VAT results in a small drop in GDP but 
distributional advantages since the reduction in nominal wage rates will offset the negative 
effects of carbon tax. Thirdly, improving lump-sum payments to household is less efficient 
because it does not reduce the distorted tax and thus it increases the economic cost in long-
term. Lastly, increasing lump-sum payments to firm indicated the largest drop in GNP. 
Moreover, the carbon tax is found to be regressive; therefore, the authors suggested to use 23% 
of the revenue to increase the welfare payments or to compensate low-income households 
through investment on energy-saving improvements.  
A study for Sweden was conducted by Brȁnnlund and Nordstrom (2004), who analysed 
consumer response and welfare effects of increasing a carbon tax42 for various energy goods 
using an econometric model estimated for pooled cross-section data from the Swedish Family 
                                                          
41 The HERMES model was also used in constructing macroeconomic forecasts for Ireland until 2020.  
42 Sweden has implemented carbon tax since 1991.  
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Expenditure Survey in 1985, 1988, and 1992. Two scenarios of revenue-recycling are 
considered to neutralize a double increase of CO2 tax: reducing the general VAT; and reducing 
the specific VAT on public transport. In the first scenario, petrol demand dropped by about 
11% for all household groups and public transport demand dropped by about 5% with 
ambiguous patterns among different household groups. The authors used the compensated 
variation (CV) to estimate the welfare effects from the carbon tax reform. The CV is defined 
as “the amount of money the household needs to be given at the new set of prices in order to 
attain the pre-reform level of utility” (Brȁnnlund and Nordstrom 2004, p. 222). In other words, 
the CV refers to the quantity of additional money which has to be given to or to be taken from 
a household to make them as well-off as before the prices change (Gravelle and Rees, 1987). 
The authors found that the lowest income quintile faced a welfare drop about SEK 465 whilst 
the richer households dropped by SEK 1305. However, relative to household expenditure, the 
welfare loss on poorest households is greater than the richest indicating that the carbon tax is 
regressive. In the second scenario, the doubling of the CO2 tax can cover 23% ad valorem 
subsidy on public transport resulting a 28% drop in its consumer price. This scenario is also 
found to be regressive although the extra subsidy caused a more uneven distribution of welfare 
loss: households in urban sites benefited the net subsidy, while those in non-urban sites have 
to bear the tax burden. 
Wier et al. (2005) investigated the distributional impacts of direct and indirect CO2 tax 
payments by households43 combining a Danish Input-Output model for 1996 – which is 
extended with a tax vector – and consumer survey from Statistics Denmark. The results showed 
that a carbon tax is regressive for both direct and indirect tax payments. The payments are 
increasing with disposable income but constitute a smaller share of spending as income 
increases. In direct CO2 tax payments, the rural households paid the tax more due to higher 
consumption on heating and electricity, while, lower-income groups paid more due to higher 
consumption on food and public transport. Ccompared to other Danish taxes, the CO2 taxes 
are found to be more regressive. Oladosu and Rose (2007) examined the income distribution 
impacts of a carbon tax ($25 / ton of carbon) on fossil fuel consumption in the Susquehanna 
River Basin Region of the United States using a computable general equilibrium model. In 
contrast to Brȁnnlund and Nordstrom (2004), the tax is found to be progressive both in the 
short and the long run: higher-income groups lose more because they tend to have higher wages 
and work in sectors that suffer larger declines in production. In addition, the progressivity 
nature is also caused by the output production pattern; the increasing lump-sum transfer to 
                                                          
43 The authors defined the direct CO2 tax payments from households as total CO2 levies per unit of energy final 
consumed. Whilst, indirect CO2 tax payments are related to the households’ payment on CO2 generated from 
total chain of intermediate input used by industries to produce the final household consumption.  
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lower-income groups; and the declined corporate profits absorbed by richer income groups 
will offset the regressive effects. 
Using a CGE model, Wissema and Dellink (2007) analysed the economy-wide impact 
of a carbon tax on energy use – ranging from 0 to €30/ton CO2 – in Ireland. They simulated 
two kinds of energy taxes: a tax based on carbon content of energy and a uniform energy tax. 
The estimations suggested that a tax on the carbon content is more efficient in reducing the 
national emissions because it induces people to switch more from CO2-based fuels to clean 
energy. With a uniform energy tax, the use of renewable sources declined because they are 
taxed at the same rate as ‘dirty’ fuels. A carbon tax has greater effects on the economy than the 
uniform energy tax because it is a differentiated tax, which leads to more changes in production 
and consumption. Both tax types provide incentives to energy efficiency in that the sectoral 
structure shifts towards less energy-intensive production. From the equivalent variation (EV) 
approach, the taxes caused welfare to be slightly dropped (1.3%). Equivalent Variation is an 
approach to calculate how much additional money that has to be given to or taken away to 
make them as well-off as after the commodity prices change (Gravelle and Rees, 1987). 
Unfortunately, this study did not examine the distributional income among household groups 
because it only used a single representative household. Nevertheless, the authors suggested to 
pay attention to assessing the impacts across different income groups since the carbon tax may 
lead certain households to poverty. 
 Callan et al. (2009) studied the distributional impacts of imposing a carbon tax (€20/ton 
CO2) and revenue recycling in the Republic of Ireland using the SWITCH model – a model of 
direct taxes and welfare payments – based on the CSO’s Survey and Living Conditions. The 
micro-data survey includes detailed information of household variables such as age, 
composition, income, employment, and disability, as well as their expenditure on energy 
utilization for heating, electricity used, and fuels. The analysis, however, does not take into 
account the indirect effects of carbon tax through the intermediate inputs processing across 
industries because the indirect analysis requires the Input-Output data. In other words, the 
study includes only the direct emissions. The results showed that the carbon tax is regressive 
especially in fuels consumption because rural households consumed more fuel than urban 
households due to a size condition where the countryside area has longer distances. 
Furthermore, the authors implemented the revenue recycling scenarios of increasing the social 
welfare payments and decreased taxes –by increasing tax credits or reducing the income taxes. 
Increasing social welfare payments benefited mostly to lower-income groups; while, the lower 
taxes benefited mostly to the upper-income households. The authors suggested that the 
regressive nature of carbon tax can be addressed through well-developed tax and benefit 
schemes.  
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Siriwardana et al (2011) investigated the economy-wide impact of taxing the carbon 
content of energy combustion (ranging from $15 - $30/ton CO2) in Australia based on a static 
CGE model – ORANI-G developed by Horridge (2000). The model is calibrated to the 
Australian Input-Output tables for 2005 as well as the carbon emission data from the GHG 
inventory 2005 published by the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency. The 
tax reduces the national emissions with a small distortion to the economy (the Australian GDP 
declines only by 0.68%). The effect on inflation, measured by the change in consumer price 
index, is also small (0.75%). Nonetheless, the electricity price increased sharply (26%) because 
in Australian, electricity generation heavily relies on coal. In terms of effects on households, 
the tax is regressive. A higher price of CO2 intensive fuels disproportionately affects household 
spending on energy; lower-income households carry a higher tax burden (3.6%) on energy 
consumption than rich households (1.4%). Therefore, the authors suggested a revenue-
recycling scheme by giving an annual lump-sum payment to all households of $685 in order 
to compensate the tax burden. 
A study for Russia was done by Orlov and Grethe (2012), who investigated the 
distributional effects of carbon tax under perfect and imperfect competition (Cournot 
oligopoly), in the context of CGE model. The model is calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) Version 7 database which represents a multi-regional SAM. The authors 
simulated the implementation of a carbon tax on fossil fuels combustion to meet the national 
emissions reduction target by 10%, where the revenue is recycled through the reduction of 
labour taxes under two market conditions: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. They 
find that under perfect competition, the revenue recycling of carbon tax through reduction of 
labour taxes can obtain a strong double dividend – although the magnitude of the welfare 
highly depends on the labour supply elasticity and the elasticity of substitution among 
production factors and energy. Welfare, measured by the EV, is improved by 0.23%; household 
income increases due to higher return to land via the increasing land supply and improvement 
of labour income via lower labour taxes and an increased labour supply. The demand for 
domestically produced fossil fuels and its import declines due to higher consumer prices, which 
in turn leads to currency depreciation and lower production costs. Domestic products therefore 
become more competitive compared to imported ones, which leads to improvement in export44. 
However, the production of energy-intensive commodities – i.e. electricity, metals, and 
chemical products – declines due to higher input costs of energy commodities. A carbon tax is 
found to be regressive; however, lower labour taxes can compensate the lower-income 
households so that the regressive effect can be prevented. Under Cournot oligopoly, carbon tax 
                                                          
44Competitiveness is calculated from a percentage change of the ratio of import prices to domestic prices.  
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increases mark-ups. which leads to welfare losses – measured as EV. The domestic supply is 
already sub-optimal under imperfect competition, thus a further reduction in domestic demand 
will lead to higher dead-weight losses. Specifically, the introduction of a carbon tax increases 
the market power of the gas sector due to the increasing shares of gas demand in the market. 
The mark-ups of chemical products and metals increase due to less competition; in contrast, 
the mark-ups of mineral products and petroleum products are declined, thus the pre-existing 
distortions arising in these markets are partially alleviated. In conclusion, the welfare costs of 
imposing the carbon tax under Cournot oligopoly is higher than that of the perfect competition.   
We also discuss in brief carbon tax studies on developing countries, among the few, as 
follows. A study for Pakistan was conducted by Shah and Larsen (1992), who analysed the 
efficiency and equity implications of imposing a carbon tax in some developing countries, 
especially Pakistan, using the 1984/1985 Household Income and Expenditure Survey and a 
dynamic factor demand model. The authors argued that the regressive incidence of carbon tax 
on industrialized countries, where household’s spending on fossil fuel as a proportion of 
current annual income declined with income, cannot be generalized to developing countries 
since it would also be affected by institutional factors. Three important cases may have a 
bearing on the tax-shifting. In the first case, tax can be regressive if the fossil fuel producers 
have full market power (or either demand or supply for the taxed commodities is perfectly 
inelastic); hence, the burden of carbon taxes can be fully shifted to households. In the second 
case, under the assumption of zero forward shifting, the burden of carbon taxes can be fully 
borne on capital owners if the price of fossil fuels is controlled and legal pass-forward of the 
tax is forbidden (or supply is completely price inelastic), i.e. through obligation of binding 
import quotas or rationed foreign exchange. The tax burden on capital income is found to be 
progressive. In the third case – when a partial forward shifting is likely occurred in Pakistan, 
the burden of carbon tax for fossil fuels is partially borne by its final users and by capital 
owners. This tax-shifting case would roughly result in a mixture distribution between the 
regressive pattern under the former case and progressive pattern under the latter case. The study 
also examined the welfare effects of four scenarios of revenue-recycling. In the first scenario, 
when the government lowers labour income tax rates, the welfare gain is very small because 
taxes are low in developing country like Pakistan. In the second scenario, when the government 
lowers the corporate income tax, the effects on welfare could be either positive or negative. 
This is because the increase prices of energy production after tax will affect their final 
consumption, while the reduction of corporate income will affect saving decisions. Thus, this 
scenario induces intertemporal inefficiencies by both reducing saving and increasing current 
consumption. In the third scenario, by assuming no changes in other distorting taxes, the 
welfare costs are significant although they are relatively small compared to the revenues 
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collected from the carbon tax. In the fourth scenario, which is similar to the third with 
additional observation of subsidies accounting, the welfare improved. The introduction of 
carbon tax actually acts to remove subsidies because it leads to an increase of carbon-based 
fuel prices. Thus, the increasing welfare costs due to carbon taxation on fossil fuels are offset 
by the welfare gain from the subsidy cut.  
Yusuf (2008) investigated the distributional effects of introducing a carbon tax of Rp. 
280,000/ton CO2 and energy price reform (or eliminating the subsidy on fuels) in Indonesia 
using the Indonesia-E3 (Economy-Equity-Environment) model, which is a type of CGE model. 
The author found that carbon tax tends to be progressive for all revenue-recycling scenarios. 
This is mainly driven by the largest contraction in energy-related industries (output reduction), 
which in turn, affected the rich (and urban) households since they own most of the production 
factors in these industries. A cut of subsidies to transportation fuels (diesel, and gasoline) also 
found to be a progressive pattern; in contrast, the scenario of reducing the kerosene subsidy 
tends to be regressive. The author also found that a uniform transfers scheme (social cash 
transfers) – implemented in October 2005 – tends to over-compensate the rural-poor 
households but under-compensate the urban-poor households. Therefore, the author suggested 
that a well-designed of compensation, i.e. more compensation to urban and less compensation 
to rural groups, would minimize the poverty incidence in urban location.   
Brenner et al. (2007) examined the distributional implications of carbon tax of 300 yuan/ 
metric ton of carbon in China based on the household income and expenditure survey in year 
1995. The results suggested that a carbon tax is progressive under two scenarios: with revenue-
recycling scheme in the form of a lump-sum compensation to all households or a ‘sky trust’45, 
and without a revenue-recycling scheme. This progressive incidence is due to pattern of 
consumption where the higher-income (urban) households spend more on carbon-intensive 
goods, i.e. energy and industrial goods, than the lower-income (urban) households, whilst the 
rural household groups spend more on less carbon-intensive, i.e. foods. In other words, the 
urban households would pay a higher share of their expenditure to the sky trust than rural 
households. This study, however, does not assess the welfare gains. 
Corong (2008) assessed the distributional impacts of imposing a carbon tax of 100 peso/ 
ton of carbon emissions) during the trade liberalization process in the Philippines within the 
context of a CGE model. The work analysed the case if the tax revenues are used as a 
compensation to reduce the trade tariffs or a 0.34% decline in the price of imported 
commodities. More specifically, the author undertook four scenarios: (i) no carbon tax and the 
nominal tariff rates are reduced and the revenue loss is compensated through an increase of 
                                                          
45 The author defined ‘sky trust’ as a system of carbon charges in which the revenues are recycled to the public 
on an equal per capita basis. 
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household’s income tax; (ii) a joint simulation of a tariff rate reduction and a carbon tax of 100 
peso/ton CO2 and the tax revenues are recycled through reduction in household income tax; 
(iii) that is identical to (ii) but the revenues are recycled through reduction in output tax; and 
(iv) that is also identical to (ii) but with different Keynesian closures (unemployment is allowed 
to adjust). The results found that in all carbon-tax scenarios (ii – iv), output across industries 
declines due to a higher import demand and increased in energy prices which leads to a 
contraction in domestic production. However, compared to the scenario without a carbon tax 
(i), the price effects due to a lower import tariff are smaller because they were partially offset 
by the introduction of carbon tax. As expected, the demand for carbon-based coal and oil and 
energy-intensive (conventional generation) inputs declines and demand for less carbon-based 
energy, i.e. hydro and geothermal plant, increases. These changes lead to a reduction in 
national emissions by approximately 1%. In terms of income distribution, the study revealed 
the progressive nature of carbon taxation: agricultural workers and blue collar industrial 
workers experienced the highest reduction in their spending on goods due to their small energy 
consumption pattern46. All households experienced an improvement in their welfare although 
the lower-income groups gained the least. 
Apart from assessing the economic impacts of imposing carbon energy taxes on 
Pakistan’s economy, Mahmood and Marpaung (2014) also investigated the effects, including 
the possibility of rebound effect, of implementing the simultaneous carbon energy taxes and 
energy efficiency improvement. By employing a recursive CGE model, they simulated two 
main scenarios: (i) the shock of carbon tax (at different levels ranging from $20 - $80/ton CO2) 
with two alternatives of revenue-recycling, which are either adjusting the government spending 
on public goods or lump-sum transfers to households; and (ii) the shock of simultaneous carbon 
tax ($50) and energy efficiency (at different levels) with increase of government spending on 
public goods to recycle the tax revenue. The findings revealed that all scenarios lead to a GDP 
contraction and a large reduction of GHG emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, and SO2). In scenario 
(i), the carbon tax of $80/ ton CO2 will decrease GDP by 3.59% in year 2050; the primary 
energy consumption dropped largely by 27.92% and CO2 20.83%. A lower carbon tax ($10/ton 
CO2) the GDP (and other macroeconomic variables excluding government consumption) 
reduction is much smaller. Across sectors, this scenario reduces the output of fossil fuels (coal, 
gas, and petroleum products) and electricity as well as other energy-intensive (i.e. non-metallic 
mineral products) sectors. In a variant of scenario (i), the results indicated a less contraction to 
GDP due to the increased investment (or a higher marginal propensity to save) which in turn 
                                                          
46 In the study, the author distinguishes the household’s types based on their occupation. Thus, we suggest that 
the agricultural workers and blue collar industrial workers are categorised in lower-income groups; while 
government workers and professional-headed households are included in upper-income groups.    
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increases final consumption; nonetheless, the effects on CO2 emissions and sectoral changes 
are quite similar to that of the first case. In contrast, scenario (ii) has positive implications for 
the economy in which the GDP is improving while energy consumption and pollutant 
emissions decline more than that of both cases in scenario (i). The authors argued that this is 
induced by the effects of energy efficiency improvement which identical to a higher volume 
of energy inputs but reduction of their prices, which in turn, it gradually offset the adverse 
effects of carbon taxation. This study, does not examine the impacts on income distribution 
since it is only based on a single representative household. 
Among recent studies, Nurdianto and Resosudarmo (2016) analysed the economic 
benefits and losses of implementing carbon tax across ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) using the Inter-Regional System of Analysis for 
ASEAN (IRSA-ASEAN) model – a multi-region CGE model. The study simulated a uniform 
carbon tax (US$ 10/ ton CO2) under three different scenarios of recycling scheme. The first 
scenario assumes the recycling mechanism in which government consumption increases 
proportionally with the extra revenues. The second scenario deals with 50% extra 
compensation in the form of government cash transfers to poor households (both in rural and 
urban sites). In the third scenario, the government uses 50% of carbon tax revenues to reduce 
the indirect taxes; this scenario aims to assess a double-dividend hypothesis. Overall, the 
results suggested that the carbon tax, in short run, can reduce the national emissions in an 
effective way without a rebound effect. However, a double-dividend might not be always 
achieved through a combination of the carbon taxation and its revenue-recycling scheme 
among ASEAN countries. The introduction of a carbon tax would likely result in a fall in GDP. 
More specifically, Indonesia and Malaysia benefited the most from a carbon tax due to their 
current fuel subsidies. The carbon tax will act as a compensation mechanism to remove the 
subsidies by increasing the prices of dirty fuels. In contrast, Vietnam would gain the smallest 
benefit since the carbon tax will raise costs (in terms of GDP contraction) to their economy. In 
terms of income distribution, the carbon tax tends to be progressive for all countries except 
Singapore. The carbon tax can also lead to more poverty; however, poverty can be reduced if 
the government directly compensates the poor households through cash transfers.  
 
7.2.2.   Feed-in Tariff Studies 
In this section we briefly discuss studies which analyse the distributional implications of 
implementing a feed-in tariff (FIT). Compared to studies on carbon tax, the studies on the FIT47 
– in terms of assessing its economy-wide impacts – are still lacking especially in case of 
                                                          
47 The studies here are referred to those of a peer-reviewed literature.  
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developing countries. This paper, to some extent, will be the first attempt in assessing the 
economy-wide implications of introducing a FIT in Indonesia, within the context of a CGE 
model.  
Bohringer and Loschel (2006) investigated the economic and environment implications 
of promoting renewable energy in the European Union using a hybrid-CGE model. The 
scenario aims to meet the EU mandate of increasing the clean energy production up to 30% in 
year 2020 from the business-as-usual levels in year 2005. The model they used is limited to a 
detailed bottom-up representation of electricity sector. Hence, the target was translated into at 
least a 20% increase of renewable energy shares (biomass, wind, and solar) in electricity 
production. The target is achieved through adjustment of uniform ad-valorem subsidies on 
renewable productions, which are financed from government (lump-sum) transfers. As results, 
total electricity production increases by almost 5%, primarily due to a reduction in the 
electricity price (2.3%). Specifically, electricity produced from fossil fuel-based generation – 
such as combined hard coal-natural gas, natural gas, and oil – decline by more than 10% in 
year 2020; in contrast, generation produced from wind and biomass improves by more than 
170%, by assuming a fixed electricity production from nuclear, soft coal and hydro generation. 
Welfare, based on the Hicksian equivalent variation, slightly decreased ranging from -0.03% 
in 2010 to -0.08% in 2020, which is obviously influenced by the increasing government 
expenditure on renewable subsidies. This result indicates that a promotion of clean energy 
production through the endogenous ad-valorem subsidies imposes fewer costs to the European 
economy. In terms of environmental impact, the improvement of clean energy production 
reduces carbon emissions in Europe although they are partially offset by an increase of 
electricity production due to the implicit subsidy of electricity from renewable generation.   
A similar work as above, Bohringer et al. (2007) investigated the economy impacts of 
increasing electricity production from renewable energy sources in the European Union 
through (i) feed-in tariffs (or direct subsidies on renewable energy); and (ii) quota obligation 
systems with tradable green certificates, based on a static large-scale partial equilibrium model 
of the EU’s electricity market. Four scenarios are simulated as follows. The first scenario 
mimics the current Member State schemes where the diversified FIT support across different 
renewable technologies is illustrated. The second scenario illustrates the harmonized regional 
FITs (or an equal premium for each technology). In contrast to the financing scheme proposed 
in Bohringer and Loschel (2006), both FIT scenarios in this study are financed through an 
endogenous tax on electricity output. In the third scenario, the target of higher renewables 
production is achieved through a quota system which obliges the electricity producers to meet 
regional targets. This scenario does not involve subsidies and thus no extra tax on electricity is 
required. However, it raises costs of electricity due to the required level of renewable 
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productions which will be financed via higher electricity prices. Finally, the fourth scenario 
illustrates an identical scheme to that of the third scenario but with additional allowance of 
tradable green certificates – in which the certificates could be sold at the market. The results 
indicated that, in overall, the improvement of clean energy production leads to an increase in 
electricity prices primarily due to technological substitution from cheaper conventional 
generation (i.e. fossil fuel-based power plants) to more expensive renewable generation. This 
increase, in turn, leads to a contraction in electricity demand (by 7.4%). Compared to the 
diversified FIT (scenario 1), the uniform FIT (scenario 2) induces a smaller increase in the 
electricity price, which leads to a smaller decline in electricity demand (by 6.2%). This is 
because the premium provided in uniform FIT is based on the marginal costs of the green 
supply options across region which the producers to exploit the most cheaper renewable 
potentials. Finally, in the quota scenario (3 and 4), the results are similar to that of the uniform 
FIT scenario in that these scenarios also lead to a more efficient adjustment cost to meet the 
clean production target.   
Bohringer et al. (2012) analysed the labour market implications of the FIT policy 
implemented in Ontario within the context of a static multi-region CGE model. The study was 
conducted in order to answer the critique that promoting green energy production may destroy 
jobs. In the scenario, the FIT is set at the forecasted average point ($USD 0.223/ kWh or 
translated into 81.3% subsidy rate on renewable generation) which is financed through an 
endogenous tax on electricity sales. The results found that the electricity price increases by 
13% which, in turn, reduces the electricity demand by about 2.1%. The welfare, measured as 
Hicksian EV, declines about 0.54%. This welfare loss, however, does yet to consider the 
environmental benefits (such as health improvement) of closing down the carbon based-
generations. In terms of sectoral effects, as expected, the electricity sector faced the largest 
impact. The electricity output produced from conventional (fossil fuel) generations decreases 
by 20%, which is offset by the increase of clean energy production. This shift leads to a 
contraction in the electricity-intensive sectors, i.e. mining and manufacturing, because it 
induces higher electricity prices and less demand for fossil fuel-related inputs. The estimation 
results suggested that the FIT scenario improves employment only in the relevant sector of 
renewable generation and manufacturing sectors – as improvement in clean energy production 
induces a higher demand for manufacturing equipment required for renewable generation. In 
the broader labour market, however, the subsidy scheme causes a contraction by which the 
unemployment rate in Ontario increases by 0.32%. This is mainly triggered from a reduction 
in real wage due to higher consumer prices.  
Proenca and Aubyn (2013) assessed the economic and environmental effects of 
Portugal’s FITs policy to promote clean energy production by employing a hybrid-CGE model. 
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The scenario aims to meet the national renewable electricity target up to 45% in year 2010 
through the FITs scheme where the ad-valorem subsidy to renewable electricity output is 
allowed to adjust. The subsidies are financed from household lump-sum transfers to electricity 
producers. The results indicated a shift from conventional (fossil fuel) electricity generation 
towards carbon-free renewable generation, in which wind power generation contributes the 
largest share in total renewable generation (48.5%) followed by hydropower (46.3%) and 
biomass (5.1%). Since the subsidies to renewable production are paid by the households’ lump-
sum transfers, thus, the FITs scenario has a negligible effect on electricity production costs 
which results in an almost unchanged electricity price (and output). In terms of macroeconomic 
implications, the FITs leads to a smaller contraction to the economy, where GDP and welfare 
(measured as Hicksian EV) decline slightly. These contractions are mainly induced by the 
decline in real household’s income due to extra spending on subsidy payments, which 
negatively affects their consumption. Finally, in terms of environmental impacts, the 
promotion of clean energy production through the FITs mechanism results in a large reduction 
in national CO2 emissions which is about 31% from benchmark levels.  
 
7.3. Policy Scenarios for Indonesia and Their Impacts 
This section discusses the theoretical model and identification of scenarios of implementing a 
carbon tax and FITs under different revenue-recycling schemes. The scenarios are illustrated 
within the context of the hybrid CGE model provided in Chapter 6. The model features, in 
detail, the production structure of energy sectors as well as the technological explicitness of 
bottom-up energy system for the electricity sector. The solution software is General Algebraic 
Modelling System (GAMS) with the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) solver, which 
has the advantage that it accommodates the complementarity slackness of a flexible 
mathematical representation of market equilibrium conditions (Bohringer and Loschel, 2006). 
The MCP solver is useful to solve the non-linear equation systems. It specifies 
complementarity boundary conditions clearly such that the model is solved normally and is 
calibrated to the initial values in the SAM (Dirkse, 1994). By changing the exogenous 
variables, the MCP solves the model to obtain a new equilibrium. 
As previously mentioned, the scenarios chosen in this study are motivated from the 
literature reviewed. The simulations concern two main policy instruments: the implementation 
of a carbon tax; and a FIT. Therefore, for each instrument, we consider a different recycling 
scheme by executing the model as follows. 
In the carbon tax scheme, at the initial equilibrium, we introduce the exogenous injection 
of carbon tax by which the government collects the tax (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂2) of Rp. 100,000/ ton CO2e 
on dirty fuels with three possible revenue-recycling scenarios: 
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1. In scenario 1, we allow a revenue-recycling scheme in which the income (labour) tax 
rate across activities (𝐻𝐴𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) adjusts such that the government net receipts are 
balance; while rests of taxes and subsidies as well as government saving remain 
unchanged.  We expect a double dividend where both environmental improvement and 
reduction of the distorting tax system can be achieved 
2. In scenario 2, following Ditya and Resosudarmo (2016), we assume that the extra 
revenue raised from a carbon tax is used to proportionally increase government 
expenditure on goods and services. Thus, in the model, the adjusted government 
expenditure across commodities (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽) is assumed to be endogenous in order to clear 
the government net receipts. All taxes and subsidies as well as government saving (𝑆𝐺) 
remain unchanged. We expect that an increase of public expenditure improves the 
national income.       
3. In scenario 3, following Yusuf (2008), we assume that the extra revenue raised from 
carbon tax is not returned to the economy or not used for compensation. In other words, 
the tax revenue is kept as government saving to run a budget surplus. Thus, in the model, 
government saving (𝑆𝐺) is assumed to be endogenous in order to clear the government 
net receipts. All taxes and subsidies as well as government expenditure on goods remain 
unchanged. This scenario intends to investigate the impact of a carbon tax on Indonesia’s 
economy if there is no revenue-neutralizing mechanism. 
In the FIT scheme, we assume that the government sets a 15% subsidy rate to renewable 
generation (hydro and geothermal generation) (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤)) with two possible 
financing scenarios which do not affect the fiscal sustainability:  
4. In scenario 4, we assume that the FIT is paid by electricity consumers through the 
endogenous electricity tax rate (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐)). Following Bohringer et al. (2012), 
we expect that this scenario would increase the electricity price which leads to a drop in 
its demand.  
5. Finally, in scenario 5, we assume that the FIT support is financed by a carbon tax 
adjustment.   
The closure choices for all scenarios are similar to that in Chapter 4, which are set as follows. 
 
BOP vs. Exchange Rate Regime  
The balance of payments (𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊) is fixed and the exchange rate adjusts to ensure 𝑆𝑅𝑂𝑊 =
0. This closure setting is selected to reflect the real condition of Indonesia which has had a 
floating exchange rate regime since 1977 (Bank of Indonesia, 2014). It also ensures that the 
model avoids capital flow and foreign borrowing. Hence, the model restricts the government 
to finance its budget deficit by selling treasury bonds to domestic institutions. Lofgren et al. 
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(2002) stated that by fixing the trade balance, ceteris paribus, a depreciation of the domestic 
currency would occur to cover a drop of foreign saving below the exogenous level. Damuri 
and Perdana, (2003) argued that this closure ensures the private investment unaffected from 
the endogenous trade balances. Fiscal expansion would therefore push the interest rate to soar. 
The increased interest rate would reduce investment, which in turn lowers the positive effect 
on aggregate demand (Damuri and Perdana, 2003).  
 
Investment-Saving Closure  
In the model, the actual investment goods (𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖) and enterprise saving (𝑆𝐵) are exogenous. 
In terms of household saving, we only allow the richest type of households (non-agricultural-
urban households with high wages (HH_NAGU_HL))48 to adjust their saving ratio 
(𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ = 1) but the saving of other household types is assumed fixed. Government saving 
(𝑆𝐺) is allowed to adjust only in scenario 2 so that the additional revenue from a carbon tax is 
recycled to obtain budget surplus; whilst in rests of scenarios, the government saving remains 
unchanged. 
           
Factor Closures  
We assume that the capital stock is mobile across activities. Thus, both capital rent of activity 
specific and distorted rent of capital across activities (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐾𝑗) are fixed; while stock of 
capital (𝐾𝑗  ) adjusts to ensure clearing of each 𝑗-th activity. We assume no excess capital (fully 
employed capital). Similarly, workers are also assumed to be mobile between industries with 
fixed wages. Therefore, the adjusted wage of labour types across activities (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇_𝐿𝑜,𝑗) and 
the average wage of labour types (𝑃𝑜
𝐿) are exogenous. Both employed labour used across 
activities (𝐿𝑜,𝑗) and labour composite (𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗) are endogenous.  Hence, the labour market is 
cleared through the adjusted unemployment rates. This setting follows the fact that Indonesia 
currently faces a massive labour surplus (Yusuf et al., 2008). In addition, we include the factor 
of natural resources49 only for fossil mining and renewable electricity generation, i.e. oil 
resources factor for oil sector, coal resources for coal mining, and natural gas resources for gas 
mining, geological hot dry rock for geothermal generation, and topographically-determined 
hydrostatic potential for hydro generation (Sue Wing, 2006). We assume a fixed supply of 
resources factor (𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑗 ,    𝑗 ∈ 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑙 & 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ⊂ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ⊂ 𝐴). The rent of resources 
adjusts (𝑃_𝑅𝐸𝑆) to ensure market clearing. 
                                                          
48 We define the richest households’ based on the highest income ratio to total income of households given in 
the SAM classifications. 
49 Due to a limited information, we follow we follow Sue Wing (2006) hypothetical assumption by which the 
factor of resources is estimated as roughly 20% shares of capital input. 
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Government Closure 
The government closure depends on the selected revenue (in case of introducing the carbon 
tax) or cost neutralizing (in case of introducing the FIT or subsidy on renewable generations) 
in each scenario. For example, in the case of scenario 1, all taxes and subsidies rates as well as 
government saving are exogenous; while government expenditure on commodities adjusts to 
clear the fiscal balance. In scenario 2, all taxes and subsidies rates as well as government 
expenditure are exogenous while government saving adjusts to allow a budget surplus so that 
the government balance is achieved. In scenario 3, all government instruments, excluding ad 
valorem tax rates, remain unchanged. In scenario 4, the electricity tax rates are endogenous but 
the rests of government variables are exogenous. Finally, in scenario 5, all government 
instruments, excluding the carbon tax, remain unchanged.       
 
7.4. Simulation Results 
This section presents the simulation results of both revenue-recycling scenarios of introducing 
the carbon tax and cost-neutralizing scenarios of implementing the feed-in tariff. The impacts 
of these policy shocks on Indonesia’s macroeconomy as well as income and output distribution 
are discussed here. 
 
7.4.1. Simulation 1: Recycling Carbon Tax to Reduce Income Tax 
In simulation 1, we examine the impact of implementing a carbon tax of Rp. 100,000/ ton CO2e 
on carbon-based fuels, where the revenue raised from carbon tax is recycled through s 
reduction of labour income tax rates. In other word, the of labour income tax rates adjust to 
clear the government budget balance. The other tax and subsidy rates as well as government 
spending on goods and services remain unchanged. 
 
7.4.1.1. Impacts on Macroeconomy and on CO2 Emissions 
Table 7.1 summarizes the macroeconomic impacts of introducing a carbon tax compensated 
by adjustment in income (labour) tax.  The results reveal that recycling the carbon tax through 
a reduction in labour taxes leads to improvement in all GDPs, (GDP at factor cost) that is 
calculated from total factors returns, GDP at market price from income side that is obtained 
from total private consumption, government consumption, investment and net export; and GDP 
at market price from expenditure side that is the sum of GDP at factor costs and net taxes.  
From Table 7.1 it can be seen that the introduction of carbon tax leads to a reduction of 
labour (income) tax rates by -3.24%, which in turn, leads to the expansion in GDP at market 
price from income side (1.56%) and GDP at market price from expenditure side (2.04%) are 
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more pronounced than GDP at factor costs (0.58%). These imply that the increase of fuel prices 
due to a carbon tax is offset primarily by higher household income improvement via labour 
income tax rate reduction. Thus, it induces a higher domestic demand on goods and services 
due to improvement in their disposable income, which in turn, increases the aggregate output 
production. Nevertheless, net exports contract by 5.11% due to a slight reduction in exports by 
0.14% while total imports increase by 0.36%. We suspect that these changes are influenced by 
the expansion in composite final domestic commodities which results in a higher demand of 
imported goods and services relatively to export. The net indirect tax revenues indicate a strong 
increase by 74.30%. This implies that substituting carbon tax for labour tax leads to expansions 
in national output such that the government gains more from the commodity (indirect) taxes. 
In addition, the net indirect tax is the component to estimate GDP at market price from 
expenditure side. It is revealed that, although the increase of net indirect tax increases sharply, 
it does not strongly affect the GDP at market price from expenditure side because the ratio of 
net indirect tax to the GDP at market price from expenditure side is less than 2%.      
In terms of emissions accounting, the results found that there is no rebound effect – in 
aggregate terms – among energy consumers (households, industries, and government). The 
largest reduction of CO2 emissions through lower consumption of fossil energy is obtained by 
households (-7.52%) followed by industries (-0.14%). The government does not experience 
any changes to their carbon emissions pattern since in the model the public spending is 
assumed exogenous. Overall, national carbon emissions drop by -0.64%. 
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Table 7.1: Simulation 1: Impact on National Income Account 
 Variables 
 
BASE SHOCKED % 
CHANGE (Billions Rupiah) 
GDP at factor costs     5,139,651.22     5,169,437.46  0.58 
GDP at market prices from income side     5,472,898.80     5,558,429.72  1.56 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side    5,243,713.58     5,350,821.20  2.04 
Total private consumption     3,318,104.75     3,323,372.41  0.16 
Total investment    1,508,830.58     1,512,092.12  0.22 
Total real government consumption        294,566.35        299,400.64  1.64 
Total export    1,531,028.46     1,528,910.35  -0.14 
Total import    1,391,532.58     1,396,548.33  0.36 
Net export        139,495.88  
       
132,362.02  
-5.11 
Net indirect tax  
(the total expenditures of all commodity taxes, 
including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities)  
       104,062.37        181,383.74  74.30 
Labour (income) tax rates 0.022 0.021 -3.24 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
   2,692,617.74     2,693,711.90  0.04 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
   2,447,033.48     2,475,725.56  1.17 
Emissions  (Billions Ton CO2)  
CO2 emissions from Households                     4.13  4.20 -7.52 
CO2 emissions from Industries                  55.69  61.17 -0.14 
CO2 emissions from Government                     0.50  0.55  
TOTAL CO2                  60.32  65.92 -0.64 
 
7.4.1.2. Impacts on Output and Energy Composite 
Table 7.2 presents the implications of simulation 1 on industry’s output, the required input of 
energy composite, and the energy intensity. It reveals that the implementation of a carbon tax 
with adjustment in labour income tax does not necessarily lead to a rise in input prices or a 
decline in volumes of composite fuels across industries. For examples, in energy industries – 
i.e. coal mining, natural gas mining, oil mining, and refinery, the input price of energy 
composite is sharply increased by 10.10%, 6.16%, 6.11%, 6.08%, respectively. In contrast, for 
some energy intensive industries – i.e. land transportation, construction, paper products, trade, 
and textile products, the input price of energy composite tends to fall by -4.95%, -12.81%, -
3.58%, -13.18%, -2.21%, respectively. In contrast, the consumption pattern of energy 
composite in most of these industries (energy and energy-intensive industries) indicate an 
expansion, although the magnitude changes of output production tend to decline for most of 
energy-intensive sectors but flat for coal, natural gas, and oil mining sector. For example, 
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conventional power plant indicates the largest contraction by -94.38% but its input of energy 
composite increases by 7.01%.   
The energy consumption pattern across industries can also be seen clearly through their 
energy intensity – measured by diving total energy requirement by output. Despite a 
contraction in output production, most of energy-intensive industries – excluding chemical 
sector – require more energy inputs to produce a unit of output. On the other hand, in energy 
industries, the changes of both energy intensity and output production are considerably 
negligible. Orlov (2012) argued that the main factor in determining the magnitude changes of 
energy intensity is the elasticities of substitution among inter-fuel and factor-fuels as featured 
in the model. For example, if a Leontief production function is assumed, then the energy 
intensity remains unchanged because its nesting structure does not allow any substitution 
possibility (Orlov, 2012).  
Therefore, by looking at these trends, it can be suspected that there is an indication of 
‘local’ rebound effect especially in energy-intensive industries, excluding the chemical sector. 
In other words, instead of improving energy efficiency, the introduction of a carbon tax on 
polluted fuels compensated by a reduction in labour income tax triggers a higher level of 
energy consumption thereby offsetting some of the energy saving achieved (Sorrel and 
Dimitropoulos 2008; and Sorrel 2009). Sorrel (2007) stated that the chosen recycling 
mechanism of carbon tax, i.e. compensating the carbon tax by lowering the distorted taxes, is 
very influential to create the incidence of rebound effect through demand responses. By 
reducing the labour income tax, the households’ purchasing power increases, which could 
induce a higher consumption of energy goods or other closely-associated products.    
On the other hand, for non-energy intensive industries that require less fossil fuel inputs, 
the magnitude of changes of fuels composite, output, and energy intensity varies – although 
the input price of fuels composite tends to increase. In other words, the fuels consumption 
pattern across these industries is not necessarily in line with the changes of their output 
production. We argue that these variations are caused by two channels: (i) the contraction 
effects of carbon tax are offset by the increased disposable income due to lower labour income 
tax, which could improve the aggregate demand; and (ii) fuel substitution effects in which 
industry will favor less polluted (less emission factor) fuels. Fifteen non-energy sectors 
signalled a reduction in energy composite input, namely air, sea, and communication 
transportation (-0.95%); bank and assurance (-0.02%); cattle products (-0.17%); fishery (-
0.85%); forestry and hunting (-0.22%); geothermal mining (-12.97%); hotel (-0.13%), 
individual services, households, and other service (-8.77%); agriculture for other crops (-
0.13%); other mining and excavations (-2.18%); restaurants (-0.24%); supporting services for 
transportation and warehouse (-2.70%); train transportation (-1.03%); electricity transmission 
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and distribution (-1.98%); and wood products (-20.34%). In contrast, six sectors that signalled 
an increase in energy composite input, namely agriculture food crops (0.01%); city gas 
(0.50%); real estates (0.25%); food and drinks (2.12%); government services and defenses 
(5.02%); clean water (148.05%). The pattern of fuels composite input in these industries is not 
in line with their output production. For example, although the energy aggregate inputs in 
agriculture food crops are increased by 2.12%, its output production signals a slight contraction 
by 0.44%. 
 
Table 7.2: Simulation 1: Impact on Energy Composite, Output, and Energy Intensity 
(%CHANGE) 
Industry 
Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄  
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry 
  
Coal Mining -0.04 10.10 0.00 -0.47 0.00 
Natural Gas Mining 0.36 6.16 0.00 -0.16 0.00 
Oil Mining 0.38 6.11 0.00 0.23 0.00 
Conventional Power Plant 
(Aggregated Fossil Fuels Generation) 
7.01 -5.23 -94.38 93.56 1805.00 
Refineries 0.13 6.08 -1.04 0.93 1.05 
Chemical -6.27 7.73 -5.93 3.15 -0.54 
Metal Ores Mining -1.55 0.85 -7.48 5.59 8.08 
Land Transportation 4.31 -4.95 -0.39 -1.29 4.91 
Construction 13.65 -12.81 -0.01 0.31 14.44 
Paper, Printing, Transport 
Equipment, and Products from Metal  
3.99 -3.58 -0.85 0.65 3.96 
Trade 13.90 -13.18 -1.00 0.19 15.04 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and 
Leather Industries 
 
2.50 -2.21 1.07 -0.18 5.54 
 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.01 0.01 -0.50 0.01 0.51 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
-0.95 1.51 15.29 -12.18 -14.81 
Bank and Assurance -0.02 0.13 -0.08 -0.37 0.08 
Cattle and the Products -0.17 0.08 0.13 -0.51 -0.30 
City Gas 0.50 0.46 -13.83 10.68 16.05 
Real Estate, and Private Services 0.25 0.05 0.07 -0.16 -0.07 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
Industry 
Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄  
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
Fishery -0.85 0.87 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 2.12 -2.02 -0.44 0.44 9.57 
Forestry and Hunting -0.22 0.18 0.18 -0.26 -0.18 
Geothermal Mining -12.97 6.14 -0.03 -0.22 -12.95 
Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social 
Services 
5.02 -3.16 -1.86 2.63 7.89 
Hotel -0.13 0.03 8.64 -5.10 -8.06 
Hydro Generation na na -0.04 76.76 0.04 
Individual Services, Households, and 
Other Service 
-8.77 4.51 0.95 -2.29 -0.94 
Agriculture for Other Crops -0.13 0.22 -2.29 1.91 2.35 
Other Mining and Excavations -2.18 0.52 -0.70 0.07 0.70 
Geothermal Generation na na -0.71 -0.15 0.71 
Restaurant -0.24 0.16 -0.17 0.11 0.17 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and Warehouse 
-2.70 1.00 12.16 -9.58 -10.84 
Train Transportation -1.03 0.57 20.88 -12.80 -17.27 
Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution 
-1.98 1.39 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Clean Water 148.05 -50.90 13.52 -0.08 118.51 
Wood and the Products -20.34 7.85 0.58 -0.38 -20.80 
 
7.4.1.3. Impacts on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels 
Table 7.3 summarizes the impacts of simulation 1 on employed factors and factor-fuels. The 
results reveal that introducing a carbon tax compensated by a reduction in labour income tax 
leads to a greater sectoral mobility in labour composite than in the capital stock. The composite 
labour tends to shift from energy and energy-intensive industries toward non-energy industries. 
For examples, sectors oil mining, refinery, conventional generation, chemical, and metal 
mining, the aggregate employment declines by -3.79%, -7.72%, -100%, -11.30%, and -
44.94%; while in sector of air, sea, and communication transportation, city gas, geothermal 
mining, hotel, hydro, and other mining, the aggregate employments increase sharply by 
51.91%, 1630.71%, 209.18%, 21.85%, 1935.78%, and 53.11%. We argue that this transition 
is related to the following linkages. First, at a supply side, the implementation of a carbon tax 
leads to higher production costs across energy and energy-intensive industries due to their large 
consumption of fuels relative to non-energy industries. In turn, these changes would affect 
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factor reallocation, by the tendency to reduce the labour costs more than the cost of other 
factors. Second, at the demand side, the reduced labour income tax increases the households’ 
purchasing power, which would induce a higher consumption of non-energy commodities 
relative to energy commodities. As a result, workers are assumed to be mobile across 
industries, these would initiate labour mobility towards non-energy industries.  
Furthermore, according to the production nesting model, in the third stage, capital is 
combined with energy-composite – by using either a Cobb Douglas function for non-energy 
industry or a complementarity relationship for energy-industry – to produce the capital-energy 
composite. The results suggest that the changes of capital-energy composite vary across 
industries. We suspect that these variations are influenced by the reduced labour income tax 
rates such that the producers obtain the least cost of inputs to produce a unit of output.  In the 
fourth stage, the capital-energy composite is combined with the labour composite using a 
Cobb-Douglas function to form a value added-energy composite. In energy-intensive sectors 
(except textiles), the strong reduction in labour costs lead to a decline in the value added-energy 
composite cost; the conventional generation sector experiences the largest contraction (-
94.53%) followed by metal ores mining (-7.46%), and chemical (-5.93%). On the other hand, 
in most non-energy industries, the value added-energy composite tends to increase due to their 
higher labour costs. For example, twelve non-energy sectors indicate an expansion in value 
added-energy composite, including air, sea, and communication transportation (15.25%), cattle 
products (0.11%), city gas (13.84%), real estates (0.07%), forestry (0.17%), hotel (8.62%), 
households’ services (0.95%), other mining (0.00%), supporting services for transportation 
(12.14%), train transportation (20.08%), clean water (5.30%), and wood products (0.48%). 
There are only seven non-energy sectors indicate a slight fall in value added-energy composite, 
including agriculture food crops (-0.50%), bank and assurance (-0.09%), fishery (-0.01%), 
food and drinks (-0.44%), government services and defences (-1.86%), agriculture for other 
crops (-2.29%), and restaurant (-0.05%). 
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Table 7.3: Simulation 1: Impact on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels (% Change) 
Industry 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry  
Coal Mining 3.72 -0.03 0.34 -0.04 0.14 0.01 0.10 
Natural Gas Mining 12.77 0.36 -0.91 0.36 0.05 -0.74 0.55 
Oil Mining 8.81 0.38 -3.79 0.38 -0.02 0.00 0.36 
Conventional Power 
Plant (Aggregated Fossil 
Fuels Generation) 
51.73 0.00 -100.00 2.77 -1.42 -94.53 96.84 
Refineries 4.55 0.13 -7.72 0.13 0.23 -1.06 1.41 
Chemical 1.03 -0.07 -11.30 -3.77 3.70 -5.93 5.86 
Metal Ores Mining 5.41 -0.69 -44.94 -0.71 -0.01 -7.46 6.76 
Land Transportation 0.21 -1.39 -3.95 3.07 -4.40 -0.38 -0.91 
Construction 1.13 0.02 -5.17 3.42 -3.46 -0.01 0.01 
Paper, Printing, 
Transport Equipment, 
and Products from Metal  
1.41 0.04 -3.44 0.70 -0.68 -0.85 0.85 
Trade 0.13 0.37 -3.13 7.22 -6.87 -1.07 1.34 
Spinning, Textile, 
Garment, and Leather 
Industries 
1.37 0.23 1.25 0.64 -0.43 1.06 -0.87 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.06 0.07 -0.53 0.04 -0.01 -0.50 0.36 
Air, Sea, and 
Communication 
Transportation 
1.72 0.03 51.91 -0.25 0.26 15.25 -15.30 
Bank and Assurance 2.29 24.16 -1.13 0.15 -0.03 -0.09 0.19 
Cattle and the Products 0.42 0.08 0.21 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 -0.25 
City Gas 3.19 0.52 1630.71 0.47 0.47 13.84 14.79 
Real Estate, and Private 
Services 
3.35 0.31 -0.71 0.31 -0.05 0.07 0.19 
Fishery 1.71 -0.08 -0.32 -0.15 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 
Food, Drink, and 
Tobacco 
1.38 0.01 -1.27 0.13 -0.12 -0.44 0.45 
Forestry and Hunting 1.62 -0.06 0.79 -0.15 0.09 0.17 -0.24 
Geothermal Mining 12.03 -13.38 209.18 -12.66 -0.03 -0.60 -13.69 
Government and 
Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other 
Social Services 
0.16 1.76 -2.74 2.51 -0.77 -1.86 3.60 
Hotel 1.53 0.06 21.85 0.05 1.23 8.62 -8.61 
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Table 7.3 (continued) 
Industry 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Hydro Generation 32.71 6.40 1935.78 na na na na 
Individual Services, 
Households, and Other 
Service 
0.65 -4.17 4.75 -4.48 0.92 0.95 -5.14 
Agriculture for Other 
Crops 
0.21 0.03 -2.75 -0.35 0.41 -2.29 2.36 
Other Mining and 
Excavations 
0.35 -0.25 53.11 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.41 
Geothermal Generation 24.10 1.02 -59.68 na na na na 
Restaurant 0.11 0.18 0.01 -0.19 0.11 -0.05 -0.08 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and 
Warehouse 
0.30 -2.19 17.68 -2.35 0.65 12.14 -13.93 
Train Transportation 0.28 -0.21 61.21 0.18 -0.67 20.08 -20.91 
Electricity Transmission 
and Distribution 
2.84 -0.54 3.21 -0.51 -0.12   
Clean Water 0.19 -10.49 10.81 -11.56 1.09 5.30 -15.66 
Wood and the Products 1.01 0.60 0.08 0.79 7.19 0.48 0.09 
 
7.4.1.4. Impacts on Commodities 
Three types of commodities are distinguished, namely (1) energy commodities, which include 
fossil energy mining (coal, gas, and crude oil) and petroleum products (bioethanol, biodiesel, 
kerosene, Liquid Natural Gas (LNG), non-subsidized gasoline, non-subsidized Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (LPG), subsidized biodiesel, subsidized biogas, subsidized diesel, subsidized 
gasoline, subsidized LPG, and other refined oil  products); (2) energy-intensive commodities, 
which include electricity, chemical products, metal ores mining, land transportation, 
construction, trade, textiles, and supporting services for transportation and warehouse; and (3) 
non-energy-intensive, which include agricultural food crops, air sea and communication 
transportation, bank and assurances, cattle products, city gas, real estates, fishery, food and 
drinks, forestry products, geothermal mining, government services, hotel, household services, 
non-food crops agricultural, other mining, paper and printing products, restaurant, train 
transportation, clean water, and timber products. Table 7.4 summarizes the impacts of SIM-1 
on commodity prices and volumes.  
As shown in Table 7.4, the implementation of a differentiated carbon tax on fossil fuel 
products – based on the level of their carbon content – immediately increases their consumer 
prices: coal (235.67%), natural gas (66.40%), crude oil (94.48%), bioethanol (8.22%), 
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biodiesel (9.16%), kerosene (127.16%), LNG (7.58%), non-subsidized gasoline (361.95%), 
non-subsidized LPG (140.55%), subsidized biogas (114.15%), subsidized diesel (124.34%), 
subsidized gasoline (119.71%), and subsidized LPG (56.35%). The consumer prices of energy-
intensive commodities also tend to increase, although by less than energy commodities: 
electricity (0.09%), chemical (3.19%), metal ores mining (6.61%), construction (0.43%), and 
trade (0.19%). On the other hand, for non-energy commodities, eleven commodities indicate a 
decline and 9 commodities indicate an increase. This implies that the consumer prices of most 
of these commodities tend to fall due to lower fuel costs.  
On the supply side, the producer prices of most of energy commodities slightly increase: 
coal mining (0.22%), crude oil (0.25%), bioethanol (0.25%), biodiesel (0.25%), LNG (0.30%), 
non-subsidized gasoline (1.12%), other oil products (1.00%), and subsidized biodiesel 
(0.98%). These slight price increases indicate a rise in their final domestic demand 
(consumption). However, for non-energy commodities, the producer prices considerably vary.  
In terms of domestic (final) consumption, the implementation of carbon tax compensated 
by a reduction in labour (income) tax does not necessarily reduce the final energy consumption. 
However, the results also reveal that energy consumption shifts towards less polluting types – 
indicated by lower emission factors. The domestic consumption of gas and biofuel products 
increases more than coal and crude oil products such as gasoline and kerosene. For example, 
the domestic consumption of coal declines by 0.09%, crude oil by 0.13%, kerosene by 0.19%, 
non-subsidised gasoline by 0.01%, and subsidised gasoline by 1.08%; in contrast, the domestic 
consumption of bioethanol is more increased by 10.65%, LNG by 2.12%, non-subsidised LPG 
by 11.36%, subsidised biodiesel by 0.17%, and subsidised by LPG 2.47%. However, for 
energy-intensive commodities (excluding supporting services for transportation and textiles), 
their domestic consumption tends to decline.      
On the trade side, the price index of exported (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and imported (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) goods and services 
are determined from the following relationships: 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊,           𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐸 
𝑃𝑖
𝑀 = (𝐸𝑋𝑅)𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 
Because Indonesia’s economy is classified as a small and open, Indonesia does not influence 
the world price of trade, thus, the world price index of export (𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊) are 
exogenous. This implies that the changes of domestically price of export (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) 
are fully determined by the endogenous exchange rate (domestic per foreign currency unit). 
The results found that simulation 1 leads to a slight depreciation of the currency. Thus, as 
shown in Table 7.4, the domestic price of exported and imported goods and services rises in 
line with the depreciated exchange rate (0.36%). In terms of trade volumes, the impact of SIM-
1 varies substantially among non-energy commodities. This is due to the trade assumptions in 
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the model: imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported commodity to produce 
final domestic consumption, as well as imperfect transformation from supply production to 
obtain domestic and exported commodities. However, for energy commodities, as previously 
mentioned, domestic demand shifts towards less polluting types which results in a contraction 
on their imported demand. 
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Table 7.4: Simulation 1: Impact on Commodity Prices and Volumes (% Change) 
Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Sector  
Coal  0.22 47.95 0.36 0.01 0.42 0.06 1.93 -0.09 
Natural Gas  -0.18 13.31 0.36 0.13 2.98 -0.11 -0.74 -0.12 
Crude Oil  0.25 19.33 0.36 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.36 -0.13 
Bioethanol 0.25 6.48 0.36 -620.66 na 1919.29 -112.17 10.65 
Biodiesel 0.25 1.32 0.36 -0.68 52.88 39.44 -125.81 -0.08 
Kerosene 0.00 25.94 0.36 0.00 na 0.00 -0.62 -0.19 
LNG 0.30 1.43 0.36 -1.04 -1.12 0.00 -0.60 2.12 
Non-Subsidized Gasoline 1.12 73.86 0.36 -1.07 na -1.05 0.45 -0.01 
Non-Subsidized LPG -1.97 27.90 0.36 12.74 na 0.70 -3.86 11.36 
Other Oil Products 1.00 12.03 0.36 -1.04 -2.53 -0.39 1.53 0.75 
Subsidized Biodiesel 0.98 21.74 0.36 -0.80 na -0.76 14.95 0.17 
Subsidized Biogas -4.63 22.79 0.36 630.18 na 7.52 1.92 -0.47 
Subsidized Diesel 1.86 25.63 0.36 -0.76 na -1.03 1.92 0.67 
Subsidized Gasoline 2.74 24.69 0.36 -1.94 na -1.94 15.52 -1.08 
Subsidized LPG 4.92 13.48 0.36 -2.59 na -2.66 6.64 2.47 
Electricity 0.23 0.09 0.36 0.00 na 0.03 na 0.25 
Chemical 3.44 3.19 0.36 -5.93 -12.23 -4.29 3.44 -2.26 
Metal Ores Mining 5.59 6.61 0.36 -7.47 -18.27 -4.21 7.14 -2.97 
Land Transportation -1.29 -1.28 0.36 -0.27 2.55 -0.50 -3.90 -0.62 
Construction 0.43 0.43 0.36 -0.01 na -0.01 na -0.01 
Trade 0.19 0.19 0.36 -1.01 na -1.01 na -1.01 
Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse -9.58 -8.47 0.36 12.20 31.64 9.87 -12.35 5.30 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries -0.17 -0.31 0.36 1.07 1.79 0.61 4.50 0.46 
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Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Non-Energy Intensive Sector 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.54 0.53 0.36 -0.50 -12.00 -0.51 -0.19 -0.47 
Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation -11.76 -11.33 0.36 15.29 39.15 10.75 -18.04 5.35 
Bank and Assurance -0.16 -0.15 0.36 -0.07 11.67 0.04 4.32 -0.16 
Cattle and the Products -0.04 -0.04 0.36 0.12 31.24 0.22 -0.35 0.11 
City Gas 11.15 11.40 0.36 -13.88 na -11.38 na -14.30 
Real Estate, and Private Services -0.14 -0.10 0.36 0.04 2.40 0.03 -1.04 -0.13 
Fishery -0.01 -0.07 0.36 -0.01 2.98 -0.02 -0.31 -0.02 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 0.64 0.47 0.36 -0.44 -0.99 -0.35 -0.16 -0.34 
Forestry and Hunting -0.23 0.02 0.36 0.16 14.92 0.16 -30.45 -0.37 
Geothermal Mining -0.35 -0.11 0.36 4.89 na 0.29 na -0.05 
Government and Defense, Education, Health, Film, and 
Other Social Services 
2.60 2.69 0.36 -1.83 -6.66 -1.64 3.15 -1.51 
Hotel -5.09 -6.71 0.36 9.28 19.36 -8.64 -36.82 -22.91 
Individual Services, Households, and Other Service -2.29 -2.20 0.36 1.02 6.67 0.92 -1.60 0.72 
Agriculture for Other Crops 1.91 1.91 0.36 -2.29 -5.75 -1.91 1.54 -1.69 
Other Mining and Excavations 0.08 0.06 0.36 -0.68 3.02 -0.70 7.11 -3.20 
Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Products from 
Metal  
0.70 0.50 0.36 -0.85 -1.84 -0.60 0.50 -0.34 
Restaurant 0.13 0.08 0.36 -0.01 0.26 -0.04 11.33 -0.04 
Train Transportation -12.78 -14.63 0.36 37.63 46.98 9.76 -26.30 8.54 
Clean Water -8.92 -9.11 0.36 13.50 na 4.97 na 5.36 
Wood and the Products -0.353 -0.38 0.36 0.54 1.21 0.15 -1.33 0.14 
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7.4.1.5. Impact on Income Distribution and Welfare 
This section discusses the effects of SIM-1 on household welfare and inequality. The inequality 
is measured by the Theil-L index, which belongs to the family of generalized entropy 
inequality measures; Welfare is measured by the Equivalent Variation (EV). Table 7.5 
summarises the impacts of simulation 1 on income distribution and welfare.  
The Theil-L index is widely used to measure inequality since it satisfied the criteria of 
good measures of inequality: mean independence, population size independence, symmetry, 
Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity, decomposability, and statistical testability (Hasnain, 2010)50. 
According to Hasnain (2010), the Theil-L index can be decomposed as follows: 
𝑇𝐿 =∑
1
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
ln (
∑ 𝑌𝐻ℎℎ
𝑌𝐻ℎ ∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
)
𝑁
ℎ=1
 
=∑(
𝑁ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
) 𝑇𝐿ℎ +∑
𝑁ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
ℎ
ln(
𝑁ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
⁄
𝑌𝐻ℎ
∑ 𝑌𝐻ℎℎ
⁄
)
ℎ
                                                               (1) 
 
Where 𝑌 is the total income of the population, 𝑌𝐻ℎ is the income of subgroup, 𝑁 is total 
population, and 𝑁ℎ us the population in the subgroup. Due to limited data of population in 
details, we only take into account the between-groups inequality, that is the second term of 
right hand side of eq. (1): 
𝑇𝐿 =∑
𝑁ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
ℎ
ln (
𝑁ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
⁄
𝑌𝐻ℎ
∑ 𝑌𝐻ℎℎ
⁄
) 
which can be rewritten as: 
𝑇𝐿 = ln (
∑ 𝑌𝐻ℎℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
) −
∑ 𝑁ℎ ln (
𝑌𝐻ℎ
𝑁ℎ
)
ℎ
∑ 𝑁ℎℎ
                                                                                           (2) 
The welfare effect is estimated as the equivalent variation of the representative 
households. Equivalent variation is the amount of spending that is taken away from consumers 
after the price change without reducing their maximized utility as they would before the 
change. In the model the equivalent variation is expressed as follows: 
𝐸𝑉ℎ = (
𝑃𝐼ℎ
0
𝑃𝐼ℎ
1)𝐸𝐻ℎ
1 − 𝐸𝐻ℎ
0 
                                                          
50 For further details, see Hasnain (2010). 
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where 𝑃𝐼ℎ denotes the household price index; 𝐸𝐻ℎ denotes the household expenditure; and 
superscripts 0 and 1 represent the situations at pre and post change of commodity price. Thus, 
change in total welfare (or in economy wide welfare) can be estimated as the percentage change 
of the sums of EVs across households: 
𝑇𝐸𝑉 = 100 [
∑ 𝐸𝑉ℎℎ
∑ 𝐸𝐻ℎ
1
ℎ
] 
Table 7.5 shows that the introduction of a carbon tax in Indonesia compensated by 
lowering the labour (income) tax rates tends to be neutral (or slightly regressive) in both rural 
and urban areas. In other words, the impacts of SIM-3 on household welfare are negligible. 
However, in terms of aggregate welfare –  measured as economy-wide EV – SIM-1 results in 
a slight welfare loss by -0.036%.  Regarding income distribution, measured as Theil-L index, 
the result shows that inequality remains unchanged due to the negligible changes in household 
welfare. 
 
Table 7.5: Simulation 1: Impact on Income Distribution and Welfare 
Household's Group 
Initial  
Total 
Budget 
Budget on 
Energy 
Consumption 
WELFARE Inequality 
VALUE %CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
 Billion Rp   
Rural households' - 
unclear occupations  
158015.28 3528.11 -1582.06 -0.03     
Rural households' - 
agricultural labors with 
low income  
162021.42 1662.63 -197.2 0.00     
Rural households' – non-
agricultural labors with 
low income 
385336.98 7871.47 -321.119 -0.01   
Rural households' – non-
agricultural with high 
income 
450508.35 6962.91 -2453.81 -0.05     
Rural Households' - 
Agricultural Employers 
642327.17 8864.30 -1499.11 -0.03     
Urban households' - 
unclear occupations 
213768.06 4859.06 -462.723 -0.01     
Urban households' - low 
income 
633498.92 7775.67 -850.787 -0.02     
Urban households' - high 
income 
672628.57 11447.65 6168.249 0.12     
Total       -0.036 0.136 0.136 
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7.4.1.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
Since the parameters used in the model are ‘borrowed’ from the literature, it is necessary to 
check the robustness of simulation results with respect to parameter uncertainty (Yusuf, 2008). 
Orlov (2012) and Qi et al. (2016) argued that the results of implementing price discrimination 
on specific commodities, i.e. imposing carbon tax on fossil fuel commodities, can be sensitive 
to model parameterisations such as trade elasticities. The magnitude of the tax-shifting effect 
between imports and domestic commodities to produce final commodities consumed 
domestically (and the transformation from domestic supply to domestic and exported 
commodities) is mainly depending on elasticity of substitution between these commodity 
types. This is done by implementing a sensitivity analysis of trade parameters and examining 
the changes of endogenous variables. We vary the import elasticity (CES trade parameters) by 
a 25% decrease and increase (between 1.5 and 2.5) and then check the reliability of results. 
Table 7.6 presents the sensitivity analysis results of SIM-1 on macroeconomic accounts.  
The sensitivity analysis shows that the changes of trade elasticity of substitution affect 
the macroeconomic accounts due to a change in trade accounts (export and import as well as 
the net export). As shown in Table 7.6, under a low elasticity scenario (trade elasticity = 1.5), 
the contraction in net export are more pronounced than the midpoint scenario (trade elasticity 
= 2) due to higher import and lower exports. This contraction obviously leads to a fall in GDP 
at market prices from income side; as well as net indirect tax and total wage bill since the 
changes in exports and imports would affect the final composite commodities purchased by 
domestic consumers. However, apart from total investment, under the high elasticity scenario 
(trade elasticity = 2.5), SIM-1 generates a consistent direction across all endogenous variables. 
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Table 7.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Simulation 1 on National Income Accounts  
(% Change) 
Variables 
Trade Elasticities 
= 1.5 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.0 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.5 
GDP at factor costs  0.76 0.58 0.78 
GDP at market prices from income side   -0.44 1.56 0.73 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side  0.48 2.04 1.73 
Total private consumption  1.11 0.16 0.01 
Total investment -2.56 0.22 -2.55 
Total net government consumption 3.36 1.64 4.49 
Total export 0.78 -0.14 3.63 
Total import 2.29 0.36 3.43 
Net export -14.26 -5.11 5.62 
Net indirect tax  
(total expenditures of all commodity taxes, 
including 
import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities)  
-13.19 74.30 48.76 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
-0.06 0.04 0.40 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
1.65 1.17 1.19 
Source: simulation results 
 
7.4.2. Simulation 2: Recycling Carbon Tax to Improve the Public Spending 
In simulation 2, we examine the impact of implementing a carbon tax of Rp. 100,000/ton CO2e 
on carbon-based fuels where the revenue raised from carbon tax is recycled through an 
expansion of government expenditures on commodities. In other word, the adjusted 
government expenditures across commodities (𝐶𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽) is endogenous in order to clear the 
government budget balance; all tax and subsidy rates are fixed.  
 
7.4.2.1. Impact on Macroeconomic and CO2 Emission Account 
Table 7.7 summarizes the macroeconomic impact of introducing the carbon tax with 
adjustment in public spending.  In the model, we estimate three kinds of GDP, namely GDP at 
factor cost that is calculated from total factors returns; GDP at market price from income side 
that is obtained from total private consumption, government consumption, investment and net 
export; and GDP at market price from expenditure side that is the sum of GDP at factor costs 
and indirect net taxes. 
The implementation of a carbon tax on fossil fuels immediately increases their consumer 
prices. Thus, the increase of these prices will induce factors to be reallocated particularly in 
energy-intensive industries (Yusuf, 2008). In turn, the changes in factor markets have an 
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important effect on sectoral and income distribution (Yusuf, 2008). As shown in Table 7.7, the 
GDP at factor cost slightly falls by -0.006%. This contraction is strongly related to the slight 
reduction of its component of the total wage bill (-0.049%). In contrast, the total capital bill 
slight increases (0.043%).  
The introduction of a carbon tax is compensated by an increase of public expenditure on 
commodities by 0.07%. This implies that the negative effect of carbon tax on the economy is 
offset by an expansion of public expenditure on commodities that shifts up the aggregate 
demand. This pattern is indicated through the improvement in GDP at market prices by 0.601% 
from the income side and by 0.292% from the expenditure side. The carbon tax, which is 
embodied in domestic consumer fuel prices, leads to a drop in both total exported goods (-
0.304%) and total imported goods (-0.469%). However, net exports improve by 1.34%. In 
addition, the introduction of carbon tax also leads to a strong rise in net indirect taxes 
(45.991%) which leads to a slight increase in the GDP at market prices from the expenditure 
side. As mentioned earlier, the share of net indirect taxes in GDP at market prices from the 
expenditure side is only about 1.98%. This implies that although the net indirect tax strongly 
increases, the GDP at market prices from the expenditure side only increases slightly. 
In terms of emissions accounting, there is no rebound effect. The largest reduction of 
CO2 emissions through lower consumption of fossil energy commodities are obtained by 
households (-18.533%) followed by industries (-1.377%). The government experiences the 
smallest reduction of carbon emission (-0.067%), which can be explained by the chosen 
revenue-recycling of increasing government expenditures on commodities which increases 
government consumption of fossil fuels. This increase – especially in energy goods – raises 
their carbon emissions, which in turn offsets the original reduction of government carbon 
emission. Overall, the national carbon emissions drop by -1.106%. Regarding Indonesia’s 
commitment to the UFCCC ratification, of which the national share emissions from energy 
utilization are targeted to be reduced by about 1%, simulation 2 demonstrates that the target 
can be achieved through imposing the carbon tax on fossil fuels compensated by an increase 
in public consumption on goods and services. 
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Table 7.7: SIM-2 Impacts on National Income Account 
 Variables 
 
BASE SHOCKED 
% CHANGE 
(Billions Rupiah) 
GDP at factor costs      5,139,651.22     5,139,363.12  -0.006 
GDP at market prices from income side  
 
   5,472,898.80     5,505,805.87  0.601 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side 
  
   5,243,713.58     5,259,046.42  0.292 
Total private consumption     3,318,104.75     3,361,220.97  1.299 
Total investment    1,508,830.58     1,474,576.53  -2.27 
Total real government consumption        294,566.35         302,036.19  2.536 
Total nominal government consumption 294566.348 294368.423 -0.07 
Total export    1,531,028.46     1,526,377.78  -0.304 
Total import    1,391,532.58     1,385,013.23  -0.469 
Net export        139,495.88         141,364.56  1.34 
Net indirect tax  
(total expenditures of all commodity taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities) 
       104,062.37         119,683.30  15.011 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
   2,692,617.74     2,691,288.35  -0.049 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
   2,447,033.48     2,448,074.77  0.043 
Emissions  (Billions Ton CO2)  
CO2 emissions from Households                     4.13                      3.54  -14.159 
CO2 emissions from Industries                  55.69                   55.61  -0.149 
CO2 emissions from Government                     0.50                      0.50  -0.067 
TOTAL CO2                  60.32                   59.65  -1.106 
 
7.4.2.2. Impacts on Output and Energy Composite 
Table 7.8 presents the impacts of simulation 2 on industries’s output and the required 
industries’ input of energy composite as well as the industries’ energy intensities. As 
mentioned earlier, the changes in output (price and volume) are strongly influenced by the 
changes in energy input costs – indicated by the price of energy composite (𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) across 
industries. The introduction of a carbon tax immediately increases the input price of fuel 
products, which leads to a rise in the aggregated energy costs (Orlov, 2012). As shown in table 
7.8, the input price of the energy composite increases in almost all sectors – especially in 
energy-intensive industries – which leads to a drop in energy aggregate input. For example, 
energy composite demand falls in conventional generation (-24%), metal ores mining (-18%), 
textiles (-13%), construction (-10%), and paper products industry (-4%) since their production 
is heavily relied on fossil fuel inputs. These changes raise the price (or lower the volumes) of 
their output; the output price of conventional generation indicates the largest increase. In 
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contrast, the output from renewable electricity increases by 0.39% (hydro) and 5.35% 
(geothermal). This expansion is due to the technology switching effect from conventional 
(fossil fuels) generation to renewable (clean) generation.   
For most of the non-energy intensive industries that require less fossil fuel inputs, 
demand for energy composite input falls. The magnitude changes of fuel composite demand 
across these industries are irrelevant to the changes of their output production. We argue that 
these variations are determined by two channels: (i) the increasing aggregate demand in 
economy through the expansion of public consumption of commodities; and (ii) fuel 
substitution effects in which an industry will favor the less polluting (identified by less 
emission factor) fuels than the higher carbon-based fuels. In other words, the contraction due 
to the introduction of a carbon tax on fossil fuels will be offset by an increase of government 
expenditure on goods and services. In thirteen non-energy sectors, the energy composite input 
went down, namely supporting services for transportation and warehouses (-102.16%); 
agricultural for food crops (-49.76%); bank and assurances (-22.09%); electricity transmission 
and distribution (-21.31%); wood products (-20.34%); forestry and hunting (-10.16%); fishery 
(-7.55%); food, drink, and tobaccos (-6.73%); other mining (-6.41%); air, sea, and 
communication transportation (-4.59%); restaurant (-3.07%); government services (-3.61%); 
and cattle and their products (-1.28%). In contrast, six sectors had an increase in energy 
composite input, namely clean water (148.05%); agriculture for other crops (44.87%); real 
estate, and private services (21.75%); city gas (9.21%); hotel (4.03%); and individual services, 
households, and other service (1.78%). The changes of energy aggregate input among these 
industries are not in line with their output production. For example, although the aggregated 
energy inputs in agriculture food crops sharply dropped (-49.76%), their output production still 
slightly increased (0.12%). This is because food crops are required as raw inputs to produce 
food and drink commodities.  
Furthermore, in terms of energy intensity – measured by the division of total energy 
requirements by output, I found that the changes in energy intensity substantially vary across 
industries. For example, the largest decline of energy intensity occurred in supporting services 
for transportation and warehouse sector (-102.23%) (Table 7.2). It means that this sector 
requires 102.23% less energy to produce a unit of output. In contrast, the energy intensity of 
natural gas mining (1.01%) increased by more than coal mining (0.55%) due to a higher 
demand for energy inputs. Orlov (2012) argued that the main factors in determining the 
magnitude changes of energy intensity are the elasticity of substitution among inter-fuel and 
factor-fuels. For example, if a Leontief production function is assumed, then the energy 
intensity remains unchanged because its nesting structure does not allow any substitution 
possibility (Orlov, 2012). 
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Table 7.8: Simulation 2: Impact on Energy Composite, Output, and Energy Intensity 
(% Change) 
Industry 
Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄  
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry 
  
Coal Mining -0.68 0.62 -1.23 0.04 0.55 
Natural Gas Mining 0.77 0.22 -0.24 0.27 1.01 
Oil Mining -1.76 -0.32 -0.08 0.33 -1.84 
Conventional Power Plant 
(Aggregated Fossil Fuels Generation) 
-24.21 27.57 -20.04 1.75 -5.22 
Refineries -0.17 1.08 -0.46 0.59 -0.63 
Chemical -1.57 -1.21 -0.20 0.64 -1.77 
Metal Ores Mining -17.69 17.25 -0.88 -0.02 -16.96 
Land Transportation -0.32 0.29 -0.29 0.66 -0.03 
Construction -10.22 10.85 0.09 0.89 -10.29 
Paper, Printing, Transport 
Equipment, and Products from Metal  
-3.59 -3.38 -0.02 -0.46 -3.61 
Trade -1.26 2.11 0.00 0.57 -1.25 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and 
Leather Industries 
-13.34 13.16 -0.56 -0.16 -12.86 
 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
 
Agriculture Food Crops -49.76 2.44 0.12 -0.04 -49.82 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
-4.59 3.76 -1.40 0.03 -3.24 
Bank and Assurance -22.09 7.61 -0.06 -0.64 -22.05 
Cattle and the Products -1.28 8.61 0.01 0.62 -1.29 
City Gas 9.21 -11.28 -6.31 0.79 16.57 
Real Estate, and Private Services 21.75 -21.98 -1.29 -0.64 23.34 
Fishery -7.55 6.21 -0.07 0.36 -7.48 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco -6.73 -0.42 0.04 0.04 -6.70 
Forestry and Hunting -10.16 -0.19 -3.24 -0.45 -7.15 
Geothermal Mining 1.70 -1.02 1.90 0.38 -0.19 
Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social 
Services 
-3.61 4.32 0.27 -0.64 -3.87 
Hotel 4.03 5.58 2.82 -0.64 1.18 
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Table 7.8 (continued) 
Industry 
Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄  
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
Hydro Generation na na 0.39 -1.18 na 
Individual Services, Households, and 
Other Service 
1.78 0.19 0.39 0.70 1.38 
Agriculture for Other Crops 44.87 -46.13 1.17 0.10 43.20 
Other Mining and Excavations -6.41 0.07 3.58 0.34 -9.64 
Geothermal Generation na na 5.35 1.724 na 
Restaurant -3.07 9.54 -0.57 0.40 -2.51 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and Warehouse 
-102.16 192.90 -3.35 0.30 -102.23 
Train Transportation -19.89 34.58 5.15 -0.80 -23.81 
Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution 
-21.31 10.76 -0.69 0.97 -20.76 
Clean Water 148.05 -50.90 13.52 -0.08 118.51 
Wood and the Products -20.34 7.85 0.58 -0.38 -20.80 
 
7.4.2.3. Impacts on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels 
The changes in output reallocates factors across sectors (Yusuf, 2008). In addition, because in 
the factor closures we assume that capital and workers are mobile between industries within a 
fixed labour wage and capital rent, thus, the injection of an increase of government spending 
on goods and services induces only the capital stock and the number of workers. Table 7.9 
presents the effects of simulation 2 on employed factors and factor-fuels.  
The factor ratio of capital to labour composite (
𝐾
𝐿𝐴𝐵
), shows that most energy-intensive 
industries are also capital-intensive. These industries, which experience a decline in output due 
to carbon tax, also have tendency in reducing the capital cost. For example, there are a decrease 
in capital input for conventional electricity generation (-0.49%), fossils mining (coal (-2.99%) 
and gas (-0.43%)), refinery (-0.25%), chemical (-0.49%), metal mining (-0.73%), construction 
(-0.69%), paper products (-0.49%), trade (-0.34%), and textiles (-0.88%)51. However, for 
capital-intensive renewable industries, the demand for capital increases by a lot. We argue that 
this finding is due to the generation technology switching from fossil fuels plant to renewables 
(hydro and geothermal) as a result of the carbon tax on fuels.52 The results also revealed a sharp 
contraction of employment in the capital-intensive energy (fossil and renewable) sectors such 
                                                          
51 These findings are similar to those study of Yusuf (2008). 
52 Based on the bottom-up model framework in electricity production structure, this technology switching is 
allowed to obtain total output generation.  
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as conventional generation (-37.31%), hydro generation (-100%) and geothermal generation (-
100%). Overall, simulation 2 slightly improves the aggregate employment by 0.09%.    
In the third stage of the production structure in the model, capital is combined with 
energy-composite by using either a Cobb Douglas function (for non-energy industry) or a 
Leontief function (for energy industry) to produce the capital-energy composite. Some energy-
intensive (and energy) sectors contract, i.e. coal mining (-1.15%), natural gas mining (-0.13%), 
oil mining (-0.19%), conventional power plant (-7.10%), construction (-1.99%), paper 
products (-0.05%), trade (-0.79%), and textiles -0.06%). Orlov (2012) argued that the 
magnitude of reduction of capital-energy composite depends on the ratio of capital cost relative 
to energy input costs. When the energy costs are higher than capital costs, the capital-energy 
aggregate declines more. For example, the largest decline in capital-energy composite is 
obtained in conventional generation plants since this industry heavily depends on fossil-fuel 
combustion; on the contrary, there is only a slight decrease of capital-energy composite in 
textiles and trade sector since they depend on more capital (the machineries) than on energy 
input.  
In the next stage of the production structure (the fourth stage), the capital-energy composite is 
combined with the labour composite using a Cobb-Douglas function to form value added-
energy composite. In some sectors, the reduction in employment costs decreases the cost of 
the value added-energy composite; conventional generation sector has the largest contraction 
(-24.43%) followed by city gas (-6.25%), real estate (-1.94%), and air, sea, and communication 
transportation (-1.44%). 
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Table 7.9: Simulation 2: Impact on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels (% Change) 
Industry 
Initial input 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry  
Coal Mining 3.72 -2.99 -2.69 -1.15 -0.1 -1.28 0.29 
Natural Gas Mining 12.77 -0.43 3.32 -0.13 -5.9 -0.20 0.07 
Oil Mining 8.81 0.00 1.13 -0.19 0.0 -0.10 0.16 
Conventional Power Plant 
(Aggregated Fossil Fuels 
Generation) 
51.73 -0.49 -37.31 -7.10 -20.9 -24.43 -0.63 
Refineries 4.55 -0.25 0.61 0.00 0.4 1.70 -1.42 
Chemical 1.03 -0.49 3.21 0.62 -0.5 1.00 -0.87 
Metal Ores Mining 5.41 -0.73 -0.41 0.13 -0.4 -0.87 0.23 
Land Transportation 0.21 1.79 -1.33 1.01 -0.8 -0.22 0.88 
Construction 1.13 -0.69 2.59 -1.99 2.3 0.73 -0.37 
Paper, Printing, Transport 
Equipment, and Products from 
Metal  
1.41 -0.49 -2.20 -0.05 -0.5 -0.05 0.03 
Trade 0.13 -0.34 0.25 -0.79 0.2 -0.10 -0.79 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, 
and Leather Industries 
1.37 -0.88 -1.57 -0.06 0.0 -0.45 0.10 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.06 -0.41 0.19 -0.54 0.8 0.08 -0.65 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
1.72 0.02 -0.44 -1.41 0.5 -1.44 0.32 
Bank and Assurance 2.29 -1.07 1.26 -2.60 1.7 -0.19 -0.70 
Cattle and the Products 0.42 6.62 -2.59 7.66 -5.6 0.26 2.03 
City Gas 3.19 -6.91 -32.12 0.97 -1.6 -6.25 1.34 
Real Estate, and Private 
Services 
3.35 -2.29 -4.33 -1.40 -0.8 -1.94 -0.93 
Fishery 1.71 0.63 5.13 0.01 0.6 -0.46 1.07 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 1.38 0.07 0.68 0.37 -0.3 0.14 -0.11 
Forestry and Hunting 1.62 -5.76 0.92 -5.75 -0.4 -3.25 -0.70 
Geothermal Mining 12.03 1.26 153.98 2.22 -0.6 2.44 0.07 
Government and Defence, 
Education, Health, Film, and 
Other Social Services 
0.16 -0.73 0.36 -1.61 0.0 0.22 -0.76 
Hotel 1.53 1.55 3.89 0.73 1.8 2.82 -1.11 
Hydro Generation 32.71 9.54 -100 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Individual Services, 
Households, and Other 
Service 
0.65 -0.41 0.84 -0.25 2.1 0.40 1.64 
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Table 7.9 (continued) 
Industry 
Initial input 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Agriculture for Other Crops 0.21 0.29 1.27 0.64 -0.3 1.17 0.49 
Other Mining and Excavations 0.35 4.60 -1.66 1.91 -0.6 3.59 0.61 
Geothermal Generation 24.10 240.44 -100 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Restaurant 0.11 4.51 -0.77 6.27 0.5 -0.22 0.80 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and Warehouse 
0.30 -30.19 -39.60 -7.92 0.9 -3.72 0.76 
Train Transportation 0.28 -77.91 9.09 1.75 0.1 5.70 -1.11 
Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution 
2.84 -3.57 82.67 -0.48 -0.4  n.a  n.a 
Clean Water 0.19 34.15 -2.70 64.57 1.2 13.92 0.58 
Wood and the Products 1.01 0.82 1.30 -0.01 209.7 0.61 0.54 
 
7.4.2.4. Impacts on Commodities 
According to the SAM dataset, we distinguish three types of commodities: (1) energy 
commodities which including fossil energy mining (coal, gas, and crude oil) and petroleum 
products (bioethanol, biodiesel, kerosene, Liquid Natural Gas (LNG), non-subsidized gasoline, 
non-subsidized Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG), subsidized biodiesel, subsidized biogas, 
subsidized diesel, subsidized gasoline, subsidized LPG, and other refined oil  products); (2) 
energy-intensive commodities which including electricity, chemical products, metal ores 
mining, land transportation, construction, trade, textiles, and supporting services for 
transportation and warehouse; and (3) non-energy-intensive which including agricultural food 
crops, air sea and communication transportation, bank and assurances, cattle products, city gas, 
real estates, fishery, food and drinks, forestry products, geothermal mining, government 
services, hotel, household services, non-food crops agricultural, other mining, paper and 
printing products, restaurant, train transportation, clean water, and timber products. Table 7.10 
summarizes the impacts of simulation 2 on commodity prices (and volumes).  
In the model framework, the carbon tax is embodied in the consumer prices of fossil 
fuels according to the level of their emission. This imposition immediately increases the 
consumer prices of those fuel products, namely coal (235.67%), natural gas (66.40%), crude 
oil (94.48%), bioethanol (8.22%), biodiesel (9.16%), kerosene (127.16%), LNG (7.58%), non-
subsidized gasoline (361.95%), non-subsidized LPG (140.55%), subsidized biogas (114.15%), 
subsidized diesel (124.34%), subsidized gasoline (119.71%), and subsidized LPG (56.35%). 
However, for energy-intensive commodities (electricity), the consumer price declines. This is 
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because in the model, technology switching from conventional to renewable (clean) generation 
is allowed resulting in a lower price of electricity. For the other energy-intensive commodities 
(excluding land transportation), the consumer price also drops mostly due to their lower factor 
costs (Table 7.3). In contrast, the changes in most consumer prices of non-energy commodities 
are negligible.   
On the supply side, the producer price of most of energy commodities tends to fall: 
natural gas (-0.34%), crude oil (-0.32%), bioethanol (-0.01%), biodiesel (-0.24%), non-
subsidized LPG (-0.13%), subsidized biodiesel (-0.03%), subsidized biogas (-0.51%), 
subsidized diesel (-0.06%), subsidized gasoline (-2.04%). These price falls are influenced by 
a sharp decrease in their final domestic demand (consumption). However, for non-energy 
commodities, the producer price tends to increase. We argue that this improvement is triggered 
by the increased government spending on goods which, in turn, increases the aggregate 
demand.  
Furthermore, on the trade side, as previously discussed, the world price index of export 
(𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝑊) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀𝑊) are exogenous. Thus, the changes of domestically price of export 
(𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and import (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) are fully determined by the endogenous exchange rate. Simulation 2 still 
leads to an appreciation of the home currency. Thus, as shown in Table 7.10, the domestic 
price of exported and imported goods and services falls in line with the appreciated exchange 
rate (-0.49%). In terms of trade volumes, the impact of simulation 2 varies substantially, 
especially for non-energy commodities. This is due to the trade assumptions in the model: 
imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported commodity to produce final 
domestic consumption as well as domestic and export transformation function from supply 
commodities. However, for energy commodities, as previously discussed, the introduction of 
a carbon tax on fossil fuels leads to an increase in price (or a decline in volume) of final 
domestic consumption. Therefore, this contraction would in turn lead to a drop of both import 
and domestic supply of energy goods.
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Table 7.10: Simulation 2: Impact on Commodity Prices and Volumes (% Change) 
Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Sector  
Coal Mining 0.33 235.67 -0.49 -1.24 -2.05 -1.94 -5.91 -0.17 
Natural Gas Mining -0.34 66.40 -0.49 0.02 -0.37 -0.05 -9.28 -0.10 
Oil Mining -0.32 94.48 -0.49 -0.21 -0.08 -0.10 -1.61 -0.58 
Bioethanol -0.01 8.22 -0.49 954.17 n.a 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 
Biodiesel -0.24 9.16 -0.49 -100.00 -82.11 -80.42 0.00 -0.66 
Kerosene 0.00 127.16 -0.49 618.28 n.a 0.00 -17.40 -3.71 
LNG 1.58 7.58 -0.49 -10.46 1.79 26.48 -65.74 -100.00 
Non-Subsidized Gasoline 0.36 361.95 -0.49 0.29 n.a 0.44 1.52 0.25 
Non-Subsidized LPG -0.13 140.55 -0.49 -8.03 n.a -13.10 12.02 -3.11 
Other Oil Products 0.10 56.32 -0.49 -1.33 -1.64 -1.23 -1.52 -0.20 
Subsidized Biodiesel -0.03 105.97 -0.49 57.34 n.a 20.38 -12.56 -2.28 
Subsidized Biogas -0.51 114.15 -0.49 680.14 n.a -100.00 -100.00 -1.46 
Subsidized Diesel -0.06 124.34 -0.49 0.94 n.a -0.82 0.02 -0.93 
Subsidized Gasoline -2.04 119.71 -0.49 -0.80 n.a -3.32 -4.70 -1.37 
Subsidized LPG 0.04 56.35 -0.49 26.79 n.a 17.69 -32.93 -2.55 
Electricity 0.68 -1.69 -0.49 -1.83 n.a -1.01 n.a -0.44 
Chemical -0.60 -0.93 -0.49 -0.19 0.20 -0.25 -0.39 0.32 
Metal Ores Mining 0.10 -0.65 -0.49 1.26 2.12 -1.48 0.39 -0.24 
Land Transportation 0.60 1.59 -0.49 0.18 -17.53 0.12 1.41 -1.34 
Construction -0.29 -0.29 -0.49 0.07 n.a 0.13 n.a 0.17 
Trade -0.60 -0.61 -0.49 0.14 n.a -0.05 n.a -0.01 
Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse 0.31 -0.89 -0.49 -1.40 -6.77 -1.78 6.24 0.76 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries -0.19 -0.26 -0.49 -0.32 -0.64 -0.10 2.12 0.84 
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Table 7.10 (continued) 
Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Non-Energy Intensive Sector 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.13 0.17 -0.49 0.13 84.80 0.02 0.40 -0.07 
Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation -0.09 0.32 -0.49 -1.58 -1.28 -1.62 -0.85 -2.11 
Bank and Assurance -0.61 -0.07 -0.49 -0.16 -95.44 0.58 28.62 0.56 
Cattle and the Products 0.98 0.46 -0.49 0.13 696.51 -0.49 29.80 -0.29 
City Gas 0.97 0.15 -0.49 -7.01 n.a -12.70 n.a -8.86 
Real Estate, and Private Services -0.54 -1.55 -0.49 -1.39 5.74 -1.32 2.08 0.13 
Fishery 0.45 0.64 -0.49 -0.03 -1.97 0.11 -100.00 -0.31 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 0.95 0.15 -0.49 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.37 -0.09 
Forestry and Hunting -0.34 -3.34 -0.49 -3.78 177.45 -3.91 301.01 2.33 
Geothermal Mining 0.08 3.09 -0.49 9.47 n.a 1.78 n.a -0.54 
Government and Defense, Education, Health, Film, and 
Other Social Services 
-0.72 -0.61 -0.49 0.38 1.68 0.26 2.22 0.33 
Hotel -0.62 0.63 -0.49 2.77 -2.85 8.20 9.89 11.35 
Individual Services, Households, and Other Service 0.72 0.80 -0.49 0.58 41.94 0.16 2.29 0.25 
Agriculture for Other Crops 0.13 -0.08 -0.49 0.94 1.25 1.16 -2.49 0.19 
Other Mining and Excavations 0.36 1.02 -0.49 2.21 42.54 1.70 3.97 1.03 
Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Products from 
Metal  
-0.32 -1.26 -0.49 -0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.11 -0.01 
Restaurant 0.42 0.10 -0.49 -0.11 -3.07 0.10 7.83 0.07 
Train Transportation -0.74 1.81 -0.49 84.07 39.66 26.45 308.27 26.97 
Clean Water -0.09 -0.99 -0.49 10.72 n.a -6.34 n.a -5.32 
Wood and the Products -0.40 -0.10 -0.49 0.31 1.43 0.06 0.42 0.11 
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7.4.2.5. Impacts on Income Distribution and Welfare 
As previously discussed, inequality is measured from the Theil-L index, and the welfare is 
measured from the Equivalent Variation (EV). Table 7.11 presents the impacts of simulation 
2 on income distribution and welfare.  
In general, the introduction of a carbon tax in Indonesia compensated by higher public 
spending tends to be progressive –higher income groups, especially urban households, are 
worse off than lower income groups. In other words, the higher income groups bear a higher 
share of the carbon tax burden.  
More specifically, poor rural households tend to gain more than rich households. Relative 
to the initial total budget of households, the welfare on poorest rural households – i.e. rural 
households with unclear occupations and rural with agricultural workers with low income – 
tends to improve more (or to lose less) by 0.08% and -0.13%, respectively; while the higher 
income groups – i.e. rural households employed in non-agricultural with high income and rural 
households worked as agricultural employer – tend to lose more (or to improve less) by -024% 
and 0.06%, respectively. In urban areas, the households experience a welfare loss as their 
budget increases.  
Yusuf (2008) argued that the main reasons behind these results are related to the 
introduction of a carbon tax on polluting fuel commodities, combined with the consumption 
pattern as well as factor returns for each households. As revealed in Table 7.5, the higher 
income groups (in rural and urban areas) spend a larger share of their budget on energy 
commodities than the poorer households. In rural areas, the poorest households (unclear 
occupations) spend only about Rp. 3,528.11 billion, while the richest (agricultural employers) 
spends more than twice as much (about Rp. 8,864.30 billion). In urban areas, the poorest 
households (unclear occupations) spending on energy commodities is only about Rp. 4859.06 
billion, while the richest (high income) spends almost three times as much (about Rp. 
1,1447.65 billion). These consumption patterns are influenced by the subsidy for gasoline price 
in year 2008. 
Regarding income distribution, measured as Theil-L index, the result shows that 
inequality slightly reduces from 0.136 to 0.135. We argue that this slight improvement is due 
to the progressive nature of simulation 2 where the welfare loss by richest households reduces 
the inequality gap among households. 
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Table 7.11: Simulation 2: Impact on Income Distribution and Welfare 
Household's Group 
Initial  
Total 
Budget 
Budget on 
Energy 
Consumption 
 WELFARE Inequality 
 VALUE %CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
  Billion Rp   
Rural households' 
- unclear 
occupations  
158015.28 3528.11 
 
4254.56 0.08     
Rural households' 
- agricultural 
labors with low 
income  
162021.42 1662.63 
 
-6412.49 -0.13     
Rural households' 
– non-agricultural 
labors with low 
income 
385336.98 7871.47 
 
1600.65 0.03   
Rural households' 
– non-agricultural 
with high income 
450508.35 6962.91 
 
-12089.21 -0.24     
Rural Households' 
- Agricultural 
Employers 
642327.17 8864.30 
 
3169.69 0.06     
Urban households' 
- unclear 
occupations 
213768.06 4859.06 
 
10464.32 0.20     
Urban households' 
- low income 
633498.92 7775.67 
 
-108.35 -0.002     
Urban households' 
- high income 
672628.57 11447.65 
 
-110980.07 -2.16     
Total        -3.32 0.136 0.135 
 
7.4.2.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
To test the robustness of simulation results with respect to parameter uncertainty, we 
implement a sensitivity analysis of trade parameters and examine the changes of endogenous 
variables. We vary the import elasticity (CES trade parameters) by a 25% decrease and increase 
(between 1.5 and 2.5) and then check the reliability of results. Table 7.12 shows the sensitivity 
analysis results of simulation 2 on macroeconomic accounts.  
 The sensitivity analysis shows that the changes of trade elasticity of substitution would 
affect the results of macroeconomic accounts due to a change in trade accounts (export and 
import as well as the net export). Higher elasticity of trade elasticity induces lower export (and 
import) but improving the net export (export reduction is less pronounced than import). As 
shown in table 7.6, by increasing the trade elasticity from 1.5 to 2.5, it is showed that export 
decreases from 0.03% to -1.64% and import decreases from 0.76% -5.54%. These changes, in 
turn, would lead to a larger rise in GDP at market prices from income side. Apart from the 
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trade accounts, under high and low elasticity, simulation 2 generates a consistent direction 
across all endogenous variables. 
 
Table 7.12: Sensitivity Analysis of Simulation 2 on National Income Accounts  
(% Change) 
Variables 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
1.5 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.0 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.5 
GDP at factor costs  0.39 -0.01 -0.30 
GDP at market prices from income side  0.48 0.60 4.07 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side 0.91 0.29 0.01 
Total private consumption  1.51 1.30 3.90 
Total investment -2.70 -2.27 -2.01 
Total real government consumption 0.59 2.54 22.45 
Total export 0.03 -0.30 -1.64 
Total import 0.76 -0.47 -5.44 
Net export -7.23 1.34 36.23 
Net indirect tax  
(total expenditures of all commodity taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities)  
26.82 15.01 15.28 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
-0.41 -0.05 -5.97 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
1.27 0.04 5.95 
 
7.4.3. Simulation 3: Imposing a Carbon Tax without Compensation 
In simulation 3, we examine the impact of implementing the carbon tax (Rp. 100,000/ ton 
CO2e) on carbon-based fuels within the condition if the additional revenue raised from carbon 
tax is not returned to the economy or not used for compensation. In other words, the tax revenue 
is kept as government saving to run a budget surplus. All taxes and subsidies as well as 
government expenditures on goods remain unchanged. This scenario aims to investigate the 
impact of carbon tax on Indonesia’s economy when there is no revenue-neutralizing 
mechanism. 
 
7.4.3.1. Impacts on Macroeconomic and CO2 Emission Account 
Table 7.13 presents the macroeconomic implications of introducing the carbon tax without any 
compensation to the economy. The results show that the introduction of a carbon tax leads to 
a huge increase in net government saving (budget surplus) by 43%. Compared to scenarios of 
a carbon tax with revenue recycling schemes (simulation 1 and simulation 2), the economy is 
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more adversely affected: all GDPs contract –GDP at factor costs (-0.31%), GDP at market 
price from income side by -0.83%, GDP at market price from expenditure side by -0.87%. The 
reduction of GDP at factor costs is related to a decline of its components of both total capital 
bills (-0.33%) and wage bills (-0.29%). The contraction of the GDP at market price from 
expenditure side is slightly higher than that of the GDP at factor costs due to a large decline in 
the net indirect tax (-28.54%). In other words, the equilibrium output tends to shift downward 
which in turn reduces the net indirect tax revenues. In terms of trade, both export and import 
indicate a strong contraction, which are -4.14% and -4.68%. The reason for this is clear: since 
the increased domestic price of energy products due to imposing the carbon tax is not 
compensated through a revenue-recycling scheme, the production costs rise. As a result, the 
contraction in aggregate demand is more pronounced in simulation 3 than that of simulation 1 
and simulation 2. 
 
Table 7.13: Simulation 3: Impact on National Income Account 
 Variables 
 
BASE SHOCKED 
% CHANGE 
(Billions Rupiah) 
GDP at factor costs    5,139,651.22    5,123,988.28  -0.31 
GDP at market prices from income side     5,472,898.80    5,427,691.66  -0.83 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side   5,243,713.58    5,198,349.81  -0.87 
Total private consumption    3,318,104.75    3,353,772.77  1.08 
Total investment   1,508,830.58    1,451,343.49  -3.81 
Total real government consumption      294,566.35       302,490.95  2.69 
Total export   1,531,028.46    1,467,599.42  -4.14 
Total import   1,391,532.58    1,326,438.36  -4.68 
Net export      139,495.88       141,161.06  1.19 
Net indirect tax  
(total expenditures of all commodity taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities)  
     104,062.37         74,361.53  -28.54 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
  2,692,617.74    2,684,914.07  -0.29 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
  2,447,033.48    2,439,074.22  -0.33 
Budget Surplus 229,473.13 321,262.38 40 
Emissions (Billions Ton CO2)  
CO2 emissions from Households 4.54 3.97 -12.53 
CO2 emissions from Industries 61.26 60.65 -0.99 
CO2 emissions from Government 0.55 0.55 - 
TOTAL CO2 66.35 65.17 -1.77 
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In terms of emissions, the results show that total emissions generated from households strongly 
decrease (-12.53%); but total emissions generated from firm slightly drop (-0.99%). Overall, 
the national carbon emissions drop by 1.77%, a pronounced drop than in simulation 1 and 
simulation 2. 
 
7.4.3.2. Impacts on Output and Energy Composite 
Table 7.14 presents the impacts of simulation 3 on industries’ output and the required 
industries’ input of energy composite as well as the industries’ energy intensities. The price 
changes of energy composite across industries are substantially larger than in simulation 1 and 
simulation 2 especially in the energy-intensive (utilities) sectors, i.e. conventional generation 
plant (90.62%) and land transportation sector (24.16%). The increasing price of the energy 
composite immediately leads to a sharp decline in their input volumes, by 100% in 
conventional electricity generation and followed land transport by 26.21%, since their 
production heavily relies on fossil fuel inputs. However, the results also reveal that some 
energy-intensive sectors increase their energy composite input, which in turn it induces a 
higher energy intensity.  
For non-energy intensive industries, the changes of energy aggregate input prominently 
vary, although they are not necessarily in line with the changes of their output production. 
From Table 7.14, it can be seen that implementing a carbon tax without a revenue-recycling 
scheme could initiate large structural changes across non-energy industries. In other words, 
simulation 3 leads to a greater uncertainty about the magnitude of energy consumption pattern 
across non-energy industries. We suspect that the changes might be related to a substantial 
shift of inputs combination between industries such that the production costs are minimized. 
For example, four non-energy sectors have a large reduction in energy composite input, namely 
air, sea, and communication transportation (-9.81%); city gas utilities (-15.37%); forestry and 
hunting (-29.51%); and hotel (-83.78%). In contrast, six sectors have a sharp increase in energy 
composite input, namely food, drink, and tobacco (13.34%); other mining and excavations 
(13.09%); real estate, and private services (21.75%); and supporting services for transportation 
and warehouse (45.31%). Furthermore, in terms of output, conventional power plant hurts the 
most (-63.07%); however, the small or zero emissions-based generation indicate the largest 
improvement by 935.41% (hydro) and 81.21% (geothermal).  
In terms of energy intensity, the changes vary across industries. Conventional power plant and 
hotel indicate the largest decline of energy intensity by -100%. This means that the industries 
require approximately half the energy input to produce a unit of output. In contrast, some 
sectors indicate a sharp increase in energy intensity, i.e. chemical, trade, paper products, food 
and drink products, supporting services for transportation, and paper products. 
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Table 7.14: Simulation 3: Impact on Energy Composite, Output, and Energy Intensity 
(% Change) 
Industry Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄   
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry 
Coal Mining -8.38 4.81 -1.89 0.02 -6.68 
Natural Gas Mining -1.47 10.65 -2.63 0.08 -0.08 
Oil Mining -0.11 11.33 -1.24 0.00 0.00 
Conventional Power Plant 
(Aggregated Fossil Fuels Generation) 
-100.00 90.62 -63.07 23.68 -100.00 
Refineries -1.84 7.16 -2.47 2.88 -3.96 
Chemical 51.41 -47.31 -7.83 11.02 36.45 
Metal Ores Mining -0.40 -1.41 -11.76 8.87 -8.15 
Land Transportation -26.21 24.16 -1.98 2.10 -27.37 
Construction 15.69 -16.14 -1.52 -0.11 16.63 
Paper, Printing, Transport 
Equipment, and Products from Metal  
44.34 -44.66 -2.17 1.53 42.43 
Trade 63.43 -63.19 -0.07 1.23 60.53 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and 
Leather Industries 
6.62 -8.92 7.45 -15.87 26.78 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food Crops -0.96 -0.88 0.42 -2.36 1.43 
Air, Sea, and Communication 
Transportation 
-9.81 8.25 10.59 -12.79 2.38 
Bank and Assurance -1.39 -0.54 -23.03 31.26 -23.82 
Cattle and the Products -1.06 -0.82 1.55 -4.15 3.23 
City Gas -15.37 10.24 -5.19 -2.20 -12.36 
Real Estate, and Private Services 0.41 -1.45 0.29 -1.02 1.03 
Fishery -3.46 1.83 0.95 -2.24 2.30 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 13.34 -14.59 0.17 -2.21 20.85 
Forestry and Hunting -29.51 10.43 -40.83 60.14 -68.78 
Geothermal Mining -1.85 11.00 -1.60 0.02 -1.86 
Government and Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other Social 
Services 
3.66 -4.23 -1.78 2.47 3.33 
Hotel -83.78 5.99 12.22 -100.02 -100.00 
Hydro Generation na na 935.41 -0.08 0.08 
Individual Services, Households, and 
Other Service 
3.25 -3.87 -3.20 5.04 14.24 
Agriculture for Other Crops -3.74 1.20 -4.56 3.24 -3.13 
Other Mining and Excavations 13.09 -9.57 3.38 -0.48 20.57 
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Table 7.14 (continued) 
Industry Energy Composite  Output Energy 
Intensity 
𝑬𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴
𝑸𝑨⁄   
Quantity 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀) 
Price 
(𝑃_𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀)  
Quantity 
(𝑄𝐴) 
Price  
(𝑃_𝑄𝐴) 
Geothermal Generation na na 81.21 -1.87 1.91 
Restaurant -1.32 -0.64 0.48 -0.81 0.82 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and Warehouse 
45.31 -21.41 34.83 -29.19 111.84 
Train Transportation -4.69 1.59 -11.55 16.86 -14.43 
Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution 
-1.99 0.02 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 
Clean Water 3.77 -2.03 -1.13 1.19 2.55 
Wood and the Products 4.49 -5.88 -4.29 3.77 15.64 
 
7.4.3.3. Impacts on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels 
Table 7.15 presents the changes in production factors (volume) as well as volumes and prices 
of the capital-energy composite and the value added-energy composite. As previously 
discussed, the size of the output changes across industries are related to their nested production 
structure. From Table 7.15 it can be seen that imposing a carbon tax on fossil fuel products 
without revenue-recycling (simulation 3) results in large structural changes for some 
industries. Based on the model, at the fourth stage, the labour composite is combined with the 
capital-energy composite to obtain the value added-energy composite. The results reveal that 
for all energy sectors – i.e. coal mining, natural gas mining, oil mining, and conventional 
generation inputs shift from the capital-energy aggregate to labour. The conventional 
generation sector indicates the largest shift, where its quantity of capital-energy composite 
declines by 133.27% and price of capital-energy composite increases by 49.07% while the 
number of employments sharply increase reaching 1,536.46%. In contrast, most energy-
intensive sectors indicate a contraction in employment but an increase in the capital-energy 
composite.  
Orlov (2012) argued that the magnitude of reduction of capital-energy composite 
depends on the ratio of capital cost relative to energy input costs. When energy costs are higher 
than the capital costs, the capital-energy aggregate declines more. For example, the largest 
decline in capital-energy composite is obtained in conventional generation plants, since this 
industry heavily relies on fossil-fuels combustion; on the contrary, there is only a slight 
decrease of capital-energy composite in the oil sector since they depend more on capital 
(machineries) to exploit the crude oil resources beneath the soil.   
In the next stage of the production structure (the fourth stage), the capital-energy 
composite is combined with the labour composite using a Cobb-Douglas function to obtain the 
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value added-energy composite. Table 7.15 shows that the pattern of changes of value added-
energy composite varies across industries. The contraction of value added-energy composite 
is more pronounced in energy and energy-intensive sectors than in non-energy industries. For 
example, the conventional generation sector has the largest reduction (-23.67%), while the 
forestry sector has the largest increase (60.14%). 
 
Table 7.15: Simulation 3: Impact on Employed Factors and Factor-Fuels (% Change) 
Industry 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry  
Coal Mining 3.72 -9.00 42.87 -9.00 0.51 0.01 -8.36 
Natural Gas Mining 12.77 -2.97 53.67 -2.97 2.06 0.07 -1.00 
Oil Mining 8.81 -0.74 5.86 -0.74 1.12 0.00 0.37 
Conventional Power 
Plant (Aggregated Fossil 
Fuels Generation) 
51.73 34.53 1536.46 -133.27 49.07 -23.67 65.49 
Refineries 4.55 -2.36 32.68 -2.60 1.19 2.88 -4.44 
Chemical 1.03 -0.63 -29.84 29.59 -29.57 10.99 -12.92 
Metal Ores Mining 5.41 -0.29 -36.67 -0.19 -0.58 8.87 -14.66 
Land Transportation 0.21 -0.73 71.63 -20.90 20.08 2.10 -3.26 
Construction 1.13 0.76 -7.18 4.53 -4.11 -0.13 0.55 
Paper, Printing, 
Transport Equipment, 
and Products from Metal  
1.41 -0.43 -7.35 7.03 -7.72 1.53 -2.44 
Trade 0.13 2.23 -6.88 32.47 -30.80 1.23 0.66 
Spinning, Textile, 
Garment, and Leather 
Industries 
1.37 -1.18 -38.87 0.04 -1.38 -15.87 15.60 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.06 0.12 -2.50 0.20 -1.13 -2.36 1.45 
Air, Sea, and 
Communication 
Transportation 
1.72 -0.32 -34.04 -2.92 2.26 -12.81 12.85 
Bank and Assurance 2.29 -0.68 110.33 -0.74 -0.27 31.25 -31.60 
Cattle and the Products 0.42 -0.45 -5.67 -0.47 -0.47 -4.17 3.26 
City Gas 3.19 -8.84 71.59 -12.21 4.04 -2.23 -6.05 
Real Estate, and Private 
Services 
3.35 0.37 -5.81 0.38 -0.52 -1.04 0.90 
Fishery 1.71 -0.31 -11.85 -0.59 -0.13 -2.24 1.55 
Food, Drink, and 
Tobacco 
1.38 -0.14 -6.41 0.49 -0.95 -2.21 1.77 
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Table 7.15 (continued) 
Industry 
cost ratio of 
capital/labor 
Capital Labor 
Capital-Energy 
Composite 
Value Added-
Energy 
Composite 
Volume Price Volume Price 
Forestry and Hunting 1.62 -18.01 257.37 -18.60 0.18 60.14 -60.61 
Geothermal Mining 12.03 -2.27 35.48 -2.26 1.85 0.01 -0.52 
Government and 
Defence, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other 
Social Services 
0.16 0.65 2.67 1.35 -1.00 2.47 -2.22 
Hotel 1.53 -76.49 -280.29 -76.61 -0.14 -100.02 19.89 
Hydro Generation 32.71 20.70 -100.00         
Individual Services, 
Households, and Other 
Service 
0.65 1.73 7.42 1.82 -0.29 5.04 -3.60 
Agriculture for Other 
Crops 
0.21 -1.23 4.28 -2.91 1.76 3.24 -4.88 
Other Mining and 
Excavations 
0.35 5.12 -3.51 6.84 -1.87 -0.48 5.00 
Geothermal Generation 24.10 189.07 487.04         
Restaurant 0.11 0.15 -1.04 1.39 -1.58 -0.81 -0.11 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and 
Warehouse 
0.30 19.87 -49.78 25.54 -5.90 -29.19 56.07 
Train Transportation 0.28 -3.58 151.11 -32.86 28.17 16.86 -18.78 
Electricity Transmission 
and Distribution 
2.84 -0.36 12.11 -0.87 0.37     
Clean Water 0.19 4.17 -0.66 6.36 -3.68 1.21 1.55 
Wood and the Products 1.01 -0.14 6.89 0.41 -0.88 3.80 -4.86 
 
7.4.3.4. Impacts on Commodities 
Based on the SAM dataset, the commodities are separated into three groups: energy 
commodities, energy-intensive commodities, and non-energy commodities. Table 7.16 
summarizes the impact of simulation 3 on commodity prices and volumes.  
On the supply side, the producer prices of energy and energy-intensive commodities 
decline by more than in simulation 1 and simulation 2. These declines are induced by a sharp 
decrease in their final domestic consumption. On the other hand, the producer price of a non-
energy commodity tends to increase because of the increase in their domestic consumption. By 
looking at these results, it can be concluded that the introduction of carbon tax without revenue 
recycling can initiate a large shift of domestic consumption patterns from energy commodities 
towards non-energy commodities.  
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On the demand side, since the carbon tax is imposed on consumer prices of fossil fuels 
according to their level of emissions, it immediately increases the consumer prices of fuel 
products, namely coal (288.03%), natural gas (79.59%), crude oil (113.02%), bioethanol 
(125.43%), biodiesel (7.41%), kerosene (154.12%), LNG (127.63%), non-subsidized gasoline 
(438.82%), non-subsidized LPG (168.10%), subsidized biogas (140.16%), subsidized diesel 
(148.44%), subsidized gasoline (141.79%), and subsidized LPG (65.83%). However, for 
energy-intensive commodities, most consumer prices fall because consumers switch from fuels 
with a higher carbon content (higher emission factor) to less polluting (lower emission factor). 
For non-energy commodities, some consumer prices rise and some drop.  
In terms of trade, since Indonesia is a small and open economy that does not influence the 
world price of trade, the changes of domestic prices of exports (𝑃𝑖
𝐸) and imports (𝑃𝑖
𝑀) are fully 
determined by the endogenous exchange rate. The results found that simulation 3 leads to an 
appreciation of the domestic currency. Thus, as shown in Table 7.16, the domestic price of 
exported and imported goods and services falls in line with the appreciated exchange rate (-
2.01%). In terms of trade volumes, the impacts of simulation 3 vary substantially across 
commodities. In sum, the implementation of a carbon tax without compensation returned to 
the economy would lead to uncertainty in trade volume patterns, although the energy 
consumption clearly falls. 
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Table 7.16: Simulation 3: Impact on Commodity Prices and Volumes (% Change) 
Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Sector  
Coal Mining -1.89 288.03 -2.01 0.02 1.81 -2.28 -4.77 -2.96 
Natural Gas Mining -2.63 79.59 -2.01 0.07 3.66 -0.17 -1.74 -1.71 
Oil Mining -1.24 113.02 -2.01 0.09 0.57 0.38 2.20 -0.12 
Bioethanol -2.48 125.43 -2.01 -121.97 n.a -122.69 257.56 -1.83 
Biodiesel -2.32 7.41 -2.01 2.89 5.15 1.47 -14.70 -1.84 
Kerosene 0.00 154.12 -2.01 0.00 n.a -100.00 0.47 -1.67 
LNG -1.27 127.63 -2.01 2.88 3.50 -100.00 -75.59 -441.35 
Non-Subsidized Gasoline -3.74 438.82 -2.01 2.55 n.a 2.54 -0.77 -1.16 
Non-Subsidized LPG -11.56 168.10 -2.01 10.18 n.a 10.16 -8.54 -1.79 
Other Oil Products 5.32 69.59 -2.01 -17.56 -28.73 -12.52 -7.25 -0.87 
Subsidized Biodiesel -17.85 125.85 -2.01 23.41 n.a 23.26 -4.85 -0.81 
Subsidized Biogas 14.91 140.16 -2.01 -20.51 n.a -20.73 5.20 -0.79 
Subsidized Diesel -4.29 148.44 -2.01 3.12 n.a 3.12 -1.30 -1.17 
Subsidized Gasoline -4.80 141.79 -2.01 3.46 n.a 3.46 -0.62 -0.99 
Subsidized LPG -5.76 65.83 -2.01 4.92 n.a 4.92 -2.47 -0.75 
Electricity -0.13 -0.13 -2.01 -0.03 n.a -0.02 n.a -0.03 
Chemical -7.83 -7.21 -2.01 11.02 22.86 8.36 -6.15 4.55 
Metal Ores Mining -11.74 -10.06 -2.01 8.87 11.40 10.26 -39.53 4.70 
Land Transportation -1.98 -1.99 -2.01 2.10 3.74 2.07 2.06 2.08 
Construction -1.52 -1.52 -2.01 -0.11 n.a -0.12 n.a -0.11 
Trade -0.07 -0.07 -2.01 1.23 n.a 1.23 n.a 1.23 
Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse 34.83 29.99 -2.01 -29.35 -93.88 -21.92 60.85 -5.31 
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Table 7.16 (continued) 
Commodity 
Producer 
Price 
Consumer 
Price 
Export and 
Import Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Export 
Domestic 
Demand 
Import 
Domestic 
Consumption 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries 7.45 10.62 -2.01 -15.88 -30.60 -7.75 20.06 -5.24 
Non-Energy Intensive Sector 
Agriculture Food Crops 0.43 0.26 -2.01 -2.36 -5.18 -2.35 2.51 -2.02 
Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation 10.59 9.81 -2.01 -12.79 -33.33 -8.92 20.73 -3.50 
Bank and Assurance -23.03 -11.10 -2.01 31.28 77.71 30.62 -100.00 5.81 
Cattle and the Products 1.55 1.50 -2.01 -4.15 -9.36 -4.14 2.91 -4.03 
City Gas -5.19 -6.78 -2.01 -1.76 n.a -1.74 n.a -0.07 
Real Estate, and Private Services 0.28 0.00 -2.01 -1.03 -3.63 -0.86 3.89 -0.14 
Fishery 0.95 0.98 -2.01 -2.25 -5.05 -2.19 0.35 -2.19 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 0.17 0.58 -2.01 -2.21 -4.47 -1.62 -0.96 -1.84 
Forestry and Hunting -40.83 -13.76 -2.01 60.19 98.72 59.59 -100.00 -28.97 
Geothermal Mining -1.60 -1.63 -2.01 -1.84 n.a -1.88 n.a -1.87 
Government and Defense, Education, Health, Film, and 
Other Social Services 
-1.79 -1.81 -2.01 2.47 3.75 2.44 2.95 2.46 
Hotel 12.22 16.64 -2.01 -100.04 -130.86 -50.43 25.14 -12.57 
Individual Services, Households, and Other Service -3.20 0.94 -2.01 5.04 9.60 0.70 6.77 0.92 
Agriculture for Other Crops -4.56 -4.73 -2.01 3.20 9.91 2.49 -3.55 2.12 
Other Mining and Excavations 3.38 3.10 -2.01 -0.06 -17.81 0.12 11.24 0.84 
Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Products from 
Metal  
-2.17 -2.26 -2.01 1.53 3.76 1.12 0.36 0.90 
Restaurant 0.48 0.48 -2.01 -0.87 -4.30 -0.68 4.49 -0.49 
Train Transportation -11.57 -13.71 -2.01 15.24 37.22 9.47 -17.78 8.10 
Clean Water -1.13 -1.13 -2.01 1.20 n.a 1.21 n.a 1.20 
Wood and the Products -4.29 -4.75 -2.01 3.80 6.80 3.41 -3.21 3.30 
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7.4.3.5. Impacts on Income Distribution and Welfare 
In rural areas, the welfare of lower-income groups – i.e. rural households with unclear 
occupations and rural households who employed as agricultural labours with low income – 
declines by -0.438% and -0.364%, respectively; whilst the welfare on higher income groups – 
i.e. rural households who employed in non-agricultural with high income and rural households 
who employed as agricultural employer – declines only by -0.162% and -0.148%, respectively. 
Similarly, in urban areas, the welfare of lower-income groups – i.e. urban households with 
unclear occupations and urban households with low income – declines by -0.183 and -0.159; 
whilst the welfare on richest urban households (urban households with high income) shows a 
strong improvement by 9.490%.  
We argue that although the households’ spending on energy goods strongly increased as 
income rises, the changes in the distributional income are also determined by factor returns 
and the pattern of household spending on non-energy goods. As previously discussed, the 
introduction of carbon tax on energy fossil commodities without revenue-recycling initiates a 
large shifting of domestic consumption pattern from energy commodity towards non-energy 
commodity types. In turn, it increases the prices of non-energy commodities which negatively 
affects the poorer household consumption more than the richest.  
Regarding income distribution, the result shows that inequality (measured by the Theil-
L index) increases from 0.136 to 0.140. We argue that this increase in inequality is due to the 
regressive nature of simulation 3 where the welfare loss by poorer households increases the 
inequality gap among households. 
In sum, the implementation of a carbon tax without compensation tends to be regressive 
– the welfare losses on lower income households are more deteriorating than higher income 
households in both rural and urban areas. In other words, the poorer groups carry a greater 
burden of the carbon tax.  
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Table 7.17: Simulation 3: Impact on Income Distribution and Welfare 
Household's Group 
Initial  
Total 
Budget 
Budget on 
Energy 
Consumption 
WELFARE Inequality 
VALUE %CHANGE 
BASE SHOCKED 
 Billion Rp   
Rural households' - 
unclear occupations  
158015.28 3528.11 -22451.694 -0.438     
Rural households' - 
agricultural labors with 
low income  
162021.42 1662.63 -18650.571 -0.364     
Rural households' – non-
agricultural labors with 
low income 
385336.98 7871.47 -6571.953 -0.128   
Rural households' – non-
agricultural with high 
income 
450508.35 6962.91 -8320.558 -0.162     
Rural Households' - 
Agricultural Employers 
642327.17 8864.30 -7601.123 -0.148     
Urban households' - 
unclear occupations 
213768.06 4859.06 -9394.397 -0.183     
Urban households' - low 
income 
633498.92 7775.67 -8171.281 -0.159     
Urban households' - high 
income 
672628.57 11447.65 486269.25 9.490     
Total       12.20 0.136 0.140 
 
7.4.3.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
As previously mentioned, since the parameters used in the model are ‘borrowed’ from 
literature, thus, it is necessary to check the robustness of the simulation results with respect to 
parameters uncertainty (Yusuf, 2008). This is done by implementing a sensitivity analysis of 
trade parameters and examining the changes of endogenous variables. We choose to vary the 
import elasticity (CES trade parameters) by a 25% decrease and increase (between 1.5 and 2.5) 
and then check the reliability of results. Table 7.18 presents the sensitivity analysis results of 
simulation 3 on macroeconomic accounts.  
Similar to simulation 1 and simulation 2, the sensitivity analysis of simulation 3 shows 
that the changes of trade elasticity of substitution would affect the results of macroeconomic 
accounts due to a change in trade accounts (export and import as well as the net export). The 
higher elasticity of trade lowers exports and imports but improves the net exports (export 
reduction is less pronounced than import). As shown in Table 7.18, by increasing the trade 
elasticity from 1.5 to 2.5, exports strongly decrease from -0.52% to -7.18% and imports from 
1.53% to -12.23%. These changes influence the size of changes of composite commodities 
demand, which in turn, will affect the total factor costs – as trade elasticity increases, total 
wage bills fall but total capital bills improve.  
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Table 7.18: Sensitivity Analysis of Simulation 3 on National Income Accounts  
(% Change) 
Variables 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
1.5 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.0 
Trade 
Elasticities = 
2.5 
%CHANGE 
GDP at factor costs   -1.21 -0.31 -0.21 
GDP at market prices from income side  -0.02 -0.83 -2.62 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side  -0.03 -0.87 1.27 
Total private consumption  0.88 1.08 -7.30 
Total investment -4.60 -3.81 -3.88 
Total real government consumption 1.55 2.69 9.85 
Total export -0.52 -4.14 -7.18 
Total import 1.53 -4.68 -12.23 
Net export -20.89 1.19 43.17 
Net indirect tax  
(total expenditures of all commodity taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities)  
58.13 -28.54 74.53 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
0.25 -0.29 -2.86 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
-2.82 -0.33 2.69 
 
7.4.4. Introducing the FIT scheme Under Different Financing Options 
In this section, we examine the implications of introducing the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) scheme (or 
subsidy to renewable production) under two different financing scenarios:  
i. Simulation 4: The FIT is financed by electricity consumers through the endogenous 
electricity tax rate (𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐)); and  
ii. Simulation 5: The FIT is financed through the carbon tax adjustment.   
As previously explained, the FIT scheme guarantees a fixed price for purchases of 
renewable generation from the producer within a long-term contract (Mendoca et al., 2010; 
Bohringer et al., 2012). The price cap is usually set higher than either the average unit cost rate 
of electricity supplied into the grid connectors or the average unit cost of the most expensive 
fuel generators, i.e. natural gas-fired generators (Mendoca, et al., 2010; and Bohringer et al., 
2012).  
According to the current FIT schemes in the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Regulation No. 04/2012, the price of each type of renewable sources is fixed Rp. 656/kWh – 
Rp. 1,722.5/kWh depending on the types of renewables, level of generated voltage, and 
geographic location. Since the CGE model we used a single country model, following 
Bohringer et al. (2012), we use the mid-point between these price caps (Rp. 1,189.25/kWh). 
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According to PLN (2011b), the average unit cost of electricity generation was year 2011 is Rp. 
1,051.14/kWh. The FITs therefore translate into approximately a 15% subsidy rate for 
purchasing renewable generation technologies.  
 
7.4.4.1. Impacts on Macroeconomic and CO2 Emission Account 
Table 7.19 presents the macroeconomic impacts of the two FIT scenarios: (1) implementing 
the FIT financed by an increase in electricity tax rates; and (2) implementing the FIT financed 
by an increase in carbon tax. Overall, the results show that the effects of both FIT scenarios on 
macroeconomic accounts are negligible. The GDP at factor costs remains unchanged, while, 
the GDP at market prices (income side and expenditure side) indicate a slight decline by -
0.003% due to a contraction in the net indirect tax – by the introduction of subsidy on 
renewable sources. 
We suspect that these negligible impacts are due to the low shares of renewables 
(geothermal and hydro) generation load in total electricity mix. Based on the SAM dataset in 
year 2008, the initial share is only about 5% for geothermal and 11% for hydro. In other words, 
the Indonesian electricity supply is still dominated by fossil fuels (conventional) based 
generation, which account for about 85% of the electricity mix. Therefore, the implementation 
of the current FIT regulation – about subsidies of 15% on hydro and geothermal production – 
would not necessarily affect the national income account.  
Compared to simulation 4, financing FIT through carbon taxation (simulation 5) leads to 
a larger contraction in GDP at market prices. This is because the differentiated carbon tax on 
polluted fuels immediately increases their commodity prices as well as the energy-associated 
products, which leads to a downward shift in their output, private consumption, and 
investment. In turn, the total government receipts from output taxes declines more than in 
simulation 4. Net indirect tax drops by -1.118%. As a result, GDP at market prices declines 
more by -0.022%. On the other hand, under simulation 4, the increase in electricity tax rates 
only leads to a higher price of electricity commodity, which results in a less contraction to the 
national output and net indirect tax.    
In terms of carbon emissions, the FIT schemes do not effectively reduce the national 
emissions. As shown in table 7.19, the percentage decline of total CO2 emissions is only tiny, 
from -0.001% to -0.004%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed FIT schemes are 
insufficient to achieve the ambitious target of lowering the national emissions from energy 
utilization by about 1%.   
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Table 7.19: FIT Impacts on National Income account (% Change) 
 Variables Simulation 4 Simulation 5 
GDP at factor costs  0.000 0.000 
GDP at market prices from income side  -0.003 -0.022 
GDP at market prices from expenditure side -0.003 -0.022 
Total private consumption  0.000 -0.001 
Total investment 0.000 -0.001 
Total real government consumption 0.002 0.000 
Total export -0.001 0.000 
Total import -0.001 0.000 
Net export 0.000 0.002 
Net indirect tax  
(the total expenditures of all commodity taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on commodities  
(and activities) 
-0.162 -1.118 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
0.000 0.000 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
0.000 0.000 
Emissions 
CO2 emissions from Households -0.003 -0.005 
CO2 emissions from Industries -0.005 0.000 
CO2 emissions from Government     
TOTAL CO2 -0.004 -0.001 
  
7.4.4.2. Impacts on the Generation Technology 
Table 7.20 presents the effects of the two FIT schemes on the electricity production from fossil 
fuels (conventional) and renewable sources (hydro and geothermal). Overall, the results 
suggest that the magnitude change of each electricity generation is very small. Nonetheless, 
compared to simulation 4, the generation technological changes resulted from simulation 5 are 
slightly more pronounced: conventional output slightly reduces by -0.007%, while hydro 
output slightly increases by 0.004%. This is because the FIT’s financing option through carbon 
taxation would increase the prices of fossil fuels, which in turn, leads to more decline in 
conventional output load (or an increase price in conventional output load price). As a result, 
the output load of renewable generation technologies (hydro and geothermal) tends to slightly 
increase (or slightly decline in renewable output price) more than simulation 5. It can be 
concluded that the FIT scenarios do not achieve the main goal of promoting clean energy 
production. 
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Table 7.20: FIT Impacts on National Income account (% Change) 
 Generation Technology 
Output Load  Output Price  
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 
Conventional (fossil fuels composite) -0.000 -0.007 -0.321 1.173 
Hydro 0.000 0.004 -0.321 -0.934 
Geothermal 0.000 0.000 -0.321 -3.306 
 
7.4.4.3. Impacts on Output and Energy Composite 
Table 7.21 summarises the impacts of the two FIT schemes on output and on the energy 
composite. The results found that not all scenarios affect the sectoral outputs. This is due to 
the small shares of renewables generation (hydro and geothermal) in total electricity supply; 
thus, the implementation of a 15% subsidy to these renewable productions would have 
negligible impacts on sectoral output. However, in terms of the energy composite input used 
by industries, the FIT scenarios differ considerably. Compared to simulation 4, the FIT’s 
financing scheme through carbon taxation on fossil fuels leads to a larger contraction in energy 
composite demand, particularly among energy-intensive sectors such as metal mining, land 
transportation, construction, paper products, trade, and textiles. This is because carbon taxation 
raises the price of carbon-based fuels.      
 
Table 7.21: FIT Impacts on Output and Energy Composite (% Change) 
Industry 
Energy Composite Output  
Volumes Prices Volumes Prices 
Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Industry 
Coal Mining 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Natural Gas Mining -0.009 -0.021 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 -0.002 
Oil Mining 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Refineries -0.018 0.000 0.054 -0.001 -0.012 0.001 0.003 -0.001 
Chemical 0.012 0.025 -0.019 -0.024 0.001 0.010 0.000 -0.006 
Metal Ores Mining -1.960 -74.889 2.004 10.556 -0.035 0.019 0.033 -0.016 
Land Transportation -0.002 -1.625 0.000 1.612 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.004 
Construction 0.000 -1.830 0.000 1.694 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Paper, Printing, 
Transport Equipment, 
and Products from 
Metal  
0.066 -0.148 -0.073 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Trade 0.037 -0.022 -0.042 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Spinning, Textile, 
Garment, and Leather 
Industries 
0.199 -0.017 -0.197 0.017 0.021 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 
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Table 7.21 (continued) 
Industry 
Energy Composite Output  
Volumes Prices Volumes Prices 
Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Non-Energy Intensive Industry 
Agriculture Food 
Crops 
28.969 68.509 -22.395 -65.604 0.000 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
Air, Sea, and 
Communication 
Transportation 
0.051 -0.402 -0.051 0.402 0.010 -0.050 -0.007 0.038 
Bank and Assurance 0.210 10.461 -0.208 -11.224 0.000 0.012 0.001 -0.007 
Cattle and the Products -4.516 3.620 4.761 -3.606 -0.015 0.001 0.019 -0.001 
City Gas -0.646 -0.001 1.410 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.560 0.000 
Real Estate, and 
Private Services 
0.111 -1.584 -0.111 -5.809 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Fishery 0.773 -11.527 -0.797 12.586 0.026 0.001 -0.037 0.000 
Food, Drink, and 
Tobacco 
-0.090 -8.491 0.092 8.859 -0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
Forestry and Hunting -0.048 50.752 0.051 -37.531 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.001 
Government and 
Defense, Education, 
Health, Film, and Other 
Social Services 
-0.045 -5.237 0.046 5.287 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.002 
Hotel 0.638 -0.808 -0.634 -31.808 0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
Individual Services, 
Households, and Other 
Service 
-0.395 0.196 0.406 -0.196 -0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.002 
Agriculture for Other 
Crops 
-0.280 1.321 0.290 -1.358 -0.004 0.004 0.009 0.000 
Other Mining and 
Excavations 
0.027 0.391 -0.028 -0.415 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Restaurant -3.841 0.483 4.012 -0.519 -0.015 0.000 0.016 -0.001 
Supporting Services for 
Transportation and 
Warehouse 
0.342 1.138 -0.348 -1.151 0.013 -0.035 -0.012 0.026 
Train Transportation 0.416 -8.620 -0.470 -3.437 0.229 -0.006 -0.171 0.004 
Electricity 
Transmission and 
Distribution 
0.000 -0.274 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.048 
Clean Water -0.520 0.520 0.618 -0.515 -0.044 0.047 0.087 -0.024 
Wood and the Products 0.036 -0.444 -0.037 0.446 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
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7.4.4.4. Impacts on Commodities 
Table 7.21 summarises the impacts of the two FIT schemes on commodity types (volumes and 
prices). The results reveal that the implications of the two scenarios (simulation 4 and 
simulation 5) on domestic commodities tend to be very small (and even negligible for some 
commodity types). Nevertheless, compared to simulation 4, the financing scenario through 
carbon taxation leads to a higher contraction in the domestic consumption of energy products 
due to their lower domestic demand. For example, in simulation 5, domestic consumption falls 
for bioethanol (-0.018%), biodiesel (-0.018%), non-subsidised gasoline (-0.007%), subsidised 
biodiesel (-0.005%), subsidised biogas (-0.004%), subsidised diesel (-0.007%), and other oil 
products (-0.012%). On the other hand, in simulation 4, the changes of domestic consumption 
for these energy products are negligibly small (less than 0.000%).  
The reason for these negligible patterns is because in simulation 4 the subsidy on 
renewables is financed by the electricity consumers through an increased price of electricity. 
Hence, from Table 7.21, it can be seen that the consumer price of electricity commodity slightly 
increases (by only 0.010%) due to the low subsidy rates for renewable generations (hydro and 
geothermal plant). As a result, the effects of simulation 4 on energy domestic commodities are 
smaller than of simulation 5. 
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Table 7.22: FIT Impacts on Commodities (% Change) 
Commodity 
Producer Price Consumer Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Domestic Demand Domestic Consumption 
Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Energy and Energy-Intensive Sector  
Coal  -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 
Natural Gas  0.060 -0.002 0.064 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.011 
Crude Oil  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
Bioethanol -0.008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.012 0.000 -0.018 
Biodiesel -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.004 -0.017 0.000 -0.018 
Kerosene 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.086 1.459 -0.086 1.459 -0.007 0.000 
LNG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.144 0.001 -0.012 -0.329 0.033 -0.059 -0.013 
Non-Subsidized Gasoline 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.007 
Non-Subsidized LPG 0.009 -0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 -0.002 -0.006 
Other Oil Products 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 
Subsidized Biodiesel 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.005 
Subsidized Biogas 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.012 -0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.004 
Subsidized Diesel 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.007 
Subsidized Gasoline 0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.004 
Subsidized LPG 0.008 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 
Electricity -0.166 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chemical 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Metal Ores Mining 0.033 -0.016 0.039 -0.019 0.019 -0.035 0.010 -0.015 0.006 -0.007 
Land Transportation 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.000 
Construction 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Supporting Services for Transportation and Warehouse -0.012 0.026 -0.011 0.023 -0.035 0.013 -0.029 0.010 -0.017 0.005 
Spinning, Textile, Garment, and Leather Industries -0.007 0.003 -0.010 0.004 -0.006 0.021 -0.003 0.014 -0.002 
0.012 
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Table 7.22 (continued) 
Commodity 
Producer Price Consumer Price 
Domestic 
Production 
Domestic Demand Domestic Consumption 
Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Non-Energy Intensive Sector 
Agriculture Food Crops -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 
Air, Sea, and Communication Transportation -0.007 0.038 -0.007 0.036 0.010 -0.050 0.007 -0.036 0.004 -0.019 
Bank and Assurance 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 
Cattle and the Products 0.019 -0.001 0.019 -0.001 -0.015 0.001 -0.015 0.001 -0.015 0.001 
City Gas 0.560 0.000 0.560 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 
Real Estate, and Private Services 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fishery -0.037 0.000 -0.037 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.025 0.001 
Food, Drink, and Tobacco 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Forestry and Hunting 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Geothermal Mining 3.237 -0.023 3.237 -0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Government and Defense, Education, Health, Film, and 
Other Social Services 
0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
Hotel -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.016 
Individual Services, Households, and Other Service 0.007 -0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
Agriculture for Other Crops 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.004 
Other Mining and Excavations -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Paper, Printing, Transport Equipment, and Products 
from Metal  
0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Restaurant 0.016 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.000 
Train Transportation -0.171 0.004 -0.206 0.005 0.229 -0.006 0.137 -0.004 0.115 -0.003 
Clean Water 0.087 -0.024 0.087 0.023 -0.044 0.047 -0.044 0.047 -0.044 0.001 
Wood and the Products -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
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7.4.4.5. Impacts on Income Distribution and Welfare 
Table 7.23 shows that none of the FIT schemes (simulation 4 and simulation 5) affects the 
households’ welfare in rural and urban areas.  
Compared to simulation 4, financing the FIT’s support by carbon taxation would slightly 
change the households’ welfare. The impacts tend to be slightly progressive in rural and urban 
areas – i.e. rural households who work as agricultural employers (-001%); rural households 
who worked in non-agricultural fields with high income (-0.001%); urban households with low 
income (-0.002%). This is because the richer households spend a larger share of their budget 
on fuels than poorer households; thus, the higher income households would pay a higher share 
of their budget on carbon tax. On the other hand, in simulation 4, household welfare remains 
unchanged for all income groups (changes of less than 0.0005%). Regarding income 
distribution – measured as Theil-L index – the results show that in all scenarios, the inequality 
remains unchanged by 0.136 due to the negligible changes in household welfare. 
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Table 7.23: FIT Impacts on Income Distribution and Welfare 
Households’ Group 
Initial Total 
Budget 
Budget Shares on 
Energy 
Consumption 
Welfare  Inequality 
VALUE %CHANGE 
BASE 
SHOCKED 
Sim 4 Sim 5 
Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Billion Rp 
Rural households' - unclear occupations  158015.28 3528.11 -0.067 -18.757 0.000 0.000       
Rural households' - agricultural labors with low 
income  
162021.42 1662.63 1.080 -21.543 0.000 0.000       
Rural households' – non-agricultural labors 
with low income 
385336.98 7871.47 -0.396 -40.086 0.000 -0.001       
Rural households' – non-agricultural with high 
income 
450508.35 6962.91 2.507 -63.037 0.000 -0.001       
Rural Households' - Agricultural Employers 642327.17 8864.3 3.615 -31.302 0.000 -0.001       
Urban households' - unclear occupations 213768.06 4859.06 -0.048 333.309 0.000 0.006       
Urban households' - low income 633498.92 7775.67 -2.354 -127.207 0.000 -0.002       
Urban households' - high income 672628.57 11447.65 7.449 -11.733 0.000 0.000       
Total  3318104.75 52983.586     0.000 0.001 0.136 0.136 0.136 
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7.4.4.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
Since the parameters used in this model are obtained from other literature, it is necessary to 
check the robustness of the simulation results with respect to parameter uncertainty. We 
implement a sensitivity analysis of trade parameters and examine the changes in 
macroeconomic variables. We vary the import elasticity (CES trade parameters) by a 25% 
decrease and increase (between 1.5 and 2.5) and then check the reliability of results. Table 7.24 
shows the sensitivity analysis of the two FIT scenarios (simulation 4 and simulation 5) on 
macroeconomic accounts.  
The results found that, under high and low elasticity, all FIT scenarios generate a 
consistent pattern across all macroeconomic variables, although several variables show small 
changes. The robustness of results within a CGE model framework is usually confirmed in two 
conditions: (i) a small variation in the results of post shock and (ii) consistent signs (increase 
or decrease). Therefore, based on sensitivity results given in Table 7.24, the results can be 
considered robust and consistent. 
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Table 7.24: Sensitivity Analysis of the FIT Schemes on National Income Accounts  
(% Change) 
Variables 
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 
Trade 
elasticity 
= 1.5 
Trade 
elasticity 
= 2 
Trade 
elasticity 
= 2.5 
Trade 
elasticity 
= 1.5 
Trade 
elasticity 
= 2 
Trade 
elasticity  
= 2.5 
GDP at factor costs  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GDP at market prices from 
income side   
-0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.022 -0.000 
GDP at market prices from 
expenditure side  
-0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.022 -0.000 
Total private consumption  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
Total investment 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
Total net government 
consumption 
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total export 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total import 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Net export 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Net indirect tax  
(the total of all commodity 
taxes, including 
Import tariff, less subsidy on 
commodities  
(and activities)  
-0.185 -0.162 -0.112 -0.016 -1.118 0.000 
Total payment to all workers  
(WAGEBILL)  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total payment to capital  
(CAPBILL)  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
7.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, by employing the extended CGE-energy model developed in Chapter 6, we 
investigate the economy-wide impacts of introducing two specific environmental (energy) 
policies: (1) implementing carbon tax on fossil fuels; and (2) promoting the production of 
renewable electricity through the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme. In the case of a carbon tax, we 
assume that the Indonesia’s government levies a tax of Rp. 100,000/ton CO2e with three 
possible revenue-recycling mechanisms. In the first simulation, we allow the revenue 
neutralizing scheme by which the revenue raised from a carbon tax is neutralized through a 
reduction in the income (labour) tax rate across activities. In the second simulation, we allow 
the government to adjust their spending on goods proportionally in response to the revenue 
raised from a carbon tax. The third simulation assumes endogenous government saving, 
without any revenue recycling, to allow a budget surplus. In latter case of a feed-in tariff 
scheme, we assume that the government sets a 15% subsidy rate to renewable generation 
(hydro and geothermal), with two possible financing schemes. In the fourth simulation, we 
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assume that the FIT is distributed equally among the electricity consumers through a higher 
electricity tax rate. Finally, the fifth simulation assumes the FIT is financed by a carbon tax on 
fossil fuels.  
Aside from their achievement in reducing the national greenhouse gas emissions, the 
results also reveal that all scenarios of carbon taxation would affect the economy’s 
performance differently in their magnitude of changes. Imposing carbon tax on fossil fuels 
immediately increases their consumer prices. In turn, these changes make the economy (such 
as sectoral outputs, aggregate demand, as well as household welfare) contract. Nonetheless, 
these adverse effects can properly be addressed through the selected compensation (revenue-
recycling) scenarios. Of all scenarios, compensating the carbon tax by a reduction in labour 
(income) tax is likely the most beneficial scheme, of which a double dividend is gained. The 
increased price of fuels is offset through household income improvement via labour income 
reduction. Hence, it would initiate a higher domestic demand due to improvement in their 
disposable income, which in turn, increases the aggregate output. The impacts on household 
welfare are negligible (neutral) in both rural and urban area; and inequality remains unchanged. 
In the scenario of revenue-recycling through higher public spending, the the model predicts 
that the GDP at factor costs slightly falls but the GDP at market prices improves. The 
downward effects of a carbon tax are offset by the expansion of public expenditure on 
commodities that shifts up aggregate demand. The impacts on household welfare tend to be 
progressive: the welfare losses for higher income groups, especially urban households, are 
larger than for lower income groups; thus, the inequality gap between households is slightly 
reduced. In contrast, the uncompensated scenario – where the additional revenue raised from 
a carbon tax is kept as government saving to run budget surplus –  generates the most 
disadvantages on economy’s performance. All GDPs contract, since the increased domestic 
price of energy products due to carbon tax is not compensated through a revenue-recycling 
scheme. In terms of sectoral outputs, the production costs are relatively more expensive than 
in the compensating scenarios, which results in a higher drop in aggregate demand. The 
impacts on household welfare tend to be regressive: the welfare losses for poor households are 
larger than for higher income households in rural and urban area. 
Furthermore, in the FIT scenarios, the results found that their impacts on Indonesia’s 
economy are negligible, i.e. all GDPs, sectoral outputs, and households’ welfare remain 
unchanged. This is due to the fact that the initial renewable shares on total electricity 
production are small (about 5% from geothermal generation and 11% for hydro generation). 
In other words, the Indonesian electricity supply is still dominated by fossil fuels 
(conventional) based generation covering about 85% of the electricity mix. Therefore, the 
implementation of the current FIT regulation – about 15% subsidies to hydro and geothermal 
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production – would not necessarily affect the national income account. Specifically, in the 
electricity sector, the FIT schemes are unable to improve the share of clean energy production 
in Indonesia’s electricity mix. However, by comparing the two financing methods, it is 
revealed that financing FITs through a carbon tax leads to a larger contraction in GDP at market 
prices. This is because the increased price of carbon-based fuels leads to a fall in output 
production, private consumption, and investment. In turn, the total government receipts from 
output taxes decline more. In terms of carbon accounting, the results reveal that the FIT 
schemes do not effectively reduce the national emissions. Compared to carbon taxes, the 
proposed FIT schemes are insufficient to achieve the ambitious target of lowering the national 
emissions from energy utilization by about 1%.    
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Chapter 8 
General Conclusions 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has analyzed the implications of fiscal expansion (or contraction) as well as 
implementing the carbon tax and feed-in tariff on Indonesia’s main macroeconomic indicators 
and their effects on different institutions and sectors in the economy, within the context of a 
static computable general equilibrium model.  
In the first research, three scenarios were carried out in order to analyze the effects of 
expanding the exogenous public spending using a standard CGE model that is calibrated to the 
official Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Indonesia in the year 2008. These scenarios were 
related to the sources of financing to cover the additional public expenditure on goods and 
services: (1) to allow borrowing (budget deficit adjustment); (2) to allow a reduction of 
subsidies across activities; and (3) to allow an increase of output tax rates. 
In the second research, five scenarios were conducted to investigate the effects of 
introducing the carbon tax and a feed-in tariff using a hybrid CGE model that is calibrated to 
the hypothetical Energy-SAM for Indonesia in the year 2008. The hybrid CGE model was the 
extended version of the standard CGE model in which we incorporated the energy factors 
combinations and electricity technological explicitness. The scenarios were principally related 
to the mechanism of compensating (recycling) the carbon tax revenue or financing the feed-in 
tariff incentives. To compensate the carbon tax, three scenarios were carried out: (1) a 
reduction of income (labor) tax rates; (2) an increase of public expenditures on commodities; 
(3) government saving adjustment to run a budget surplus. To finance the feed-in tariff 
incentives, two scenarios were carried out: (4) an increase of electricity tax rate; and (5) 
allowing the carbon tax to adjust.  
The thesis was presented through eight chapters. The introductory chapter explained the 
research problems and specified the objectives of the study. Chapter 1 reviewed the overview 
of Indonesian economy. Chapter 2 presented the principles and schematic frameworks of the 
Social Accounting Matrix dataset including the preliminary modification of the official SAM 
for Indonesia in year 2008. Chapter 3 discussed the construction of the standard CGE model 
including the closure choices. Chapter 4 discussed the background and results of fiscal policy 
scenarios. Chapter 5 presented the background as well as the steps of constructing the 
Indonesian Energy-SAM. Chapter 6 explained the construction of the hybrid CGE model for 
specific energy analysis. Chapter 7 discussed the results of implementing the carbon tax (or 
feed-in tariff) scenarios. Finally, Chapter 8 presented the general conclusions of the thesis.  
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 presents the summary of research 
results. Section 8.3 describes the limitations of the study. Finally, Section 8.4 discusses 
suggestions for further research.  
 
8.2. Summary of research results 
In the first research study, we employ the standard CGE model developed in Chapter 3 to 
examine the impact of implementing specific fiscal policies on Indonesia’s main 
macroeconomic indicators and to their consequences by examining how different institutions 
and sectors in the economy are affected a result. The results show that an increase in public 
expenditure shifts up the equilibrium output. Simulation 1 generates the strongest impact due 
to the static nature of the model that does not consider the deficit payment in the future. The 
financing scheme of lowering subsidy rates to activities given in simulation 2 resulted in a 
smaller improvement of Indonesia’s GDP. This is because a subsidy cut directly increases the 
cost of production which in turn reduces national income. We also found that fiscal expansion 
with higher output tax revenue under simulation 3 gives the largest contraction in national 
income; the sectors were pressurized by higher taxes which creates deindustrialization, low 
employment, and thus reduces equilibrium national income and output. 
In the second research study, we employ the extended CGE energy model developed in 
Chapter 6 to investigate the economy-wide impacts of introducing two specific environmental 
(energy) policies: (1) implementing a carbon tax on fossil fuels; and (2) promoting the 
production of renewable electricity through the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme. In the case of a 
carbon tax, we allow the government of Indonesia to collect a carbon tax of Rp. 100,000/ton 
CO2e by three possible revenue-recycling mechanisms. In the first simulation, we allow the 
revenue neutralizing scheme by which the revenue raised from carbon tax is recycled through 
a reduction in income (labor) tax rate across activities. In the second simulation, we allow the 
government to adjust their spending on goods proportionally in response to the revenue raised 
from carbon tax. The third simulation assumes endogenous government saving, without any 
revenue recycling, to allow a budget surplus. While in case of feed-in tariff scheme, we assume 
that the government sets a 15% subsidy rate to renewable generation (hydro and geothermal) 
with two possible financing schemes. In the fourth scenario, we assume that the FIT is 
distributed equally among the electricity consumers through higher electricity tax rate. Finally, 
the fifth simulation assumes that the FIT is financed by a carbon tax on fossil fuels.  
Aside from their achievement in reducing the national greenhouse gas emissions, the 
results reveal that all scenarios of carbon taxation would affect the economy’s performance 
differently in their magnitude. Imposing a carbon tax on fossil fuels immediately increases 
their consumer prices. In turn, these changes would lead to economy’s contraction such as 
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sectoral outputs, aggregate demand, as well as households’ welfare. Nonetheless, these adverse 
effects can properly be addressed through the selected compensation (revenue-recycling) 
scenarios. Compensating the carbon tax by a reduction in labor (income) tax would likely be 
the most benefited scheme, of which a double dividend is gained. The increased price of fuels 
is offset through household income improvement via labor income reduction. Hence, it would 
initiate a higher domestic demand due to improvement in their disposable income, which in 
turn, increases the aggregate outputs. The impacts on household welfare are negligible in both 
rural and urban areas; and inequality remains unchanged. In the scenario of revenue-recycling 
through public spending improvement, the results found that the GDP at factor costs slightly 
falls but the GDP at market prices improves. The downward effects of carbon tax are offset by 
the expansion of public expenditures on commodities that would shift up the aggregate 
demand. The impacts on households’ welfare tend to be progressive because the welfare losses 
on higher income groups, especially urban households, are worse-off than those of lower 
income groups; thus, the inequality gap among households is slightly reduced. In contrast, the 
uncompensated scenario – where the additional revenue raised from carbon tax is kept as 
government saving to run budget surplus –  generates the most disadvantages on economy’s 
performance. All GDPs contract since the increased domestic price of energy products due to 
carbon tax are not compensated through a revenue-recycling scheme. In terms of sectoral 
outputs, the production costs are more expensive than in the compensated scenarios, which 
results in a steeper drop in aggregate demand. The impacts on household welfare tend to be 
regressive, in which the welfare losses on poor households are more deteriorating than higher 
income households in both rural and urban areas. 
Furthermore, the FIT scenarios have negligible impacts on Indonesia’s economy: GDP, 
sectoral outputs, and household welfare remain unchanged. This is due to the fact that the initial 
renewable shares on total electricity production are small (5% from geothermal generation and 
11% for hydro). In other words, the Indonesian electricity supply is still dominated by fossil 
fuels (conventional) based generation covering about 85% shares in the electricity mix. 
Therefore, the implementation of the current FIT regulation – about 15% subsidies on hydro 
and geothermal production – would not affect the national income account. Specifically, in the 
electricity sector, the FIT schemes are unable to improve the clean energy production shares 
in Indonesia’s electricity mix at a large scale. Comparing the two financing methods, financing 
through a carbon taxat leads to more contraction in GDP at market prices. This is because the 
increased price of carbon-based fuels leads to a fall in output, private consumption, and 
investment. In turn, the total government receipts from output taxes decline more. In terms of 
carbon accounting, the results reveal that the FIT schemes do not effectively reduce the 
national emissions. Compared to a carbon tax, the proposed FIT schemes are insufficient to 
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achieve the ambitious target of lowering the national emissions from energy utilization by 
about 1%. 
 
8.3. Research Limitations 
Overall, the studies are constrained by some limitations related to the model features as well 
as the SAM dataset to calibrate the model. In both research studies, the analysis is within the 
context of a comparative static-single country CGE model. Therefore, the analysis does not 
capture the changes of household income and expenditure and technological changes that 
would affect investment-saving over time. The parameters of substitution elasticity used in the 
model are taken from another literature. In other words, the parameter is not econometrically 
estimated. Although the robustness of the simulation results was tested using sensitivity 
analysis, the chosen parameter value may be sensitive at the micro level, i.e. the magnitude of 
some industrial outputs, commodities, and household income distribution.  
Another limitation is the source of dataset to calibrate the CGE model. The analysis is 
based on the Indonesian SAM dataset which represents the global economy in the year 2008. 
To our findings, this SAM dataset is the most recent source published officially by the 
Indonesian statistic agency. The official Indonesian SAM dataset is usually updated every five 
years; we expect that the official SAM dataset in year 2013 should had been issued. However, 
the latest version of the SAM is still that for 2008. Although it is possible to update the SAM 
manually, the efforts would be very sophisticated since the processes of the SAM updating 
cover all of the economy’s transaction in details which include the SAM balancing method to 
square the matrices. In turn, the updated SAM will probably lead to huge discrepancies of 
transactions compared to reality. 
In the second research contribution, the limitations are as follows. Although the analysis 
is based on the extended hybrid CGE model – that allows for factor-fuels and inter-fuels 
substitution, introduces the satellite features of carbon emission and its taxation module as well 
incorporates the electricity technological explicitness, the mechanisms of the supply-demand 
framework are based on a market with perfect competition. In other words, the producers are 
price takers (zero profit condition). Nonetheless, the energy markets are often imperfect, such 
as natural monopolistic or oligopolistic market. This can affect the outcome of implementing 
a carbon tax (or feed-in tariff) (Orlov, 2012). In term of sectoral outputs, numerous literatures 
argued that the implementation of a carbon tax on energy-intensive industries would 
significantly reduce their competitiveness in the domestic and international markets. Apart 
from the regressive nature of carbon tax on households’ welfare, these concerns have been 
another important issue in political debates. Therefore, a carbon tax free to energy-intensive 
industries are sometimes implemented (OECD, 1995 and 2006; Fullerton et al., 2008).  
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The hybrid model used in this analysis is also based on a single country. It would be 
more ideal if a multi-regional based CGE model is used, since regional disparities play an 
important role to examine the impacts of environmental taxes on household welfare and 
inequality (Hasnain, 2010). To establish a multi-regional based hybrid CGE model, a multi-
regional SAM dataset is thus required. Furthermore, the carbon tax analysis provided in this 
study focuses only on CO2 emissions generated from fossil fuels combustion. Therefore, the 
impacts of carbon taxes on other greenhouse gas emissions types – i.e. methane (CH4), nitrogen 
oxides (NO2), sulphur oxides (SO2) and other particulates –  generated from deforestation and 
land-use change activities are not captured in the model. Following Allan et al. (2008), we do 
not take into account the pollutants from non-CO2 emissions due to the complexity of 
identifications that are strongly related to combustion conditions and technology specificity.   
Most of the above model limitations are related to the data limitation. As mentioned 
earlier, the hybrid model used in the second research is calibrated to the hypothetical Energy-
SAM dataset in the year 2008. This SAM dataset is the extended version of the official 
Indonesian SAM in year 2008 in which we disaggregated the energy sectors and the natural 
resources factor. To our knowledge, there is no such available information to specify, in details, 
the transaction flows of each of energy type according to that of SAM framework. Therefore, 
to establish the squared Energy-SAM dataset, we roughly adopt the shares approximation using 
the most available information of energy statistics. This approach might lead to discrepancy of 
results especially in the trade (export-import) analysis.  
 
8.4. Suggestions for further research 
Due to above limitations, we consider some recommendations for further research to our study 
as follows: 
1. Updating the official Indonesian SAM to the most recent period is useful to examine the 
impacts on Indonesia’s economy at recent year. The construction of a multi-regional SAM 
dataset would also help to assess the effects of inter-regional disparities and transaction 
flows especially on households’ welfare and inequality. In addition, estimating the elasticity 
parameters econometrically can make the simulation results more realistric. 
2. To enlarge the model from a single country CGE model into a multi-regional CGE model 
would be ideal to assess the regional disparities in Indonesia. A recursive dynamic version 
of a CGE model through technological changes would be a better tool to predict the dynamic 
welfare effects in the long run especially in the case of implementing the carbon tax (and 
feed-in tariffs). This is because the implementation of carbon tax (or feed-in tariffs) could 
induce the acceleration of energy efficiency, less carbon-intensive technologies, and 
366 
 
 
 
research innovation in the long run (Orlov, 2012). Implementing imperfect market 
competition, especially in energy markets, would generate more realistic results.   
3. Finally, enriching the types of carbon emissions apart from CO2 such as CH4, NO2, SO2, 
CO, and other particulates as well as emitters from deforestation and land use change will 
specify the results of introducing the carbon taxes in detail. Reilly et al. (2004) argued that 
the curbing of non CO2 GHG emissions is less costly than CO2 emissions. Therefore, 
targeting a carbon tax towards these emissions could be considered.  
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